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The State Of West Bengal v. Chandi Charan Das .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent, Chandicharan Das, a rice dealer, purchased 230 maunds of rice at Mathurapur. While the rice was being transported it was seized on 29 March 1946 by Amar Choudhury, Inspector of Civil Supplies, on the ostensible ground of smuggling out of a cordoned area. The seized rice was deposited with Shaw Wallace & Ispahani Co., the chief procurement agent of the Province of Bengal. The respondent prosecuted Amar Choudhury for an alleged illegal seizure, and Amar Choudhury was prosecuted under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code; he was acquitted on 28 February 1948. During the criminal proceedings the respondent attempted to obtain return of the rice from the Sub-divisional Officer at Diamond Harbour; the rice remained in Shaw Wallace & Co.'s custody by order of the Magistrate. After Amar Choudhury's acquittal the respondent again sought return or price, but the Sub-divisional Officer on 5 December 1949 refused to return the rice or pay its price. The respondent then instituted a suit to recover Rs. 2932/8as. as the price of the rice.
The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had not proved that the defendant had utilised the rice or been benefited by it. The plaintiff appealed, and the Lower Appellate Court reversed the trial Court's decree, finding that the rice had been kept in the procurement agent's godown and had been utilised for the benefit of the State; it decreed the plaintiff's suit. The question of limitation was not litigated before the Lower Appellate Court.
The present appeal was brought by the State of West Bengal and was argued only on the ground of limitation. The State contended that Article 48 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act applied and that limitation should run from the date of seizure, 29 March 1946. The Court below rejected that submission and held that Article 49 applied and limitation began from the date the State's possession became wrongful, stated in the plaint as 5 December 1949. The suit was held to have been instituted within three years of that date.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff's claim for the price of the rice was barred by limitation.
- Which provision of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act applies on these facts — Article 48 (conversion) or Article 49 (detainer of specific movable property) — and from what date limitation should run.
- Whether the State of West Bengal can be treated as having converted the rice from the date of its initial seizure by its officer Amar Choudhury on 29 March 1946, or whether the State's possession was innocent until it refused to return the rice on 5 December 1949.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State of West Bengal) — Arguments
- The appeal was pressed solely on the ground of limitation.
- Mr. Mazumdar submitted that, on the facts, the claim was barred by limitation and that the substance of the respondent's claim was an action for conversion by the State of the rice seized from him.
- It was contended that Article 48 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act applied and that limitation should run from the date of seizure, 29 March 1946, because the respondent knew of the seizure from that date.
- Mr. Bose relied on the Privy Council decision in L.P.E. Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen (56 Ind App. 93 : AIR 1929 PC 69) to support the submission that conversion by the State occurred from the date of the initial (allegedly illegal) seizure, so that limitation would begin then.
- The State's written statement also asserted that the initial seizure was made by Amar Choudhury at his sole risk and responsibility, and that the State was not bound by that illegal action.
Respondent (Chandicharan Das) — Arguments/Contentions as presented in the opinion
- The respondent's case was that his rice had been illegally seized and detained and that he was entitled to recover the price of the rice (Rs. 2932/8as.).
- He repeatedly sought return of the rice during the pendency of the criminal proceedings and after the acquittal of Amar Choudhury, and alleges that the Sub-divisional Officer refused to return the rice or pay its price on 5 December 1949.
- The respondent's pleading alleged that the State's possession became wrongful from that refusal, and this allegation was not controverted in the State's written statement (so far as the date of refusal is concerned).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| L.P.E. Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen, 56 Ind App. 93 : AIR 1929 PC 69 | Authority relied upon to support the proposition that conversion by the State (even without dishonesty) from the time of initial seizure can cause limitation under Article 48 to run from the date of seizure. | The Court considered the case but rejected its applicability on the facts: the Court held there was no conversion by the State from the date of seizure because the chief procurement agent held the rice as an innocent custodian under magistrate's orders during criminal proceedings; accordingly the precedent did not require limitation to run from 29 March 1946 in this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in steps tied closely to the pleaded facts:
- Characterisation of the initial seizure: The Court accepted the appellant State's pleaded position that the initial seizure by Amar Choudhury was illegal and was committed by Amar Choudhury at his "sole risk and responsibility." Therefore the unlawful act of Amar Choudhury could not automatically be treated as an act of the State.
- Custody after seizure: After seizure the rice was taken into the custody of Shaw Wallace & Co., the chief procurement agent of the Government. When that firm took the rice into custody, that custody was not wrongful or illegal because it was by order of a Magistrate during the pendency of criminal proceedings against Amar Choudhury.
- Effect of criminal proceedings: From the date of seizure (29 March 1946) up to the termination of the criminal prosecution (28 February 1948), the possession of the Government or its agent was innocent and lawful because it was under Magistrate's order while proceedings were pending.
