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Suhashini Dasi v. Ahi Bhusan Dey
Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by P.B. Mukharji, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff instituted a suit for partition on 31 May 1954 against six defendants (four contesting defendants and two pro forma defendants). The suit was valued at Rs. 6,000 and sought a preliminary decree for partition and division by metes and bounds of the plaintiff's eight annas share in the properties that had devolved through ancestral Wills. The plaintiff claimed title under the Wills of the ancestor William Mahendra Nath Das (Will dated 9 November 1907; he died 1911) and his wife Dhanamoni (Will dated 18 July 1911; she died 1913) through their only daughter Kumudini (died 25 August 1923), and alleged her share descended via that line.
The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, holding the legacy (as he treated it) became payable on Kumudini's death in 1923 and the suit filed in 1954 was beyond the 12-year period. The plaintiff appealed. The defendants (except the pro forma defendants) contested the suit by written statements, denying title and disputing Dhanamoni's capacity to make a Will. The pro forma defendants never participated in the trial.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff's suit for partition was barred by limitation under Article 123 of the Limitation Act (read with Section 28).
- Whether the contesting defendants established title by adverse possession sufficient to oust the plaintiff's share.
- Whether Dhanamoni (wife of William) had the right to dispose of the property by Will (i.e., whether she held an absolute estate or only a life/limited estate), and accordingly whether transfers or bequests under her Will were valid.
- Whether the death of a pro forma defendant during the pendency of the appeal required substitution of her heir or otherwise affected the competency of the appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff / Appellant
- The plaintiff claimed title and partition rights in the joint properties inherited through the Wills of William and Dhanamoni and sought a partition of her eight annas share.
- Implicitly argued (and succeeded on merits at trial on title issues) that the suit was properly a partition suit (valued as such) rather than an action invoking Article 123 as a legacy claim.
- Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Dutt Roy) relied on authority (Lakshmamma v. Sreeramalu) and principles preventing a person who takes benefits and administers under a Will from later denying the testator's capacity to dispose by Will.
Defendants / Respondents (contesting respondents)
- The trial judge (and respondents before the trial court) treated the claim as a legacy claim and contended it was barred by Article 123 of the Limitation Act; respondents relied on precedent (Gurubaksh Singh v. Bhagwan Singh) to that effect.
- On appeal, Mr. Mitter for the contesting respondents advanced two alternate grounds to support the decree of dismissal: (a) that the plaintiff's claim was barred by adverse possession (asserting more than 20 years' possession by Phanibhusan and his successors), and (b) that, on construction of William's Will, Dhanamoni had no power to dispose of the property by Will (i.e., she allegedly had only a limited or life estate).
- The pro forma defendants did not participate; one pro forma defendant (No. 6) died during the appeal and the respondents urged that substitution might be required.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gurubaksh Singh v. Bhagwan Singh, AIR 1924 Lah 561 (75 Ind Cas 934) | Authority relied upon by the Subordinate Judge to apply Article 123 to the suit. | The court noted the Subordinate Judge relied on this Lahore decision but observed it was based on earlier authority and that subsequent Privy Council guidance (Ghulam Mohammad) had qualified that approach; the appellate court held the Lahore decision was not applicable to these facts. |
| Maung Tun Tha v. Ma Thit, 44 Ind App 42; AIR 1916 PC 145 | Earlier decision underlying the Lahore decision. | The opinion records that the Lahore decision was based on this earlier ruling but that the Privy Council later explained the position; the appellate court referred to that evolution in law. |
| Ghulam Mohammad v. Ghulam Husain, 59 Ind App 74; AIR 1932 PC 81 | Privy Council decision explaining that Article 123 applies only where suit is against an executor, administrator or person legally charged with distributing the estate. | The court treated this decision as authoritative for India, held the Subordinate Judge failed to notice it, and applied its ratio to conclude Article 123 did not apply because the suit was not against an executor/administrator/distributor. |
| Meenakshi Sundarammal v. Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1955 Mad 369 | A Division Bench observation that mere possession does not attract Article 123; possession must be with a duty to distribute the legacy. | The court cited this authority to support the proposition that Article 123 requires possession coupled with a duty to distribute (ordinarily the executor/administrator), reinforcing the conclusion that Article 123 was inapplicable here. |
