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Walford Transport Ltd. v. First Industrial Tribunal Of West Bengal & Ors.
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Walword Transport Ltd., challenged (impugned) an award made by the First Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal had concluded that certain car salesmen were "workmen" within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, and it made an award that included compensation for employees whose terminations had been considered by the Tribunal. The petitioner advanced three core contentions: (1) that car salesmen were not "workmen" and therefore the Industrial Tribunal lacked jurisdiction; (2) that the Tribunal's decision was barred by res judicata because an earlier Industrial Tribunal had held car salesmen were not workmen; and (3) that, since the Tribunal found the terminations of specific employees (Sarbasri K., P. Chakravorty and D. N. Ghosh) to be justified, any award of compensation exceeded the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
The Tribunal's factual findings described duties of the car salesmen: selling vehicles, opening bonnets to show parts, writing orders, collecting money, issuing receipts, filling order forms, calculating hire-purchase charges, and attending to post-sale service. The Tribunal concluded these duties amounted in essence to "manual and clerical combined" work and therefore fell within the statutory definition of "workmen." On review, the petitioner challenged the sufficiency and correctness of those factual findings and urged legal doctrines (including res judicata and limits of Tribunal powers) to support quashing the award.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether car salesmen fall within the statutory definition of "workmen" under the Industrial Disputes Act, such that the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the dispute.
- Whether the Tribunal's award was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because an earlier Industrial Tribunal had held that car salesmen were not workmen.
- Whether the Industrial Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by awarding compensation where it had found the terminations of the employees to be justified (i.e., whether compensation could properly be awarded absent retrenchment or wrongful dismissal).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments — Mr. Ginwalla
- The Tribunal's finding that car salesmen were "workmen" was erroneous or unsupported by evidence; the true test is what the employee was employed to do, and car salesmen's work requires initiative and imagination rather than manual or clerical labour.
- Specific tasks relied on by the Tribunal did not necessarily amount to manual or clerical work: for example, opening bonnets was not "manual work," and forms were in some cases filled by others.
- The earlier decision of another Labour/Industrial Tribunal held that car salesmen were not workmen; relying on that decision the company had arranged its affairs and the present award is barred by res judicata because there was no change in circumstances warranting a different decision.
- Because the Industrial Tribunal found the terminations of particular employees to be justified, any award of compensation was not appropriate and amounted to an excess of jurisdiction.
Workmen's and State's Arguments
- The workmen pointed to evidence that salesmen travelled, contacted prospective purchasers, and opened car bonnets; they argued these facts support the Tribunal's conclusion that the work involved manual and clerical duties and therefore brought them within the definition of "workmen."
- Counsel for the workmen and counsel for the State argued that the Industrial Tribunal's jurisdiction was wide and that it had power to award compensation — including in cases where dismissal was permitted to be confirmed but compensation was still appropriate; they relied on authorities (including Swadesamitran Ltd.) to support the view that compensation awards by Labour/Industrial Tribunals are discretionary and not easily open to challenge.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rex v. Assessment Committee of the Metropolitan Borough of Shoreditch, 1910-2 KB 859 | Illustrates that a tribunal with limited jurisdiction cannot be allowed to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction without review; factual or legal errors on jurisdictional questions can be subject to challenge (as explained by Farwell L.J.). | The court cited the case to explain the principle that findings regarding a tribunal's jurisdiction may be challenged if the tribunal oversteps its limits; it was used to frame the standard for reviewing jurisdictional findings. |
| Workmen of Kettle-well Bullen and Co. Ltd. v. Kettlewell and Co. Ltd. | Affirms that superior courts will not reappraise or rehear findings of fact by an inferior tribunal in certiorari proceedings unless there is plain excess of jurisdiction; a court with jurisdiction may decide wrongly, and absent appellate right the superior court should not substitute its view on facts. | The court relied on this authority to state that interference with the Tribunal's factual finding (whether car salesmen were workmen) is difficult, because when jurisdiction turns on disputed facts superior courts usually decline to interfere unless there is a plain excess of jurisdiction. |
| Burn and Co. v. Their Workmen | Discusses finality of industrial awards and that awards, after full inquiry, should not ordinarily be re-agitated; although Section 11 CPC may not fully apply, the policy of finality (interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium) applies to industrial awards. | The court used this precedent to support the res judicata argument: since an earlier Tribunal had decided car salesmen were not workmen and there had been no change of circumstances, the present award was vulnerable to attack on grounds of res judicata and finality of earlier decisions. |
| J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union | Holds that Industrial Tribunals' powers are derived from statute and, although wide, are limited; tribunals must confine themselves to pleadings and issues and not reach conclusions outside the scope of those issues. | The court invoked this decision to emphasise that the Tribunal must act within statutory powers and the pleadings; it used the principle to conclude that the Tribunal's award of compensation in the present case was beyond the limits of its jurisdiction because it disregarded the proper scope of its powers. |
| Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi | Mahajan, J., observed that the powers of tribunals/courts are not to be exercised arbitrarily or absolutely; benevolent despotism is foreign to a democratic constitution. | The court cited this to underline the limits on tribunal powers and to support the proposition that tribunals must work within statutory constraints rather than acting as benevolent despots when awarding relief such as compensation. |
| Swadesamitran Ltd., Madras v. Their Workmen | Establishes that compensation awarded to retrenched workers by Labour Tribunals is a discretionary matter of the Tribunal and, when properly exercised, not open to challenge. | The State relied on this case to argue that a compensation award by the Tribunal should stand; the court, however, distinguished Swadesamitran on the facts because in the present case there was neither retrenchment nor wrongful dismissal, and therefore the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to award compensation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the three principal contentions in turn, applying both factual review principles and doctrines of finality and statutory limits on tribunal powers as articulated in the authorities cited.