- Appropriateness of limitation articles: Although Article 48 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act covers conversions (including those not dishonest), the Court held Article 48 did not properly apply to the factual matrix because there had been no conversion by the State from the date of seizure. The Court concluded that Article 49, which prescribes a three-year period for actions when possession or detainer of a specific movable property becomes unlawful, was the more appropriate provision.
- Commencement of limitation under Article 49: The Court reasoned that limitation under Article 49 could only begin once the possession became wrongful. On the pleaded facts the wrongful or unlawful possession arose when the State (through the Sub-divisional Officer) refused to return the rice or pay its price — a refusal dated in the plaint as 5 December 1949. That date was not controverted in the State's written statement.
- Application to the present suit: Because the suit was instituted within three years of 5 December 1949, the Court concluded that the suit was not barred by limitation.
- Treatment of the Privy Council authority: The Court considered L.P.E. Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen as advanced by the State but declined to accept that it dictated that conversion by the State must be treated as having occurred from 29 March 1946 on these facts; the Court emphasized the innocence and lawfulness of custody while the magistrate-ordered criminal proceedings were pending.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. The Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation because Article 49 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act applies and limitation began to run from 5 December 1949 (the date of the refusal to return the rice), and the suit was instituted within three years of that date.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The State of West Bengal's contention that the claim was time-barred under Article 48 from 29 March 1946 was rejected; the respondent's suit was held to be within time and the appeal by the State was dismissed with costs.
- Limitation principle: On these facts the Court emphasised that when an officer illegally seizes property at his own risk and the property is thereafter held lawfully (for example, by a procurement agent under orders of a Magistrate during criminal proceedings), limitation for a claim against the State does not commence from the date of the initial illegal seizure but from the date when the State's possession becomes wrongful by an improper refusal to return the property.
- Precedential impact: The opinion does not state that it establishes any broader new precedent beyond its application of Article 49 to these facts; the decision's direct consequence is the denial of the State's limitation defence in this appeal.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed (with costs to the respondent). B. N. Banerjee, J. agreed.
Renupada Mukherjee, J.:— The appellant before us is the State of West Bengal, and the appeal was pressed only on the ground of limitation.
2. In order to appreciate how the question of limitation has arisen in the present case, it is necessary to state the following facts about which there is practically no controversy in this Court. Respondent Chandicharan Das of this appeal was a dealer in rice, and he had purchased 230 maunds of rice at Mathurapur, and while this quantity of rice was in the course of transport, it was seized by one Amar Choudhury who was Inspector of Civil Supplies under the Government of Bengal on 29th March, 1946, on the ostensible plea that the rice was being smuggled out of the cordoned area. The said quantity of rice was thereafter deposited with Messrs Shaw Wallace and Ispahani Co. which was a firm and the chief procurement agent of the Province of Bengal, as it then was. The respondent thereafter brought a criminal case against the said Amar Choudhury on the allegation that he had illegally seized the rice of the plaintiff respondent because of the latter's refusal to pay some illegal gratification to him. On the footing of that allegation Amar Choudhury was prosecuted for an offence under S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of the Sub-divisional Officer at Diamond Harbour. This case resulted in the acquittal of Amar Choudhury on 28-2-1948. During the pendency of the criminal case, the respondent made several attempts before the Sub-divisional Officer of Diamond Harbour for getting back the rice which was seized from him, but to no purpose. Under the orders of the said officer the rice was kept in deposit in the godown of Shaw Wallace & Co. at Mathurapur. No action was taken against the respondent at any time for his alleged attempt to smuggle the rice out of the cordoned area. After the final disposal of the criminal case against Amar Choudhury, the plaintiff respondent again moved the Sub-divisional Officer of Diamond Harbour for getting back the rice or its equivalent price, but that officer passed an order on 5th December, 1949, refusing either to deliver back the rice or to pay its price to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2932/8as. as being the price of the rice.
3. Various defences were taken on behalf of the State contesting the claim of the plaintiff. In this appeal we are not concerned with any of those defences, except the defence of limitation. We may just mention here that the suit of the plaintiff respondent was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant had utilised the rice in question in any way, and was thereby benefited. An appeal was preferred by the plaintiff from the decree of dismissal passed by the trial Court and the appeal succeeded. The Lower Appellate Court which was the final Court of facts has found that at all material times the quantity of rice which was seized by Amar Choudhury was kept in the godown of the firm of Shaw Wallace and Company which was the chief procurement agent of the Government of Bengal, as it then was. The Lower Appellate Court has further found that this rice was not returned to the plaintiff respondent in spite of his repeated prayers and it was utilised for the benefit of the State of West Bengal. In this view of the matter, the Lower Appellate Court reversed the decree of the trial Court and decreed the suit of the plaintiff. The question of limitation does not appear to have been raised or canvassed before the Lower Appellate Court. Mr. Mazumdar appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal submitted before us that upon the facts of this case, the Courts below should have held that the claim of the plaintiff was barred by limitation. He submitted that the substance of the allegation of the plaintiff respondent, so far as the State of West Bengal was concerned, was that his rice was illegally seized and converted by the Government of West Bengal to its own use, and he was, therefore, entitled to recover the price of the quantity of rice seized from his custody. Mr. Mazumdar contended that Article 48 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act was the proper article which should be applied to the facts of the present case, and as the plaintiff respondent all along knew that the rice had been illegally detained by the Government from the date of seizure, viz., 29th March, 1946, limitation would run from that date.
