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Golden Soap Factory (P) Ltd. v. Nakul Chandra Mandal
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Laik, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent (workman) was working as a fitter during the erection of a structure when, on May 27, 1958, he fell from a height of 40 feet while fitting the frame and sustained injuries. He claimed a lump sum of Rs. 4,900 on the basis of 100% disability. The learned Commissioner, after hearing oral evidence for both parties, accepted the workman's case and found permanent partial disablement, fixing the total loss of earning capacity at 70% and awarding Rs. 3,430. The employer (appellant company) appealed against that award. The appellant contended (inter alia) that the accident occurred on the premises of another company (Sree Iron Foundry Works (P) Ltd.), that the appellant had no knowledge of the accident, that there was no master–servant relationship, and that a contractor had been interposed between the employer and the workman. The appeal was heard by this Bench (Laik, J., with whom P.B. Mukharji, J. concurred).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant and respondent satisfy the test of being respectively the employer and the workman under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
- Whether the employer is relieved of liability because a contractor was interposed between the employer and the workman and whether the contractor is a necessary party to the proceedings.
- Whether the type of accident falls outside the scope of the Act.
- Whether the accident "arose out of and in the course of" the employment.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Employer's) Arguments
- The accident did not occur within the appellant company's premises but in the premises of Sree Iron Foundry Works (P) Ltd., and the appellant company had no knowledge of the accident.
- There was no master–servant relationship between the appellant and the respondent (i.e., the respondent was not the company's workman within the meaning of the Act).
- The presence of a contractor (Probodh, the company's labour contractor, as alleged by the appellant) meant the appellant was not liable; the contractor was interposed and should be considered instead.
- The evidence was insufficient to support the Commissioner's finding that the workman's total loss of earning capacity was 70%.
Respondent's (Workman's) Case
- The respondent fell from a height of 40 feet while fitting the frame during an erection on the employer's premises and sustained injuries that arose out of and in the course of his employment.
- He claimed compensation (a lump sum of Rs. 4,900) on the basis of complete disability (cent per cent).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Armstrong v. Redford, (1920) A.C. 757 | Lord Wrenbury's observation on the difficulty of deciding cases on the phrase "out of and in course of" employment. | The observation was quoted to acknowledge the conceptual difficulty of the phrase but the court proceeded to resolve the question on the facts and applicable tests. |
| Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja, A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 881 | Notional extension of the employer's premises and rules about commencement/place of employment. | The court held that the notional extension rule as discussed in that case was not applicable to the present facts. |
| Smith v. General Motor, (1911) A.C. 188 | General rule that there must be a master–servant relationship between employer and workman. | The court acknowledged the general rule but explained that under Indian law the controlling test is whether the employer could command and control the workman at the time of the accident. |
| Geddes v. Dunfermline District Committee, 20 B.W.C.C. 815 | Scottish position that a workman could not claim compensation against both the undertaker (principal) and the contractor. | Used as comparative law material in discussing whether the principal remains liable where a contractor is interposed. |
| Meier v. Dublin Corporation, 6 B.W.C.C. 441 | Irish position that liability of principal and contractor is neither joint nor joint and several; award against one prevents proceeding against the other if award unproductive. | Referenced as part of comparative discussion on contractor/principal liability. |
| Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Heighley, (1917) A.C. 352 | Test (Lord Sumner): "Was it part of the injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer or to do which caused his injury? If yes, the accident arose out of his employment." | The court adopted this test and applied it, finding that the accident did arise out of and in the course of the respondent's employment. |
| Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co. Ltd., (1903) A.C. 443 | Lord Macnaghten's definition of "accident": "an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed." | The court used this definition in assessing the type of accident and concluded the injury was not attributable to serious and wilful misconduct by the workman. |
| Cases referred to as "Burrell, Walker, Evan, Petschett" (no full citations in text) | These cases concern categories/types of accidents and whether particular accidents fall within the Act. | The court stated it would serve no useful purpose to discuss these cases in detail for the present facts and therefore did not analyze them further. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in distinct logical steps that follow the issues as framed:
-
Relationship of employer and workman:
- The court examined the statutory definition of "workman" under the Workmen's Compensation Act (section 2(n) and Schedule II referenced) and noted the differences between the Indian Act and the English Act regarding the scope of these definitions.
