Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Motilal Chamaria v. Lal Chand Dugar .

Calcutta High Court
Aug 12, 1959
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application for setting aside an arbitration award referred under Chapter V, Rule 2 of the Original Side Rules of the Court to a Special Bench. The dispute arose from a contract dated 12th March 1951 whereby the petitioner agreed to sell and the respondent agreed to buy 20,000 pieces of D.W. Flour bags at a specified price and delivery date. The contract contained an arbitration clause referring disputes to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry Tribunal of Arbitration. The respondent initiated arbitration proceedings on 15th April 1954 alleging breach of contract and claiming damages. The petitioner contended that the claim was barred by limitation and that the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim or make an award. The Court was tasked with determining whether the respondent’s claim was barred by limitation at the commencement of arbitration and whether the arbitrators misconducted the proceedings by entertaining a barred claim.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent’s claim was barred by limitation on the date of commencement of the arbitration.
  2. If the claim was barred by limitation, whether the arbitrators misconducted the proceedings by entertaining such a claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that under Section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act, an arbitration is deemed to commence only when one party serves notice requiring appointment of an arbitrator or submits the dispute to a named arbitrator.
  • Accordingly, unless one of these conditions is met within the limitation period, the claim becomes barred and the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim or grant relief.
  • The petitioner relied on a Bombay High Court decision (Parshottamdas v. Impex (India) Ltd.) to argue that Section 37(3) overrides the general provisions of the Limitation Act.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Parshottamdas v. Impex (India) Ltd., A.I.R (1954) Bom. 309 Interpretation of Section 37(5) of the Arbitration Act and its effect on Limitation Act provisions The Court rejected the narrow construction given by the Bombay High Court, holding that Section 37(3) does not override the general provisions of the Limitation Act.
Penukonda Ratha Krishnamurtty v. Balasubramania & Co., A.I.R (1949) Madras 559 Interpretation of Section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act The Court approved the Madras High Court's reasoning that Section 37(3) should not be construed as overriding the Limitation Act generally.
Ramdutt Ramkrissendas v. E.D Sasson & Co., 56 I.A 128 Application of Limitation Act principles to arbitration proceedings The Court cited this Privy Council decision to affirm that arbitration proceedings are subject to limitation principles analogous to court proceedings.
In re Astley & Tyldesley Coal Co., (1899) 68 L.J Q.B 252 Limitation Act application to arbitration The Court noted approval of this English decision by the Privy Council, supporting the application of Limitation Act provisions to arbitration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, which incorporates the Indian Limitation Act provisions into arbitration proceedings, placing arbitration on the same footing as court proceedings. The Court rejected the petitioner's narrow interpretation of Section 37(3), explaining that the subsection specifies two notional modes of commencement but is not exhaustive. The Court reasoned that arbitration may commence by other means, such as submission of a claim according to agreed arbitration rules, as was done by the respondent with the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on 15th April 1954.

The Court emphasized that the submission of the application to the Registrar constituted commencement of arbitration, regardless of the later constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The Court also considered but rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Clause (3) of the First Schedule and the Bombay High Court decision, finding that Section 37(3) does not override the general Limitation Act provisions. The Court highlighted that Section 37(5) was a special provision for exclusion of certain periods and did not imply that Section 37(3) had overriding effect.

Historical decisions, including those of the Privy Council, were cited to support the view that limitation principles apply to arbitration as to court proceedings. Thus, the Court concluded that the respondent’s claim was not barred by limitation on the date arbitration commenced.

Since the Court found the claim was not barred, it did not address the question of arbitrator misconduct.

Holding and Implications

The Court dismissed the application to set aside the award, holding that the respondent’s claim was not barred by limitation at the date of commencement of arbitration.

The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the validity of the arbitration proceedings and the award. The Court did not set any new precedent beyond affirming the application of the Limitation Act to arbitration proceedings and clarifying the interpretation of Section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act.

Show all summary ...

Bose, J.:— This application for setting aside an award has been referred under Chapter V, Rule 2 of the Original Side Rules of this Court for decision by a Special Bench.

2. The only questions which arise for determination in this case are whether the claim of the respondent was barred by limitation on the date of the commencement of the arbitration, and if so whether the arbitrators misconducted the proceedings by entertaining such a claim. It appears that by a contract concluded by the exchange of a Bought note and a Sold note both dated the 12th March, 1951 the petitioner agreed to sell to the respondent and the respondent agreed to buy from the petitioner 20000 pieces of D.W Flour bags of certain specifications contained in the said Notes at Rs. 237/- per 100 bags F.O.R Katihar—delivery R/R 15th April, 1951.