| State v. Debendra Lal Khan, 61 Ind App 78; AIR 1934 PC 23 | Privy Council authority stating essential requisites for adverse possession (nec vi nec clam nec precario; continuity, publicity and extent). | The court cited this decision as part of the well-settled requirements for adverse possession which the respondents had to prove and found the respondents did not meet these tests. |
| Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna, 27 Ind App 136 | Authority cited for principles on adverse possession in the context of co-sharers. | Used along with other Privy Council decisions to state the requisites for adverse possession and to support rejection of the adverse-possession plea in this case. |
| P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 | Supreme Court rule that burden of proving ouster is on the person claiming adverse possession; requires open assertion of hostile title and exclusive possession to the knowledge of the other co-sharers. | The court applied these tests and held that the contesting respondents did not satisfy them; consequently the adverse-possession defence failed. |
| Lakshmamma v. Sreeramalu, AIR 1927 Mad 1066 | Principle that a person who takes property under a will, enjoys it and deals with it, cannot later deny the validity of the testator's dispositions to defeat beneficiaries' rights. | The court cited this decision (as relied on by appellant's counsel) in support of the view that Phani (who took benefits and administered the estate) could not now contest the power of Dhanamoni to dispose of her property by Will. |
| Williams v. Evans, 1911 P. 175 | Discussion (by Horridge J.) on whether probate or administration precludes an executor/administrator from disputing the will; considerations of estoppel-like effects. | The court summarized the authorities and distinguished the present facts, using the general principle that an administrator who accepts benefits and administers cannot turn round and challenge the testator's capacity in respect of that benefit. |
| In the Goods of Chamberlain, (1867) 1 P. & D. 316 | Authority discussed in Williams v. Evans about the executor's interest and ability to challenge the will. | The court cited the chain of authority in Williams v. Evans and recognized the point but distinguished it from the present case where an administrator accepted and administered benefits. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by addressing each major contested point as follows, applying legal principles stated in the authorities cited in the opinion and facts found on the record.
1. Limitation — Article 123 of the Limitation Act
The Subordinate Judge had held the suit barred under Article 123 (a 12-year period) treating the plaintiff's claim as a suit for legacy that became payable on Kumudini's death (1923). The appellate court examined the authority on which that conclusion rested and held the Subordinate Judge erred in applying Article 123 to this case. The court explained that a line of authorities, culminating in the Privy Council decision in Ghulam Mohammad v. Ghulam Husain (59 Ind App 74 : AIR 1932 PC 81), confined Article 123 to suits brought against an executor, administrator or some person legally charged with the duty of distributing an estate. Because the present suit was not brought against an executor, administrator or person so charged, Article 123 did not apply. The court further relied on a Madras Division Bench decision (Meenakshi Sundarammal v. Subramania Ayyar) that held mere possession cannot attract Article 123 unless the possessor has a duty to distribute the legacy. The court also observed that the trial court had earlier accepted the suit's valuation and character as a partition suit, and it was improper subsequently to recharacterize it as a legacy suit for the purpose of invoking Article 123.
2. Character of the Suit — Partition vs. Legacy
The court emphasized that a suit for partition does not become a suit for legacy under Article 123 simply because the plaintiff traces title under ancestral Wills. The trial court had already accepted the suit as a partition suit for valuation purposes, and the appellate court held it could not be reclassified as a legacy claim for limitation reasons when the defendant was not an executor/administrator.
3. Adverse Possession
The respondents argued long possession by Phanibhusan and his successors extinguished the plaintiff's rights. The court set out the established principles governing adverse possession between co-sharers: possession must be nec vi nec clam nec precario (continuity, publicity and extent), and, crucially in co-shares, the ouster of the non-possessing co-sharer must be clearly proved — mere sole occupation by one co-sharer is not enough because possession by one co-sharer is ordinarily possession for all. The court cited Privy Council and Supreme Court authorities (including State v. Debendra Lal Khan, Radhamoni Debi, and P. Lakshmi Reddy) that place the burden of proving ouster on the party asserting adverse possession and require evidence of open hostile assertion of title known to the other co-sharers. Reviewing the evidence (including the dakhilas, rent books and decrees in the names of Phanibhusan), the court agreed with the Subordinate Judge's factual finding that there was no adequate proof of ouster; the documents in issue showed administration activity (Phanibhusan had taken out Letters of Administration and paid taxes/collected rents in that capacity) rather than hostile assertion of ownership. Consequently, the adverse-possession plea failed.
