Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Dulal Ranjan Aditya v. R.B Bose And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Feb 11, 1958
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Judgment — Dulal Ranjan Adetya (Article 226)

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant, Dulal Ranjan Adetya, was appointed as a bus conductor in the State Transport Service on 15 May 1952 at Rs. 50 per month plus allowances. On 21 November 1956 he was served with a charge sheet alleging refusal to perform duty and gross insubordination (specifically, refusing to perform duty on Route No. 35A on 20 November 1956 and using caustic language). He was suspended with a subsistence grant.

The applicant submitted an explanation on 23 November 1956 admitting that he signed a way bill stating refusal to work. A notice to show cause dated 27 December 1956 informed him he had been found guilty and proposed discharge; he replied on 2 January 1957 and referred to his past service record in mitigation (and noted who served the charge sheet). On 23/26 February 1957 the Depot Manager of Belghoria Depot ordered his discharge with effect from 23 February 1957. The applicant appealed; the Director‑General of Transport rejected the appeal on 16 April 1957.

The applicant filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking mandamus and certiorari in respect of the dismissal. The Court (P.B. Mukharji, J.) heard the matter and delivered the judgment summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dismissal/discharge by the Depot Manager violated Article 311 of the Constitution because the dismissing authority was subordinate to the authority that appointed the applicant (i.e., whether an authority subordinate to the appointing authority dismissed the applicant).
  2. Whether reliance on the applicant's past service record (or considering it for imposing harsher punishment) without prior notice to the applicant violated the principles of natural justice and Article 311(2) (i.e., that he be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Applicant's) Arguments — as presented by Mr. Bose

  • Primary contention: The order of discharge was made by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority, thus infringing Article 311 of the Constitution.
  • Secondary contention: The discharge was based on extraneous considerations, notably reference to the applicant's past records; the applicant had no prior notice of reliance on those past records and thus had no opportunity to explain them — breaching natural justice.
  • Reliance on authority: Cited Mahesh Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1955) and other decisions to support the contention about competency of the removing authority and the requirement of notice when past records are to be relied upon.

Respondent/Government Arguments — as presented by Mr. B. Das

  • Questioned the correctness of the cases relied upon by the applicant; argued by analogy to criminal procedure that previous convictions (or past record) are relevant for sentencing only after guilt is established and need not be separately charged in the initial accusation.
  • Submitted that the charge here was serious (refusal to obey orders and insubordination) and that past records were considered only at the stage of determining punishment after a finding of guilt.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahesh Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1955) S.C.A. 65 Principle that the authority removing a civil servant must not be subordinate to the authority who made the appointment; the Court there observed that it is sufficient if the removing authority is of the same rank or grade. The learned judge found this decision did not assist the applicant; instead, the judge concluded the Depot Manager in the reorganised scheme must be regarded as having the requisite status/power for appointment and dismissal in respect of staff under him and thus meets the "same rank/grade" test in the factual context. The judge also distinguished the case because Mahesh Prasad did not concern abolition of the appointing post and reorganisation of powers.
Sankar Chandra Chatterjee v. S.N. Haldar (unreported decision of Sinha, J., 11 January 1957) Statement that if departmental enquiry proposes to rely on any part of a servant's service record to be used against him, the servant must be given notice of it and opportunity to meet it. The Court acknowledged the principle but distinguished the present facts: the applicant himself had put his past service instances before the dismissing authority in his answer to the notice to show cause, so the rule did not operate to invalidate the dismissal here.
Gopalrao Damodarji v. State Government of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1954 (Nagpur) 90–92 Principle that when other considerations (like past service record) not forming part of the charge are to be relied upon for heavier punishment, those considerations should be intimated to the civil servant to enable proper defence. The Court recorded the principle but held it distinguishable on the facts: since the applicant himself raised and sought consideration of specific past-service instances in his response to the show-cause notice, the reliance on such records did not violate the principle identified in Gopalrao.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, applying legal principles to the factual matrix as set out in the record:

  1. Procedural sufficiency and opportunity to be heard: The Court examined the chronology of notices, the charge sheet, suspension, the notice to show cause of 27 December 1956 (directing the applicant to show cause by 4 January 1957), and the applicant's written answers (23 November 1956 and 2 January 1957). The judge concluded that the notice and the opportunities afforded satisfied Article 311(2)'s requirement that the person be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause.
  2. Who was the appointing authority and whether the dismissing authority was subordinate: The Court reviewed the administrative reorganisations effected by Notification No. 1986 WT/3E‑12/53 (19 February 1953) and a later Notification No. 4858‑WT/T 3E‑60/56 (28 August 1956). Those notifications abolished the earlier post of Director of Administration (who had made the appointment) and reallocated powers among newly created Directors‑in‑Charge and Depot Managers, expressly conferring appointment and disciplinary powers on Depot Managers with appeal rights to the Director‑General.
  3. Interpretation of Article 311 in context: The Court interpreted Article 311 as addressing a situation of existing subordination of the dismissing authority to the appointing authority. Because the appointing post no longer existed (it had been abolished and its functions redistributed), the notion of dismissal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority did not objectively obtain. The judge emphasized that Article 311 protects against an existing superior's appointment being nullified by an existing subordinate; it was not meant to be applied as a "senseless fetish" where the appointing post has ceased to exist and the reorganised post legitimately exercises the powers.
  4. Application of precedent: The Court considered Mahesh Prasad and observed that that case required testing whether the removing authority was of the same rank or grade; here, because the reorganised scheme made the Depot Manager the appointing/removing authority for staff under him, he meets the comparable test in the facts of this case. The Court also rejected a narrow insistence that salary alone would determine rank: the reorganised scheme and expressly conferred powers were central.
  5. Reliance on past service record and notice: The Court reviewed earlier authorities requiring notice if past service records are to be used to justify a greater penalty. However, the Court found a distinguishing fact: the applicant himself, in his answer to the show‑cause notice, specifically submitted 12 instances of his past service record and asked that they be considered in mitigation. Because the applicant put forward those records proactively as part of his explanation, the policy behind requiring prior notice of adverse records (to enable a defence) did not apply to the case facts; it would be inconsistent for the applicant to later complain that the authority considered the very records he had urged be considered.
  6. Analogy to criminal procedure and counter‑arguments: The Court noted the respondent's counsel's submission by analogy to criminal law (previous convictions used at sentencing) but declined to decide the correctness of the precedents relied upon by the applicant because the factual circumstances gave an answer to the objection: the applicant had been given reasonable opportunity and had himself relied on his past record in his defence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was dismissed. The Court dismissed the writ petition, discharged the Rule, vacated any interim orders, and directed that there would be no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The order of discharge passed by the Depot Manager (confirmed on appeal by the Director‑General) stands; the applicant's challenge under Article 226 fails.
  • On constitutional principle: The Court held that Article 311's prohibition on dismissal by a subordinate authority applies to situations of existing subordination; where the appointing post has been abolished and a reorganised post expressly carries appointment and disciplinary powers, dismissal by that post does not infringe Article 311. The decision applies that legal principle to the facts but does not purport to create a broader new rule beyond the conclusions drawn from the reorganised statutory/notification scheme.
  • No new precedent beyond the factual application: The judgment distinguishes prior authorities on the issue of reliance on past service record because of the distinctive fact that the aggrieved officer himself had put forward parts of his record as part of his defence; the Court did not overrule the principle requiring notice where the record would be used adversely but found the present facts to justify the action taken.

Disposition recorded by the Court: petition dismissed; rule discharged; interim orders vacated; no costs.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

P.B Mukharji, J.:— This is an application by Dulal Ranjan Adetya under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus and certiorari in respect of the order of his dismissal. By order, dated 23rd/26th February, 1957 and 26th April, 1957 the applicant was dischrged from service.

