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N.C Mookerjee And Co. v. Union Of India And Another Opposite Party.

Calcutta High Court
Feb 14, 1963
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Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a registered partnership firm of four partners. For the accounting year ending 31 March 1942 the firm was assessed to excess profits tax on 25 August 1954. A notice of demand under Section 29 of the Indian Income-tax Act read with Section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 dated 3 September 1954 required payment of Rs. 11,192 by 25 September 1954. The firm did not pay; on 12 March 1956 the Income-tax Officer (N.U. District II, Calcutta) forwarded a certificate to the Certificate Officer and Additional District Magistrate, 24 Parganas, for recovery. On 29 March 1956 a certificate under Section 6 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 was signed and filed and notice under Section 7 issued and served.

The petitioner objected under Section 9 (23 May 1956) and at the hearing the Certificate Officer upheld the objection; later, however, subsequent notices and objections followed (including a supplementary objection filed 4 February 1957) and the Certificate Officer rejected the latter objection. The petitioner appealed under Section 51 to the Commissioner, Presidency Division, who dismissed the appeal summarily on 18 April 1958. The petitioner sought revision under Section 53 before the Additional Member, Board of Revenue; the Additional Member rejected the revision petitions on 21 April 1960. The petitioner obtained Rules in this Court; a Division Bench (Bachawat, J. and Chatterjee, J.) discharged those Rules by order dated 26 September 1962.

The petitioner seeks a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court against that Division Bench decision. Central to the dispute is the validity of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery (Validation of Certificates and Notices) Act (West Bengal Act XI of 1961), which the petitioner contends is ultra vires because (inter alia) it falls within Entry 43 of the Concurrent List and therefore required the President's prior assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether West Bengal Act XI of 1961 (Bengal Public Demands Recovery (Validation of Certificates and Notices) Act) is a valid exercise of the State Legislature's power or whether it is a law with respect to Entry 43 of the Concurrent List such that the prior assent of the President under Article 254(2) was required.
  2. Alternatively, whether the validating legislation was of a nature that only Parliament could enact (invoking Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I).
  3. Whether the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 (and the acts validating certificates) fall within Entries 3 and 45 of the State List (i.e., law with respect to administration of justice and land revenue) or within the Union/Concurrent legislative fields.
  4. Whether a Certificate Officer (and Member, Board of Revenue) is a "Court" for the purposes of Entry 3 of the State List and related constitutional provisions, thereby affecting the characterisation of the proceedings.
  5. Whether Article 133(1)(c) is available (i.e., maintainability of the certificate) where the matter came to the High Court not from a conventional "court of first instance" but from revenue/adjudicatory authorities such as the Board of Revenue or Certificate Officer.
  6. Whether the proceeding before the High Court is a "civil proceeding" attracting Article 133(1) (as the petitioner contends a revenue assessment point was also argued).
  7. Procedural maintainability issues, including whether the Certificate Officer was a necessary party to the application and whether failure to make him a party affected maintainability.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The certificates and proceedings under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act were not in accordance with the Act and rules and therefore invalid.
  • The Bengal Public Demands Recovery (Validation of Certificates and Notices) Act (West Bengal Act XI of 1961) is ultra vires: it relates to Entry 43 of the Concurrent List (law relating to recovery in a State of claims arising outside that State) and therefore required the prior assent of the President under Article 254(2).
  • Alternatively, the legislation deals with matters within the exclusive competence of Parliament under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I and thus State legislation is incompetent.
  • The validating Act could not be regarded as falling within State List Entries 3 or 45 and so could not be upheld on that basis.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Objection to maintainability of the application under Article 133(1)(c): it was argued that the clause presupposes a Court of first instance and required that there be a court of first instance before a High Court decision could attract Article 133(1)(c).
  • It was argued that the proceeding before the High Court was not a civil proceeding because one of the substantive points argued related to the validity of an excess profits tax assessment (a revenue matter), and therefore Article 133(1) would not be attracted.
  • Objection that the Certificate Officer had not been made a party to the application and that this omission affected maintainability; this led to an order joining the Certificate Officer as a respondent upon application by the petitioner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dwarkanath v. Srigobinda, AIR 1929 Cal 130 Held (by a Division Bench of this Court) that a Certificate Officer is not a Court. The Division Bench's opinion noted this authority as part of the conflict of authorities on whether a Certificate Officer is a court; the case was cited to show there is precedent against treating Certificate Officers as courts.
Joy Durga Dassi v. Sourish Chandra Roy, AIR 1940 Cal 215 Referenced as taking a contrary view (supporting the proposition that a Certificate Officer is a court). The Court cited it to demonstrate conflicting Calcutta High Court authorities on whether a Certificate Officer is a court; used in the context of determining that for present purposes the Certificate Officer/Board of Revenue functions as a Revenue Court.
Abanindra v. A.K. Biswas, AIR 1954 Cal 355 Another decision taking the view that a Certificate Officer is a court. Referred to as part of conflicting local authorities; the Division Bench treated the Certificate Officer/Member, Board of Revenue as Revenue Courts for purposes of Entry 3 of the State List.
Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., AIR 1950 SC 188 A Supreme Court decision cited in the context of the debate over the nature of adjudicatory bodies (no specific rule extracted in the opinion). Noted as one of two Supreme Court decisions referred to while discussing whether Certificate Officers are courts; the decision was relied upon as an authority relevant to that issue.
Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, (S) AIR 1956 SC 153 A Supreme Court decision cited alongside Bharat Bank for the point on adjudicatory authority. Referred to as part of the authorities considered on whether Certificate Officers or similar functionaries are to be treated as courts.
Raghunath Prasad Singh v. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh, 54 I.A. 126; AIR 1927 PC 110 Judicial Committee observation: even if a decision is obviously right, a certificate may be granted where substantial questions of law or matters of considerable private importance are involved. The Court invoked this principle to justify that even though the Division Bench decision was difficult to fault, the presence of substantial questions of law and considerable private importance warranted granting a certificate under Article 133(1)(c).
Tirath Singh v. [name not fully printed], AIR 1955 SC 830 Example where a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) was granted in respect of a judgment arising from an Election Tribunal under Article 227 (noting that no objection was taken that there was no court of first instance). Used to show precedent where Article 133(1)(c) had been applied despite the original proceeding not arising from a conventional court of first instance; supported the maintainability of the petitioner's certificate application.
Guru Govinda Basu v. Sankar Prasad Ghosal, AIR 1963 Cal 364 Considered the question of what constitutes a "civil proceeding" and discussed similar Division Bench cases. The Court relied on the recent analysis in this case to support the conclusion that proceedings under Article 227 challenging decisions of Certificate Officers/Board of Revenue are civil proceedings (involving disputes as to civil rights) and therefore Article 133 applies.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds along two main lines: (1) the substantive question of the legislative competence and validity of the validating Act, and (2) preliminary questions of maintainability of the certificate under Article 133(1)(c).