- On the question whether car salesmen were "workmen": the Tribunal had found (on evidence) that the salesmen performed duties such as opening bonnets to show parts, writing orders, collecting money, granting receipts, filling order forms, calculating hire-purchase charges and attending to service after sale. The Tribunal characterised these duties as "manual and clerical combined" and concluded they amounted to work within the amended statutory definition. The petitioner contested that finding as unsupported by evidence or erroneous. The court noted the general rule — drawn from authority — that findings of fact by an inferior tribunal are not ordinarily re-heard on certiorari or by a superior court when there is evidence supporting them, and that interference is appropriate only where there is a plain excess of jurisdiction. The court therefore observed it would be difficult to interfere solely on the factual question of classification of car salesmen absent a clear jurisdictional excess.
- On the res judicata point: the court observed that an earlier Labour Tribunal had held car salesmen were not workmen under the definition as it then stood (limited to manual and clerical work). The earlier decision had been followed by litigation up to the Court under Article 226. Subsequently, while the definition of "workmen" had been slightly amended to include technical and supervisory work, attempts to characterise car salesmen as technical or supervisory had failed. The court reasoned that the earlier decision addressed essentially the same question, involving the same company and the representation of the workmen (albeit possibly by a different union), and that different unions representing the same class of employees do not render the parties materially different for purposes of industrial adjudication. Because there was no change of circumstances shown to justify reopening the question, the court held the present decision was hit by res judicata and the principle of finality ("interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium") applied.
- On the excess-of-jurisdiction/compensation issue: the court examined the Tribunal's framing of the issue — whether the terminations of Sarbasri K., P. Chakravarty and B. N. Ghose were justified and what reliefs they were entitled to — and noted the Tribunal had concluded the terminations were justified and not retrenchment, and that management was not motivated by improper considerations. Despite that, the Tribunal awarded some relief in the form of compensation. The court analysed relevant authorities establishing that the powers of Industrial/Labour Tribunals are statutory and limited and that tribunals must confine themselves to issues and pleadings. It concluded that, because this was neither a retrenchment case nor a wrongful dismissal case, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to award compensation in the circumstances and that the award of compensation was therefore totally in excess of jurisdiction. While the State relied on Swadesamitran to argue that compensation awards are discretionary and not open to challenge, the court distinguished that authority on the factual basis that in Swadesamitran the award related to retrenchment, whereas here there was no retrenchment or wrongful dismissal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the award of the First Industrial Tribunal was bad and it quashed the award; the rule was made absolute.
Direct consequences for the parties (as ordered in the opinion):
- The impugned award is quashed.
- The union is ordered to pay the costs of the petitioner (Walword Transport Ltd.).
- The State is to bear and pay its own costs.
Broader implications:
The opinion rests on established principles: (a) superior courts ordinarily will not reappraise findings of fact made by inferior tribunals unless there is a plain excess of jurisdiction; (b) decisions of Industrial Tribunals on matters fully litigated should not be re-agitated absent a change of circumstances (res judicata/finality); and (c) Industrial Tribunals act within statutory limits and cannot award relief (such as compensation) where the statutory scheme does not permit it in the particular factual context (here, where terminations were found justified and not retrenchment or wrongful dismissal). The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts before it.
