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Gift Tax Officer v. Kastur Chand Jain
Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
On or about August 8, 1957 the respondent gifted 250 ordinary shares (face value Rs.100 each) in R. McDill & Co. (Private) Ltd. (R.M. Company) and 100 ordinary shares (face value Rs.100 each) in Misrilall Dharamchand (Private) Ltd. (M.D. Company) to his daughter. On or about July 28, 1959 the respondent submitted a voluntary return valuing those shares at their face value (Rs.35,000). By an order dated February 24, 1960 the Gift Tax Officer, invoking section 15(3) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958, rejected that valuation and determined the total value of the shares at Rs.2,68,503 and the gift tax at Rs.21,020.36. On April 19, 1960 the respondent was served with a notice of demand under section 31 of the Act.
On May 19, 1960 the respondent obtained a Rule calling upon the Gift Tax Officer and other appellants to show cause why the assessment and notice of demand should not be quashed by certiorari and why mandamus should not issue directing them not to give effect to the assessment. On March 16, 1961 D.N. Sinha, J. made the Rule absolute (quashed the assessment). The present appeal concerns questions about the proper mode of valuation of the shares and the correctness of the Gift Tax Officer's method of assessing value.
The Judgment rendered in the appellate court is reported by Bachawat, J., with Arun K. Mukherjee, J. concurring.
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the proper mode of valuation of shares for gift-tax purposes under section 6(1) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 and Rule 10 of the Gift Tax Rules, 1958 (particularly where shares are in private companies and subject to restrictive articles)?
- Whether shares of the two private companies were "saleable in the open market" for the purpose of section 6(1) or, alternatively, properly valued under rule 10(2) as not saleable in the open market?
- When valuing shares by reference to the value of a company’s total assets (under rule 10(2)), whether the Gift Tax Officer was required to deduct debts and liabilities — in particular (a) provisions for taxation and (b) proposed dividends — in estimating net asset value?
- Whether the Gift Tax Officer erred in using "artificial wealth" (net wealth per section 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957) as the basis of valuation for the purposes of gift tax?
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent (Assessee) / Applicant in Original Writ
- Originally valued the gifted shares at face value (Rs.35,000) in a voluntary return.
- Challenged the Gift Tax Officer’s assessment and notice of demand by seeking certiorari and mandamus, contending that the assessment was incorrect.
- Contended (and adduced evidence through Mr. Meyer) that the items shown as 'provision for taxation' in the companies’ balance sheets were genuine pre-estimates of tax liability and should be taken into account (i.e., deducted) when valuing shares by reference to company assets. Mr. Meyer conceded at the close that the conclusion reached by D.N. Sinha, J. on this point was correct.
Appellants (Gift Tax Officer / Revenue)
- The Gift Tax Officer treated the shares as not saleable in an open market (because the companies were private and their articles restricted transfer) and therefore applied section 15(3) of the Gift Tax Act read with rule 10(2) of the Gift Tax Rules.
- In determining value by reference to the companies’ balance sheets, the Gift Tax Officer computed aggregate values of all issued shares by reference to figures apparently derived from net wealth computed for wealth-tax purposes (i.e., as per section 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957).