Substantive legislative-competence analysis

  • The Division Bench had held that West Bengal Act XI of 1961 deals with certificates and notices issued under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, and that the 1913 Act is not a law with respect to Entry 43 of the Concurrent List. The 1913 Act was treated as law concerning administration of justice, organisation and procedure of Revenue Courts, and land revenue/collection of land revenue, thus falling squarely within Entries 3 and 45 of the State List.
  • The Division Bench contrasted the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act with the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 (Central Act I of 1890), which was noted as an instance of a law with respect to Entry 43 of List III.
  • Given that the 1913 Act is covered by the State List entries, the Division Bench concluded that the validating Act did not require the assent of the President under Article 254(2); consequently the validating legislation was validly enacted by the State legislature.
  • The Court acknowledged conflict of authority on whether Certificate Officers are "courts" but accepted (for purposes of the decision) that Certificate Officer and the Member, Board of Revenue, insofar as they adjudicate rights of the parties, are "Revenue Courts" within the meaning of Entry 3 of the State List.
  • The Division Bench also examined alleged irregularities and defects in the form of the certificates; it noted conflicting authority on that point, but held that the validating Act cured those irregularities and defects — obviating the need to refer the question to a larger Bench.

Maintainability and procedural analysis

  • Respondent's objection that Article 133(1)(c) requires a Court of first instance was addressed by the Court by reference to the text of Article 133 and the qualifying paragraph that follows clause (c). The Court explained that the additional certification requirement in the paragraph (concerning affirmance of a decision of the court immediately below) applies only to cases other than those referred to in clause (c), and so the paragraph has no application to clause (c) matters.
  • The Court observed precedent (Tirath Singh) where a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) was granted for a proceeding coming from an Election Tribunal (under Article 227) and where no objection was made that no court of first instance existed; this supported the proposition that a "court of first instance" in the rigid sense is not a condition precedent to Article 133(1)(c).
  • On whether the High Court proceeding was a civil proceeding, the Court noted that although one point raised the validity of a tax assessment, many other points involved the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227. The Court relied on authorities (including Guru Govinda Basu) and general definitions: courts that decide disputed rights between subjects or between a subject and the State are civil courts and processes for the enforcement of civil rights are civil proceedings. Accordingly, disputes before Certificate Officers/Board of Revenue — where the debtor contests liability or raises entitlement to set-offs/refunds — are civil disputes and proceedings to challenge those decisions before the High Court are civil proceedings for the purposes of Article 133.
  • The objection that the Certificate Officer had not been made a party was met by counsel for the petitioner, who applied to add the Certificate Officer; the Court ordered the Certificate Officer to be added as a respondent and treated that procedural step as satisfactory.
  • After considering these preliminary points, the Court concluded that the matter was fit for the grant of a certificate under Article 133(1)(c), given the substantial questions of constitutional law raised (including interpretation of constitutional entries and the prior legislative practice around assent under Article 254(2)).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court granted the certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. The opinion records that a certificate was issued.