1. The petitioner Walword Transport Ltd. has Impeached the award of the First Industrial Tribunal. It was contended, first, that the decision of the Tribunal that car salesmen were workmen within the meaning of the term in the Industrial Disputes Act was erroneous and trial the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction in the matter if the car salesmen were not workmen; secondly, it was contended that the decision of the First industrial Tribunal was barred by res judicata by reason of an earlier decision of another Industrial Tribunal between the petitioner company and its workmen where it had been held that car salesmen were not workmen doing manual or clerical work; thirdly, it was contended that the issue before the industrial Tribunal being whether termination of services of Sarbasri K, P. Chakravorty and D. N. Ghosh was justified and the Tribunal having come to the conclusion that the termination was justified the award of compensation was in excess of jurisdiction.
As to the first contention that car salesmen ate not workmen within the definition of Industrial Disputes Act the Tribunal came to the conclusion that on the evidence the car salesmen did not have to do any technical work as mentioned In the amended section in the definition of workmen. The Industrial Tribunal further held that the car salesmen had to open the bonnet of the car to snow the various parts of the car, and had to write orders, collect money, grant receipts, fill in order forms, calculate hire-purchase charge and to attend service after sale, me Industrial Tribunal held that the duties of the car salesmen did not differ in essence from that of a salesman of any other commodity, as for example, a salesman in a cigarette factory or a salseman in a cotton goods sales organisation. The Tribunal further said,
"In all these cases as in the present case, salesman has to sell articles, receive money, do some clerical work and has to pick up some detailed knowledge about the commodity he deals in to induce the buyer to purchase his goods. If a salesman with the advantage of his general education gathers specialised knowledge in cigarette or cotton textiles over the long period of his work as a salesman of such commodity, that would not raise his work to the level of technical work in respect of such commodities. His work will continue to be the same as it was before, and I consider it to be nothing but manual and clerical combined".
This finding was challenged by Counsel for the petitioner as erroneous or based on no evidence at all. On behalf of the workmen there is the evidence that a salesman moves over from place to place and further that salesman's main duty is to contract the prospective purchasers of the new vehicles. Counsel on behalf of the workmen contended that inasmuch as the workmen had to travel and further that there was evidence that they had to open the bonnets of cars there was sufficient evidence to come to a conclusion that they were doing manual and clerical work and were therefore workmen.
3. It is true that the decision of the Tribunal will not be open to review either by way of appeal or by way of appraisement of evidence. If there is ho evidence at all the finding may be challenged. Mr. Ginwalla relied on the decision of Shoreditch Assessment Committee case reported in Rex v. Assessment Committee of the Metropolitan Borough of Shoreditch, 1910-2 KB 859 to illustrate as to how the finding of fact could be challenged by way or certiorari. Farwell L.J. said,
"It is a contradiction in terms to create a tribunal with limited jurisdiction and unlimited power to determine such limit at its own will and pleasure ..... and it is immaterial whether the decision... .on the question or the existence or non-existence of its own jurisdiction is founded on law or fact."
Counsel for the petitioner contended that as to the filling in of forms the evidence was that in some cases forms were filled in by others. As to the opening of bonnets of cars Counsel contended that that was not manual work. Mr. Ginwalla contended that the test of a workman was what that workman was employed to do. The business of a car salesman, he contended, would require qualities of initiative and imagination in the matter of sales of can and that there was nothing manual or clerical in the work. Mr. Ginwalla contended that the Tribunal usurped jurisdiction by an erroneous decision that car salesmen were workmen.
4. It has recently been held in Workmen of Kettle-well Bullen and Co. Ltd. v. Kettlewell and Co. Ltd. that the Court will not review the findings of tact reactied by the inferior Court even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision the superior Court should not re-hear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari. The Court interferes if there is a plain excess of jurisdiction. Where the question of jurisdiction turns upon the disputed questions of fact the Court generally declines to interfere. It therefore, becomes difficult to interfere in the present case on the finding of fact or on the question reached as to whether the car salesmen were workmen or not within the definition of the Industrial Disputes Act.
