Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Dilip Nath Sen, v. Certificate Officer And Others,

Calcutta High Court
Jun 13, 1961
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application for review of a judgment delivered by the same judge on 22 December 1960, by which the earlier application was dismissed and the rule discharged. The underlying matter arose from the income-tax assessment year 1945–1946 in which “Messrs Sen and Co., Proprietor Sri Panna Lal Sen” was assessed to arrears and a penalty under Section 46(1) of the Income Tax Act. A certificate for the amount was forwarded by the Income Tax Officer to the Certificate Officer, 24 Parganas, and filed on 31 March 1955; the filed certificate contained a clerical error. A notice under Section 7 of the (Public Demands Recovery) Act was served on the certificate debtor; before objection could be taken, Panna Lal Sen died. His heirs and legal representatives sought adjournments and the petitioner ultimately applied under Section 37 of the Public Demands Recovery Act; that objection was rejected and a rule was issued. Various points were argued and considered in the judgment of 22 December 1960, which dismissed the application and discharged the rule.

The present review application is founded primarily on a Division Bench judgment in Satish Chandra Bhowmick v. Union of India (C.R No. 2023 of 1960, 2024 of 1960 and 4074 of 1959 (Cal)), reported at 65 Cal WN 324, which held that the Form of the certificate (Form No. 1 / Bengal Form No. 1027) prescribed in the Appendix to the Rules Schedule II was materially different from the statutory Form prescribed by Notification No. 1637 O.C.P dated 28 December 1956. The petitioner asserts the certificate in this case is the same as that struck down and seeks review on that basis. Subsequently Act No. II of 1961 was passed to remove the difficulty created by that Division Bench judgment; the respondents contend the amendment renders the Division Bench decision inapplicable to the present certificate. The petitioner also raises an additional ground challenging Act II of 1961 as ultra vires under Article 254 of the Constitution on the basis that the subject matter falls within the concurrent list and the Public Demands Recovery Act and its rules are “existing laws.”

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application for review lies against a judgment in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether, assuming review jurisdiction exists, the facts of this case (in particular the petitioner’s subsequent discovery of a Division Bench judgment) constitute grounds for review under Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  3. Whether Act No. II of 1961 (which purported to validate/rectify the form of the certificate) is ultra vires the Constitution because it is repugnant to existing laws and was not reserved for the President’s consideration with assent under Article 254.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner sought review because, after the judgment of 22 December 1960, a Division Bench decision in Satish Chandra Bhowmick v. Union of India was discovered which struck down the form of the certificate used; the petitioner and his lawyer were unaware of that ruling at the time of the original hearing.
  • Additionally, the petitioner contends that Act No. II of 1961 (which remedied the statutory form problem) is ultra vires because the amendment relates to matters in the concurrent list and purportedly alters existing laws without reservation to the President and assent under Article 254 of the Constitution.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The learned Government Pleader and Mr. Pal contended that an application for review does not lie in respect of proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  • They also argued that even if review jurisdiction exists, the conditions permitting review under Order 47 CPC are absent in this case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Satish Chandra Bhowmick v. Union of India, C.R No. 2023 of 1960, 2024 of 1960 and 4074 of 1959 (Cal) (reported 65 Cal WN 324) Held that the Form of the certificate of Public Demand (Form No. 1 / Bengal Form No. 1027) in the Appendix to the Rules Schedule II was materially different from the statutory Form prescribed by Notification No. 1637 O.C.P dated 28th December 1956. The petitioner relied on this decision to argue the certificate in the present case was invalid; the Court observed that Act No. II of 1961 was subsequently passed to remove the difficulty identified by this Division Bench judgment.
Haji Suleman v. Custodian Evacuee Property (S) AIR 1955 Madh-B 108 Held that high prerogative writs under Article 226 were not subject to review because there was no provision to alter, modify or vacate such orders by way of review. Listed as authority reflecting a contrary view; the Court noted the conflict of authority but did not adopt this view.
Chenchanna v. Praia Seva Transport Ltd., Cuddappah, AIR 1953 Mad 39 Held that in writ proceedings under Article 226 on the civil side the Civil Procedure Code applies and the High Court has jurisdiction to review its own orders. The Court accepted this view (the Madras view) as correct and applied it to conclude that review jurisdiction can exist in proper cases under Article 226 governed by CPC procedure.
S.P Awate v. C.P Fernandis, AIR 1959 Bom 466 Held that the High Court has power to review orders in Article 226 proceedings but the power is limited; review is appropriate where there is an error apparent on the face of the record — an error so manifest that no Court would permit it to remain. The Court endorsed the restricted conception of review power as articulated by Chief Justice Chagla: review is limited and requires an error apparent on the face of the record to justify reopening.
Juli Mean v. Atar Din, AIR 1935 Rang 32 Authority for the proposition that production of an authority not brought to the judge’s attention at first hearing is not a ground for review. The Court relied on this authority to support the view that ignorance of a binding decision at the time of the original hearing does not constitute a ground for review under Order 47 CPC.
Ellem v. Basheer, ILR 1 Cal 184 Held (by a Division Bench) that producing an authority not brought to the Judge's attention at the first hearing is not sufficient ground for review; if the judge decided improperly on a point of law, that is a matter for appeal not review. The Court cited and relied on this long-established Calcutta authority to reinforce that discovery of a legal authority after judgment is not a sufficient ground for review.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed first whether review jurisdiction exists in Article 226 proceedings. Noting conflicting authorities, the judge accepted the Madras and Bombay decisions that the High Court does have limited power to review orders made in writ proceedings when civil procedure governs the process. The Court reasoned that Article 226 confers power to issue writs analogous to the King's Bench Division in England but does not prescribe procedure; in civil cases the Civil Procedure Code or High Court rules govern procedure, and therefore in a proper case a review application may lie.

