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Triegi Nath And Ors. v. Indian Iron And Steel Co. Ltd. And Ors.
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners (forty-one workmen employed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2) had been dismissed from service. The Fifth Industrial Tribunal issued an award reinstating them and directing payment of compensation, phrased as:
“Accordingly I award that these men * * * would get half salary for the entire period from October 2, 1953 up to date of their actual return to duties after the award.”
The award was published on September 19, 1955. The petitioners say they offered to resume duties immediately or shortly thereafter but were unable to rejoin because respondents Nos. 1 and 2 obtained successive stays of the award in appeals:
- Stay by the Labour Appellate Tribunal on March 14, 1956; that appeal was dismissed on June 29, 1956 and the stay then vacated;
- Special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was obtained by respondents Nos. 1 and 2, and the Supreme Court granted a stay of operation of the award on October 22, 1956; the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on October 15, 1957 and the stay then stood vacated.
The petitioners contended the award became effective one month after publication (i.e., from October 19, 1955) and that they were entitled to half salary from October 2, 1953 to October 18, 1955 and full salary thereafter. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 proposed to pay half salary only up to the date when the petitioners were actually allowed to rejoin after the Supreme Court's dismissal, and full salary thereafter.
Because of this difference in computation, the petitioners applied to the Second Labour Court under the provisions of section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computation of benefits in terms of money. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 raised a preliminary objection that the Second Labour Court had no jurisdiction because it had not been specified for computation by the appropriate Government. The Labour Court upheld that objection by order dated February 15, 1961, and rejected the applications. The petitioners then moved this Court seeking certiorari to quash that order and mandamus directing the Labour Court to withdraw/cancel it.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Labour Court that has not been specifically designated by the appropriate Government may entertain an application under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computation of benefits in terms of money.
- Whether the jurisdiction of Labour Courts to decide matters under section 33C(2) flows from the combination of section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the matters listed in the Second Schedule, such that specification by the appropriate Government is merely a matter of distribution/convenience.
- Whether the principle applied under section 13 of the Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887) and related case law, concerning distribution of business among courts and retention of jurisdiction where multiple courts share the same local limits, is applicable by analogy to Labour Courts and section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee)
- Labour Courts are constituted under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to matters in the Second Schedule, which includes disputes over computation of benefits in terms of money under section 33C(2).
- Therefore, without further specification, all Labour Courts have the power to compute benefits; specification under section 33C(2) is for convenience/distribution of business only and does not deprive any Labour Court of jurisdiction.
- Support for this proposition was drawn from decisions under the Civil Courts Act: Chatur-bhuj Marwari v. A.W Walker (13 C.W.N 265) and Jagabandhu Nandi v. Sivaprosad Bhattacharjya (53 C.W.N 629).
Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. A.C. Mitra)
- Notwithstanding section 7, in the absence of a specific designation by the appropriate Government, no Labour Court is entitled to exercise any power under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chatur-bhuj Marwari v. A.W. Walker, (13 C.W.N 265) | Authority interpreting assignment/distribution of judicial business and the effect of such assignments on the underlying jurisdiction of courts (analogy from Civil Courts Act jurisprudence). | Relied upon by the Court as part of the line of authority showing that distribution/assignment of business does not divest another court of its jurisdiction; used to support the proposition that specification for computation is a matter of convenience and does not remove jurisdiction from other Labour Courts. |
| Jagabandhu Nandi v. Sivaprosad Bhattacharjya, (53 C.W.N 629) | Interpretation of section 13 of the Civil Courts Act: assignment of business among multiple subordinate judges is distributionary and does not deprive courts of jurisdiction they otherwise possess. | Quoted and applied by the Court (through Chakravartti, J.'s observation) as persuasive authority for treating specification/distribution as a convenience rather than a source-conferring act that removes jurisdiction from other courts. |
| Nasrab Khan v. Deb Nath Nali, (75 C.L.J 255) | Decision holding that the source of a Munsiff's jurisdiction is the government order under section 13(1) of the relevant Civil Courts Act, and that distribution by the District Judge under section 13(2) is by way of convenience and does not deprive other courts of jurisdiction. | Used by the Court as an authoritative precedent underpinning the analogy: where more than one court has the same territorial jurisdiction, assignment of business does not extinguish the underlying jurisdiction of either court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by citing the text of section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which provides that where a workman is entitled to a benefit capable of being computed in money, the amount may be determined by "such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government" and that the amount so determined may be recovered as provided.
The court observed that the Second Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act includes, in a residuary item (item 6), matters within the jurisdiction of Labour Courts that are not in the Third Schedule. That residuary clause may be taken to include disputes over computation of benefits under an award in terms of money, i.e., matters mentioned in section 33C(2).