2. The facts of this case may be briefly, stated. The applicant was appointed as a bus conductor in the State Transport Service on the 15th May, 1952 at a monthly salary of Rs. 50 plus the usual allowances. The appointment was made by one R.K Bose, then known as the Director of Administration in the Directorate of Transportation, Government of West Bengal. On the 21st November, 1956, the applicant was served with a charge sheet from R. Ghosh, Director of Operations. The charge sheet informs him of the serious complaint against the applicant. The gist of the com plaint is that the applicant refused to perform his duty and he was charged with ‘gross dereliction of duty and gross insubordination.’ In fact, the charge sheet expressly states that it has been reported that in the second shift on 20th November, 1956 during change of shift at Howrah Control Point at 18.50 hours when the applicant was allotted duty in State Bus WBS 1240 of Route No. 35A he refused to perform his duty over Route 35A and moreover used caustic language to the officers present there against all codes of discipline. He was suspended pending the decision of enquiry into the case and was allowed a subsistence grant of one fourth of his pay plus full allowances during the period of suspension. On the 23rd November, 1956 the applicant submitted the explanation to the charge sheet. In that answer the applicant admits that he signed the way bill with statement of refusal to work although he says that he had no other option but to do it. Qn the 27th December, 1956 the next notice to show cause was given to the petitioner by stating—

“You have been found guilty of the charge framed against you and proposed for discharge from service. You are, therefore, hereby directed to show cause by the 4th January, 1957 against the proposed order,”

3. This shows that he was given full notice and particulars of the charges against him. He was given fullest opportunities to answer those charges. He availed of that opportunity and submitted his written answer to that charge. Then he was found guilty of those charges. Thereupon the Depot Manager gave his notice to show cause on the 27th December, 1956 why he should not be discharged from service. The applicant again showed cause on the 2nd January, 1957. In showing cause against the proposed punishment of discharge, it is the applicant who referred to his own past service record to show that the particular officer always found fault with his work. This answer to the second notice to show cause against the proposed action for discharge from service is significant in two ways in that not one of the two objections now taken against the order of discharge is mentioned in that explanation. In the first place, he himself refers to his past record of service with a view to provide extenuating circumstances in order to avoid the punishment of discharge from service. Secondly, no objection was there taken that the Depot Manager could not or was not the proper authority or that he was in any way a subordinate authority vis-a-vis the appointing authority and, therefore, could not dismiss or discharge the applicant. In fact, he says in his letter of the 2nd January, 1957:

“The copy of the charge sheet was given by Director-in-Charge, Belghoria Depot, instead of Depot Manager, Belghoria.”

4. On the 23rd/26th February, 1957, the Depot Manager of Belghoria Depot passed the following order:

“Heard the conductor and seen all the records. The conductor gave all possible explanations, but none are satisfactory. He refused to carry out the order of the T.I who allotted his duty on Route No. 35A on that day instead of the usual duty on Route. No. 11A. Subsequently the conductor reported sick. This plea of the conductor cannot be accepted as only the day before he was certified by his attending physician to be fit for duty. The conductor seems to be incorrigible. His past records of service is anything but satisfactory. He is considered unsuitable for an Essential Public Service like ‘State Transport.’ He is discharged from service with effect from 23rd February, 1957. The period under suspension to be treated as one-fourth pay plus full allowances.”

5. On the 21st March, 1957 the applicant preferred an appeal against the order of the Depot Manager. The appeal was rejected on the 16th April, 1957 by the appellate authority, the Director-General of Transport. The order of the 16th April, 1957 states as follows:

“Examined the records. The appellant says that his version is true and the allegation against him is false. There is nothing in the record except his own statement to support his case. It is not probable that the others have combined against him to implicate in a false ease. He admits having received a way bill and tickets for duty on Route No. 11A. His duty was then changed to Route No. 35A, but he refused to do duty on this route. His plea is that he suddenly got pain in the stomach and wanted to go ‘sick.’ It is a strange coincidence that his sickness developed suddenly when he was asked to do duty on a different route The allegation against him that ho was not willing to carry out order is proved.

