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Commissioner Of Income-Tax (Central), Calcutta v. Mugneeram Bangur And Company.

Calcutta High Court
Dec 13, 1961
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Judgment Summary — G.K. Mitter, J. (with Ray, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

Four questions of law were referred to this Court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The first question concerned the competency of an appeal filed by the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle XIV, Calcutta, against an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Range-A, Calcutta. That point was not pressed before the Court and was held to be covered by an earlier Division Bench judgment (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sarkar & Co.).

The remaining inter-dependent questions arose out of the transfer of the business and assets of the firm Mugneeram Bangur & Co., Land Department (the "firm") to a public limited company, Amalgamated Land Development Company Ltd. (the "company"). The central factual matrix is:

  • The firm carried on land-development business (buy large blocks of land, develop, subdivide and sell).
  • Originally seven partners; two (Mugneeram Bangur and Charu Chandra Chatterjee) retired on 11 July 1945. The remaining five partners decided to float a limited company because they did not wish to continue with unlimited liability.
  • The company was incorporated on 8 April 1948. The five remaining partners were promoters; the company had four directors (two Bangurs and two outsiders). The capital was Rs. 34,99,300 divided into Rs.100 shares; all but seven shares were allotted to the five partners.
  • By an agreement dated 7 July 1948 the firm transferred its business and assets to the company for Rs. 34,99,300. The sale consideration was itemised and included: land (Rs. 12,68,628-7-7), goodwill (Rs. 2,50,000), other assets (motor vehicles, furniture), mortgages, deposits, advances and cash, with liabilities deducted to arrive at the total.
  • The controversy focused chiefly on the Rs. 2,50,000 shown as goodwill and whether that item in substance represented an assessable profit (essentially an appreciation in the value of land — the firm’s stock-in-trade) or a legitimate transfer of goodwill.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal filed by the Income-tax Officer against the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order was competent (the point was not pressed and held covered by an earlier Division Bench judgment).
  2. Whether the partners of Mugneeram Bangur & Co., Land Department realised a profit (assessable to income-tax) by transferring the firm's entire business and stock-in-trade to the public limited company.
  3. Whether the Rs. 2,50,000 shown as goodwill truly represented goodwill or instead represented excess value attributable to land (stock-in-trade) and thus a taxable profit.
  4. If the stock-in-trade (land) was taken over at a value greater than its book/cost figure, whether any such excess amounted to taxable profit.

Arguments of the Parties

Department's Arguments

  • There was no real goodwill in the transaction; the item of Rs. 2,50,000 was a fiction used to extract from the company an amount that actually represented the increase in the value of the land (stock-in-trade).
  • Several circumstances supported the conclusion of negligible or no goodwill:
    • The firm Mugneeram Bangur & Co., Land Department shared partners with another firm of similar name; some conveyances were executed in the other firm's name, suggesting the firm-name was not material.
    • The company’s name differed entirely from the assessee-firm's name.
    • The firm and the company carried on business from different addresses.
    • No undertaking was given by the firm members not to carry on land-development business in the old name — so any purported transfer of goodwill would be meaningless if they continued in the same trade.
    • The company's prospectus did not assign any value to goodwill when disclosing the vendor firm's balance-sheet.
  • Because the prospectus disclosed that properties taken over at cost had market values well above cost, and other items in the consideration were fixed, the department argued that the apparent appreciation must be ascribed to the land; the Rs. 2,50,000 therefore represented profit arising from the sale of stock-in-trade.
  • The department relied on authorities such as Sharkey v. Wernher (House of Lords) to the effect that, when trading stock is diverted to another enterprise or purpose, the market value should be brought into account and may produce taxable profit.