4. Construction of William's Will — Right of Dhanamoni to Dispose by Will
The contesting defendants contended Dhanamoni held only a life or limited estate, and therefore could not dispose of the property by Will. The court analysed the language of William's Will and applied the rule in Section 86 of the Succession Act that identical words used in different parts of the same will are to be taken in the same sense unless a contrary intention appears. The court noted (i) the testator used 'adhikarini' and 'adhikari' in the Will to denote ownership in the relevant context, (ii) when a limited estate was intended William used the word 'upasatwa' (translated as usufruct) elsewhere in the Will, and (iii) the Will expressly conferred on Dhanamoni powers of transfer by gift, sale, mortgage etc. according to her will. Taken together, these points led the court to conclude William intended to grant an absolute estate to Dhanamoni capable of disposal by her Will. The court therefore rejected the respondents' construction claim.
5. Estoppel / Conduct of the Administrator (Phani)
The court further reasoned that Phanibhusan had taken out Letters of Administration for both William and Dhanamoni, had paid stamp duty, furnished security and administered Dhanamoni's Will, and in those circumstances he (and his heirs who derive title through him) could not permissibly contend that Dhanamoni had no capacity to dispose of property by Will. The court stated the position was not merely one of interpretation of a will clause but of a person accepting benefits and administering the estate who cannot later challenge the testator's capacity with respect to the benefits he accepted. The court invoked the principle (illustrated by Lakshmamma v. Sreeramalu and discussed via Williams v. Evans and earlier authority) that one who accepts and enjoys benefits under a will and acts in the role of administrator cannot approbate and reprobate.
6. Death of Pro forma Defendant No. 6 During Appeal
The respondents argued the appeal was incompetent because pro forma defendant No. 6 (Mrinalini) died during the appeal and no substitution had been made. The court observed that Mrinalini had been a pro forma defendant only, had never appeared or contested at trial, and the judgment under appeal expressly excluded the properties in which defendant No. 6 had an interest from partition. Thus the death did not affect the rights at issue in the appeal. The appellant had also filed a petition in the Court seeking dispensation of service on the heir; the court granted that dispensation in the facts and circumstances and noted the Calcutta amendments to the Civil Procedure Code rules relating to substitution without making further directions.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge dismissing the plaintiff's suit were set aside and the court directed a decree in terms of prayers 'ka' and 'kha' of the plaint: a preliminary decree for partition and division by metes and bounds of the plaintiff's eight-annas share in the properties in suit and for the appointment of a Commissioner as prayed for in the plaint.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's claim for partition succeeds in this Court; the trial court decree of dismissal is set aside and a partition decree (preliminary) and appointment of a Commissioner is ordered. There is no order as to costs in either Court.
- On limitation: The court held that Article 123 of the Limitation Act does not apply to a suit for partition where the suit is not brought against an executor, administrator or person legally charged with the duty of distributing the estate; therefore the trial court erred in dismissing the partition suit on that ground.
- On adverse possession: The court reaffirmed that adverse possession as against a co-sharer requires clear proof of ouster (open hostile assertion of title with exclusive possession to the knowledge of the other co-sharers); that standard was not met here, so adverse-possession defence failed.
- On construction and conduct of administrators: The court held that the Will construed in the facts granted an absolute estate to Dhanamoni with powers to transfer, and a person who accepted benefits and administered under a Will (here Phanibhusan) cannot thereafter contend the testator lacked capacity to make the disposition he benefited under. The court therefore rejected the respondents' attack on the validity of the Will as to Dhanamoni's capacity to dispose.
- On substitution for deceased pro forma defendant: The court dispensed with service on the heir of the deceased pro forma defendant in the circumstances of this case, because the pro forma defendant had not participated and the judgment under appeal did not affect her interests.
- No order for costs and records to be sent down to the trial court as soon as possible.
Note: This summary is constrained strictly to the matters and reasoning expressly contained in the provided opinion text; no information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P.B Mukharji, J.:— This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge dismissing the plaintiff's suit for partition on the only ground that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 123 of the Limitation Act.