- The Gift Tax Officer refused to deduct the items shown in the balance sheets as "proposed dividend" and "provision for taxation" in computing the net value of assets and accordingly fixed high per-share values. The revenue contended (as described in the original litigation) that no deduction should be made for the provision for taxation; this contention was rejected by the appellate court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| I.R.C. v. Crossman (1937 A.C. 26) | Establishes principle that where articles restrict transfer the value is estimated as what the shares would fetch in an open market subject to those articles and disregarding special value to special buyers. | Used to explain the approach embodied in rule 10(2) — valuation on the footing that purchaser, if any, would be registered subject to the articles; special buyer's higher price disregarded. |
| Attorney-General of Ceylon v. Mackie (1952) 2 A.E.R. 775 | Shows that, independently of statutory provisions, shares giving controlling interest may be valued by reference to the company's business as a going concern. | Cited to explain that where controlling interest exists, valuation by reference to business value (going concern) is permissible; contrasted with the present case of non-controlling private company shares. |
| Dean v. Prince (1953) 1 Ch. 590 | Supports principle that shares giving controlling interest may be valued by reference to company's business value. | Cited as further authority for the general principle regarding valuation of controlling shareholdings by reference to the business. |
| Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Clay (1914) 3 K.B. 466 | Defines "open market" as one open to every possible purchaser, distinguishing it from offers to a limited class. | Relied upon to justify the finding that the presence of restrictive articles meant the shares were not saleable in an "open market" as envisaged by section 6(1). |
| Chatturam Horliram Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar & Orissa (1955) 2 S.C.R. 290; A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 619 | Explains that income attracts the quality of taxability independent of the annual Finance Act; payability and quantification await the Finance Act. | Used to demonstrate that although tax liability amount was uncertain on the gift date, the companies' incomes were chargeable and a provision for taxation is a proper pre-estimate of liability to be reflected in valuation. |
| Doorga Prosad Chamaria v. Secretary of State (72 I.A. 114) | Authority indicating that until an actual levy and assessment no debt is due to the Government. | Cited to distinguish between liability to tax (chargeability) and an actual debt due; used in reasoning about the nature of the provision for taxation on balance sheet. |
| Kessoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta (67 C.W.N. 22) | Held that provision for payment of tax was not a debt owing within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act and therefore not deductible in computing net wealth under that Act. | Distinguished: court observed that although that decision concerns wealth-tax definitions, when valuing a share by reference to company assets the valuation must reflect the company's real liabilities (including tax provisions) rather than artificial wealth under section 2(m). |
| Mrs. Bacha F. Yazdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay (A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 74) | Explains that a shareholder's right to participate in dividend is contractual under articles of association. | Cited in discussing whether a proposed dividend constitutes a liability on the company prior to declaration; used to show the right exists but declaration is condition precedent to enforceability. |
| Bond v. Barrow Haematite Steel Company (1902) 1 Ch. 353 | Declaration of dividend creates a debt; prior to declaration there is no enforceable debt. | Applied to conclude that 'proposed dividend' shown on balance sheet was not a liability on the date of gift and therefore need not be deducted when valuing shares by reference to company assets. |
| In re: Severn & Wye and Severn Bridge Railway Company (1896) 1 Ch. 559 | Declaration of dividend creates a debt. | Used alongside Bond to support that proposed dividend is not a pre-existing liability until declared. |
| Re Catalinas Warehouses and Mole Co. Ltd. (1947) 1 A.E.R. 51 | Affirms that in the absence of declaration the shareholder has no right to the dividend. | Relied upon to support the conclusion that proposed dividend is not a company liability at the gift date. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of discrete legal determinations closely tied to statutory text and established principles cited in authorities and rules:
- Statutory framework: The court identified the basic valuation provision in section 6(1) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 (value equals the price it would fetch if sold in the open market on the date of the gift). Section 6(3) provides that when value cannot be estimated under section 6(1) because the property is not saleable in the open market, value shall be determined in the prescribed manner; "prescribed" refers to rules made under the Act.
- Applicability of Rule 10(2): Rule 10(2) of the Gift Tax Rules prescribes valuation for shares of private companies whose articles contain restrictive provisions as to alienation. The court held that where shares are not ascertainable by reference to the value of the total assets of the company, rule 10(2) directs valuation as what they would fetch if sold in an open market subject to the articles, disregarding special-buyer value. The court noted that rule 10(2) further implies that if the value of shares is ascertainable by reference to the company’s total assets, that method must be used.
- Shares not saleable in open market: Both companies were private and had articles restricting transfer as required by the Companies Act. Applying the definition of "open market" (citing Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Clay), the court accepted that the shares could not be sold in an open market as envisaged by section 6(1). Accordingly, valuation under section 15(3) read with rule 10(2) was appropriate.
- Gift Tax Officer's chosen valuation method and its defect: The Gift Tax Officer calculated aggregate values for all issued shares of each company by reference to figures that, on the face of the assessment order and accompanying affidavits, reflected the companies' "net wealth" as computed for wealth-tax purposes under section 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The court found this to be a fundamental error: "artificial wealth" computed under the Wealth Tax Act is not the correct measure of shareholders' interest when valuing shares by reference to total assets.
- Correct approach when valuing by reference to company assets: The court held that when shares are valued by reference to the value of the total assets of a company, the Gift Tax Officer must take into account the net value of assets — i.e., deduct from gross assets all debts and liabilities and make fair allowances for contingent obligations. The court relied on the structure of rule 10(3) (valuation of firm interest by excess of assets over liabilities) and held that sub-rule (2) should be construed reasonably to require deduction of debts and liabilities when using asset-based valuation.