Assessee's Arguments

  • The department did not assert that the firm's goodwill had zero value; rather, the assessee contended that even if goodwill were over-valued, such a valuation cannot be impeached unless the transaction is fraudulent.
  • The essential contention was that the transfer was a transfer by the members of the firm to themselves as a company — a transfer in substance between the same persons — and therefore could not generate a taxable profit because a person cannot make a profit by selling to himself. The transaction was said to be a "slump" or re-organisation (citing Doughty's case).
  • The assessee relied principally on Doughty v. Commissioner of Taxes [1927] A.C. 327 and similar authorities to establish that a transfer of an entire business by its owners to a company comprising the same persons does not, in substance, realise taxable profit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sarkar & Co. (Matter No. 105 of 1952) Authority covering the competency issue of the Income-tax Officer’s appeal against an Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The point on competency was not pressed; the Court treated the matter as covered by this Division Bench judgment and did not decide the point afresh.
Doughty v. Commissioner of Taxes [1927] A.C. 327 Establishes that where partners transfer the whole business to a company consisting of the same persons (a slump transaction), there may be no real sale giving rise to taxable profit — "a vendor cannot profit from himself" in such a transaction. Treated as the assessee's "sheet anchor"; the Court found Doughty's principles strictly applicable and conclusive on the principal question, and relied on it to hold there was no taxable profit from the transfer.
Kikabhai Premchand v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Supreme Court) Majority held it is artificial to separate a business from its owner and create a fictional profit by a sale to oneself; the substance of transaction controls over form. The Court stated it was bound by Kikabhai and adopted its principle that a fictional sale to oneself does not produce taxable profit; the decision was preferred over Sharkey when they conflicted.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Sir Homi M. Mehta ([1955] 28 I.T.R. 928) Held that a transfer of shares/ assets by a person to a company in which he (and family) are the only substantial interested parties did not produce taxable profit; "a vendor cannot make profit out of himself." Cited as supportive authority; the Court regarded its reasoning as analogous and noted similarity of allotments to family/ insiders in that case and the present facts.
Rogers & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1958] 34 I.T.R. 336 Conversion of a firm into a company composed of the same members is a mere re-adjustment and not a sale; entries in books do not necessarily represent a real sale price. Followed as an authority that such conversions are not commercial sales capable of producing taxable profit; used to reinforce the view that the transaction here was a re-organisation rather than a profit-making sale.
Sharkey v. Wernher (House of Lords) Where trading stock is diverted from one taxable activity to another (or to personal use), the trading account should be credited with an amount (commonly market value) and that may produce taxable profit; rejects treating self-transfers as necessarily non-taxable in all situations. Cited by the department and examined at length. The Court recognised Sharkey's rule but considered it to be in conflict with Kikabhai; the Court felt bound by Kikabhai and therefore did not follow Sharkey for the present facts (distinguished on grounds of substance and identity of parties).
Watson Brothers v. Hornby Authority referenced in Sharkey to support treating parts of an enterprise as distinct for tax accounting (involving transfers between parts of enterprise). Cited within the Court's discussion of Sharkey; the Court noted its role in the reasoning of Sharkey but relied on domestic authorities (Kikabhai, Doughty) as binding.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. William Ransom & Son Ltd. [1918] 2 K.B. 709 Recognised, for tax purposes, the possibility of treating parts of an enterprise as distinct activities for accountancy of trading stock. Referred to as part of the Sharkey discussion; not adopted as the controlling rule by this Court, which considered it inconsistent with the binding Supreme Court authority in Kikabhai.
Box v. Commissioner of Taxation, 86 C.L.R. 387 Cited as a useful collection of judicial interpretations of the term "goodwill". Referred to in the Court's discussion to illustrate the variety of meanings attached to "goodwill"; used as a contextual source for defining goodwill in the present case.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Mutter & Company's Margarine Ltd. [1901] A.C. 217 Lord Lindley’s inclusive formulation of "goodwill" (situation, name, reputation, connexion, introduction to customers, absence of competition, etc.). Quoted as an authoritative description of goodwill to assist in evaluating whether the firm possessed goodwill transferable in substance to the company; used to analyse the nature of any goodwill the Bangurs might have had.
Californian Copper Syndicate v. Harris Where a corporate object and conduct indicate a business intended to make profit by sale/exploitation of property, profit realised on disposal (even by exchange into shares) may be assessable. Considered and distinguished. The Court found its facts materially different (there, distinct entities and commercial intention to exploit for profit) and held Californian Copper Syndicate inapplicable to the present case.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bai Shrihbai K. Kooka Addresses valuation of shares/stock brought into business upon conversion and the proper base (market value on conversion date) for computing profits in subsequent sales. Cited and discussed. The Court used the case to consider valuation principles on commencement of business and to observe that, for accounting purposes, stock-in-trade brought into a new business should be valued at market value on the date of commencement — but ultimately the Court's conclusion turned on the absence of a real sale producing taxable profit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps (relying only on the material in the opinion):

  1. First question (competency): the point was not pressed before the Court and the Court considered it covered by a Division Bench decision (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sarkar & Co.), so no independent determination was made on that issue.
  2. The core questions concerned whether the transfer of the firm's entire business and stock-in-trade to a limited company (largely owned by the same persons) produced a profit assessable to income-tax, with particular focus on the Rs. 2,50,000 shown as goodwill.
  3. The Court examined the parties' positions: the department argued the goodwill figure was really an artificial device to attribute appreciation in land value to goodwill; the assessee relied primarily on Doughty and submitted that, in substance, the partners had transferred the business to themselves and so could not have realised a taxable profit.
  4. The Court reviewed relevant authorities. It explained Doughty (a slump transaction leading to no taxable profit) and noted that Indian authorities—most importantly Kikabhai Premchand (Supreme Court majority)—support the proposition that one cannot create a taxable profit by a purely fictional sale to oneself. The Court stated it was bound by Kikabhai.
  5. The Court considered Bombay High Court authorities (Sir Homi Mehta; Rogers & Co.) that applied the "no profit on a sale to oneself" principle and found them supportive of the assessee's position.
  6. The Court analysed Sharkey v. Wernher (House of Lords), which held that when trading stock is diverted to another activity the trading account should reflect market value and this may produce assessable profit. The Court acknowledged Sharkey but observed that it conflicted with Kikabhai; since the Court was bound by Kikabhai it did not adopt Sharkey's approach for the present facts and distinguished it on commercial-substance grounds.
  7. On the concept of goodwill, the Court discussed authoritative definitions (Margarine Ltd., Box) and analysed the factual indicia of goodwill: the company neither used the firm's name nor its place of business and there was no undertaking by firm members not to compete. The Court concluded any goodwill was essentially personal to the Bangurs and, absent renunciation of the right to carry on that trade, a purported transfer of goodwill without an anti-competition undertaking was meaningless.
  8. Bringing these strands together, the Court held that the Rs. 2,50,000 shown as goodwill must, in reality, represent surplus attributable to the sale of the land (stock-in-trade). However, because the transfer was, in substance, a transfer to themselves (a slump/re-organisation), no taxable profit arose from the transaction.
  9. The Court also addressed the subsidiary question that even if the stock-in-trade value taken over by the company exceeded the figure in the agreement, by reason of the principal holding (no profit on the transfer in substance) there was no taxable profit.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: There was no taxable profit arising from the transfer of the firm's entire business and stock-in-trade to the Amalgamated Land Development Company Ltd.; the reference is answered in favour of the assessee on that point.