2. The plaintiff instituted this suit on the 31st May, 1954 against six defendants, four of whom were the defendants and the remaining two pro forma-defendants. The parties are all related to one another. The suit was valued at Rs. 6,000/-. The reliefs claimed in the suit were for preliminary decree for partition and division by metes and bounds of the plaintiff's 8 annas share in the property in suit and if necessary for appointment of a Commissioner for such division and a final decree. The plaintiff is the daughter of one Bidyabhusan Dey who was the grandson of William Mahendra Nath Das and Srimati Dhanamoni Das through their only daughter and child Kumudini. The pro forma defendants are (1) Mrinalini, who is a daughter of Kumudini and a sister of Bidya and (2) Anil a son of Saibalini another deceased sister of Bidya. The real and contesting defendants are the widow Promodini and the sons, of Promodini's deceased husband Phanibhusan, the brother of Bidya. William Mahendra Nath Das, the ancestor, died in 1911 leaving a will dated the 9th November, 1907. His wife Dhanamoni died in 1913 leaving a Will dated the 18th July, 1911. William and Dhanamoni left only one daughter Kumudini who died on the 25th August, 1923 leaving Bidya, Phani, Mrinalini and Saibalini as her sons and daughters. Bidya died on the 25th February, 1923, Phani died on the 6th February, 1949, Mrinalini died pending appeal in 1961 and Saibalini had died before leaving the son Anil mentioned above.
3. The plaintiff claimed her title and interest in the estate left by William and Dhanamoni under their respective Wills. The plaint is a plaint for partition of the joint properties inherited by the descendants of William and Dhanamoni through their daughter Kumudini and with reference to the two Wills of William and Dhanamoni. The reliefs are the reliefs ordinarily claimed in a partition suit. The learned Subordinate Judge valued the suit as a suit for partition at Rs. 6,000/-.
4. The defendants, except the pro forma defendants contested the suit and filed their written statements. They denied the title and interest of the plaintiff in the properties left by William and Dhanamoni in particular they disputed also Dhanamoni's right to make a Will. The pro forma defendants did neither enter their appearance in the suit nor did they file their written statements nor did they appear at any stage before the Trial Court.
5. A number of issues were framed among which the main issues were if the suit was barred by limitation and adverse possession and whether the plaintiff had any right, title and interest in the properties in suit and if so what was the share of the plaintiff in the same. The plaintiff won on all the main issues on merits but lost before the Trial Judge on the issue of limitation. The learned Trial Judge held that this was a suit for legacy bequeathed by the testator and therefore must have been brought within 12 years from the date of legacy becoming payable under Article 123 of the Limitation Act. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the legacy became payable to Bidya and Phani on the death of Kumudini and Kumudini died in August, 1923 as appearing in Ext. J(2). Then the learned Subordinate Judge finds that the present suit was filed in 1954 as noticed above which was clearly beyond the period mentioned in Article 123 of the Limitation Act read with Section 28 of the Limitation Act. He relied on a decision of Gurubaksh Singh v. Bhagwan Singh reported in AIR 1924 Lah 561, with corresponding reference to 75 Ind Cas 934.
6. The decision of the learned Subordinate Judge holding that Article 123 of the Limitation Act applied to this case is, in our opinion, clearly wrong in the facts of this case. The Lahore decision on which he relied was based on the earlier decision of Maung Tun Tha v. Ma Thit, 44 Ind App 42 : (AIR 1916 PC 145), but which was explained and considered by a later decision of the Privy Council in Ghulam Mohammad v. Ghulam Husain, reported in 59 Ind App 74 : (AIR 1932 PC 81), which the learned Subordinate Judge failed to notice. A long line of authorities in India beginning from at least 1882 held that this Article 123 of the Limitation Act applied only where the suit was brought against an Executor or an Administrator or some person legally charged with the duty of distributing the estate. This is the ratio which was approved and adopted for India by the Judicial Committee in 59 Ind App 74 at pp. 89 and 90 : (AIR 1932 PC 81 at p. 88). In this case the suit was neither against an executor nor an administrator nor against a person legally charged with the duty of distributing an estate.
7. This decision and the principles laid down there by the Privy Council was followed in a recent authority in Madras in Meenakshi Sundarammal v. Subramania Ayyar, reported in (S) AIR 1955 Mad 369, where a Division Bench of the Madras High Court at page 377 observed that mere possession of the estate could not attract Article 123 of the Limitation Act but that possession must be with a duty to distribute the legacy. That duty to distribute, in our view, lies ordinarily on an executor or an administrator. The legal duty to distribute the legacy is not upon a legatee, qua legatee or a claimant qua claimant under the Will as it is the duty of somebody on whom the duty is cast either by the terms of the will as executor or by an order of the Court as an administrator. We, therefore, do not consider that the Lahore decision is any longer good Saw. We set aside the finding and the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge and hold that the suit is not ??? under Article 123 of the Limitation Act.