- Specific treatment of "provision for taxation": The court examined whether the item "provision for taxation" in the balance sheets was a genuine liability. Although the amount of tax payable was uncertain on the gift date (because the Annual Finance Act for 1958–59 had not been enacted), the court accepted authorities (notably Chatturam Horliram Ltd.) that income for the previous year is chargeable to tax independent of the Finance Act; thus the companies were liable to tax on the accounting period ending July 31, 1957. The court found that the provisions (Rs.13,85,000 in R.M.; Rs.4,90,000 in M.D.) were fair estimates and were not concealed reserves. Therefore they represented a genuine liability that should be taken into account (i.e., deducted) in estimating net asset value.
- Specific treatment of "proposed dividend": The court examined the legal nature of a proposed dividend shown on the balance sheet and concluded that a proposed dividend was not a liability on the date of the gift. Citing authorities, the court explained that declaration of dividend is the condition precedent to a right to enforce and creates a debt only upon declaration; until then, the profits remain part of the company's assets. Consequently, the Gift Tax Officer correctly refused to deduct the proposed dividend when computing net asset value.
- Conclusion on assessment legality: Because the Gift Tax Officer failed to take into account the company's liability for taxation (i.e., he did not deduct a genuine provision for taxation and instead used net-wealth figures under the Wealth Tax Act), the assessment order and notice of demand were illegal. The court thus upheld the quashing of the assessment insofar as it was based on that erroneous method.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
THE ASSESSMENT ORDER AND THE NOTICE OF DEMAND ARE QUASHED AND SET ASIDE to the extent that they were computed without taking into account the companies' genuine provision for taxation; the appeal is otherwise dismissed subject to the observations recorded in the opinion.
Implications:
- The court affirmed that where shares in a private company are to be valued by reference to the company's total assets (as contemplated by rule 10(2)), the correct basis is the company's real net assets — gross assets less debts and bona fide liabilities and fair allowances for contingent liabilities. It is not permissible to adopt "artificial wealth" figures used under the Wealth Tax Act (section 2(m)) as the valuation basis for shares without adjusting for genuine liabilities.
- The court held that a provision for taxation based on a fair pre-estimate of tax liability at the date of gift must be treated as a real liability for the purpose of asset-based valuation of shares; failure to deduct such a provision renders the assessment invalid.
- The court held that a proposed (undistributed and undeclared) dividend is not a liability at the date of the gift and need not be deducted in computing net asset value for share valuation.
- Direct practical effect: the Gift Tax Officer’s assessment and the consequent notice of demand were declared illegal and quashed on the ground identified (failure to account for provision for taxation). The appellate court dismissed the appeal subject to the observations made; each party was directed to bear its own costs.
- No broader novel precedent was claimed to be set beyond the application and clarification of existing statutory provisions, rules and established authorities on valuation principles; the decision is framed as an application of those principles to the facts before the court.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Subject to the observations made above, the appeal be and is hereby dismissed. In view of the dividend success, we direct that each party should pay and bear his own costs of and incidental to this appeal." (Bachawat, J.; Arun K. Mukherjee, J. agreed.)
