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Jagadananda Roy v. Rabindranath Sikdar And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Feb 18, 1958
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (P.N. Mookerjee, J.) — Election Appeal (Falakata Constituency)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an Election Petition challenging the election to the Falakata Legislative Assembly Constituency, Jalpaiguri, West Bengal. The appellant (the successful candidate at the polls) received 14,720 votes; respondent No. 1 received 14,427 votes; respondent No. 2 received 1,979 votes. Respondent No. 1 petitioned to set aside the appellant's election on multiple grounds, but at the hearing pursued only the contention that the appellant was disqualified because he had not attained the minimum age of 25 years as required by Article 173(b) of the Constitution.

Key dates and procedural steps stated in the opinion:

  • Last date for filing nominations: 1 February 1957; scrutiny: 6 February 1957.
  • Poll held: 4 March 1957; result declared: 14 March 1957.
  • Election petition filed by respondent No. 1: received 10 April 1957 (registered as Election Petition No. 19 of 1957).
  • One-man Tribunal (Sri D.N. Chakladar) constituted by the Election Commission on 31 May 1957 and notification published in early June 1957; Tribunal assumed charge 12 June 1957; trial dates set and parties appeared; written statements filed in July 1957.
  • The Tribunal accepted respondent No. 1's contention on the age question, set aside the appellant's election, but refused respondent No. 1's separate prayer to be declared duly elected. The appellant appealed and respondent No. 1 filed a cross-objection against that refusal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant was disqualified from being a candidate under Article 173(b) of the Constitution because he had not attained the age of 25 years at the relevant dates (date of nomination, date of election, date of declaration).
  2. Whether, upon holding the appellant to be disqualified, the votes cast for him should be treated as "thrown away" (invalid) so that, on excluding those votes under section 101(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, respondent No. 1 would have a majority and thus should be declared duly elected.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant asserted he was well above 25 years at relevant times and specifically alleged he was born in 1336 B.S. (Bengali era), in the month of Bhadra.
  • Documentary and testimonial material in support included: a Certificate from the District Inspector of Schools (marked Ext. E(1)), Electoral Rolls (Exts. A(1), B(1), C(1)), and various school/college transfer and admission documents and matriculation extracts (part of documents led on his behalf).
  • Some witnesses were examined on his behalf to support the claimed date/year of birth (e.g., mother, step-brother, other local witnesses), and the appellant explained entries in records as incorrect and, in part, not corrected because of advice that lower recorded age might be beneficial.