- Rather than adopting an exclusively narrow test of master–servant drawn from English decisions, the court emphasized the practical Indian test: whether the employer was in a position to command and control the services of the workman or to direct the manner of performance when the accident occurred.
- On the evidence, the court was satisfied that the appellant had the requisite command and control and therefore affirmed the Commissioner's finding that the respondent was a workman employed by the appellant.
-
Evidence on disablement and quantum:
- The court reviewed the evidence, noting the doctor's testimony (P.W.3) showing total incapacitation and the unchallenged testimony of the workman; the workman had lost his right hand, right leg and pelvis. These are factual findings, and the court held they could not be upset on appeal.
- The court rejected the appellant's contention that the finding of 70% loss of earning capacity was unsupported by evidence.
-
Liability despite interposition of a contractor:
- The court discussed statutory provisions (section 12(1) and 12(2) were referenced) and comparative law positions (England, Scotland, Ireland) about recovery against principal and contractor.
- The learned Commissioner disbelieved the appellant's assertion that the workman had been engaged by Probodh, the company's labour contractor, and the company failed to call directors or controlling persons to support that allegation; the workman was not cross-examined on the point.
- Given the factual finding that the workman was employed by the appellant, the court held the appellant could not escape liability merely by asserting a contractor had been interposed; the absence of the contractor as a party did not vitiate the proceedings.
-
"Arising out of and in the course of" the employment:
- The court acknowledged the conceptual difficulty of the phrase and that no universal test exists; many aspects turn on the nature, conditions, incidents and obligations of the employment and on the particular facts.
- It relied upon the Lord Sumner formulation (Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Heighley) — whether it was part of the injured person's employment to do or risk that which caused the injury — and stated that employment must be understood broadly, taking character, conditions, incidents and risks into account.
- Applying this test to the present facts, the court found that the accident did arise out of and in the course of the respondent's employment and affirmed the Commissioner's finding to that effect.
-
Type of accident and misconduct:
- The court adopted Lord Macnaghten's definition of "accident" from Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co. Ltd. ("an unlooked-for mishap...").
- It concluded that the injury in the instant case was not attributable to serious and wilful misconduct by the workman; the court rejected arguments that a restricted construction should exclude the case from the Act on that basis.
-
Interpretative approach:
- The court expressed an interpretative stance that the Indian Workmen's Compensation Act should receive a benevolent construction (contrasting this with the view that it should be construed very strictly) and declined to adopt an unduly narrow or restrictive approach.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The appellate court affirmed the finding of the learned Commissioner that the respondent was a workman employed by the appellant, that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment, and that the workman suffered permanent partial disablement with a 70% loss of earning capacity; the Commissioner's award of Rs. 3,430 was therefore upheld. The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Commissioner's award in favour of the workman is affirmed and the appellant remains liable to pay the compensation (Rs. 3,430) as awarded; the appellant must also pay costs to the respondent.
- On liability where a contractor is alleged to be interposed: The court confirmed that an employer cannot escape liability merely by asserting the interposition of a contractor when, on the facts, the employer was in a position to command and control the workman; failure to make a contractor a party does not automatically vitiate recovery against the employer in such circumstances.
- On statutory interpretation: The court endorsed a benevolent construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act rather than an unduly narrow or technical approach to exclusion from coverage.
- Precedential effect: The court applied established tests (including Lord Sumner's formulation) and comparative law principles; the decision resolves the present dispute on its facts and affirms the Commissioner's factual findings. The opinion reiterates interpretative guidance but does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond its factual application.
Judges: Laik, J. (author of the opinion); P.B. Mukharji, J. concurred.
Laik, J.:— In this appeal the same old questions, viz., whether the appellant and the respondent satisfy the test of being the employer and the workman respectively, under the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter called the Act); whether the employer is liable because of the introduction of a contractor in between the employer and the workman and whether the contractor is a necessary party in the proceeding; whether the type of the accident is such as is outside the scope of the Act; and lastly whether the accident ‘arose out of and in course of’ the employment about which phrase Lord Wrenbury in the case of Armstrong v. Redford, (1) 1920 A.C 757 (780) observed, “The decisions upon it are such as that I have long since abandoned the hope of deciding any case upon the word ‘out of and in course of’, upon grounds satisfactory to myself or convincing to others”. Speaking for myself, I cannot abandon so early the hope of deciding a case, according to my knowledge and satisfaction, when the point is argued.