Direct consequences recorded in the opinion:

  • The Court answered Question No. 4 by holding that there was no profit in the transaction by which the firm's entire stock-in-trade and business were transferred to the limited company.
  • With respect to goodwill, the Court held that the Rs. 2,50,000 shown as goodwill did not represent a genuine, transferable goodwill (given the company did not use the firm's name or place of business and no non-compete was given) and must be regarded as representing surplus on the sale of lands (stock-in-trade).
  • On Question No. 3 the Court held that even if the company-valued stock-in-trade exceeded the agreement figure, in view of the answer to Question No. 4 (no profit in substance) there was no taxable profit.
  • The first procedural point (competency of the Income-tax Officer’s appeal) was left as covered by the earlier Division Bench authority; the point was not pressed before the Court.

Broader implications: the opinion rests on established authorities (notably Doughty and the binding Supreme Court decision in Kikabhai) and applies those principles to the facts. The Court did not purport to create new precedent; it followed and applied existing authorities and distinguished others (notably Sharkey) where inconsistent with the binding rule.


Disposition recorded in the opinion: Ray, J. agreed. "Order accordingly."

Show all summary ...

G.K Mitter, J.:— In this matter four questions of law have been referred to this court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The first relates to the competency of an appeal filed by the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle XIV, Calcutta, against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Range-A, Calcutta, on the ground that he was not the proper officer to do so. Before us the point was not pressed and it is covered by a judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Matter No. 105 of 1952 (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sarkar & Co.). The other questions are inter-depehdent and arise out of the transfer of the business of a firm known as Mugneeram Bangur & Co., Land Department, to a public limited company by the name of Amalgamated Land Development Company Ltd., the central question being whether the partners of the firm made a profit in the transaction which is assessable to income-tax.

2. The assessee firm, Mugneeram Bangur & Co., Land Department, had been carrying on the business of land development for many years. Its business was to buy large blocks of land in the suburbs of Calcutta, develop the same and parcel out in small plots and sell at a profit. Originally it had seven partners, six of them being Bangurs and the seventh being one Charu Chandra Chatterjee. Two of the partners, namely, Mugneeram Bangur and Charu Chandra Chatterjee, retired from the firm on July 11, 1945. The remaining partners, were not willing to carry on the business with unlimited liability and decided to float a limited company which would take over the business of the firm. Accordingly, a new company was formed in the name mentioned above and incorporated as a, public company on April 8, 1948. The five remaining partners of the firm were also the promoters of the new company which had four directors, two of them being Bangurs and two being outsiders, namely, one Walter Robert Elliot and the late Sir Bejby Prosad Singha Roy. The capital of the company was Rs. 34,99,300 divided into shares of Rs. 100 each. Out of these all but seven shares were allotted to the five partners. Rs. 34,99,300 was the consideration for which the firm, transferred its business and its assets to the company. The sum was made up as shown below in the agreement for sale dated July 7, 1948.

Rs. A.P I. Land 12,68,628-7-7 2. Goodwill 2,50,000-0-0 3. Motor car & lorries 26,866-8-5 4. Furniture, fixtures, etc. 5,244-5-6 5. Mortgage secured 17,62,367-6-0 6. Deposits for purchase of land 53,500-0-0 7. Advances paid to pleaders, solicitors, contractors' staff and other outstandings 1,83,622-3-3 8. Cash in bank 71,800-1-8 Less liabilities 36,21,029-0-9 1,21,729-0-9 34,99,300-0-0

3. The value of the land shown above was the cost of acquiring the same from time to time. Items Nos. 3 and 4 give the written down values of the assets mentioned in the books of account of the company tems Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 represent transactions in cash about which there is no dispute. The controversy in this case centres round the item of goodwill valued at Rs. 2,50,000. The case of the department was that there was and could be no goodwill in respect of the transaction effected and by the inclusion of this item the partners were seeking to get sumething from the company which really represented the increase in the value of the land. There is no dispute that the value of the land, at, the date of the transfer was much more than that shown in the agreement for sale and that land was the stock-in-trade of the firm which was taken over by the company. The department's contention that the assessee firm had no goodwill or that the value of the goodwill was negligible in the circumstances of the case is based on the following:

(1) Mugneeram Bangur & Co., Land Department, was a firm consisting of the same partners as those constituting another firm by the name of Mugneeram Bangur & Co., the only difference being that the partners had different shares in the two firms. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. also carried on business in lands and buildings and some of the conveyances purported to have been executed by the assessee firm of Mugneeram Bangur & Co., Land Department, were as a matter of fact executed in the name of Mugneeram Bangur & Co. From this it is sought to be inferred that the name of the firm in which the business was carried on was not a matter of any moment.

(2) The name of the assessee firm is completely different from the name of the new company, there being nothing common between the two names.

(3) The assessee firm carried on business at an address different from that of the company, the firm's address being No. 65, Sir Hariram Goenka Street, Calcutta, while the company's office was situated at No. 9, Clive Row, Calcutta.