Respondent No. 1's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • Respondent No. 1 pleaded that the appellant was below the minimum age of 25 years for Assembly candidature under Article 173(b) and adduced oral evidence and multiple documentary exhibits (Exts. 1 to 10) including school transfer certificates, admission register entries, college admission application, matriculation register extract and Calcutta Gazette publication of matriculation result.
  • On the cross-objection (seeking to be declared elected if appellant's votes were invalid), counsel for respondent No. 1 (Mr. G.P. Kar) argued from English authority and treatises that votes cast for a candidate disqualified by status (e.g., infancy) should be treated as "thrown away" and therefore excluded under section 101(a), resulting in respondent No. 1 having a majority; his submissions were advanced under three heads:
    1. That 'status incapacity' or 'status disqualification' (such as infancy) differs from other disqualifications and should, by itself, justify the inference of wilful perverseness such that votes are thrown away.
    2. That the Matriculation result showing the appellant’s age was published in the Calcutta Gazette (Ext. 10), which would amount to notice to voters.
    3. That constitutional (status) incapacity should be treated differently from statutory disqualification and notice should not be required to invalidate votes cast for a constitutionally disqualified candidate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Beresford-Hope v. Lady Sandhurst (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 79 Illustration of votes being "thrown away" where disqualification (a woman candidate for certain offices) was notorious and notice could be presumed. The court considered the case relied upon by counsel for respondent No. 1 but held it did not support the proposition that notice is unnecessary in all cases of status disqualification. Lady Sandhurst's case was treated as authority for the proposition that notoriety can supply notice.
Gosling v. Veley (1847) 7 Q.B. 406 (at p. 439) Authority for the principle that an elector may be presumed to know the law and for the requirement of notice/knowledge of factual disqualification before a vote is thrown away. The Court cited it to support the position that notice or knowledge of the facts creating disqualification is necessary before votes are to be treated as thrown away.
Fermanagh and South Tyrone Division case (1955) (cited in 105 L.J. 594) Referenced via Halsbury/secondary sources as part of the authority on the requirement of notice/knowledge for "thrown away" votes. Used in the Court's exposition of the law (via Halsbury), confirming that notice or constructive notice is required.
Reg v. Mayor of Tewkesbury (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 629 An earlier case bearing on whether notice of disqualification was necessary (treated as representing a different view which was later regarded as overruled). The court noted this case was at one time regarded as taking a different view but observed it was regarded as overruled by Lady Sandhurst's case and subsequent authorities.
Hobbs v. Morey (1904) 1 K.B. 74 Authority cited in relation to the notoriety/notice principle applied in Lady Sandhurst's case. Referred to as part of the body of English cases elucidating when notice may be presumed.
Claridge v. Evelyn (1821) 5 B. & Ald. 81 An earlier decision on election law referenced among important cases on the subject. Listed by the Court as part of important authorities on thrown away votes; used for completeness of reference.
Drinkwater v. Deakin (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 626 Case treating the law of thrown away votes; noted to be against the contention asserted by respondent's counsel. The Court cited it as authority contrary to Mr. Kar's contention and observed it was accepted in Lady Sandhurst's case as correctly stating the law.
Secondary sources: Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed., Vol. 14, section 549) and Rogers on Elections Textual exposition of the doctrine of thrown away votes and the requirement of notice/knowledge; passages used by both parties in argument. The Court relied on later passages in Halsbury (and Rogers on Elections) to state the correct, complete legal position: votes are thrown away only where voters had actual or constructive notice of the facts creating disqualification; mere status does not automatically dispense with notice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in two interconnected parts: (A) the factual determination of the appellant's age and resulting disqualification under Article 173(b); and (B) the legal question whether votes cast for a constitutionally disqualified candidate are to be treated as "thrown away" without notice, thereby entitling the second-placed candidate to be declared elected under section 101(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

A. Age and Disqualification (Article 173(b))

  • The petitioner's case relied on a collection of documentary exhibits (Exts. 1 to 10) and oral evidence. The appellant relied on other documents (including a District Inspector of Schools certificate marked Ext. E(1)), Electoral Rolls (Exts. A1, B1, C1), and witness testimony asserting a later birth year (1336 B.S.).
  • The Tribunal and this Court placed decisive weight on the appellant's Matriculation Certificate (admitted by the appellant) which recorded his age as 16 years 8 months on 1 March 1949. That entry was corroborated by a chain of school and transfer documents (Exts. 1–10) and by the appellant's step-brother's categorical oral statement that the appellant was about 9 years old when he left primary school in or before December 1941 — which supports the matriculation-recorded age and contradicts the appellant's asserted birth-year.
  • The Court found the appellant's oral testimony and the oral testimony of several of his witnesses to be unreliable or inconsistent in material respects. The Electoral Rolls (Exts. A1, B1, C1) were accorded little evidentiary weight because entries were admitted to have been made on the appellant's own statement.
  • Ext. E(1) (District Inspector's Certificate) was filed late; though admitted in the interests of a fair trial, the Court found that its age entry likely derived from the same primary school records as the Transfer Certificate (Ext. 4). Where conflict arose, the Court preferred the Transfer Certificate (Ext. 4) and related school records over the Inspector's Certificate.
  • On balance, and on the basis of the Matriculation Certificate and corroborating matters, the Court held the appellant's age to be 16 years 8 months on 1 March 1949, which rendered him below 25 years on the dates of nomination, election and declaration (including 14 March 1957).
  • Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's finding that the appellant was disqualified under Article 173(b) of the Constitution and that his election could not stand; the Tribunal was therefore justified in declaring the election void and setting it aside.