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:
Bachawat, J.:— On or about August 8, 1957 the respondent made a gift of 250 ordinary shares of the face value of Rs. 100/- each in R. McDill & Co. (Private) Ltd. (hereafter referred to as the R.M Company) and 100 ordinary shares of the face value of Rs. 100/- each in Misrilall Dharamchand (Private) Ltd., (hereafter referred to as the M.D Company) to his daughter. On or about July 28, 1959 he submitted a voluntary return of the gift to the Gift Tax Officer valuing the shares at their face value of Rs. 35,000/-. By this order dated February 24, 1960, the Gift Tax Officer rejected their valauation and acting under section 15(3) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 determined the total value of the shares to be Rs. 2,68,503/- and the gift tax to be Rs. 21020.36 On April 19, 1960, the respondent was served with the notice of demand under section 31 of the Act. On May 19, 1960 he obtained a Rule calling upon the Gift Tax Officer and the other appellants to show cause why the order of assessment and the notice of demand should not be quashed and set aside by a writ in the nature of certiorari, and, why a writ in the nature of mandamus should not be issued directing them not to give effect to the same. On March 16, 1961, D.N Sinha, J. made the Rule absolute. The appeal raises questions as to the proper mode of valuation of the shares. Section 6 of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 provides for he manner in which the value of gifts may be determined and is as follows:— “S. 6. Value of gifts, how determined: (1) The value of any property other than cash transferred by way of gift, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), be estimated to be the price which in the opinion of the Gift Tax Officer it would fetch if sold in the open market on the date on which gift was made. (2) Where a person makes a gift which is not revocable for a specified period, the value of the property gifted shall be the capitalised value of the income from the property gifted during the period for which the gift is not revocable. (3) Where the value of any property cannot be estimated under sub-section (1) because it is not saleable in the open market, the value shall be determined in the prescribed manner.” The basic principle of valuation is embodied in section 6(1) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 and in the corresponding section 36 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 and section 7(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The valuer has to find “the price which…. ….it would fetch if sold in the open market”. The measure of value of the property is the price which the hypothetical buyer in an open market would pay for it. The machinery of section 6(1) does not exactly fit in a case where the property is of such a nature that it cannot be sold in the open market. But the existence of an open market is not the pre-condition of the liability for the tax and in the absence of a supplementary provision like section 6(3), the machinery of section 6(1) would have to be applied and an estimation of the value of the property would have to be made on general business lines on the basis of a hypothetical sale to a buyer in the open market. Accordingly, under section 7(5) of the English Finance Act, 1894 and in the absence of supplementary provisions corresponding to section 6(3) of the Gift Tax Act and rule 10(2) of the Gift Tax Rules, it was held that where the articles of association of a company contained restrictive provisions as to the alienation and transfer of the shares, the value of the shares for the purpose of estate duty was to be estimated at the price which they would fetch if sold in the open market on the terms that the purchaser should be entitled to be registered as the holder of the shares subject to the articles including those relating to the alienation and transfer of shares in the company but the special value of the shares to special buyers should be disregarded. See I.R.C v. Crossman (1) 1937 A.C 26, Halsbury Third Edition, volume 15, Article 151. The value is found on the assumption that the share can be offered freely in the market, that the highest bidder buying freely in the market would be registered as a share-holder and would then be subject to the same restrictions in the articles and that the hypothetical bid for a share subject to those restrictions would naturally be lower than a bid for a share free from the restrictions.
1. Considering that it is difficult and sometimes almost impossible to fit the machinery of section 6(1) in a case where the property is not saleable in the open market, section 6(3) provides that where the value of the property cannot be estimated under section 6(1), because it is not saleable in the open market, the value shall be determined in the prescribed manner. By section 2 (XIX) ‘prescribed’ means prescribed by rules made under the Act. Rule 10 of the Gift Tax Rules, 1958 prescribes the mode of valuation of properties not saleable in the open market and is as follows: “10. Valuation of Property — (1) The value of a policy of insurance shall be its cash surrender value on the date on which the gift was made. (2) Where the articles of association of a private company contain restrictive provisions as to the alienation of shares, the value of the shares, if not ascertainable by reference to the value of the total assets of the company, shall be estimated to be what they would fetch if on the date of gift they could be sold in the open market on the terms of the purchaser being entitled to be registered as holder subject to the articles but, the fact that a special buyer would for his own special reasons give a higher price than the price in the open market shall be disregarded. (3) The value of an interest in a firm or association of persons shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions, namely, (a) The excess of the market value of the assets of the firm or association over its liabilities (excluding reserves) shall be determined as on the date of gift, (b) The excess aforesaid shall be allocated among the partners of the firm or members of the association in accordance with the agreement of partnership or association for the distribution of assets in the event of dissolution of the firm or association or in the absence of any such agreement, in the proportion in which the partners or members are entitled to share profits. (c) The total of the amount allocated under clause (b) to each partner or member together with the capital contributed by him shall be treated as the value of his interest. (4) The value of any other property not saleable in the open market shall be determined by the Board.”