(4) There was no undertaking given by the members of the assessee firm not to carry on a business in land development in the old name and style and if they chose to carry on business in that name and style a transfer of the goodwill to the company was meaningless.

(5) In the prospectus issued by the new company disclosing the balance-sheet of the vendor firm no value had been assigned to the goodwill.

4. It was further argued on behalf of the department that as the partners had stated in the prospectus issued by the company that the properties which were being taken over at cost were according to market value well above the said cost price and as the value of the items Nos. 3 to 8 were fixed the appreciation could only be ascribed to the rise in value of the land which was measured by Rs. 2,50,000, wrongly given as the value of the goodwill. Consequently, it was contended that this excess of Rs. 2,50,000 over the cost price showed the profit which was being made by the firm in the transaction.

5. According to the assessee it was not the case of the department nor the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that its goodwill had no value at all and it was argued that if there had been a transfer of the goodwill at an over-valuation the transaction could not be impeached unless characterised as fraudulent. The main contention of the assessee was and is that the transaction was in substance a transfer by the members of the firm to themselves as a company and consequently it was not a business transaction which could result in profit as a man cannot make a profit out of himself. It was also argued that the transaction was in reality a slump transaction entered into merely for the purpose of carrying on business more conveniently and the case was therefore covered by the well-known judgment of the Judicial Committee in Doughty's case [1927] A.C 327..

6. Now, if the transaction is not a business transaction resulting in any profit the question of liability to taxation does not arise. The sheet anchor of the assessee's case is Doughty v. Commissioner of Taxes. In this case the appellant and one Arthur John George carried on business at Wellington as wholesale soft goods merchants and drapers in partnership. In 1920 they converted their business into a private limited company, of which they were the only two shareholders. The arrangement which was embodied in an agreement dated June 25, 1920, was that the partners as vendors should sell to the company and the latter should purchase as from January 20 then past, the goodwill of the business, the leasehold, plant, machinery, book-debts, the benefit of pending contracts, all cash bills and notes and generally all property to which the vendors were entitled in connection with the business. Part of the consideration for the sale was the allotment of shares both ordinary and preference to the two persons, the residue of the consideration being the undertaking by the company to satisfy all the liabilities and engagements of the firm. The vendors contracted not to carry on the business of a draper independently of the company and further stated that they had subscribed to the memorandum of association for all the shares in the company in certain proportions, each of the partners rendering himself liable to that extent for the debts of the company. The nominal value of the shares being more than the sum to the credit of the capital account of the partnership in its last balance-sheet, a new balance-sheet was prepared showing a large value for the stock-in-trade. The Commissioner of Taxes claimed that the increase in value was a profit arising on the sale of the stock-in-trade on which income-tax was leviable. Before the Judicial Committee it was argued by the appellant that, if the transaction was to be treated as a sale, there was no separate sale of the stock and no valuation of the stock, as an item forming part of the aggregate which was sold and, secondly, that there was no sale at all but merely a re-adjustment of the business position of the two partners, the conversion of the business into a private limited company being for the convenience of carrying it on. In delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee Lord Phillimore pointed out that where, however, a business consists, as in the present case, entirely in buying and selling, it is more difficult to distinguish between an ordinary and a realization sale, the object in either case being to dispose of goods at a higher price than that given for them, and thus to make a profit out of the business. The fact that large blocks of stock are sold does not render the profit obtained anything different in kind from the profit obtained by a series of gradual and smaller sales. This might even be the case if the whole stock was sold out in one sale. But, upon the evidence in this case, it would appear that no such separate sale was effected. It was a transfer of all the assets of the partnership for 76,000 shares, some preference, some ordinary, all taken at their face value of £1 each, with an obligation, measured by a number of shares not paid up, to discharge the liabilities of the partnership.” Their Lordships then examined various cases cited at the bar to show the distinction to be drawn between capital sales and sales producing income and held that if the business be one of purely buying and selling, a profit made by the sale of the whole of the stock, if it stood by itself, might well be assessable to income-tax; but on the facts they agreed with Stout C.J that this was a slump transaction. They also accepted the appellant's contention that the transaction which led to the claim for tax was not a sale whereby any profit accrued to the two partners and that they made no money by the mere process of having their stock-in-trade valued at a high rate in transferring the same to a company consisting of their two selves.