B. Cross-Objection — "Thrown Away" Votes and Section 101(a), RPA 1951

  • Respondent No. 1 sought, on the setting aside of the appellant's election for disqualification, to be declared duly elected by contending that the votes cast for the disqualified appellant were "thrown away" and therefore should be excluded under section 101(a), leaving respondent No. 1 with a majority.
  • The Court reviewed the doctrine of "thrown away" votes as presented in English authorities and standard texts (e.g., Halsbury, Rogers on Elections). The Court stated the doctrine in clear form: for votes to be treated as thrown away, the voters must, before voting, either have had or be deemed to have had notice of the facts creating the candidate's disqualification — that is, actual or constructive notice (which may arise from notoriety of the fact or otherwise). Votes cast without such notice or knowledge are good votes.
  • The Court rejected counsel's three contentions in support of treating the appellant's votes as thrown away:
    1. The argument that status disqualification (e.g., infancy) by itself dispenses with the notice requirement was not accepted. The Court found no authority supporting the proposition that status disqualification automatically renders votes thrown away without any notice requirement.
    2. The submission that publication of the matriculation result (Ext. 10) in the Calcutta Gazette amounted to notice was not advanced successfully; nothing was placed before the Court to substantiate that the publication provided the requisite notice and the point was eventually abandoned by counsel.
    3. The contention that constitutional status disqualification should be treated differently from statutory disqualification (so that notice is not required) was found unsupported by authority or principle.
  • The Court emphasized that accepting the argument that status disqualification alone invalidates votes without notice would unjustifiably deprive the majority of voters of their franchise and would contradict democratic principles under the Constitution.
  • Therefore, absent proof that voters had actual or constructive notice of the facts creating the appellant's disqualification, the votes cast for him could not be treated as thrown away; respondent No. 1 therefore could not be declared elected on that basis. The cross-objection was dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court affirmed the Tribunal's finding that the appellant was a disqualified candidate under Article 173(b) of the Constitution and held that the appellant's election was void and must be set aside.

Implications and direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • The appellant's election is declared void and set aside because he was under 25 years of age at the relevant times.
  • The respondent No. 1's cross-objection seeking to be declared duly elected by excluding the appellant's votes under section 101(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, was dismissed: the Court held that votes for a disqualified candidate are thrown away only if voters had actual or constructive notice of the disqualification; no such notice was established here.
  • The appeal by the appellant and the cross-objection by respondent No. 1 were both dismissed. There was no order as to costs in either matter.
  • The Court ordered that a copy of the judgment be forwarded to the Election Commission as early as possible.
The opinion did not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond the application and statement of existing law: it applied established authorities on the "thrown away" votes doctrine and found the facts insufficient to displace the presumption that votes cast without notice are valid. The Court did not declare any broader declaratory rule beyond the facts and analyses set out in the opinion.

Disposition recorded in the judgment: both the appeal and the cross-objection were dismissed. Sarkar, J. agreed with the judgment delivered by P.N. Mookerjee, J.

Show all summary ...

The judgment of the Court was as follows:

P.N Mookerjee, J.:— This is an Election Appeal, seeking for the reversal of an order, setting aside the election of the Falakata Legislative Assembly Constituency of Jalpaiguri, West Bengal. The applicant was the successful candidate at the polls. His election was challenged by the respondent No. 1, who petitioned inter alia for setting aside the said election on the ground, amongst others, that the appellant was a disqualified candidate, he not having attained the minimum age of 25 years at the relevant date as required by Article 173(b) of the Constitution. Respondent No. 2 was the other unsuccessful candidate at the polls and respondent No. 3 was the Returning Officer.

2. The Constituency is a single member Constituency. Three candidates, namely, the appellant and respondents Nos. 1 and 2, went to the polls. Of them, the appellant secured 14,720 votes, respondent No. 1,14,427 votes and respondent No. 21,979 votes. The appellant was declared elected and thereafter, his election was challenged by respondent No. 1 and that challenge having succeeded before the Tribunal, the appellant has preferred this appeal.

3. The petitioner (respondent No. 1) also prayed that, on declaration that the appellant's election was void, he (respondent No. 1) should be declared duly elected. This latter declaration has been refused by the Tribunal and against that refusal, there is a cross-objection in this appeal on behalf of the said petitioner (respondent No. 1).

4. Five candidates appear to have filed nomination papers. Of one, the nomination paper appears to have been rejected at the scrutiny and of the remaining four, whose nomination papers were accepted, one (Dr. Abani Guha Neogy) withdrew from the contest, leaving the appellant and the first two respondents in the field. The respondent No. 1 was the Congress candidate, the appellant belonged to the Proja Socialist Party and the third, namely, respondent No. 2, appears to have been set up by some other party organisation.