2. In the instant case sub-rules (1), (3) and (4) have no application. Sub-rule (2) provides for valuation of shares in a private company where the articles of association contain restrictive provisions as to the alienation of shares. The sub-rule corresponds to section 37 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 and embodies the principles enunciated by the House of Lords in I.R.C v. Crossman (1) 1937 A.C 26 with an important difference. The value of the shares must be determined on the basis of a hypothetical sale in an open market as indicated in the sub-rule, “if not ascertainable by reference to the value of the total assets of the company.” In other words rule 10(2) implies that if the value of the shares is ascertainable by reference to the value of the total assets of the company, the value must be so ascertained. Apart from rule 10(2) there is no other specific provision in the Gift Tax Act and Rules requiring the valuation of shares by reference to the value of the company's assets for the purposes of gift tax. We notice that for the purpose of estate duty, there are specific provisions requiring valuation of the shares of a controlled company by reference to the company's assets both in this country and in England, see rule 15 of the Estate Duty (Controlled Companies) Rules 1953, and Halsbury 3rd Edition, Vol. 15, articles 152 to 162 pages 74 to 78. Independently of a statutory provision of this type the value of shares giving the controlling interest in a company may, on general principles, be estimated by reference to the value of the company's business as a going concern, see Attorney General of Ceylon v. Mackie (2) (1952) 2 A.E.R 775, Dean v. Prince (3) (1953) 1 Ch. 590. Under rule 10(2) of the Gift Tax Rules, the shares of a private company giving no controlling interest in the company may properly be made by reference to the break up value of the company's assets as shown in its latest balance sheet. In the instant case, the assessee as also the Gift Tax Officer admit that the shares should be valued by adopting this method of valuation.
3. Both the companies are private companies and their articles of association contain provisions restricting the right to transfer shares as required by section 27(3) read with section 3(1)(iii)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956. The Gift Tax Officer found that the shares were not quoted in the Stock Exchange and could not be bought in the open market. D.N Sinha, J. said that even then he did not know “why it should be held that they cannot be sold in the open market.” We cannot subscribe to this view. An open market means a market open to every possible purchaser. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Clay (4) (1914) 3 KB. 466 at 475, Swinfen Eady L.J observed — “A value, ascertained by reference to the amount obtainable in the open market shows an intention to include every possible purchaser. The market is to be the open market as distinguished from an offer to a limited class only, such as the members of a family.” Having regard to the restrictive provision in the articles of association as to the alienation of shares and the materials before him the Gift Tax Officer rightly valued the shares under section 15(3) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 read with rule 10(2) of the Gift Tax Rules on the footing that they were not saleable in the open market.
4. In the assessment order, the Gift Tax Officer after referring to the latest balance sheets of the R.M and M.D companies for the year ending July 31, 1957 valued the 3000 issued shares in the R.M company at Rs. 22,05,370 and the 970 issued shares in the M.D Company at Rs. 8,21,801 and on dividing in each case the aggregate value of all the shares by the total number of the shares found that the value of one share in the R.M Company was Rs. 7,35,123 and the value of one share in the M.D Company was Rs. 8,47,127. In both the companies, all the issued shares were ordinary shares and were fully paid up; the companies had not issued any preference shares or debentures. On the face of the assessment order, the Gift-tax Officer did not disclose how he came to determine the total value of the 3000 shares in the R.M company at Rs. 22,05,370 and the 970 shares in the M.D Company at Rs. 8,21,801. The Gift-tax Officer is required to form an opinion and to make an estimate of the value of the property gifted. In the matter of making the valuation, the Gift-tax Officer has ample discretion. The valuation is an art and not a precise science. But his opinion is a judicial opinion. It is not final, it is justiciable, it is liable to be tested on appeal to the appellate assistant commissioner under section 22(1)(a), on further appeal to the appellate tribunal under section 23, and on reference to arbitration under section 23(6). The Gift Tax Officer should state in his assessment order the reasons for his opinion so that the appellate authorities and, in case of reference to arbitration, the valuers may be in a position to judge its reasonableness. In the assessment order in the instant case, the Gift Tax Officer did not give full reasons for his opinion. But the learned Judge allowed him to file affidavits to explain as to how he came to make the valuation. Looking at those affidavits it would appear that he valued the shares by reference to the balance sheet value of the assets of the company, but in making the valuation he adopted the net wealth of the company computed for the purposes of the assess-of the company to wealth tax as the value of the net assets of the company. Thus in the case of the M.D Company he took as the starting point the sum of Rs. 14,49,354 shown as the total value of the assets