7. The principle that a man cannot make a profit in a transaction in which he figures both as a vendor and as a purchaser has been acted upon in India in many cases. Thus in Kikabhai Premchand v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the Supreme Court by a majority of four to one held that “it was wholly unreal and artificial to separate the business from its owner and treat them as if they were separate entities trading with each other and then by means of a fictional sale introduce a fictional profit which in truth and in fact was non-existent”. In this case the assessee was a person dealing in silver and shares and a substantial part of his holding was kept in silver bullion and shares. He was the sole owner of the business and his accounts were maintained according to the mercantile system under which stocks could be valued from year to year on the basis of their cost price both at the beginning and at the end of a particular year. In the course of the year 1942 the assessee withdrew some bars of silver and shares from the business and settled them on certain trusts. He was one of the beneficiaries in all the three trusts and retained to himself a reversionary life-interest after the death of his wife who was given the first life-interest. After certain other life-interests the ultimate beneficiaries were charities. In his books of account the appellant credited the business with the cost price of the bars and shares so withdrawn. The assessee claimed that this transaction did not involve a profit or gain to himself and was not taxable. On behalf of the department it was argued that the withdrawal of the bars and shares from the business must be dealt with according to ordinary and well known business-principles, namely, that if a person withdraws an asset from a business he must account for it to the business at the market rate prevailing at the date of the withdrawal. It was further argued that the mere fact that the appellant was the sole owner of the business could make no difference, for, under the Income-tax Act, incoijie was assessable under distinct heads and when working out the income of a business the rules applicable to business income must be applied whoever was the owner. It was also contended that if the withdrawal took place at a time when the market price was higher than the cost price, the State would be deprived of a potential profit. This contention was rejected offhand and with regard to the first the Supreme Court held by a majority that the withdrawal was not a business transaction and by that act the business made no profit or gain nor did it sustain a loss and the-appellant derived no income from it. It was observed that the assessee might store up a future advantage for himself but as he derived no immediate pecuniary gain, the State could not tax it. The Supreme Court said: “It is well recognised that in revenue cases regard must be had to the substance of the transaction rather than to its mere form. In the present case, disregarding technicalities it is impossible to get away from the fact that the business is owned and run by the assessee himself… Cut away the fictions and you reach the position that the man is supposed to be selling to himself and thereby making a profit out of himself which on the face of it is not only absurd but against all canons of mercantile and income-tax law. And worse. He may keep it and not show a profit. He may sell it to another at a loss and cannot be taxed because he cannot be compelled to sell at a profit. But in this purely fictional sale to himself he is compelled to sell at a fictional profit when the market rises in order that he may be compelled to pay to Government a tax which is anything but fictional.”

8. The principle again came up for consideration in Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Sir Homi M. Mehta owned large blocks of shares in various joint stock companies, both public and private and dealt in them both ready and forward. The cost price of these shares was Rs. 30,45,017. These shares were transferred by him to a private limited company for Rs. 40,97,000 being the market value of the shares at the date of transfer. The assets of the company included not only the shares formerly belonging to Sir Homi Mehta but also several businesses carried on by him. In return for the assets transferred, 5,600 shares out of 6,000 shares (the total number of shares issued by the company) were allotted to the assessee, the remaining 400 shares being given to his four sons at his instance. The Income-tax Officer valued the excess of the market price of the shares over their cost price at the date of the transfer as profit made by Sir Homi Mehta in the transaction. The stand taken by the department was negatived by the Bombay High Court and Chagla C.J observed that for the purpose of income-tax a transaction must be looked at from a commercial point of view and in trying to determine whether a certain transaction resulted in profits, we must come to a conclusion that the transaction resulted in real profit, profits which from the commercial point of view meant a gain to the person who entered into the transaction, not profits from any narrow, technical or legalistic point of view. The learned Chief Justice further held that in transferring the shares to the limited company the assessee was not undertaking any business activity and said: “The important test of a business activity must always be that an activity is undertaken with the object of making profit. The object may not be realised but a businessman ordinarily and normally enters into a business transaction or undertakes a business activity with the object of making profit.” Further on, he observed: “It is well established both in English courts and in our own courts that there can be no profit subject to tax when there is a sale by a vendor to himself. A vendor cannot make profit out of himself, and therefore the transaction relied upon by the department is not a transaction which was capable of resulting in any profits.” It was also pointed out that it was a transfer in which both as vendor and as vendee only the assessee and his sons were interested and the shares transferred to the assessee represented all the shares which were transferred or sold by the assessee to the limited company and the case was not, therefore, one where shares or stock constituting stock-in-trade of the assessee were converted into different shares. The learned Chief Justice found his reasoning fortified by the decision in Doughty's case.

9. The above decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Rogers & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1958] 34 I.T.R 336.. In this case eleven persons carried on business under the name and style of Rogers & Co. The firm converted itself into a private limited company and the shares thereof allotted to the members were in the same proportion as the shares held by them in the partnership, there being a very slight difference due to rounding off to a specific number. The written down value of the block assets of the firm in their books was Rs. 3,81,848. The assets transferred to the company were valued at the original cost price of Rs. 4,85,354 and the department contended that the difference between the two figures was liable to tax by reason of the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act. Chagla C.J again held that from a commercial point of view the vendor and the vendee being the same there was no sale and the transaction in substance was only a re-adjustment made by certain persons so as to carry on business in one form rather than in another… No change has taken place except the legal change of a company taking the place of a firm.” Accordingly, the court came to the conclusion the entries made in the books of account do not represent the real nature of the transaction as far as the sale is concerned; and if they do not represent the real nature of the transaction in that sense, they equally do not represent the real transaction from the point of view of the price fixed for this transaction.”

10. As against this proposition it was contended on behalf of the department mainly on the strength of a judgment of the House of Lords in Sharkey v. Wernher, that the withdrawal of the stock-in-trade, i.e, the land from the firm of Mugneeram Bangur & Co., Land Department, must be accounted for in the books of the firm at their market value at the date of the withdrawal as in Sharkey's case and so regarded there was a profit assessable to tax. The facts in Sharkey's case were as follows:

Lady Zia Wernher carried on a stud farm and owned besides racing stables. At her farm she bred horses for her racing stables and from time to time transferred horses from her farm to her stables. In the year ended December 31, 1948, she transferred five horses from her stud farm to her stables. The cost of breeding these horses had been debited in the stud farm accounts and it was common ground between the parties that, consequent upon such transfer, for income-tax purposes, some figure in respect of the transferred horses had to be brought in the stud farm accounts as a receipt. Her activity in the farm was “husbandry” which was taxable under Schedule D to the Finance Act, but the activity in maintaining the racing stables gave rise to no liability to tax as it was a recreational enterprise. The market value of the horses transferred (if they were to be treated as sold) was considerably in excess of their cost and the sole ground of appeal against the assessment put forward on behalf of the assessee was that the proper figure to be brought into the accounts as aforesaid was the cost of breeding the transferred horses and not the market value on an assumed scale. The House of Lords by a majority of four to one allowed the appeal of the department. Viscount Simonds and Lord Radcliffe gave opinions in favour of the department and Lord Porter and Lord Tucker agreed thereto. Lord Oaksey gave the dissenting judgment. Viscount Simonds referred to the judgments in Watson Brothers v. Hornby and Inland Revenue Commissioners v. William Ransom & Son Ltd. [1918] 2 K.B 709. In the former case, the taxpayers carried on a business of poultry dealers and breeders of poultry at a hatchery belonging to them which was conceded to be an enterprise chargeable as a trade under Case I of Schedule D of the Income Tax Act, 1918. The business of the hatchery was to produce and sell day-old chicks. They also carried on farming activities which were conceded to be, for income-tax purposes, an enterprise separate from the hatchery business and, as the law then stood, was an income-tax source chargeable under Schedule B of the Income Tax Act, 1918. Most of the produce of the hatchery was sold, but a substantial number of day-old chicks were from time to time transferred to the farm and became part of the stock of poultry of the farm. The question in the appeal was whether, in computing the profits of the hatchery business, the day-old chicks transferred to the farm should be brought in at cost or market value. The market value was at the material time much below cost, viz., 4d as against 7d per chick. It was contended for the taxpayers that market price and for the Crown that cost of production should be adopted as the appropriate figure in the accbunts. Macnaghten J. upheld the contention of the taxpayers. Viscount Simonds noted that this decision had ever since been adopted as the basis of assessment by the revenue in similar cases and observed “that the taxpayer may in certain cases be subject to a sort of dichotomy for income tax purposes and be regarded as selling to himself in one capacity what he has produced in another, and, secondly, that he is regarded as selling what he sells at market price”. With regard to the second case, Viscount Simonds noted that it recognised that for tax purposes two parts of an enterprise carried on by a taxpayer should be treated as distinct. Viscount Simonds observed that he could see no valid distinction between a trader crediting himself with a price (market value) which produces a profit or with a price (production cost) which strikes a balance or reduces his loss. According to the two cases “something has to be brought into account where the legislature recognises a sort of artificial dichotomy and a taxpayer is regarded as carrying on more than one taxable activity”. His Lordship recognised that this principle conflicted with the proposition taken in its broadest sense that a man could not trade with himself and went on to observe “yet it seems to me that it is a necessary qualification of the broad proposition. For, if there are commodities which are the subject of a man's trade but may also be the subject of his use and enjoyment, I do not know how his account as a trader can properly be made up so as to ascertain his annual profits and gains unless his trading account is credited with a receipt in respect of those goods which he has diverted to his own use and enjoyment. I think, therefore, that the admission was rightly made that some sum must be brought into the stud farm account as a receipt though nothing was received and so far at least the taxpayer must be regarded as having traded with himself. But still the question remains, what is that sum to be? I suppose that in the generality of cases in which the question arises in a farming or any other business, e.g, where the farmer supplies his own house with milk, or a market gardener with vegetables, an arbitrary or conventional sum is agreed. The House was not given any information as to the prevailing practice…. But it appears to me that, when it has been admitted or determined that an article forms part of the stock-in-trade of the trader and that upon his parting with it so that it no longer forms part of his stock-in-trade some sum must appear in his trading account as having been received in respect of it, the only logical way to treat it is to regard it as having been disposed of by way of trade. If so, I see no reason for ascribing to it any other sum than that which he would normally have received for it in the due course of trade, that is to say, the market value… The unreality of this alternative would be plain to the taxpayer, if, as well might happen, a very large service fee had been paid so that the cost of production was high and the market value did not equal it.”

11. According to Lord Radcliffe “the composite proposition that a man-cannot make taxable profit out of trading with himself is of unquestioned validity when it is applied to the two kinds of activity with which it is habitually associated in income tax history, mutual insurance and certain public utilities financed by rates…. The situation presented to us is a different one. For we are required to assume… that the activities to which the accounts relate do constitute a trade for income tax purposes; and our problem is to determine what upon that basis are the proper entries to make in those trading accounts in relation to certain transactions with trade stock… all things considered, I do not think that we ought to treat the respondent's general proposition as precluding the possibility that the income tax scheme may be found to require that in certain situations a taxpayer should be treated as if he had dealt with himself on commercial terms.” His Lordship went on to say that when a horse was transferred from the stud farm to the owner's personal account, there was unquestionably a disposition of trading stock. The three methods suggested in argument for recording the result in the stud farm's trading accounts were (i) There might be no entry of a receipt at all; (2) the figure brought in as a receipt might be cost; and (3) the figure might be on the basis of the market value. With regard to the first method his Lordship said that although theoretically a trader could destroy or let waste or give away his stock, he did not do so in practice and a tax system which allowed business losses to be set off against taxable income from other sources was bound to reject such a method because of the absurd anomalies that it would produce as between one taxpayer and another. It would give the self-supplier a quite unfair tax advantage. With regard to the second method his Lordship said that “no sale in the legal sense has taken place nor has there been any actual receipt: the cost basis, therefore, treats the matter as though there had been some sort of deal between the taxpayer and himself but maintains that in principle he can only break even on such a deal. The fact that an item of stock is dis posed of not by way of sale does not mean that it was any the less part of the trading stock at.the moment of disposal. In a situation where everything is to some extent fictitious, I think that we should prefer the third alternative of entering as a receipt a figure equivalent to the current realizable value of the stock item transferred. The realizable value figure is neither more nor less ‘real’ than the cost figure, and in my opinion it is to be preferred, for two reasons. First, it gives a fairer measure of assessable trading profit as between one taxpayer and another, for it eliminates variations which are due to no other cause than any one taxpayer's decision as to what proportion of his total product he will supply to himself. A formula which achieves this makes for a more equitable distribution of the burden of tax, and is to be preferred on that account. Secondly, it seems to me better economics to credit the trading owner with the current realizable value of any stock which he has chosen to dispose of without commercial disposal than to credit him with an amount equivalent to the accumulated expenses in respect of that stock.”