5. The 1st of February, 1957, appears to have been the last date for filing nomination papers and the nomination papers of all the above candidates appear also to have been filed in time. The scrutiny was held on the 6th February, 1957. The voters went to polls on the 4th March, 1957, which was the date fixed for the election, and the result, declaring the appellant duly elected, was announced on the 14th. On the 10th April, 1957, the petition for setting aside the election was duly filed by the present respondent No. 1, it having been received by registered post by the Election Commission, New Delhi, on that date, and it was registered as Election Petition No. 19 of 1957. The one-man Tribunal, Sri Dhirendra Nath Chakladar (Sri D.N Chakladar), District Judge, Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling, was constituted by the Election Commission on May 31. 1957, and this was followed by the issue of an appropriate notification on the 4th of June, 1957, which was published in the extra-ordinary issue of the Calcutta Gazette, dated the 6th June, 1957, and the Election Petition was duly sent to it by the Commission on or about the same date and the Tribunal assumed charge on the 12th. Meanwhile, the Election Commission had also appointed Jalpaiguri as the place of trial and 21st June, 1957, had been fixed as the date for the first appearance of the parties before the Tribunal and requisite notices in that behalf had been duly issued. The parties duly entered appearance and on the 11th and 20th July, 1957, the three respondents before the Tribunal, who are respectively the appellant and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 before us, filed their written statements.

6. Various grounds were taken in the Election Petition for the setting aside of the disputed election but, at the hearing, only one ground was pressed and with that alone, we are here concerned. That ground was one of the appellant's non-age under the Constitution for purposes of his candidature in the election and in it, the averment was that he was below the age of 25 years which was the requisite minimum age of qualification for Assembly Election candidature under the Constitution, vide, Article 173(b). This allegation was denied by the appellant and his case was that he was much above 25 years even at the date of filing his nomination paper and even when the Electoral Roll was prepared and published. This was made more specific at the time of trial and in evidence, the appellant's case was that he was bron in 1336 B.S or, to be more precise, in the month of Bhadra that year.

7. In support of his allegation that the appellant was below 25 years at all material times, the petitioner, who is respondent No. 1 before us, adduced some oral evidence and he also proved a number of documents (Exts. 1 to 10) and the appellant, who was respondent No. 1 before the Tribunal, examined, in his turn, several witnesses and also proved a Certificate [Ext. E(1)] from the District Inspector of Schools, Jalpaiguri, whose signature therein was marked as Ext. D(1). He also exhibited the several Electoral Rolls Exts. A9 (1), B(1) and C(1).

8. On the above materials, the learned Tribunal accepted the petitioner's contention and having held that the appellant was below 25 years both at the date of nomination and at the date of election, it set aside his election but it refused the petitioner's other prayer, namely, that he (the petitioner) should be declared to have been duly elected. The first part of the above decision is the subject matter of the present appeal, the second, of the petitioner respondent No. 1's cross-objection.