on the assets side of the balance sheet. From this figure he excluded the sum of Rs. 1,48,104 shown on the assets side as advance payment of income-tax, as this item did not represent any real asset of the company, and then deducted the amounts shown on the liabilities side as liabilities for loans and advances, sundry creditors, interest on loans, other finance, unclaimed dividend, and deposits. But he refused to deduct (1) the sum of Rs. 97000 shown as proposed dividend and (2) the sum of Rs. 4,90,000 shown as provision for taxation on the liabilities side. On this footing he determined the net value of the assets of the M.D Company at Rs. 821,801 and took this sum to be the aggregate value of its 970 issued shares. He followed a similar method of computation in the case of R.M Company, refused to deduct the item shown as proposed dividend and provision for taxation and on that footing found the net value of its assets to be Rs. 22,05,370 and took this sum to be the aggregate value of its 3000 issued shares. Now the Gift Tax Officer made a fundamental error in taxing the artificial wealth of the company computed under-section 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 as the basis of the valuation. This artificial wealth cannot be the correct measure of the value of the interest of the shareholders in the company. In valuing, the shares on the basis of the value of the total assets of the company, the Gift Tax Officer must take into account the net value of its assets ascertained by deducting from the value of its gross assets, all its debts and liabilities and making all fair and reasonable allowances for its uncertain and contingent liabilities. The value of the company's gross assets cannot be an index of the value of its share and a valuation of the shares based on the value of the gross assets without taking into account all the debts and liabilities is worthless. It is interesting to notice that sub-rule (3) of rule 10 requires the valuation of the interest of a partner in a firm on the basis of the excess of the market value of the assets of the firm over its liabilities. The position of a shareholder of a company cannot of course be equated to that of a partner in a firm. But on general principle and on a reasonable construction of Sub-rule (2) of rule 10, in valuing the shares by reference to the value of the total assets of the company, the debts and liabilities of the company cannot be ignored.
5. Now the point in issue is whether the account shown as “provision for taxation” in the balance sheet represented a real liability of the company. The gift was made on August 8, 1957.
6. The last accounting year of both the companies ended on July 31, 1957. The income of this year would be an income of the ‘previous year’ for the purpose of the levy of income tax for the income tax year 1958–59. The Annual Finance Act levying income tax for the year 1958–59 had not been passed on the date of the gift. Nevertheless, independently of the passing of the relevant Finance Act, the income of both the companies for the year ended July 31, 1957 were at the close of the year chargeable to income tax, and both the companies were then liable to pay the tax. On the date of the gift, the amount of the liability was uncertain, for the actual levy, the determination of the rate of the tax and the assessment of the tax liability was made much later. Still in estimating the net value of the assets of the company on that date, it is necessary and proper to make a just and fair allowance for this uncertain liability. The R.M Company made a provision of Rs. 13,85,000 and the M.D Company made a provision of Rs. 4,90,000 for their respective tax liabilities on their income up to the year ended on July 31, 1957. Mr. Meyer admitted that those provisions were fair estimates of their tax liability for their income up to the year ended on July 31, 1957. We therefore proceed upon the footing that the item of provision for taxation was a genuine pre-estimate of the tax liability and no part of it was a concealed reserve or surplus of the company concerned. Mr. Meyer said that the matter was fought in the original court on a question of principle, and the principle contended for on behalf of the revenue was that in computing the value of the shares on the basis of the value of the assets of the company, there should be no deduction for this uncertain liability. This contention must be rejected. In Chatturam Horliram Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar & Orissa, (5) (1955) 2 S.C.R 290, 297 : A.I.R 1955 S.C 619, 622-3, Jagannathadas, J. observed “The tax is leviable under s. 3 and is in respect of the total income of the assessee in the previous year *** It is by virtue of this section that the actual levy of the tax and the rates at which the tax has to be computed is determined each year by the annual Finance Acts. Thus, under the scheme of the Income Tax Act, the income of an assesse attracts the quality of taxability with reference to the standing provisions of the Act but the payability and quantification of the tax depend on the passing and application of the annual Finance Act. Thus, income is chargeable to tax independent of the passing of the Finance Act but until the Finance Act is passed no tax can be actually levied. A comparison of Ss. 3 and 6 of the Act shows that the Act recognises the distinction between the chargeability and the actual operation of the charge.” It will appear therefore that on the date of the gift the companies concerned were liable to pay income tax in respect of all their income up to the close of the accounting year ended on July 31, 1957. But in the absence of the actual levy and assessment and the consequential