2. The workman's case was simple. On May 27, 1958 at a time when an erection was being put up in the employer's premises and he was working as a fitter for the erection, he fell from a height of 40’ feet while he was fitting the frame and received personal injuries due to the accident which arose out of and in course of his employment. He claimed a lump sum of Rs. 4900/- on the basis of cent per cent. disability.
3. Over and above the argument of Mr. Mukherjee the learned Advocate appearing for the employer, the appellant company, giving rise to the above questions, which I shall presently deal with he also argued that the accident did not happen within the premises of the appellant company but in the premises of another company, viz., Sree Iron Foundry Works (P) Ltd. and that the appellant company was neither aware of nor had any knowledge of any such accident. At the outset I dispose of this argument by saying that these are pure questions of fact found against Mr. Mukherjee's client, on evidence, by the learned Commissioner, which it would not be possible for us to upset in the appeal. Moreover, neither the theory of notional extension of employer's premises controlling the general rule of commencement and place of employment as laid down in the case of Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja (2) A.I.R (1958) S.C 881 is applicable to the facts of the present case nor the tests where the employment is ‘for the purpose of the employer's trade or business’, are necessary to be discussed here, as sought to be argued by Mr. Mukherjee, the facts being different. Oral evidence was adduced on behalf of both the parties and considering all the evidence the learned Commissioner accepted the case of the workman and awarded in his favour the sum of Rs. 3430/- on the basis that there is permanent partial disablement and the total loss of the earning capacity is 70 per cent. Against the said order the present appeal has been preferred by the employer company.
4. Mr. Mukherjee faintly suggested that the evidence is not sufficient to support the finding of the said loss of the earning capacity of 70 per cent. In my view he is not correct. There is the evidence of the Doctor (P.W 3) proving that the workman was totally incapacitated and he could not work. Over and above, the workman himself proved the same who was not cross-examined on this point. The workman lost his right hand, right leg and pelvis. Again these being all questions of fact cannot be upset in the appeal.
5. On the first question of law, as to the relationship of the employer and the workman it is argued that there is none as between a master and a servant.
6. The definition of workman in our Act is exhaustive and the Act applies only to certain classes of workmen defined in section 2(n) and enumerated in Schedule II thereof. It is unlike the English Act which applies to all workmen. Again in our Act the definition of ‘employer’ being an inclusive one is not exhaustive whereas in the English Act, unless the context otherwise requires the phrase ‘employer’ includes any body or person, corporate or incorporate, and the legal personal representatives of a deceased employer and where the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the workman has entered into a con-tract of service or apprenticeship; the latter shall be deemed to continue to be the employer of the workman while he Is working for that other person. Under the English Act the original employer remains the employer in case of lent services.
7. It is no doubt true that the general rule as laid down by the House of Lords in Smith v. General Motor, (3) 1911 A.C 188 that there must be the relationship of master and servant between the employer and the workman. It is equally true that an independent contractor is not a workman in all cases. It cannot (also be disputed that the workman, in order to be entitled to compensation, should be acting in the course of his employment, that is, when he is doing something in discharge of a duty to his employer directly or indirectly imposed upon him by his contract of service and the word ‘employment’ covers and includes things belonging to or arising out of it. But under the Indian Law, an employer Is he, who controls the services of the workman or in a position to command and control the workman in the manner of performing the work, when the accident occurs.
8. In the instant case I am satisfied on the evidence that the appellant company was in a position to command and control the respondent in the manner of performing the work when the accident happened. The learned Commissioner was right in holding that the respondent was a workman who had been employed by the appellant that is; there is relationship of employer and workman between the appellant and the respondent. I might add that though the decisions are not uniform, it should be held that our Act should be given a benevolent construction, the same being not a quasi penal statute. The view that it must not be interpreted with sympathetic leniency but must be construed very strictly, is not in my opinion, correct.
9. On the second question of law as to the exemption of the employer's liability because of the interposition of the contractor and whether he is a necessary party, the general notion is that if it is ordinarily part of a business of a person to execute certain work, then ordinarily he will do that work by his own servants, he is not to escape liability for any accident that takes place merely by interposing a contractor—the contractor undertaking to do what ordinarily the principal would do for himself. In England, the statute reserves to the workman the right of recovering compensation either from the principal or from the contractor who employs him directly but not from both; but it is doubtful as to whether the workman there, may make both the principal and the contractor respondents in the proceedings.