4. In our opinion, this contention of Mr. Mazumdar cannot be accepted. If we were to accept this contention, then we would have to give a complete go-by to the defence of the appellant. The defence of the appellant was that the initial seizure of the rice which was made by Amar Choudhury was made at the sole risk and, responsibility of Amar Choudhury. The seizure was illegal and the State was not bound by the illegal action of Amar Choudhury. This was the defence of the appellant State in its written Statement, and on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of opinion that this part of the defence is quite true. The Inspector of Civil Supplies, viz., Amar Choudhury was entirely responsible for the seizure of the rice which in this particular case was illegal and unauthorised. The commission of this illegality cannot be vested upon the State of West Bengal. After the seizure of the rice, it was kept in the custody of the chief procurement agent of the Government, viz., Shaw Wallace & Co. When the firm took the rice into its custody, the custody was not illegal or wrongful. Shortly after the seizure of the rice a criminal prosecution was started against Amar Choudhury under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. During the pendency of that criminal case the plaintiff respondent made various attempts to get back the rice, but without any success. The rice was detained in the custody of Shaw Wallace & Co. by the order of the Magistrate during the pendency of the criminal proceedings against Amar Choudhury. That case finally ended with the acquittal of Amar Choudhury on 28th February, 1948. Up till that date no question of the possession of the State being illegal or wrongful arises, because the rice remained in the custody of the chief procurement agent of the State under the orders of a Magistrate.
5. Mr. Bose who argued this appeal on the second day on behalf of the Government drew our attention to a case reported in L.P.E Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen, 56 Ind App. 93 : (AIR 1929 PC 69) (A) and contended that the quantity of rice having been initially seized in an illegal manner, it should be held that there was conversion of the rice by the State from the date of the seizure, and as the plaintiff respondent all along knew that his rice had been seized on 29th March, 1946, limitation should run from that date. We have already pointed out that there was no conversion of the rice by the State of West Bengal from the time of seizure. It is, no doubt, true that Article 48 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act includes all conversions, whether dishonest or not. Mr. Bose contended on the strength of the Privy Council case that conversion by the State of West Bengal having taken place, as a matter of fact, from 29th March, 1946, limitation should run from that date, although there was no dishonesty on the part of Government.
6. We are not inclined to accept this argument, because there was no conversion of any sort on the part of the Government from 29th March, 1946, and the Government, or rather the chief procurement agent of the Government, was merely an innocent custodian of the rice from 29-3-46 upto the date of the termination of the criminal proceedings against Amar Choudhury, which was 28th February, 1948. In our judgment Article 48 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act does not properly apply to the facts of the present case and the more appropriate article of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act which would be applicable to the facts of the present case would be Article 49. That article provides a period of three years as the period of limitation from the date when the possession of a detainer of some specific movable property becomes unlawful. In the present case, as we have already seen, the possession of Government, or rather of its agent, was innocent and lawful not only at the inception, but also for some succeeding period, viz., the period during which the criminal case against Amar Choudhury remained pending. Limitation under Article 49 could not, therefore, arise so long as the possession of Government was not wrongful. In our opinion, such possession became unlawful or wrongful from the date when there was a refusal on the part of Government to deliver back the paddy to the plaintiff respondent. This date was given in the plaint as 5th December, 1949. That, allegation was not controverted in the written statement of the appellant State. It goes without, saying that the State has no right to detain the goods of its subject illegally or wrongfully, and if it does so, it is bound under the law; to pay the price of the goods to the subject.
7. The broad and simple facts of the present case are that a quantity of rice of the plaintiff respondent was illegally seized by an officer of the State. Of course, the State was not a party to the seizure, but the goods were taken charge of by the State. That being so, the State was bound to return the goods to the owner or to pay the equivalent price of the goods. No question off limitation arises in such a case until there is an improper or illegal refusal on the part of the State to deliver back the goods. In this case that date was 5th December, 1949. Limitation under Article 49 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act could not arise before the last mentioned; date.
8. The suit was instituted within three years of that date, and it is not, therefore, barred by limitation.
9. The only contention urged on behalf of the appellant State having failed this appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondent.
10. B.N Banerjee, J.:— I agree.
D.H.Z
11. Appeal dismissed.
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