The plea of sickness is an afterthought. The past record of ine appellant is not satisfactory. The order of discharge is justified.

The appeal is rejected.”

6. Mr. Bose appearing on behalf of the applicant has taken two points of objection. His first objection is that the order of discharge is in this case made by an authority subordinate to that by which the applicant was appointed. He, therefore, contends that it is in violation of Article 311 of the Constituiion. His second objection is that the order of discharge was based on extraneous considerations like his past records and he has no notice of such past records, so that he could not furnish any explanation. It is, therefore, said that this reference to the past record violates the principle of natural justice. Another ground about contravention of Rule 55 of the Civil Service Classification Rule was taken in the petition but was not pressed before me.

7. On the facts of this case I have come to the conclusion that the applicant was not dismissed in this particular case by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Re was appointed by the Director of Administration. The post of the Director of Administration was subsequently abolished and was not in existence at the time of the discharge of the applicant. The post of the Director of Administration which appointed the applicant was a temporary post. On the 19th February, 1953 by a Notification No. 1986 WT/3E-12/53 the whole Directorate was reorganised. Instead of a Director of Administration, two Directors were created called as Directors-in-Charge., one Director-in-Charge of the Lake Depot, and the other Director-in-Charge of the Belghoria Depot. Having abolished the post of one Director of Administration and decentralised his work and distributed it among two Directors newly created, the posts of the Director of Administration and Chief Accountant were merged and re-designated as the Director of Administration and Accounts and the then Chief Accountant was put in charge of that post. This re-organisation makes it clear by clause; (7) of the Notification that each Director will have the power to make appointment to vacancies arising in the establishment under him, from persons elected by the Appointment Board, and to take disciplinary action against such staff and impose all penalties permissible under the Rules. It was expressly provided by clause (7) of that notification that in case of conductors and drivers on route, the Director of Operations will be competent to take necessary action against such staff for any misconduct committed while on route, but if the punishment to be awarded is one of dismissal or discharge from service, the case after completing the departmental enquiry should be forwarded to the appropriate Director-in-Charge for passing the final order. By clause (8) of that notification it was also expressly provided that in all disciplinary cases, the aggrieved person will have the right to prefer an appeal to the Director-General against any order passed by the Director concerned

8. To complete the scheme of re-organisation, there was a further notification No. 4858-WT/T 3E-60/56, dated the 28th August, 1956. This established a revised set up of the gazetted officers in the Zonal Depots under the Directorate of Transporta tion, West Bengal. By clause (3) of that notification a temporary gazetted post of Depot Manager was created in the Belghoria Depot on the scale of pay of Rs. 500-1,200 and the present incumbent, respondent No. 3 who was the Depot Manager of Belghoria, was appointed to that post at a fixed pay of Rs. 840 per month with usual dear-ness allowances and rent free quarters. It is expressly provided by clause (4) of that notification:

“That Depot Manager will have full control over the stall attached to the respective depots as well as the Depot cash staff. Each Depot Manager will have power to make appointment to vacancies arising in the establishment under him, from persons selected by the Appointment Board, and to take disciplinary action against such staff and impose all penalties permissible under the rule. In case of conductors and drivers in route, the Director of Operation will be competent to take disciplinary action against such staff for any misconduct committed while on route, but if the punishment to be awarded is one of dismissal or discharge from service, the case after completing the departmental enquiry should be forwarded to the appropriate Director-in-Charge/Depot Manager for passing the final order.”

9. This re-organisation of the Directorate shows clearly that the former Director of Administration who was the appointing authority, no longer exists. Not only has that post been abolished but the incidents of that post have been distributed to newly created posts. It is true that another officer called ‘Director of Administration and Accounts’ has come into being, but this is not the old post of Director of Administration which was the appointing authority for the applicant. By clause (4) of the last notification the Depot Manager has the express power to make appointments to vacancies arising in the establishment under him, and he has the complete power to take disciplinary action against such staff and impose all penalties permissible under the Rules. I do not think, therefore, that in this case discharge or dismissal by the Depot Manager violates the constitutional doctrine that the dismissing authority should not be subordinate to the appointing authority.