3. The contract contains an arbitration clause which may be set out hereunder:—

“All matters, questions, disputes, differences and/or claims arising out of and/or concerning and/or in connection with and/or in consequence of or relating to this contract whether or not the obligations of either or both parties under this Contract be subsisting at the time of such dispute and whether or not this contract has been terminated or supported to be terminated or completed shall be referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry under the rules of its Tribunal of Arbitration for the time being in force and according to such rules the arbitration shall be conducted.”

4. The rule of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry which has a material bearing on the questions at issue is Rule V and is as follows:—

“V(1)—In every case where a dispute or difference has arisen between parties who have agreed that such dispute or difference shall be referred for decision to the Chamber or the Tribunal, an application for arbitration may be addressed by either party to the Registrar which application in the case of disputes relating to piece goods shall be in such form as the Committee of the Chamber may from time to time prescribe.

V(2)—On receipt of such application the Registrar shall constitute a Court for the adjudication of the dispute.”

5. Pursuant to this rule V(1) the respondent presented to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry, an application for arbitration, on 15th April, 1954, alleging that the petitioner had failed to deliver the goods and had become liable to pay damages for breach of contract, amounting to Rs. 2731-0-11. The application, in its body set out the particulars of the contract, the nature of the claim and the reliefs asked for, and it was duly addressed to the Registrar, Tribunal of Arbitration, Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry. On 29th April, 1954 the Registrar constituted a court for adjudication of the disputes, in accordance with sub-rule (2) of Rule V, and on 5th May, 1954 the Registrar sent to the petitioner a copy of the Statement of the respondent, and called upon the petitioner to submit his Statement. On 7th June, 1954 the petitioner submitted his Statement. In this statement the petitioner inter alia raised the contention that the alleged claim of the respondent was barred by limitation and the Arbitrators had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim or the reference or to make any Award.

6. Sec. 37 of the Arbitration Act contains provisions with regard to limitation and the correctness or otherwise of the respective contentions raised by the parties on the question of limitation depend upon the true interpretation of these provisions.

7. It is therefore convenient to set out the relevant provisions of sec. 37 hereunder:—

“37(1)—All the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to arbitrations as they apply to proceedings in Court.

(2) ***

(3) For the purposes of this section and of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, an arbitration shall be deemed to be commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other parties thereto a notice requiring appointment of an arbitrator or where the arbitration agreement provides that the reference shall be to a person named or designated in the agreement, requiring that the difference be submitted to the person so named or designated.

(4) ***

(5) Where the Court orders that an award be set aside or orders after the commencement of an arbitration, that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with respect to the difference referred, the period between commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the Court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 for the commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect to the differences referred.”

8. The main contention of Mr. Tibrewalla on behalf of the petitioner is that sub-sec. (3) of sec. 37 lays down the different conditions under which an arbitration commences, and unless one or other of the two specified conditions are complied with, within the period of limitation prescribed for a particular claim, such a claim becomes barred and the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to entertain any such barred claim or to give any relief in respect thereof. I do not think that this contention of Mr. Tibrewalla is sound.

9. Sec. 37(1) clearly provides that all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 will apply to arbitrations, as they apply to proceedings in Court.

10. So the arbitration proceedings are placed on the same footing as proceedings in Court, and all the provisions including Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act are attracted to arbitration proceedings. In other words the Legislature has regarded, for the application of the Indian Limitation Act, the proceedings before Arbitrators as proceedings in the nature of suits and applications, and so every proceeding for arbitration instituted, after the period of limitation prescribed for suits and applications by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence, and similarly as under the Explanation to Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act a suit is instituted in ordinary cases when the plaint is presented to the proper officer, so an arbitration is commenced as soon as a claim is submitted for adjudication before the arbitrator or the officer authorised by the Arbitrator to receive the statements of claims. In the present case the respondent had submitted the application for arbitration containing the particulars of the claim and the reliefs asked for to the Registrar, Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on 15th April, 1954 in accordance with sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. As soon as this application for arbitration was submitted to the Registrar the arbitration commenced. The fact that the personal of the arbitrators was selected and the arbitral Court was actually constituted sometime thereafter, did not stand in the way of the arbitration proceeding being instituted. It is a matter of common knowledge that it is long after a suit is instituted in a court of justice that it is assigned to a particular bench for hearing or disposal.

11. Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 37 cannot be construed as exhaustive of the circumstances under which an arbitration commences. The expression “shall be deemed to be commenced” indicates that the sub-section deals with two modes of notional or fictional commencement as distinguished from factual commencement. It is possible to conceive of cases where an arbitration can be said to have commenced under circumstances not contemplated by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 37—as, for example, when parties by an agreement in writing actually submit existing disputes to a particular arbitrator of their choice. In such a case no notice to appoint an arbitrator is necessary nor is, any notice requiring that the difference be submitted to a named Arbitrator, called for. So it is clear that the sub-section (3) was not intended to be exhaustive or to be a complete code by itself.