9. Of the witnesses, examined by the petitioner, none could give any direct evidence on the question of the appellant's age and on the petitioner's side, the only material evidence on the said disputed question of age is to be found in the Certificates and Registers and applications, etc. (Exts. 1 to 10), proved on his behalf, to the extent that they are admissible in Jaw and dependable on the point, and in the admission of fact, made by the appellant pursuant to notice. Of the documents, Exts. 1 to 10, Exts. 4 and 6 are the two Transfer Certificates of the appellant from the Primary and Middle English Schools, Exts. 5 and 7 are the entries in the Admission Registers of the Middle English and High English Schools, relating to the appellant, and Ext. 2 that in the Admission Register of the Malda College. Ext. 1 is the appellant's application for admission in the Malda College and Ext 9 is his application for permission to sit at the Matriculation Examination. Ext. 3 is the extract from the University Register of candidates for the Matriculation Examination of 1949, relating to the appellant. Ext. 10 is the extract from the Calcutta Gazette, showing publication of his result at the said Examination, and Ext. 8 is an entry in the School Register of the Dhupguri H.E School, showing delivery of Matriculation Certificate to the appellant, Ext. 8(a) being the appellant's signature therein (Ext. 8), acknowledging receipt of the said Matriculation Certificate. The admission of fact is on the question of the appellant's age in his Matriculation Certificate and this was admitted to be 16 years 8 months in March, 1949. That was corroborated by all the above exhibits (Exts. 1 to 8 & Exts. 9 & 10), where the appellant's age was entered with reference to particular dates. The above entries as to age were challenged by the appellant as incorrect but the admissibility of the above documents was not eventually seriously questioned. It is unnecessary, however, to discuss these entries in any detail as the admitted age of the appellant in the Matriculation Certificate is supported by the oral evidence, adduced on behalf of the appellant himself, and as the said evidence, so far as it seeks to contradict it, does not seem to be reliable. The appellant's step-brother (Mahanta Roy), who was examined as witness No. 2 on his behalf, clearly stated in answer to the Tribunal that he (the appellant) “was aged 9 year?” when he left the Primary School. That was admittedly in December, 1941 at the earliest, and thus it supports strongly the age, as recorded in his Matriculation Certificate, as per his own admission, and directly contradicts the appellants story that he was born in 1336 B.S According to the appellant, the entry as to his age in the Matriculation Certificate was based on the statement in his application for admission to the Matriculation Examination and that, in its turn, was taken from the Admission Register (vide Ex. 7) of the Dhupguri H.E School. The age in this Admission Register (Ext. 7) must have been entered from the Transfer Certificate (Ext. 6), of the Dhupguri M.E School which would at once refer us back to the Admission Register (Ext. 5) of the said M.E School and thence to the Transfer Certificate (Ext. 4) of the Primary School and thus the ultimate source of the entry would be the Transfer Certificate (Ext. 4) from the Primary School, which, according to him, did not record the age correctly. This alleged inaccuracy, however, far from being proved or confirmed, is really disproved and contradicted by circumstances, disclosed even in the evidence, tendered on the appellant's behalf. Thus, his witness No. 2, Mohanta Roy, who is his elder step-brother, categorically states in his evidence that, before the appellant went to the Primary School, their father had told the appellant about his age which strongly supports the probability that the appellant's age, as recorded in the Primary School, was correct. The appellant, no doubt, stated in his evidence that his father had died before he entered the school but his above witness No. 2, Mohanta Roy, states otherwise and according to Mohanta Roy's evidence, the father died after the appellant's admission in the Primary School. This is also supported by the corresponding entry in the said school record, vide Ext. 4.

10. As against the above, we have to consider the evidence of the appellant's witness in support of his case that he was born in the year 1336 B.S and the entry in the District Inspector of Schools' Certificate [Ext. E(1)], which shows him even older, the appellant's other exhibits on the point of his age, namely, the Electoral Rolls (Exts. A, B, and C), being, as we shall explain later, of little value on the said point.

11. Of the above witnesses, the appellant's mother, who was his witness No. 1, in view of her statements in cross-examination, cannot be accepted as a dependable witness on the question of the appellant's age, his elder step-brother Mohanta Roy, his witness No. 2, having made the positive or categorical statement that the appellant's age was 9 years when he left the Primary School, it is difficult to accept the other parts of his evidence, wherein he seeks to support the appellant's case as to age, as those would be clearly inconsistent with his above positive statement which remains wholly unexplained. The appellant's other witnesses Nos. 3 and 4 on the question of his age do not also seem to be very much dependable in view of their cross-examination. Thus, witness No. 3, Kanchan Roy, purports to remember the appellant's date of birth with reference to the birth of his first child, which, according to him, was noted in his note book. The note book, however, is not produced. It is stated to have been lost or stolen which explanation does not seem to be very satisfactory. He does not also remember the birth of any of the appellant's brothers or of any other children of the appellant's family, although he states that, in most of those cases also, he was told about them by the appellant's father Gopeswar. In the above context, it is difficult to accept his specific statement about the appellant's date of birth. Appellant's witness No. 4, Jamiruddin, also cannot give the year of the birth of any other child of Gopeswar. He cannot also name any person who was present when Gopeswar told him about the appellant's birth although, on his own statement, there were some people present at the time. He, no doubt, states that he remembers about the appellant's birth in 1336 B.S because of an important event which happened shortly thereafter, namely, that Gopeswar went to jail in 1337 B.S in connection with the civil disobedience movement but, in view of the other parts of his evidence, which we have discussed above, it is difficult to accept that statement, particularly when it finds no mention or corroboration in the evidence of any of the appellant's other witnesses. It is to be noted also that, according to this witness Jamiruddin, the dates of birth of his children in 1312, 1314, 1317 and 1336 B.S were noted by the village chowkidar. No such practice, however, has been referred to by any of the other witnesses. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are unable to place any reliance on the oral testimony, adduced by or on behalf of the appellant, on the question of his age and we agree with the Tribunal's view against him on this point.