12. To me it seems that the principles laid down in Sharkey's case run counter to those in Kikabhai's case. It should be noted that the reasoning of Bhagwati J., in his dissenting judgment, was in line with that in Sharkey's case. However that may be, we are bound by the principles laid down in Kikabhai's case.

13. Reliance was also placed on the judgnient of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bai Shrihbai K. Kooka. In this case the assessee had first purchased shares for investment which she converted into her stock-in-trade for the purpose of carrying on a business in shares as from April 1, 1945. She thereafter sold some of the shares in the assessment year 1947-48 and the prices obtained by her were much higher than those at which she acquired the shares or those prevailing on April 1, 1945, when.they were brought into her business in shares. The question arose as to what was the value of the shares to be taken for the purpose of ascertaining the profit. Chagla C.J took the view that the difference between the price realised at the sales and the market value of the shares on April 1, 1945, represented the profits. On behalf of the department it was contended on the basis of Kikabhai's case that as the assessee could not have done business with herself she could not have sold the shares to the business as on April 1, 1945, and therefore the difference between the price realised and the cost price should be-assessable as profits. This was negatived by the learned Chief Justice who said that the observation of the Supreme Court did not mean that even for the purpose of accountancy and ascer tainment of commercial profits it was not open to the court to value the shares at a particular price when they were brought into the busi ness merely because those shares belong to the same person who started the business and who had purchased them at a higher price………. A com mercial man would be horrified if it was suggested that from the business or commercial point of view the profit made by a businessman who brings into that business a valuable asset which he had obtained free was profit on the basis of treating the valuable asset as of no value at all, in case there was a gift of the shares.

14. With respect, it seems to me that when a man starts a business with some stock-in-trade no matter how and when the stock-in-trade was acquired, for accounting purposes it should be valued on the basis of the market price prevailing on the day when the business was started. Ordinarily, anybody wishing to start a new business has to purchase stock-in-trade and the fair value therefor should be the market value at the commencement of the business. It may be that he has received a portion of the stock-in-trade by way of gift; it may be that a portion of it had been acquired at a price much higher than the market price ruling on the day when it started his business. The fair and equitable thing to do would be to take the value of the stock-in-trade at zero hour irrespective of the method of acquisition or the price paid therefor.

15. Reference was made on behalf of the department to the case of Californian Copper Syndicate v. Harris and it was argued that the case before us is covered by this authority. I do not agree. The facts in this case were as follows:

The company was incorporated with the object, inter alia, of acquiring copper and other mines, mining rights in California or elsewhere and any interest therein and in particular to acquire the several mines mentioned in the objects clause and to sell, lease, charter or otherwise dispose of absolutely or conditionally the whole or any part of the undertaking, property rights, concessions or privileges of the company for such consideration in cash, shares or otherwise as the company might think fit. The company acquired copper bearing land in the country of Fresno, extending over 480 acres at the price of £24,000 and expended the paid up capital of the company in the purchase and development of the property. Its total capital was £28,332 divided into as many shares of £1 each. The accounts showed that the cash capital of £4,332 was spent in development, preliminary and head-office expenses. The company at first sold 80 acres of its property to the Fresno Copper Co. Ltd. at the price of £105,000 payable wholly in fully paid up shares of the Fresno Copper Co. Ltd. and sold the remaining 400 acres of its property to the same company at the price of £195,000 payable likewise within a few months after the first transaction. At an extraordinary general meeting of the Californian Copper Syndicate Ltd., a resolution was passed reducing the capital from £30,000 divided into thirty thousand shares of £1 each to £3,320-145. divided into 28,332 shares of is 2d. each issued and fully paid up and such reduction was to be effected by transferring to the existing holders of the said 28,332 shares of the syndicate, rateably 283,320 shares of £1 each fully paid up of the Fresno Copper Co. Ltd. and by reducing the nominal amount of the 28,332 shares of the syndicate from £1 to is 2d. each. The resolution was unanimously confirmed and a petition for confirmation of reduction was presented to the court. On these facts, it was held that the difference between the price and the value of the shares for which the property was exchanged was the profit assessable to income-tax. The argument that the profit was not realised profit and, as such, not taxable was not accepted. Lord Justice Clerk observed that although where the owner of an ordinary investment chooses to realise it and obtains a greater price for it than he originally acquired it at, the enhanced price was not profit in the sense of Schedule D of the Income Tax Act, 1942, but it was equally well established that the enhanced values obtained from the realization or conversion of securities might be so assessable, where what was done was not merely a realisation or change of investment, but an act done in what was truly the carrying on or carrying out of a business. His Lordship said that “although that was a sale, the price to be paid in shares, I feel compelled to hold that this company was in its inception a company endeavouring to make profit by a trade or business, and that the profitable sale of its property was not truly a substitution of one form of investment for another. It is manifest that it never did intend to work this mineral field with the capital at its disposal. Such a thing was quite impossible. Its purpose was to exploit the field, and obtain gain by inducing others to take it up on such terms as would bring substantial gain to themselves.”