8. We need only add that one of the issues before the learned Subordinate Judge was whether the suit was properly valued and in deciding that issue he accepted the previous order No. 21 dated 22nd May, 1956 holding that the suit was a suit for partition and was properly valued. Therefore, it was not proper for him to hold subsequently that it was not a suit for partition but a suit for a legacy under Article 123 of the Limitation Act. A suit for partition does not become a suit for legacy within the meaning of Article 123 of the Limitation Act simply because the party claiming partition recites existence of Wills among the ancestors under which or through which the joint properties devolved to the descendants.
9. Having regard to our decision on Article 123 of the Limitation Act, and having regard to the fact that the teamed Subordinate Judge himself summarized the result of his decision by saying that “The result of my findings li that the plaintiff could have got the partition of 8 annas of the suit properties if her claim was not barred by limitation”, it must follow that this appeal should succeed.
10. Mr. Mitter, learned Advocate for the contesting respondents, however, turned round to support the decree for dismissal on grounds which were found against such respondents. There is no cross-objection in this case filed by the contesting respondents. Mr. Mitter contended that as this was a decree for dismissal it was not necessary to file cross-objection for the contesting respondents and he should be allowed freedom to urge grounds to support the decree for dismissal even on the points found against his clients. He wished to urge first that the claim was barred by adverse possession and secondly on the construction of the Will of William, that Dhanamoni had no right by her Will to dispose of the property she inherited from William. We allowed and heard Mr. Mitter to urge these two points notwithstanding the fact that his clients have not filed any cross-objections.
11. Taking up the question of adverse possession it is contended by Mr. Mitter that the plaintiff's claim is barred by adverse possession. Now this is a suit for partition a claim by one co-sharer to defeat another co-sharer by adverse possession, therefore, has to be clearly established according to well settled principles of law. The first principle is that adverse possession to succeed must be one ‘nec vi nec clam’ and ‘nec precario’. In other words, such possession to be adverse must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that the possession was adverse to the competitor. The Privy Council repeatedly laid down this essential requisite for adverse possession in such cases as Secy. of State v. Debendra Lal Khan, 61 Ind App 78 at p. 82 : (AIR 1934 PC 23 at p. 25) and Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna, 27 Ind App 136 at p. 140. The second principle is that for one co-sharer to establish adverse possession as against another co-sharer it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the property. The ouster of the non-possessing co-sharer by the co-sharer in possession who claims title by adverse possession must be clearly established and made out for normally possession of one co-sharer will be considered in law to be possession of all the co-sharers. Such possession cannot be adverse by merely cherishing a hostile animus without any overt hostile acts to call the attention of the other co-sharers that they are intended to be ousted. The Supreme Court has clearly settled the law on this point in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy reported in (S) AIR 1957 SC 314 by expressly laying down that the burden of proving ouster is on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a co-sharer by his adverse possession and that there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment of one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute the ouster. Not one of these tests laid down by the Supreme Court and the Privy Council has been satisfied by the contesting respondents and therefore their plea for adverse possession cannot, in our opinion, succeed.
12. The actual plea of the contesting defendants is that the plaintiffs right in the property has been extinguished by adverse possession for more than 20 years by Phanlbhusan and themselves. But the learned Subordinate Judge rightly records his finding on this question of fact by holding “No evidence has been adduced. In this suit to prove ouster of the plaintiff by Phanibhusah”. He has discussed ??? evidence, oral and documentary, and looking at the records we are satisfied that the conclusion that he had ??? at on this point of adverse possession was correct articular reference is made to the dakhilas which were larked exhibit A series and the Chek Muri book, exhibit B ???, on which reliance was placed by the contesting defendants to show that Phanibhusan alone was paying the ants and collecting rents from the under-tenants. The ??? Subordinate Judge was right in holding that these ??? were of no help because it was admitted that ??? took out Letters of Administration of estates if both William and Dhanamoni and it will be only natural that he would pay taxes and collect dues from the tenants, therefore, it is not a clear and hostile assertion of title ??? prove ouster according to the principles laid down by ??? Supreme Court. It is also clear from the evidence on record that decrees marked exhibit 7 and 7A show that the landlords sued Phanibhusan for rents only in his capacity as a administrator of the estate even as late as 1932-1934 and these decrees were passed on contest. We uphold the learned Subordinate Judge's finding on fact where he says
“Upon a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the both sides, I hold that the defence case that Phanibhusan acquired good title to the suit properties by adverse possession against the plaintiff is not proved.”