The judge then turned to the proper grounds for review: Order 47 CPC permits review where (a) new and important evidence, not within a party’s knowledge despite due diligence, is discovered; (b) there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (c) for any other sufficient reason analogous to those specified. The Court held that mere unawareness of a particular ruling at the time of the original hearing does not constitute an error on the face of the record or a sufficient ground for review. Authorities such as Juli Mean v. Atar Din and Ellem v. Basheer were relied upon to support this principle — that production of an authority not brought to the judge's attention is not a basis for rehearing by review and is properly the subject of appeal.

The Court further observed that even if the Division Bench judgment could be taken into account now, the situation had been overtaken by legislation: Act No. II of 1961 was enacted to remove the difficulty created by the Division Bench decision, and thereby the certificate in the present case became compliant. The petitioner’s attempt to challenge the constitutional validity of Act II of 1961 (as ultra vires under Article 254) raises substantial questions of law; the Court considered that such a contention is not manifestly clear and does not present an error apparent on the face of the record suitable for resolution in a review application. The Court noted that determining the ultra vires contention would be inappropriate in the limited context of a review.

On these bases — (i) that ignorance of a binding authority is not a ground for review, and (ii) that subsequent legislative amendment removed the asserted defect and the constitutional attack on that amendment is not a matter of manifest error — the Court concluded that the review application was misconceived.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: Application dismissed.

Implications:

  • The review application was dismissed as misconceived; there will be no order as to costs (the earlier order of 22 December 1960 stands).
  • The Court expressed the view (following Madras and Bombay authorities) that High Courts possess a limited power to review their orders in Article 226 proceedings when civil procedure governs; however, on the facts before the Court the conditions for review under Order 47 CPC were not satisfied.
  • The Court declined to decide the broader constitutional challenge to Act No. II of 1961 in the course of a review application, noting that such a question is not a proper basis for review absent an error apparent on the face of the record.
Show all summary ...

1. This is an application for review of a judgment passed herein by me on the 22nd December, 1960 by which the application was dismissed and the rule was discharged. The facts are shortly as follows: For the income-tax assessment year 1945-1946 “Messrs Sen and Co., Proprietor Sri Panna Lal Sen” was found liable to pay a certain sum as arrears of income-tax and a certain penalty was imposed under Section 46(1) of the Income Tax Act. Thereafter, the Income Tax Officer forwarded to the Certificate Officer, 24 Parganas, a certificate for the said amount and on the 31st March 1955 a certificate was filed by the Certificate Officer, 24 Parganas. In the certificate as filed, there was a clerical error. Notice under Section 7 of the Act was served on the certificate debtor but before he could object Panna Lal Sen died. At the instance of the heirs and legal representatives of Panna Lal Sen, the matter was adjourned from time to time and ultimately an application was made by the petitioner under Section 37 of the Public Demands Recovery Act. This objection was rejected and a rule was taken out from this Court Various points were taken in support of the application, which have been fully discussed in my judgment dated 22nd December, 1960. As stated above, the application was dismissed and the rule was discharged. Now this application toil review has been made on the ground that on the 16th September, 1960 a Division Bench of this Court presided over by Banerjee, J., has by Judgment delivered on September 16, 1960, in the case of Satish Chandra Bhowmick v. Union of India, being C.R No. 2023 of 1960, 2024 of 1960 and 4074 of 1959 (Cal) held inter alia that the Form of the certificate of Public Demand under Sections 4 and 6 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, being Form No. 1 (Bengal Form No. 1027) set out in the Appendix to the Rules Schedule II of the said Act, was materially different from the statutory Form, as prescribed by Notification No. 1637 O.C.P dated the 28th December 1956 published in the Calcutta Gazette dated. January 12, 1956 by the Board of Revenue. It is stated now that the form of the certificate in the present case is the same as was struck down by the said judgment and therefore, there should be a review of the order, and upon that ground the order made by me on the 22nd December, 1960 should be set aside and varied. It is stated that at the time the case was heard and judgment delivered by me, the petitioner and his lawyer did not know of the said Division Bench, judgment which has now been reported in 65 Cal WN 324. There is another fact which is relevant for the purposes of this application. Consequent upon the said Division Bench judgment, an Act has been passed, being Act No. II of 1961 whereby, the difficulty caused by the said judgment has been removed. Under the said amendment the certificate issued in this case is in proper form. Faced with this, Mr. Das appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has taken an additional ground in this application to the effect the said Act II of 1961 is ultra vires inasmuch, the subject-matter of the amendment comes within the concurrent list of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, and as the Public Demands Recovery Act and the rules framed thereunder are ‘existing Laws,’ there cannot be an amendment or alteration which is repugnant to the provisions of the such existing law, not having been reserved for the consideration of the President and not having been received his assent under Article 254 of the Constitution.