12. Turning to the documentary evidence on the appellant's side on the question of his age, we may at once say that the Electoral Rolls, Exs. A1, B1, and C1, are hardly of any evidentiary value on the point, as, apart from anything else, the relative entries therein were admittedly made on the appellant's own statement. They cannot, therefore, assist the appellant.

13. As to Ext. E(1), it is to be observed at the outset that it was filed very-late. The hearing before the Tribunal started on the 2nd September, 1957. On that date, the present respondent No. 1 petitioner's witnesses were examined and early next day, his (petitioner's) evidence was closed. Thereafter, it appears, the Certificate, Ext. E(1), was filed. Its acceptance was seriously objected to by the petitioner but the Tribunal allowed it to go into evidence in the interest of a fair trial. Several witnesses were examined by the appellant for proving this document but only one (his witness No. 8) could prove it and it was marked as Ext. E(1) on his evidence. It is clear, however, from the evidence of court witness No. 1, Probodh Chandra Bhattacharya that the entry as to age in this Certificate, Ext. E(1), must be based on the Primary School records from which also the age in the Transfer Certificate (Ext. 4) must have been entered. There would thus be a conflict and in view of the oral evidence, already discussed, the entry in the Transfer Certificate (Ext. 4) should, in our opinion, be accepted in preference to that in the Inspector's Certificate, Ext. E(1). There can be no question also that, if Ext. E(1) be admissible on the question of the appellant's age, the Transfer Certificate (Ext. 4)—and many of the (petitioner's respondent No. 1's) other exhibits too — would also be admissible on the point and that, so far as admissibility is concerned, they stand practically on the same footing. That would make the appellant's position definitely worse.

14. That the appellant's age was correctly stated in his Matriculation Certificate and therefore, in the series of documents, Exts. 1 to 10, is also proved by another circumstance, to which we shall presently refer. The appellant was admittedly aware of the entry of his age in all the above documents. That entry, however, according to him, was incorrect. He further says that, at one stage, he thought that the mistake should be corrected and he suggested that to P.W No. 1, Umerali, and on the latter's advice that the lower age would be to his (appellant's) benefit, he refrained from getting it corrected. Nothing on the point, however, was suggested to the said P.W No. 1, and that makes it difficult for us to accept the appellant's explanation as to why the incorrect entry as to his age was allowed to continue and to accept also the appellant's story of inaccuracy.

15. The net position thus stands as follows:

The Matriculation Certificate, which was certainly admissible evidence on the question of the appellant's age, admittedly gives that age as 16 years 8 months on the 1st of March, 1949, and that is very strongly supported by the categorical statement of the appellant's witness No. 2, Mohanta Roy, his elder step-brother, and the appellant's evidence to the contrary and in support of his case on the question of his age is unacceptable. This is apart from the documents, filed by the petitioner, to the admissibility whereof—or, at least, of some amongst them,—some objection may be taken. Thus the appellant's age must be taken to be 16 years 8 months on the 1st of March, 1949, and on that basis the appellant would be below 25 years even on the 14th March, 1957, the date of declaration of the result of the election. A fortiori, he would be so or the date (1st February, 1957) of filing of nomination papers and the date (4th March, 1957) of the election. In that view, we affirm the finding of the learned Tribunal that the appellant was a disqualified candidate under Article 173(b) of the Constitution and his election cannot stand. The Tribunal, therefore, was fully justified in declaring the appellant's election void and in setting it aside and this appeal must fail.

16. We now take up the respondent No. 1's cross-objection. That is directed against the refusal of respondent No. 1's (petitioner's) prayer for declaring him duly elected upon the setting aside of the appellant's election. This claim is sought to be supported on the ground that the votes, cast in favour of the appellant, who has been found to be disqualified under Article 173(b) of the Constitution, are ‘thrown away’ or invalid votes and should be left out of account in calculating the valid votes under section 101(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and as, of the valid votes, so calculated, the respondent No. 1 had admittedly secured the majority, he should be declared elected under the said section, namely, section 101(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

17. The above argument was very cleverly put by Mr. G.P Kar, Counsel for respondent No. 1, on the apparent authority of a certain English decision and certain passages in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition, to which we shall presently refer, but a closer examination betrayed its inherent weakness.