Implications and immediate consequences (as expressly stated in the opinion):

  • The petitioner is entitled to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(c), and the Court ordered that a certificate be drawn up and issued.
  • Costs of the application were directed to be costs in the Supreme Court appeal.
  • The hearing fee was assessed at five gold mohurs.
  • The Court recognised that substantial questions of law (including interpretation of different entries of the Constitution and the question of whether a validating State Act required presidential assent under Article 254(2)) were raised and that the total amount claimed in the four certificate cases exceeded two lakhs of rupees — matters of consequence to the private parties involved warranting the grant of a certificate.

This summary is confined strictly to the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add material beyond the text of that opinion.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Bose, C.J:— This is an application for a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution of India in respect of a decision of a Division Bench of this Court dated the 26th September 1962 which affirmed the order of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, dated the 21st April, 1960 in certain Certificate Proceedings under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act initiated against the petitioner.

2. The petitioner is a registered partnership firm consisting of four partners. On 25th August, 1954 the petitioner firm was assessed to excess profits tax in respect of its accounting year ending 31st March, 1942, A notice of demand under Section 29 of the Indian income-tax Act read with Section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 and dated the 3rd September, 1954 was addressed to the petitioner firm and the latter was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 11,192/- as excess profits tax by the 25th September, 1954. The petitioner firm did not pay according to the demand and the Income-tax Officer N.U District II, Calcutta, on 12th March, 1956 forwarded a certificate to the Certificate Officer and Additional District Magistrate 24 Parganas, for recovery of the tax from the petitioner firm. On 29th March, 1956, a certificate for the said firm was signed and filed by the then Certificate Officer under Section 6 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 and notice under Section 7 of the Act was issued and served upon the petitioner. On 23rd May, 1956 the petitioner filed objection under Sec. 9 and at the hearing of the Certificate Case, the Certificate Officer upheld this objection and on 20th December, 1956 a tresn notice under Sec. 7 was served upon the petitioner firm. On 27th January, 1957 the petitioner firm filed again an objection under Sec. 9 denying the petitioner firm's liability and challenging the validity and legality of the certificate and proceeding thereunder. The petitioner also pleaded payment of various amounts and asserted that the firm was entitled to refund of all moneys upon adjustment. The petitioner firm also filed a supplementary objection on 4th February, 1957. The Certificate Officer, however, rejected this objection. Against the said order the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 51 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act before the learned commissioner, Presidency Division. But on 18th April, 1958 the Commissioner dismissed the appeal summarily. Against that judgment the petitioner on 26th May, 1958 filed an application under Section 53 of the Act before the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, for revision. This application was heard analogously with petitioner firm's three other applications in three other Certificate Cases initiated against the petitioner. After hearing these applications the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, passed orders rejecting the revision petitions on 21st April, 1960. As against those orders, the petitioner moved this Court and obtained Rules in respect of the said four Certificate cases. These Rules came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Bachawat, J. and Chatterjee, J. who by an order dated the 26th September, 1962 discharged the said Rules, it is against this decision of the Division Bench that the petitioner now intends to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court. Before the learned Judges the principal contention that was raised was that the certificates were not in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, and the rules made thereunder and so were invalid and the Bengal Public Demands Recovery (Validation of Certificates and Notices) Act being West Bengal Act XI of 1961 was ultra vires the Constitution and as such was ineffective for the purpose of validating the certificates in question. It was contended that the validating Act was an Act relating to subject which was covered by Entry 43 in the Concurrent List (List III) in 7th Schedule of the Constitution or the legislation in question was one which was not covered by any item either in the Concurrent or State List and as such one which was within the exclusive power of the Parliament to make under Act, 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97 in List 1 of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. It was further contended that the legislation being one relating to Item 43 of List III it required the previous assent of the President under the provisions of Article 254 cl. (2) and no such assent having been obtained the legislation was invalid. The learned Judges of the Division Bench in overruling the contention of the petitioner observed that the West Bengal Act XI of 1961 was a piece of legislation dealing with certificates and notices issued under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 and the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act is plainly not a law with respect to Entry 43 in the Concurrent List inasmuch as it is not a law with respect to recovery in the State of West Bengal of claims regarding public demands arising outside that State and as an instance of law with respect to Entry 43 of List III the learned Judges referred to the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 which is Central Act I of 1890. The Division Bench held that the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 is a law with respect to the administration of justice, constitution and organisation of Revenue Courts, procedure of Revenue Courts and with respect to land revenue, including the collection of land revenue and as such was wholly covered by Entries Nos. 3 and 45 of the State List (List II of 7th Schedule). That Act was not a law with respect to any of the matters of the Union List or of the Concurrent List and consequently it could not be pronounced as invalid on the ground that the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution had not been obtained. In reaching this conclusion the learned Judges held incidentally that the Certificate Officer and the Member, Board of Revenue in so far as their functions extended to the adjudication of the rights of the parties were “Revenue Courts within the meaning of Entry 3 of the State List.” The learned Judges also noticed the conflict of authorities on the point as to whether a certificate Officer is a Court or not. The learned Judges referred to she case of Dwarkanath v. Srigobinda, AIR 1929 Cal 130 where a Division Bench of this Court held that a Certificate Officer is not a Court. Reference was made by the learned Judges also to the decisions of this Court reported in AIR 1940 Cal 215, Joy Durga Dassi v. Sourish Chandra Roy, and 58 Cal WN 573 at 585 : (AIR 1954 Cal 355 at 361), Abanindra v. A.K Biswas which took a contrary view and held that a Certificate Officer is a court. Reference was also made to two decisions of the supreme Court reported in AIR 1950 SC 188, Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. and (S) AIR 1956 SC 153, Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State Of Punjab . In this view or the matter the learned Judges of the Division Bench ultimately came to the conclusion that the Bengal Public demands Recovery (Validation of Certificates and notices) Act XI of 1961 is a valid piece of legislation and assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution was not necessary for its validity. The learned Judges also examined the other points raised as to the irregularities and defects in the form of the certificates and noticed the conflict of authority on this point; but held that in view of the validating Act which had the effect of curing all these irregularities and defects, it was not necessary to refer such question for the decision of a larger Bench.