13. The second point of objection against the finding in the judgment is the plea by the contesting defendants that Dhanamoni had no right to dispose of the properties an suit by Will. On a construction of the Will of William the learned Subordinate Judge came to the view that William granted an absolute estate to Dhanamoni by his Will and not a mere life estate which the contesting defendants urge. If Dhanamoni had only a life estate it is quite clear and obvious that she could not have the right to dispose of the property by her Will. Mr. Wlitter contends first on this point that the word ‘adhikarini’ used in the Will of William an describing the estate given to Dhanamoni is something very different from the usual word ‘malik’ which means the owner. We have carefully considered this argument and are satisfied that there is no substance in it. In the first place. She testator William used the words ‘adhikarini’ and adnikari in the particular context of his Will to mean the owner in this case. Even for the sons or the daughters who could be the owners on a possible event mentioned there, the word ‘adhikari’ was employed by the testator. It is well settled rule of construction and interpretation of words in a Will as particularly laid down in Section 86 of the Succession Act, that if the same words occur in different parts of the same will, they shall be taken to have been used everywhere in the same sense, unless a contrary intention appears. Cases and precedents on the words ‘malik’ in other contexts and of other wills cannot control the interpretation of this will before us. Secondly, a limited estate or a life estate was described by the testator William by a different Bengali language or word in that very Will namely, ‘Upasatwa’ which means and which has been translated as usufruct if, therefore, William was granting only a life estate to Dhanamoni and not an absolute estate then he would have used the word ‘upasatwa’ as he had used in Clause 2 of the Will. Thirdly, the testator William in the Will expressly corners on his wife Dhanamoni all rights of ‘transfer by way of gift, sale, mortgage etc. the whole or some portion of these properties according to her will.’ Now this is express grant of an absolute estate and in the face of this express language it is, in our view, impossible to contend that the grant was only of a limited estate or a life estate to Dhanamoni. If a person could dispose of properties by way of sale or gift according to his will then we do not think it is any longer open to argument that this was a limited or a life estate because no limited or life estate could have that quality of unqualified right of sale, mortgage or gift according to the will of the donee.
14. Having disposed of this question of construction on the merits we think it necessary to add that the contesting defendants should not be allowed to urge this point at all. The father of the contesting defendants namely, Phanibhusan Dey, himself obtained Letters of Administration from the court to administer the Wills of both William and Dhanamoni. Phani himself paid the stamp duty and furnished the security and obtained the Letters of Administration for Dhanamoni's Will. Admittedly, Phani administered Dhanamoni's Will. Now, Dhanamoni's Will itself provides this — ‘They shall continue to enjoy and possess the same down to their sons and son's sons etc. in succession according to their will and my daughter's sons Sri Bidya Bhuan Dey and Sri Phani Bhusan Dey shall both get in equal shares all my remaining properties and shall go on enjoying and possessing the same according to their will with powers of making gift and sale etc.” That shows that Phani was not only an Administrator but a beneficiary who accepted benefits under the will of Dhanamoni. In those circumstances and on those facts, in our view, it would not have been open to Phani if he were alive, and it would no longer now be open to Phani's heirs who derive their title from Phani, to contend that Dhanamoni could not dispose of her property by will. It is unnecessary to cite cases on this point. But Mr. Dutt Roy who appears for the appellant, cited the decision of a Division Bench of Madras High Court in Lakshmamma v. Sreeramalu reported, in AIR 1927 Mad 1066 where the principle is laid down that if a person takes a property under a will which is open to him to repudiate but does not do so and where he enjoys the property, pays maintenance which is payable under the will to the widow of the testator and deals with the property by mortgaging it leading the widow to suppose that she was getting her rights under the will, he cannot at any subsequent stage plead that the widow has no right except under the Hindu Law. Horridge J. in Williams v. Evans and reported in 1911 P. 175 at p. 178 discusses the question where a person having taken out probate is prevented from disputing the will. According to Horridge J. three things are necessary to constitute estoppel: (1) Representation, (2) the representation is untrue, and (3) that the party to whom it is made has acted on it to his detriment. He then says that the fact before him did not make it a case of estoppel. But the question really was whether there was any rule of the Probate Court which prevented the plaintiff who had, taken out probate from taking proceedings to impeach the will. Horridge J. noticed the authority