12. Therefore if the parties have agreed that they will be bound by the rules of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and the rules show that the initiation of the arbitration proceeding is to be made in a particular manner, there is no reason why the commencement of the arbitration cannot be made by adopting that course. It has been argued that some indication is also furnished by cl. (3) of the first Schedule to the Arbitration Act that an Arbitration commences as soon as an arbitrator is called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitration agreement. The said clause reads as follows:—

“(3)— The arbitrators shall make their award within four months after entering on the reference or after having been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitration agreement or within such extended time as the Court may allow.”

13. It has been held that this third implied condition in the First Schedule is directory in character, but this does not mean that the period of making the award does not begin to run after the notice in writing calling upon the arbitrator to act is served on the arbitrator by a party. But as against this construction of cl. (3) of the First Schedule, it may be pointed out that if it was the intention of the Legislature to make the service of notice on the arbitrator calling upon him to act, as the starting or commencement of the arbitration, this mode of commencement would also have been expressly mentioned in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 37; and the fact that it does not find place in that sub-section shows that the giving of such notice was not intended to amount to commencement of the arbitration. In my view too much stress cannot be laid on this clause (3) of the First Schedule in interpreting sub-sec. (3) of sec. 37 of the Act.

14. Mr. Tibrewalla has placed reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in A.I.R (1954) Bom. 309 at 311 (Parshottamdas v. Impex (India) Ltd.)(1) where sub-sec. (5) of sec. 37 has been construed by Chagla C.J, and Dixit J. and it has been held that the very fact that by sub-sec. (5) a specified or limited period between the commencement of the arbitration and an order setting aside an award or an order declaring that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect, is excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act for commencement of another subsequent proceeding with regard to the difference referred, indicates that the legislature did not intend that the general provisions contained in sec. 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable. In other words sub-sec. (5) of sec. 37 of the Arbitration Act overrides sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly it is argued before us that it should be construed in the same manner, that sub-sec (3) of sec. 37 overrides the general provisions of the Limitation Act. It appears to me that the learned judges of the Bombay High Court put a rather narrow construction on the provisions which came up for consideration before them. It is quite possible that as sec. 14 of the Limitation Act is a general section and it does not literally apply to arbitration proceedings, the legislature felt the necessity of enacting sub-sec. (5) of sec. 37 by way of abundant caution for expressly excluding certain specified periods which are conceivable only in cases where there are previous arbitration proceedings. In other words orders setting aside awards or orders declaring that the arbitration will cease to have effect, can only be made in arbitration proceedings, and such orders are not normally made in the case of ordinary suits or ordinary legal proceedings contemplated in sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. So to provide for these special cases and to place such matters beyond all disputes the special provision as embodied in sub-sec. (5) of sec. 37 was inserted in the Statute as supplemental to sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. I am therefore unable to accept the contention of Mr Tibrewalla that sub-sec. (3) of sec. 37 of the Act overrides the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. In my view the learned judges of the Madras High Court have taken the correct view as to the interpretation to be put on sub-sec. (3) of sec. 37 of the Act in the case of Penukonda Ratha Krishnamurtty v. Balasubramania & Co. (2) reported in A.I.R (1949) Madras 559, though the process of reasoning adopted by them in arriving at their conclusion is different.

15. It may be pointed out that before the enactment of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 the Judicial Committee had held in the case of Ramdutt Ramkrissendas v. E.D Sasson & Co. (3) 56 I.A 128 that:—

“Although the Limitation Act does not in terms apply to arbitrations, they think that in mercantile references, of the kind in question it is an implied term of the contract that the arbitrator must decide the dispute according to the existing law of contract, and that every defence which would have been open in a court of law can be equally propounded for the arbitrator's decision unless the parties have agreed to exclude that defence.

Where it is otherwise a claim for breach of a contract containing a reference clause could be brought at any time, it might be 20 or 30 years after the cause of action had arisen although the legislature had prescribed a limit of three years for the enforcement of such a claim in any application that might be made to the law courts.”

16. The English decision (In re Astley & Tyldesley Coal Co. (4) (1899) 68 L.J Q.B 252 on which doubt had been cast by some later cases was expressly approved by the Privy Council in course of the judgment.

17. The Privy Council had applied by analogy the provisions of the Limitation Act including sec. 14 to arbitration proceedings.

18. The Indian Legislature accepted the law laid down by the Judicial Committee and embodied it in sec. 37(1) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940.

19. I hold that the claim of the respondent was not barred by limitation at the date of the commencement of the arbitration.

20. In view of this finding it is not necessary to go into the other question raised in this application.

21. The application is dismissed with costs.

Das Gupta, C.J:— I agree.

Lahiri, J.:— I agree.

S.N.G