3. The principal point which the petitioner intends to urge before the Supreme Court is as to the validity of West Bengal Act XI of 1961 (Bengal Public Demands Recovery (Validation of Certificates and Notices)) Act it is urged that the validating Act is a legislation with respect to Entry 43 in List III and as such it requires the assent of the President as contemplated in Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The legislation cannot be regarded as one coming within Entry 3 or Entry 45 in List II. The alternative argument on this question of legislative competency is that it is a law which Parliament alone was competent to make under Article 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97 of List I. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have given their reasons for upholding the validity of the Act in some detail and looking at those reasons it is difficult for us to find fault with the reasonings, we are, however, not oblivious of the observation of the Judicial Committee which is so often repeated that even if a decision is found to be obviously right, a certificate can be granted if questions of law involved are substantial questions of law or the case is one of considerable private Importance; Raghunath Prasad Singh v. Deputy commr. or Partabgarh, 54 I.A 126 at 128-129 : (AIR 1927 PC 110 at p. 110). In the present case the decision of the Division Bench covers four certificate cases the validity of which is challenged by four applications in which Rules were obtamed and all these four Rules were disposed of by the same Judgment. The total amount claimed by the income-tax Department on account of excess profits tax in these tour rules comes to over too lakhs of rupees which is no doubt a considerable sum so far as a private business firm is concerned. The question as to the interpretation of the different entries of the Constitution which is Involved in this case and the question of the legislative practice prevailing in obtaining the previous sanction of file Governor-General under Section 5 of the Indian Councils Act, 1892 (and?) in obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution to the passing of the amending West Bengal Acts 15 of 1955 and 15 of 1957 which the learned Judges of the Division Bench considered and explained as assent being taken in such cases by way of abundant caution, cannot, in our view, be brushed aside as not being substantial questions of law. The very wide definition of the expression “public demand” as given in Sec. 3 cl. (6) of the Act read with Schedule I and particularly Items 3 and 4 thereof may provide scope for a plausible argument that the legislation also covers realisation or recovery in the State of West Bengal of claims in respect of taxes and other public demands including arrears of land revenue and sum recoverable as such arrears arising outside the State.

4. In view of all these, we think that this is a tit case in which we can grant a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.