5. The second contention of Mr. Ginwalla was that the present decision is barred by res judicata. He relied on the decision of Burn and Co. v. Their Workmen . It was held by the Supreme Court that the legislation regulating the relation between capital and labour should seek to ensure to the workmen who have not the capacity to treat with capital on equal terms fair returns for their labour and should also seek to prevent disputes between the employer and the employees. The Supreme Court had to consider the question as to whether the award by the Industrial Tribunal could be reopened by the parties. Ordinarily an award is binding for one year. A question arose that if after an award had been given on a matter in controversy between the parties either of them repudiated the award under Section 19(6) what would happen. It was held that it would be contrary to the well recognised principle that a decision once rendered by a competent authority on matter in issue between the parties after a full enquiry should be permitted to be reagitated. Though the doctrine of res judicata as embodied in Section 11 of the code of Civil Procedure might not apply with full vigour there is no reason why the decision of Industrial Tribunal should not be subject to the maxim "Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium". The rule is dictated by wisdom. There must be finality to litigation. It is only when the circumstances are changed, that new controversies between the parties can be agitated. In the present case It Is indisputable that in an earlier decision a Labour Tribunal held that car salesmen were not workmen within the definition as it then stood, workmen then included persons who were doing manual and clerical work. Car salesmen were held not to be doing manual and clerical work. The workmen being dissatisfied with the decision came up before this Court on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. Subsequent to the order of reference in the then dispute the definition of workmen was slightly changed and it included persons doing technical and supervisory work. An attempt was made on behalf of the workmen to contend that workmen were doing technical and supervisory work and therefore they were workmen. That contention was negatived. Counsel for the petitioner In the present case contended that relying on the decision the petitioner company arranged its affairs and inasmuch as there had been a decision unless it could be shown that circumstances were changed the same decision should govern. Counsel on behalf of the workmen did not contend that there was any change of circumstances, The only contention on behalf of Counsel for the petitioner as well as Counsel on behalf of the State was that in the earlier decision the parties were different, viz., the company and another workman and the Union was different and the subject-matter was also different. I am unable to see how the subject-matter was different. One of the disputes was whether car salesmen were workmen or not. The petitioner company was a party. The Union represented the workmen collectively. In Industrial Disputes different Unions may at different time espouse the cause of the workmen. Such representation of Unions does not in my opinion make them different parties in the sense that parties are understood in the Industrial relations and Industrial disputes. In my opinion Mr. Ginwalla's contention is sound and correct. I do not see any reason as to why the impugned award should not be held to be bad on the ground of res judicata. The same question having been decided not long ago and there having been no change of circumstances to show that there should be different consideration I am of opinion that the decision is hit by the mischief of res judicata.
6. The third contention of Mr. Ginwalla is that the award is in excess of jurisdiction. The question before the Industrial Tribunal was whether the termination of services of car salemen was justified. The issue as framed before the Industrial Tribunal was :
"Whether the services of Sarbasri K. P. Chakravarty and B. N. Ghose Is justified; What reliefs are they entitled to?"Counsel for the petitioner contended that the relief the two persons would be entitled to would follow the answer to earlier limb of the issue. The part having been answered against the two persons, Mr. Ginwalla contended that they were not entitled to any relief.
7. Counsel on behalf of the workmen and counsel on behalf of the State contended that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal was wide enough and it had jurisdiction to award compensation. It was contended that the Tribunal could award compensation in cases of retrencnment. It was further contended that the Tribunal had jurisdiction while permitting dismissal to award compensation. In my view neither of these two contentions applies to the present case. The Industrial Tribunal held that the termination of the services was not by way of retrencnment and further held that the management was not influenced by extraneous consideration or improper motive. The termination was fully justified. Yet the Tribunal said that the employees were entitled to some relief. In the case of J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union , the Supreme Court held that Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act to make an award, and though their powers were wide there were limitations. The powers were derived from the statutes that created them. They are to function within the limits Imposed there and to act according to its provisions. Mahajan, J., as he then was, in the case of Bharat Banx Ltd Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi , said that the powers of Court were to be exercised not in an arbitrary or in absolute fashion because benevolent despotism is foreign to a democratic constitution. In the case of J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. , the Supreme Court said that the Industrial Courts or the Labour Tribunals were retired to confine themselves to pleadings and issues and to ascertain the real disputes between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differed. It was further held that it was not open to the Tribunal to fly off at a tangent and disregarding the pleading to reach any conclusions that they think are just and proper.
8. In the present case I am of opinion that the award of compensation is totally in excess of jurisdiction. The Industrial Tribunal for some reason or other allowed itself to award compensation when the Labour Tribunal had no such power to award any. Counsel on behalf of the State relied on the decision of the Supreme court reported in Swadesamitran Ltd., Madras v. Their Workmen , in support of the contention that if compensation had been awarded by Labour Tribunal it was not open to challenge. It was held in that case that compensation awarded to retrenched workers was a matter of discretion for Labour Tribunal and as such it was not open to challenge. In the present case it was not within the discretion of the Labour Tribunal to award compensation. If it had been a case of retrenchment or it had been a case of wrongful dismissal compensation would have been within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the court would not have interfered with it. As I have already indicated in the present case there is no question of retrencnment or wrongful dismissal and therefore there is no jurisdiction to award compensation.
9. I therefore hold that the award is bad and I quash the same. The rule is made absolute. The union should pay costs of the petitioner. The State will bear and pay its own costs.
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