18. The doctrine of ‘thrown away’ votes is based on the principle of a fair inference of wilful perverseness on the part of the electors, voting for the disqualified candidate. That inference, however, is permissible only under certain circumstances, namely, where the voters, “before the voting, have had or must be deemed to have had notice of the facts, creating the candidate's disqualification,” or, in other words, actual or constructive notice of the same, which may arise from the notoriety of the particular fact or facts or otherwise. Votes given without such notice, would be good votes. Neither the case cited by Mr. Kar, namely, Beresford-Hope v. Lady Sandhurst (1) (1889) 23 Q.B.D 79 nor the passages, cited by him from Halsbury's Laws of England, namely, the first part of section 549, p. 305, Vol. 14, 3rd edition, would support any other conclusion.

19. Mr. Kar made his submissions under three heads:

He first contended that ‘status incapacity’ or ‘status disqualification’ as in the case of aliens, infants, etc., stands differently from other incapacities or disqualifications and should, by itself, be sufficient to lead to the inference of wilful perverseness on the part of the voters, voting for such disqualified candidate. He argued that, in such cases, the disqualification is “founded on a positive and definite fact, existing and established at the time of the poll so as to lead to the fair inference of wilful perverseness on the part of the voters, voting for the disqualified candidate” and in support of his argument, he relied on the several passages, occurring in the earlier part of section 549 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition, Vol. 14, where reference is given to foot-notes (1), (m) and (n), and also on the observations of Lord Coleridge, C.J, in Beresford-Hope v. Lady Sandhurst (1) (1889) 23 Q.B.D, 79 at page 94, lines 1 to 10, of the Report. He submitted that, in such cases, no question of notice would arise and the ‘status disqualification’ would, by itself, be sufficient to invalidate the votes, cast in favour of the disqualified candidate.

20. We are unable to accept Mr. Kar's argument and the authorities, cited by him, do not, in our opinion, support his extreme contention. The law on the point may now be taken to be fairly well-settled. The question of ‘thrown away’ votes would not and cannot arise unless the votes were cast in favour of the disqualified candidate with notice or knowledge of the disqualification or of the facts, creating the same. Such notice or knowledge may be actual or constructive and may arise from the notoriety of the fact, on which the disqualification is based, or otherwise. But, where the votes are cast without notice or knowledge of the basic fact of the particular disqualification, they would be good votes and would not be thrown away. Possibly, notice of the law would not be necessary as every voter may be presumed to know the law [vide Gosling v. Veley (2) (1847) 7 Q.B 406 at page 439 and Lady Sandhurst's case (1) (1889) 23 Q.B.D 79 at page 85. See also Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition. Vol. 14, page 305, section 549, citing Fermanagh and South Tyrone Division case (3) (1955) cited in 105 L.J 594] although, at one time, a different view appears to have prevailed on the point, [vide Reg v. Mayor of Tewkesbury (4) “(1868) L.R 3 Q.B 629]. This latter case, however is regarded as overruled by Lady Sandhurst's case (1) cited above (vide Rogers on Elections, Vol. II, page 83 and Vol. III, pages 86 and 87). The preponderest view also seems to be that it is not in respect of every disqualilcation that the question would arise of ‘thrown away’ votes, even where the votes are cast with notice or knowledge of the disqualification or of the facts creating it, but that it arises only where the disqualification is founded on some positive and definite fact existing or established at the time of the poll” and the passages, cited by Mr. Kar from Halsbury's Laws of England, have reference to that aspect of the matter. Those passages, however, state only part of the law on the point and it is an incomplete statement of the same without the subsequent passages which run as follows:

“For the votes, given for a candidate, to be thrown away the voters must, before voting, either have had or be deemed to have had notice of the facts, creating the candidate's disqualification. It is not necessary to show that the elector was aware of the legal result that such a fact entailed disqualilcation. Votes given without such notice are good,”