16. I do not see how the facts of the case before us can be identified with Californian Syndicate's case. There the object of the company was to purchase land, develop the same and sell at a profit. There was a real sale in that the vendor and the purchaser were entirely different legal entities not only from the strictly legal point of view but also from the commercial point of view. In the present case, there may be a sale from the legal point of view, but no sale from the commercial point of view.

17. It was argued by the learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee that the case before us could be distinguished from Sharkey's case in that it does not relate to the withdrawal of a portion of the assets of a business but is a case where the business is transferred to a new channel or given a new look. It is not for me to speculate as to whether the Supreme Court would have applied the reasoning in Wemker's case to Kikabhai's case. Doughty's case was not referred to in Sharkey's case probably because in the former the business came to an end whereas in the latter it went on with a reduction in the stock-in-trade. The principles in Doughty's case are strictly applicable to the facts before us and are conclusive on the point.

18. In my opinion, the answer to question No. 4 must be that there was no profit in the transaction by which the entire stock-in-trade and the business of the firm were transferred to the limited liability company. Again the fact that two outsiders were brought in as directors with seven shares allotted to them out of 39,300 shares makes no difference. In Sir Homi Mehla's case [1955] 28 I.T.R 928., 400 shares out of 6,000 shares were allotted to Sir Homi Mehta's sons. Nor again can I see any difference in principle between the case of conversion of business into a private limited company and one in which it is converted into a public limited company, if in the latter company outsiders are not allotted any sizeable proportion of the shares issued.

19. This is enough to dispose of the matter but as questions Nos. 2 and 3 have been referred, I propose to answer the same.

20. So far as the goodwill of the firm of Mugneeram Bangur and Co., Land Development, is concerned, it would, appear that the public company did not attribute much importance to it. I do not propose to attempt to lay down any general definition of the word “goodwill”. The various ways in which this expression has been interpreted by learned judges has been very ably collected, if I may say so with respect in Box v. Commissioner of Taxation 86 C.L.R 387, 395-97.. According to Lord Lindley in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Mutter & Company's Margarine Ltd. [1901] A.C 217. “Goodwill regarded as property has no meaning in connexion with some trade, business or calling. In that connexion I understand the word to include whatever adds value to a business by reason of situation, name and reputation, connexion, introduction to old customers, and agreed absence from competition or any of these things, and there may be others which do not occur tome.” According to the Full Bench of the High Court of Australia in Box's case “Goodwill includes whatever adds value to a business, and different businesses derive their value from different considerations. The goodwill of some business is derived almost entirely from the place where they are carried on, some goodwills are purely personal, and some goodwills derive their value partly from the locality where the business is carried on, partly from the reputation built up around the name of the individual or firm or company under which it has previously been carried on.”

21. In this case, the company was neither using the name nor the place of business of the firm nor was any agreement entered into whereby the members of the firm undertook not to carry on a similar business. Indeed, so long as Mugneeram Bangur and Co. carried on a similar business no such undertaking could be given. In a business of this type, in my opinion, goodwill would be limited to the reputation of the persons carrying it on, for, I cannot imagine any customer approaching the firm on any other consideration. A person desiring to buy land would naturally ascribe importance to the reputation of the person who was selling it specially where the vendor's business is to sell land. If the Bangurs had acquired any reputation in the manner of developing lands, it would be personal to themselves. So looked at, the transfer of the business to a company, the name of which did not suggest that the Bangurs were in it, would be meaningless, so far as the transfer of goodwill was concerned.

22. But it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the Bangurs who had been carrying on business in land development had certainly acquired some goodwill in the said business and if it was not suggested by the income-tax department that the trarteaction was a sham one or that the goodwill had no value at all the department could not challenge the valuation put on the goodwill by the partners. That would be the position but for two considerations. If there cannot be a sale by a person to himself for income-tax purposes there could equally be no transfer of goodwill by a person to himself. Secondly, as already pointed out, the members of the firm were not giving up the right to carry on business in land development and, therefore, the transfer of goodwill by them in the absence of an undertaking not to compete meant nothing. As the assets of the firm transferred to the company have been itemised and as there can he no question of variation of the figures given in items Nos. 3 to 8 in the agreement for sale, it must be held that Rs. 2,50,000 shown as the value of the goodwill must be represented by surplus on the sale of lands which was the stock-in-trade of the assessee company.

23. So far as question No. 3 is concerned, even if the value of the stock-in-trade taken over by the company was greater than the figure shown therefor in the agreement for sale, in view of the answer to question No. 4, there was no profit which could be taxed.

Ray, J.:— I agree.

25. Order accordingly.