5. But before we can grant this certificate we shall have to consider certain preliminary objections which have been raised as to the maintainability of this application. The first objection which was raised by the learned Advocate for the respondent is that Article 133(1)(c) of the. Constitution is not attracted in this case inasmuch as lie order that such provision may be applicable it has to do established that there was a Court of first instance which dealt with the matter and thereafter it came up Before the High Court and was disposed of by a decision of this Court. It is argued that the whole scheme of Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution is that there has to be Court of first instance as a condition precedent to invoicing the operation of the provisions of Article 133(1) of the Constitution and before an appeal can lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court. Stress is laid on the expression “in the court of first instance” as occurring in cl. (a) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution and the expression “of the Court immediately below” in the paragraph appearing after cl. (c) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution. It will be convenient, therefore, to refer to this paragraph which finds place after cl. (c) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution and which is as follows:—

“And where the judgment, decree or final order appeal ed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below in any case other than a case referred to in cl. (c), if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial questions of law.”

6. It is sufficient to point out that the whole subject of incorporating this clause in Article 133(1) is to provide that it is only in cases where the decision of the Court Immediately below is affirmed by any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in a civil proceeding, that is necessary for the High Court to further certify in addition to the certificate as to valuation test that the appeal involves some substantial questions of law. This paragraph further makes it abundantly clear that it has no application to a case coming under cl. (c) of Article 133(1). The words “in any case other than a case referred to in sud-cl. (c)” make that clear. It is to be noted that in a case which went up before the Supreme Court and which is reported in (S) AIR 1955 SC 830, Tirath Singh v. ??? Singh the certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution was granted by the High Court in respect of its judgment in relation to a proceeding which came up before the High Court from an Election Tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, but no objection appears to have been raised that as there was no Court of first instance such an application under Article 133(1) of the Constitution was not maintainable. In the case before us it has been held by the Division Bench that the Board of Revenue is a Revenue Court and we do not think that for the purpose of attracting the provisions of Article 133(1)(c) it is a condition precedent to the applicability of that clause that there has to be a Court of first instance in the sense of a regular Court before the provisions contained in Article 133(1)(c) can be availed of or invoked.

7. The other objection which was raised rather faintly is that the proceeding before the High Court is not a civil proceeding inasmuch as the validity of the assessment in relation to excess profits tax was challenged before the learned Judges of the Division Bench though unsuccessfully, and so the proceeding was a revenue proceeding and consequently Article 133(1) of the Constitution is not attracted. But it is to be pointed out that this is only one of the points which was raised before the High Court, mere were various other points raised before the High Court by Invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and merely because one of the points related to the question of the validity of the assessment, does not in our view make the entire proceeding a revenue proceeding. We have no doubt that the proceeding in question was a civil proceeding. As to what proceeding is to lie reagrded as a civil proceeding, has been recently considered by this Division Bench in some detail and with reference to certain Division Bench cases of different High Courts in the case of Guru Govinda Basu v. Sankar Prasad Ghosal in Supreme Court Appeal No. 83 of 1962—Judgment D/- 3-1-1963: (AIR 1963 Cal 364). It has also been pointed out that Courts which decide disputed rights between subjects or between a subject and the State are civil Courts. It is true a certificate officer or the Board of Revenue adjudicates upon disputes relating to revenue or public demands, but such dispute is nevertheless a civil dispute which arises in proceedings for enforcement of civil rights. Judicial dictionary defines a civil proceeding as a process for the recovery of individual right or redress of individual wrong. Before a Certificate Officer or Board of Revenue the person who is sought to be made ??? upon the certificate, in other words, the Certificate debtor, raises questions disputing his liability or relating to his liability to pay the amount due on the certificate and, these authorities have to adjudicate upon such questions and when the decision of the Certificate Officer or the Board of Revenue is challenged in a proceeding under Article 227 such proceeding must be regarded as a proceeding involving a dispute with regard to civil rights of the parties and consequently the proceeding before the High Court is a civil proceeding within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution, and the petitioner has, therefore, a right of appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of the High Court discharging the Rule in the present case.

8. Objection was also raised on behalf of the respondents on the ground that the Certificate Officer has not been made a party to the application. The learned Advocate for the petitioner felt the weight of this objection and made an application for adding the Certificate Officer as a party and upon that an order was made by this Court adding the Certificate Officer as party respondent. In my view for the reasons given above the application should succeed. Let a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) be drawn up and issued. Costs of the application will be costs in the Supreme Court Appeal. Hearing fee is assessed at five gold mohurs.

Mitter, J.:— I agree.

CG/R.G.D

9. Certificate issued.