10. The constitutional rule contained in Article 311 has not been broken in the facts of this case and in my opinion, has not been violated at all. The language of Article 811, material for the present application, is ‘No person Who is a member of a civil service,……shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.’ The constitutional requirement operates when the former appointing authority exists and some other authority subordinate to it wants to exercise the power of dismissal over a civil servant. The constitutional expression ‘an authority subordinate’ indicates an existing subordination. It proceeds on the sensible view that the order of a superior authority appointing a civil servant cannot be allowed to be nullified by one subordinate to him by dismissing that civil servant. That will be detrimental to the morale and security of public service. But this sensible constitutional rule need not be converted into a senseless fetish by seeking to apply it to a situation where the authority dismissing the civil servant at the time of dismissing suffers no subordination because the post of the former appointing authority has ceased to exist.

11. Mr. Bose on behalf of the applicant relied on the case of Mahesh Prasad… v. State Of Uttar Pradesh…. (1) reported in (1955) S.C.A 65 and the observations made by Jagannadha-das, J., at page 70:

“Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the requirement both of the Constitution and of the rule of the Railway Code, contemplates that the authority competent to remove must be either the very authority who appointed or any other authority directly superior to the appointing authority in the same department. We do not think that this contention is tenable. What the Constitution requires is that a person should not be removed by an authority subordinate to the one by whom he was appointed and what the rule in the Railway Code prescribes is substantially the same, viz., ‘the authority competent to remove should not be lower than the one who made the appointment.’ These provisions cannot be read as implying that the removal must be by the very same authority who made the appointment or by his direct superior. It appears to us to be enough that the removing authority is of the same rank or grade.”

12. I do not think that this case helps the applicant at all. In fact, the decision and principle quoted above goes against the applicant's contention. The question of the removing authority being of the same rank or grade has to be tested in the light of the facts of the present case. Now the only appointing and removing authority in the present re-organised scheme is the Depot Manager. Therefore, he must be deemed and regarded to be of the same rank or grade so far as this particular power is concerned. He, therefore, answers the test laid down by the Supreme Court. Besides, the Supreme Court Was not concerned with me case as in the present one before me where the post of the appointing authority itself has been abolished and new post with different schemes of power and division of duties has come into operation giving the Depot Manager the power to appoint and dismiss with rights of appeal as indicated above. The Supreme Court in the particular case was not concerned with the abolition of a post but was concerned with the comparative test between, two existing different posts in order to determine the question whether the rank or grade of the removing authority was subordinate to the appointing authority. In fact, there the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the Divisional Personnel Officer as well as the Superintendent were officers in the senior scale of the railway service drawing equal scales of pay Rs. 625-50-1,375 and held that this was ‘an indication that they were officers of the same rank.’ Mr. Bose tried to argue from this that the test of salary laid down there does not apply here because the Depot Manager does not get as much salary as the defunct post of the Director of Administration. I do not think that the Supreme Court intended to lay down there that that salary was the only test or that such test was intended to apply in case of a re-organised department where former posts of appointing and dismissing authority are replaced by new posts with new duties and new scales of pay.

13. The next objection relates to the reference to past records.

14. Mr. Bose for the applicant has relied on an unreported decision of Sinha, J. of this court dated January 11, 1957 in Sankar Chandra Chatterjee v. S.N Haldar (2) where the learned, judge says that “if in a departmental enquiry it was proposed to rely on any part of his service record which is to be used against the delinquent, then he must be given notice cf it and an opportunity of meeting it,” and a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Gopalrao Damodarji, Food Procurement Inspector v. State Government of Madhya Pradesh, (3) A.I.R 1954 Nagpur, 90, 91-92 where it was observed:

“Normally the question of punishment is linked up with the gravity of the charge and the penalty that is inflicted is proportionate to the guilt. Where the charge is trivial and ‘prima facie’ merits only a minor penalty, a civil servant may not even care to defend himself in the belief that only such guilt will be visited on him. In such a case, even if in the show cause notice a more serious punishment is indicated than what the finding of guilt warrants, he cannot be left guessing for himself what other possible reasons have impelled the proposed action. It is not, therefore, sufficient that other considerations on which a higher punishment is proposed are present in the mind of the competent authority or are supported by the record of service of the civil servant concerned. In a case where these factors did not form part of any specific charge and did not otherwise figure in the departmental enquiry, it is necessary that they should be intimated to the civil servant in order to enable him to put up proper defence against the proposed action.”

15. Mr. B, Das, the learned Junior Standing Counsel appearing for the Government has questioned the correctness of these decisions. He has drawn the analogy from the Criminal Procedure Code to argue that the charge in this case was refusal to obey orders and insubordination, very serious in their nature. The past records in this case were looked into only for the purpose of punishment. He argues on the analogy of Criminal Procedure Code that previous convictions are not any evidence in criminal courts until the trial court finds the accused guilty whereupon before sentence or punishment is inflicted the previous convictions could in certain circumstances be put forward as a consideration for higher punishment or sentence. Mr. Das's argument is that in this case the orders both of the Depot Manager and the appeal order of the Director-General of Transportation clearly show that they found him guilty of the charges of insubordination and refusal tc obey orders. It was only when the question of punishment whether he should be discharged or not came into consideration that previous records were examined. According tc his argument this is not a matter of charge but a consequence on the finding of guilt after the charge has been established. It may be necessary in some future time to review these decisions, but I do not feel called upon to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of those decisions on the ground that the facts here provide an ample answer to this objection.

16. The facts are clear on the point.

17. Article 311(2) of the Constitution says that no person shall be dismissed or removed ‘until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.’ Now on the facts, all available reasonable opportunity of showing cause against dismissal was given in this case. The notice, dated the 27th December, 1956 whereby it was said:

“You have been found guilty to the charge framed against you and proposed for discharge from service. You are, therefore, hereby directed to show cause by the 4th January, 1957 against the proposed order,”

is in my judgment sufficient compliance with the requirement of Article 311 of the Constitution, the material portion of which I have quoted above. Then the second fact in this case is that it was not the dismissing authority who was looking into the records of the applicant's past service but it was the applicant himself who was asking and putting forward specific records of his past service before the dismissing authority in answer to this very notice to show cause against the proposed older of discharge. I have already stated that the applicant by his letter, dated the 2nd January, 1957 specifically quoted 12 instances of his past record of service and asked them to be considered by the dismissing authority in answer to the notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed. In fact his whole idea in doing so was that the particular officer was always adverse to him and whose decisions had been upset on appeals to higher officers. The applicant himself put forward his past record of service with specific instances and having asked the dismissing authority to consider those instances of his past record of service, it is not open to him any more to turn round and say now that the authority should not have considered them. It is not alleged and certainly not proved that there was any other record of his past service which was looked into by the dismissing authority. In those circumstances these two signal facts distinguish this case from the two decisions on which reliance has been placed. In none of those two cases did the public servant himself put forward instances of his past record of service as explanation in answer to the notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed. Indeed I should have thought that in the explanation and answer to the notice to show cause why a public servant should not be dismissed, if the public servant puts forward specific instances of his past record of service as a part of his answer, then it is the duty oi the dismissing authority to consider them. It is worth remembering that the principle behind disclosing a record to the public servant before a punishment is inflicted on him is to enable him to answer the proposed action. But if in the very answer to the proposed action the aggrieved public servant himself asks for a consideration of his past record of service, then I do not think the principle applies at all.

18. For these reasons both these objections fail. I dismiss this petition and discharge the Rule and vacate the interim orders, if any. There will be no order as to costs.

S.K.B