demand under section 29 of the Income Tax Act, there was yet no debt due to the Government see Doorga Prosad Chamaria v. Secretary of State, (6) 72 I.A 114, 120. For this reason it was held in Kessoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta, (7) 67 C.W.N 22 that though the assessee was liable to pay income tax on the valuation date in respect of the year of account, the amount of the provision for payment of the tax was not a debt owed by the assessee within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and was not deductable in computing the net wealth of the assesse under that Act. This decision is an authority for the proposition that the liabilities of an assessee not amounting to debts owed by him cannot be deducted in computing his net wealth under section 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act. But if an item of wealth of an assesse consists of a share in a company, and this item is to be valued by reference to the company's assets, the valuation must be based on the real wealth of the company and not its artificial wealth computed under section 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act. In making this valuation of the share the Gift Tax Officer was therefore bound to take into account the company's liability for income tax. Looking at the balance sheet on which the order of assessment is based and the affidavits of the Gift Tax Officer, it is apparent that he did not take into account this liability and proceeded to make the valuation on an entirely wrong basis. We agree with D.N Sinha, J. that in doing so the Gift Tax Officer was in error in not taking into account this item of liability. At the close of his argument Mr. Meyer conceded that the ultimate conclusion of D.N Sinha, J. on this point is right and on this ground the assessment is liable to be quashed and set aside, and writs in the nature of certiorari and mandamus must issue accordingly.
7. D.N Sinha, J. also held that the amount shown as “proposed dividend” for the year ended on July 31, 1957 on the liabilities side of the balance sheet was a liability of the company on the date of the gift. We think that his decision on this point is erroneous. The gift was made on the 8th August, 1957. All that happened then on this subject was that the company had earned prots during the year ending on July 31, 1957. But the company had not yet declared the profit as liable, to be distributed by way of dividend. Much later the directors proposed to distribute a dividend for the year and the item of the proposed dividend was shown in the balance sheet for the year prepared on or about October 29, 1958. But on the date of the gift the proposed dividend was in no sense a debt or a liability of the company. It is true that the declaration of dividend is not the source of the dividend income for the foundation of the right of the shareholder to participitate in the dividend is his contractual right under the company's articles of association see Mrs. Bacha F. Yazdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, (8) A.I.R 1955 S.C 74, 76-7. But the declaration of the dividend is the condition precedent to an action to recover it. See Bond v. Barrow Haematite Steel Company (9) (1902) 1 Ch. 353, 362. The declaration creates a debt, see In re: Severn & Wye and Severn Bridge Railway Company (10) (1896) 1 Ch. 559. In the absence of the declaration the shareholder has no right to the dividend See Re. Catalinas Warehouses and Mole Co. Ltd., (11) (1947) 1 A.E.R 51. The ownership of the share gives him a bundle of rights and privileges, one of which is to enforce the declaration of the dividend. The gift passes the shares with all those rights and privileges until the declaration of the dividend, there is no separate liability of the company to pay it; until then, the profits represent an item of its real assets, and the value of the totality of its assets, is reflected in the value of the shares. In computing the value of the shares by reference to the value of the company's assets no deduction or allowance can be made for dividend not declared on the date of the gift. It is true that the relevant standard form of the balance sheet set out in Part I of Schedule VI read with section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956 showed the item of ‘proposed dividend’ under the sub-heading ‘current liabilities and provisions’ on the liabilities side. But the fact that a particular item appears on the liabilities side of the balance sheet does not necessarily show that the item is a true liability of the company.
8. Thus the items ‘share capital’ and ‘reserves and surplus’ on the liabilities side are not in any real sense its liabilities. Similarly some of the items under the heading ‘provisions’ may not be in any real sense its liabilities. In the instant case the amount shown as ‘proposed dividend’ was not a liability on the date of the gift. The Gift Tax Officer therefore rightly refused to deduct this item in computing the value of the company's assets.
9. The result is that the finding of the learned judge with regard to the item of ‘proposed dividend’ is set aside, and his decision with regard to the item of ‘provision for taxation’ is affirmed. As the Gift Tax Officer refused to take into account the item of ‘provision for taxation’ the assessment order and the notice of demand are illegal and liable to be quashed and set aside on that ground.
10. Subject to the observations made above, the appeal be and is hereby dismissed. In view of the dividend success, we direct that each party should pay and bear his own costs of and incidental to this appeal.
Arun K. Mukherjee, J.:— I agree.
C.R.D
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