21. And which are followed by the very significant passage to the effect that, “if, after deducting the votes, given after such notice, from the total number of votes, given for the disqualified candidate, he remains in a majority, the minority candidate cannot be seated and there must be a fresh election.” This passage, last quoted above, unmistakably shows that the law is not as contended for by Mr. Kar but that it has been correctly set out by us above. In Rogers on Elections also, we find a similar statement of the law, so far as the requirement of notice of knowledge is concerned, where the learned author says that “votes may be lost or thrown away by voting for a candidate, who is disqualified, after notice of disqualification or with knowledge of the disqualification or of the fact, creating it” vide Vol. II (Parliamentary Elections), page 80, and Vol. III (Municipal and other Elections), page 84, and in the course of discussion, all the relevant cases on the point including Lady Sandhurt's case (1) cited and relied on by Mr. Kar, are discussed and commented upon and explained by the learned author and he then sums up the ‘knowledge’ part of the law as follows:

“The result of the above decisions is that an elector, who votes for a disqualified candidate, with knowledge either of the disqualification or of the facts, creating the disqualification, throws away his vote; and such knowledge will be presumed where the disqualification for the facts, creating the disqualification, are notorious”.

22. We do not think that the law is different where there is notice in place of knowledge and the foregoing discussion will amply bear that out.

23. For our present purpose, it is unnecessary to prolong the discussion. We would only add that, in Lady Sandhurst's case (1) (1889) 23 Q.B.D 79, the notorious fact that the candidate was a woman was per se notice of the same and the court proceeded upon the view that that fact was known to all the voters concerned: [Vide pages 94 and 99 of the Report; vide also Hobbs v. Morey, (5) (1904) 1 K.B 74 at payts 78-79] and for a concise statement of the relevant law, we would refer to Gosling v. Veley (2) (1847), 7 Q.B, 439, where Lord Denman, C.J, in delivering the judgment of the Court, observed inter alia as follows:

“Where the disqualification depends upon a fact which may be unknown to the elector he is entitled to notice, for, without that, the inference of assent (which is essential for inferring wilful perverseness on the part of the elector) could not be fairly drawn nor would the consequence as to the vote (that is, of its being thrown away) be just. But, if the disqualification be of a sort whereof notice is to be presumed, none need expressly be given; no one can doubt that, if an elector would nominate and vote only for a woman, to fill the office of mayor or burgess in Parliament, his vole would be thrown away; there the fact would be notorious and every man would be presumed to know the law upon that fact”.

24. What we have said above is enough for our present purpose but, to complete reference to important cases on the subject, we would cite Claridge v. Evelyn (6) (1821) 5B. & Ald. 81 and Drinkwater v. Deakin (7) (1874) L.R 9 C.P, 626, which latter case is definitely against Mr. Kars contention, and we would conclude by pointing out that, in Lady Sandhurst's case, Drinkwater's case was accepted as containing a correct statement of the law on the point and that the former case was really decided upon the view of notice, presumed or implied from notoriety of the basic fact. This, indeed, is clear from the Master of the Rolls Lord Esher's judgment and also from the passages, which follow the citation of Mr. Kar, in Lord Coleridge's judgment at page 94 of the Report.

25. Mr. Kar next contended that the necessary notice of the appellant's age must be deemed to have been given in this case by reason of the publication of his Matriculation result with age in the Calcutta Gazette and he referred in that connection to Ext. 10. Nothing, however, could be placed before us in support of the above argument, and eventually, it was given up by Mr. Kar.

26. The last submission of Mr. Kar was that constitutional incapacity or the disqualification of status, arising under the Constitution, stands on a different footing from mere statutory disqualification, and in such cases, no question of notice should arise and no notice should be required,—for invalidating the votes. We find no authority or principle which supports such a proposition.

27. In the above view, we would reject Mr. Kar's argument. We need only point out that the acceptance of that argument would really have the effect of depriving the majority of voters of their right to exercise their franchise. That would be a clear negation of democracy and plainly, against all democratic principles and it cannot certainly be accepted in an election held under a democratic Constitution.

28. We would, accordingly, hold that there is no substance in the respondent No. 1's cross-objection and we would dismiss the same.

29. In the result, both the appeal and the cross-objection fall and they are dismissed. There will no order for costs in either.

30. Let a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Election Commission as early as possible.

Sarkar, J.:— I agree.

S.N.S