on this point in the case of in the Goods of Chamberlain, (1867) 1 P. and D. 316, in which case the only title the executor had was as an executor who had clothed himself with probate and there at the end of his judgment sir J.P Wilde at page 319 said — “He had an interest under the Will, because he was an executor of it, but his title rested on the will, and stood or fell with it; and it would be a strange thing to hold that, because he was named executor if there was a will, therefore he had an interest in shewing there was not.” Horridge J., however, distinguished that case from the case he was deciding. The question here before us is not also of estoppel. Here the question is whether a person who has taken benefit under a will and has administered the will as the person authorised under the direction and order of a Court as an Administrator of that will can be allowed to turn round and say that the person who made that will and under which will be had himself taken benefit and which will be had himself administered, had no capacity to make the disposition by that will and the benefit of which disposition he has accepted and enjoyed. In our view the question must be answered in the negative. Such an administrator cannot be allowed to approbate and ??? the will and blow not and cold. He cannot first take the position of an administrator and beneficiary under the will and then challenge the testator's capacity of disposition of property by the will. No doubt it is true that a Court of Probate in issuing either a probate or Letters of Administration does not and cannot conclude a question of interpretation of a clause of the will. But it is not that case at all. It is not a case merely of interpretation of the clause in the will of William Mahendra Das. It is a case of taking benefit under the different will of Dhanamoni and administering it. We do not think that such an administrator or those who derive title from such administrator to the properties, left and administered by that administrator and devolving subsequently on them can be permitted to take a point that the testator had no capacity to dispose by a will such properties.
15. Lastly, Mr. Mitter contends that this appeal is incompetent because the 6th defendant Mrinalini died during the pendency of this appeal and the appellant has taken no steps to substitute her heir who, we are told, was a daughter. The point has a seeming attraction but has no substance. As stated already Mrinalini was alive when the plaintiff instituted the suit and when the judgment under appeal was delivered. She never entered appearance. She did not file any written statement. She never contested at the trial Court. In fact she took no part. The next tact which is to be remembered is that she is only pro forma defendant and no more.
16. The next point to emphasis in this connection is that this very judgment under appeal expressly did not affect the rights of the 6th defendant at all. The finding and the order in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge on this point is
“The properties recorded in possession of the defendant No. 6 and the mother of the defendant No. 5 shall be excluded from partition as those were given away by Dhanamoni to persons other than Bidya Bhusan and Phani Bhusan.”
17. That being so, the judgment under appeal does not include the properties in which the defendant No. 6 was interested. It was, therefore, not necessary for the appellant even to make defendant No. 6 as a party to the appeal far less to substitute her heir after her death pending the appeal. Her interest is not affected either by the judgment under appeal or by any possible outcome of this appeal. In fact the appellant filed a petition in this Court affirmed on the 4th January, 1963 that these pro forma defendants were not interested in the result of the suit but they were inadvertently included as respondents and therefore claimed dispensation of service of the notice of appeal on the heir and legal representatives of the deceased pro forma respondent No. 6. There was also in that petition a prayer in the alternative that if the Court took another view, then in that event, to substitute the daughter Sushovini Roy as the sole heir and legal representative of the deceased pro forma respondent No. 6. As we grant the first part of the prayer in the petition, namely, we dispense with the service of notice of appeal on the heir and legal representative of the deceased pro forma-respondent No. 6, in the facts and circumstances of the case we do not wish to say anything further on the point except make a reference to the Calcutta Amendments in Or. 22 Rule 4(4) and also Or. 41 Rule 14(3) of the CPC and to record the death of this pro forma Respondent.
18. For these reasons the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge art. set aside. There will be a decree in terms of prayers ‘ka and ‘kha’ of the plaint, namely, one for a preliminary decree for partition and division by metes and bounds of the plaintiff's 8 as. (eight annas) share in the properties in suit and for the appointment of a Commissioner as prayed for in prayer ‘kha’.
19. There will be no order for costs either here or in the Lower Court. Let the records be sent down to the Lower Court as soon as possible.
Laik, J.:— I agree.
DG/D.R.R
20. Appeal allowed.
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