10. In Scotland, the workman could not claim compensation against both the undertaker and the contractor “jointly and severally or severally (Geddes v. Dunfermline District Committee (4) 20 B.W.C.C 815). In Ireland, the liability of the principal and the contractor is neither joint, nor joint and several; and that if the workman obtains an award against one, he cannot proceed against the other in the event of the award being unproductive (Meier v. Dublin Corporation (5) 6 B.W.C.C 441).
11. In our Act, normally a workman can recover compensation from his employer. Exception is found in section 12 (1) of the Act which gives the workman a right to recover from the person who has entered into a contract with the workman's immediate employer and in that case section 12(2) becomes operative and the principal who has engaged the contractor has a right to recover from the contractor by way of indemnity. The learned Commissioner disbelieved the story of the appellant that the workman had been engaged by Probodh, the Company's labour contractor. The Company did not produce any of its Directors or the persons who are in control of the Company to give evidence in support of its allegations. The workman was not cross-examined on this point either. On the facts found in the instant case and as I have already held, affirming the finding of the learned Commissioner, that the workman was employed by the appellant company, it cannot escape the liability merely by interposing a contractor. The proceedings would not fall through because the contractor was not made a party in the proceeding.
12. On the third question of law the phrase ‘arising out of and in course of the employment is taken from the English Act originally appearing in the Act of 1897. It has been adopted in the American and Dominion Act. It also occurs in Newzealand Act, and has the same meaning as that of the English Act. There is hardly any general principle which can be evolved to ex-plain and define the phrase, arising out of employment, but attempts have been made to explain it by classification, viz., to the nature, condition, obligations and incidents of the employment. Where in a given case, an accident arises on the one hand out of the injured person's employment, although he has conducted himself in it carelessly or improperly, or, on the other hand, arises not out of his employment but out of the fact that he has outside the scope of it or has added to it some extraneous peril of his own making, or has temporarily suspended it while he persues some excursus of his own, or has quitted it altogether, are all questions which, after as they arise, are susceptible of different answers by different minds as explained by several well known Judges and Jurists, and are always questions of nicety. So it is here. I doubt if any universal test can be found. Analogies, not always so close as they seem to be at first sight, are often resortedto but in the last analysis each case is decided on its own facts.
13. There is however in the opinion of Lord Sumner in the case of Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. and Heighley, (6) 1917 A.C 352 (372) one test, which is always at any rate applicable, which is this “Was it part of the injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer or to do which caused his injury? If yea, the accident arose out of his employment, if nay, it did not”. The word ‘employment’ again is not to be defined in a narrow manner by reference only to the duties of the workman; but the character, conditions, Incidents and special risks involved in employment, would have to be taken Into consideration in order to find out whether the accident ‘arose out of and in course of the workman's employment. I am satisfied that the above tests have been fulfilled in the instant case and I affirm the findings of the learned Commissioner that the accident arose out of and in course of the workman's employment.
14. On the question of the type of accident, the well known definition of accident by Lord Macnaghten in Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co. Ltd., (7) 1903 A.C 443 at page 448 is “an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed”. There is no difference between the English and the Indian statute as to the type of accident which gives the workman a claim to compensation and it would serve no useful purpose to discuss the cases of Burrell, Walker, Evan or Petschett to see whether the accident, in the present case was such a type of an accident which would not attract the operation of the Act. But surely the injury in the instant case cannot or even argued to be attributed to the serious and wilful mis-conduct on the part of the workman.
15. It is amazing that when a man injures himself suddenly and unexpectedly by showing all his might and all his strength and all his energy into his work by doing his very best and utmost for his employer, not sparing himself or taking thought of what may come upon him, and then he is to be told that his case is outside the Act after putting in unduly restricted and narrow constructions on the same because he is not employed as a workman, because the accident is of a different type, because it does not arise out of and in course of his employment or because he exerted himself deliberately and there was an entire lack of the fortuitous element I cannot think that this is right.
16. The appeal has no merit and is therefore dismissed with costs to the Respondent.
P.B Mukharji, J.:— I agree.
S.K.B
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