2. The learned Government Pleader and Mr. Pal appearing on behalf of the respondents have contested this application on two grounds. The first ground is that an application for review does not lie in respect of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The second point is that assuming such, an application lies, the conditions which permit a review do not exist in this case.

3. The fact that the petitioner was unaware the particular ruling at the time when the case was disposed of, does not constitute an error on the face of the proceedings or any of the grounds on which a review application can be maintained under Order 47 of the CPC.

4. Coming now to the first point, there appears to be some conflict of authority. In a Division Bench Judgment of the Madhya Bharat High Court, Haji Suleman v. Custodian Evacuee Property, (S) AIR 1955 Madh-B 108 it has been held that high prerogative writs were issued under Article 226, and there was no provision therein by which an order once made could be altered, modified or vacated by way of a review. On the other hand, in a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, Chenchanna v. Praia Seva Transport Ltd., Cuddappah, AIR 1953 Mad 39 it has been held that in the case of an application for a writ under Article 226, made on the civil side of the High Court, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply and the High Court has jurisdiction to review its own order. In a Bombay case, S.P Awate v. C.P Fernandis, AIR 1959 Bom 466 Chagla, C.J was dealing with a case of review of an application under Article 226. Although it does not appear to have been specifically argued that an application for review does not lie in this jurisdiction, the learned Chief Justice held that the High Court had power of review in such an application, but that the power was very limited. It was held that where a decision was challenged on the ground that there was an error apparent on the face of the record, he error contemplated was an error so manifest, so clear, that no Court would permit such an error to remain on the record. In my view, the Madras and Bombay views are the correct view. Article 226 of the Constitution gives power to the High Courts to issue writs and make orders in the same fashion as are made in the Kings Bench Division in England. The procedure however has not been set out in the Constitution, and in civil cases the procedure will be such as is laid down in the Civil Procedure Code or the rules framed by the Court. I do not see, therefore, why in a proper case an application for review should not lie. The question, however, is as to whether, upon the facts and circumstances of this case, a review application can be maintained. The grounds on which an application for review of judgment can be made have been laid down in Order 47 of the CPC. A review application would lie where a party has discovered new and important matters of evidence, which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge and could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, or where there was some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reasons. The sufficient reason must be on grounds analogous to those specified previously. In this particular case, the ground is that at the time when the order was made the petitioner and his law yer was not aware of a certain ruling. That, however, has never been considered as a ground for review. See Juli Mean v. Atar Din, AIR 1935 Rang 32. So far as this High Court is concerned, this position has been laid down as early as 1875, in Ellem v. Basheer, ILR 1 Cal 184 by a Division Bench presided over by Mr. Richard Garth, C.J It was held that the production of an authority, which was not brought to the notice of the Judge at the first hearing and which lays down a view of the law contrary to that taken by the Judge, is not a sufficient ground for granting a review. The learned Chief Justice stated as follows:

“…………the Subordinate Judge of Sylhet reviewed his own decision….he gives as a reason for the review that he was referred by the pleader to two authorities, decided by the High Court many years ago, one of which he considered to be opposed to his former judgment. He, accordingly, made an order for the review, and reversed his previous decision.

But the case appears to us to depend upon precisely the same principle as the last, and must be decided in the same way. It is less objectionable, no doubt, in one sense, for a Judge to review his own decision than that of his predecessor's; but he has no more right to do so without sufficient reason in the one case than in the other; and we cannot consider that the production of an authority to which the attention of the Judge was not called at the first trial, is sufficient ground for demanding a second trial. The parties ought to come prepared with all their materials, both of law and facts at the first hearing, and if they do not come properly prepared, they ought not to be allowed upon discovering that they had omitted to bring forward some decided case, to try the case over again upon the strength of their own omission. If the Judge had decided improperly upon a point of low, that would be a matter for appeal, not for review.”

5. Apart from this proposition it is obvious that there is great difficulty in holding that there was an error on the late of the proceedings. Assuming that this Court is capable of taking notice of the Division Bench judgment at this stage, in this application, the position is that a new statute has been promulgated which has nullified its effect. That it purports to nullify its effect is not disputed. What is now sought to be argued is that the Amending Act is ultra vires the Constitution and therefore, should be declared as bad. This proposition is of course strongly contested and to quote Chief Justice Chagla in the Bombay cited above, such a position in law is not manifestly clear, and there is no error on the face of the proceeding, and there can be no order for review. It would be strange if in a review application the question of ultra vires should be decided.

6. The result is that in my opinion the application for review is misconceived and does not lie and this application should be dismissed. There will be, no order as to costs.

BF/M/K.S.B

7. Application dismissed.