The court then set out section 7(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, under which the appropriate Government may constitute one or more Labour Courts for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the Second Schedule. From this, the court identified the source of Labour Courts' jurisdiction over matters in the Second Schedule.
The court considered respondents' submission that, notwithstanding section 7(1), in the absence of specification by the appropriate Government no Labour Court could exercise power under section 33C(2). The opinion then examined analogous provisions in the Civil Courts Act (specifically section 13) and the case law interpreting it. The cited authorities held that when the same local jurisdiction is assigned to two or more subordinate judges, the order of the District Judge assigning business is distributive/convenience-based and does not strip the other courts of their competence: the source of jurisdiction is the governmental order fixing territorial jurisdiction.
Applying that principle by analogy, the court concluded that the jurisdiction of Labour Courts flows from section 7 read with the Second Schedule and that specification by the appropriate Government is a distribution of business (a matter of convenience). Therefore, in the absence of any such specification, all Labour Courts must be deemed to have jurisdiction over matters in the Second Schedule, including matters under section 33C(2).
On that basis, the court held that the Second Labour Court was wrong to refuse to entertain the petitioners' application for the reasons given in its order dated February 15, 1961, and the court quashed that order.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court granted relief to the petitioners and set aside the Second Labour Court's order. In specific terms, the court made the Rule absolute and:
- Quashed the Second Labour Court's order of February 15, 1961 refusing to entertain the applications.
- Directed the Second Labour Court to hear and determine the application under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act according to law.
- Ordered costs against respondents Nos. 1 & 2.
- Issued a writ of Certiorari and a consequential writ of Mandamus accordingly.
Implications: The direct effect is that the petitioners obtain the relief sought in these proceedings — the Second Labour Court must now proceed to hear their application under section 33C(2). The opinion applies existing principles from Civil Courts Act jurisprudence by analogy to Labour Courts to conclude that absence of specification by the appropriate Government does not divest Labour Courts of jurisdiction to determine matters under section 33C(2). The opinion does not, in express terms, announce any separate broader rule beyond these conclusions; the immediate consequence is the remediation of the Labour Court's earlier refusal in this case.
End of summary.
2. The petitioners, who are forty-one in number, are workmen under respondents Nos. 1 and 2 companies. They were once dismissed from service. In an industrial adjudication before the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, there was an award in their favour reinstating them in service and also directing payment of compensation to them, for the period of their enforced unemployment, in the following terms:
“Accordingly I award that these men * * * would get half salary for the entire period from October 2, 1953 up to date of their actual return to duties after the award.”
3. The award was published on September 19, 1955. The petitioners say that they offered to resume their duties immediately or shortly thereafter, but they were not allowed to rejoin in the circumstances hereinafter stated. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 companies appealed against the award to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and obtained a stay of the operation of the award, on March 14, 1956. The appeal before the Appellate Tribunal was dismissed, on June 29, 1956, and the stay order stood vacated. Thereafter, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 companies obtained special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court and preferred an appeal before that Court. They obtained an order of stay of operation of the award from that Court, on October 22, 1956. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, on October 15, 1957, and the stay order stood vacated.
4. The petitioners contend that the award became effective with the expiry of a month of its publication in the Gazette, that is to say, from October 19, 1955, and they must, therefore, be deemed to have been reinstated in service with effect from when the award became effective. They were, however, debarred from returning to their duties, because of the successive orders of stay of operation of the award, obtained by respondents Nos. 1 and 2, in the appeals preferred by the latter. They further contend that they became entitled, under the award, to half the salary from October 2, 1953 to October 18, 1955, and thereafter to full salary and wages. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2, however, offered to pay to the petitioners only half the salary for the entire period from October 2, 1953, up to the date when they were allowed to rejoin their duties, after the dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court, and thereafter their full salaries and wages. This, the petitioners say, is unjustifiable on the ground that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 should not take advantage of the period uselessly spent by them in successive appeals, during which period the petitioners were debarred from rejoining their duties. Since there was the difference, as aforesaid, in the matter of computation, of benefits under the award, the petitioners applied before the Second Labour. Court, under the provisions of section; 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes: Act, for the computation of the benefits; under the award in terms of money.
5. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the Second. Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, on the ground that the said Labour Court had not been specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, The Labour Court upheld the objection as to jurisdiction, by its order, dated February 15, 1961, with the following observation:—
“The Government of West Bengal has not issued any general order specifying the Second Labour Court for computation in all cases; nor has it specified the Second Labour Court for the purpose of computation in respect of the present applications. So I agree with Shri S.G Sen that I have no jurisdiction to entertain the present applications. Hence I reject these applications.”
6. The petitioners have moved this Court against the aforesaid order praying for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent No. 4, Labour Court, to withdraw or cancel the order, dated. February 15, 1961, and for a writ of Certiorari for the quashing of the same.
7. Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee, learned Advocate for the petitioners contended that Labour Courts were constituted for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the second schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, which would include a dispute over computation of benefits under an award in terms of money. Therefore, without more, all Labour Courts had the power of computation and the necessity for specification of a particular Labour Court for the purpose, under section 33C(2), was merely for the purpose of convenience. In other words, he argued that even where there had been no specification of Labour Courts, under the provisions of section 33C (2), Labour Courts did not lose their jurisdiction in matters coming under that section for want of specification. In support of this argument he drew inspiration from two decisions of this Court in (1) Chatur-bhuj Marwari v. A.W Walker, (13 C.W.N 265) and (2) Jagabandhu Nandi v. Sivaprosad Bhattacharjya, (53 C.W.N 629), which deal with a similar point under the Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887).
8. In my opinion, there is good deal of substance in the argument advanced by Mr. Chatterjee. Section 33C(2) reads as follows:—
“Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court as may he specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1).”
9. In the second schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, dealing with matters within the jurisdiction of Labour Courts, item 6 includes matters other than those specified in the third schedule, namely, the schedule which deals with matters within the jurisdic tion of Industrial Tribunals. This residuary clause may be taken to include a dispute over computation of benefits under an award in terms of money, a mentioned in section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Ordinarily, only such Labour Courts will decide a dispute, under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as may have been specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government. But nevertheless, section 7 of the Industrial Dis-putes Act shows that Labour Courts are primarily constituted for the purpose of adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the second schedule, which does not exclude a matter under section 33C(2) of the Act. Section 7(1), which is material for this purpose, is set out below:—
“The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the second schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act.”
10. Mr. A.C Mitra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 1 and 2, contended that the provisions in section 7(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act notwithstanding, in the absence of specification by the appropriate Government, no Labour Court will be entitled to exercise any power under section 33C(2) of the Act. In my opinion this argument should be succeed.
11. If by their constitution, Labour Courts are entitled to exercise jurisdiction over matters coming under section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, then even in the absence of specification, by the appropriate Government, all Labour Courts may exercise jurisdiction over matters coming under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The source of jurisdiction is in section 7, read with the second schedule. The specification is only by way of distribution of business and is a matter of convenience. If such specification has been made, empowering a particular Labour Court to deal with matters under section 33C(2), that Labour Court alone may deal with such matters. But where no such specification has been made, all Labour Courts must be deemed to have jurisdiction over matters coming under section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Similar was the view which was taken by this Court in cases reported in (1) 13 C.W.N 265 and (2) 53 C.W.N 629 (supra) and also in the case of (3) Nasrdb Khan v. Deb Nath Nali, (75 C.L.J 255), while interpreting the provisions of Section 13 of the Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), which also provides for assignment, by District Judges, of civil business amongst several Subordinate Judges or Munsiffs, exercising jurisdiction over a particular local area. Section 13 of the Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887) reads as follows:—
“(1) The State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, fix and alter the local limits of jurisdiction of any Civil Court.
(2) If the same local jurisdiction is assigned to two or more Subordinate Judges or two or more Munsiffs, the District Judge may assign to each of them such civil business cognizable by the Subordinate Judge or Munsiff, as the case may be, subject to the general or special’ orders of the High Court, he thinks fit.
(3) ****”
12. In interpreting this section Cha-kravartti, J. (afterwards Chakravartti, C.J), observed in 53 C.W.N 629 (supra):—
“I am content to refer to the decision reported in the case of Nasrab Khan v. Deb Nath Nali, (75 C.L.J 255) where the matter is dealt with at page 261 of the report. There it has been held by Mukherjea and Biswas, JJ. that the source of jurisdiction of a Munsiff was the order made by the local Government under section 13 (1) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act and that order made by the District Judge of the station under section 13(2) merely distributes as a matter of convenience, and with reference to certain local areas, the civil business amongst two or more Courts, each of which has jurisdiction over the whole area. It is pointed out further that in such cases neither of the Courts loses jurisdiction which it has under the Government order under section 13 (1) of the Act.”
13. In my view the same principle should also be applied in the present case, and in the absence of specification, all Labour Courts must be deemed to have jurisdiction over matters specified in the Second Schedule, including a matter under section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The jurisdiction of Labour Courts flows from section 7 read with the second schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act and even in the absence of specification they would have jurisdiction under section 33 C(2) of the Act.
14. In the result, I hold that the Second Labour Court was wrong in refusing to entertain the application in exercise of its jurisdiction, for the reasons it did, and I quash the order.
15. This Rule is made absolute, with costs against respondents Nos. 1 & 2.
16. The Second Labour Court is directed to hear and determine the application under section 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act according to law.
17. Let a Wirt of Certiorari and a consequential Writ of Mandamus issue accordingly.
S.K.B
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