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Alliance Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Union Of India

Calcutta High Court
Jan 7, 1959
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit was filed by Alliance Assurance Co. Ltd. against the Union of India as the main defendant and the Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Company of India Ltd. as a proforma defendant. The claim was for Rs. 3,680-5-0p, representing the value of 12 tyres short-delivered by the Railway from Bansabati to Delhi. The Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Company had insured these goods with the plaintiff and received payment from the plaintiff under the insurance policy for the short delivery. The Goodyear Tyres assigned all rights, title, and interest in the goods and the related Railway Receipts to the plaintiff, who then sued the Union of India. An additional claim for damages for wrongful detention was not pressed. The principal dispute concerned the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Were the goods alleged to be short delivered insured with the plaintiff as alleged?
  2. What is the value of the said goods?
  3. Has the defendant No. 2 validly transferred or assigned to the plaintiff the right, title, and interest in the said goods?
  4. Does the Court have jurisdiction to try this suit?
  5. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The assignment of the consignor’s rights to the plaintiff took place within the jurisdiction of this Court at No. 2, Hare Street, Calcutta.
  • The assignment is a material part of the cause of action and thereby confers jurisdiction to the Court of the place where the assignment took place.
  • Relied on a trilogy of cases (Kalooram Agarwalla v. Jonistha Lal Chuckroberty; Daulatram Rawatmull v. Maharajlal; Harnathrai Binjraj v. Sew Prasad Sing) and the Court of Appeals decision in Bhabani Prasanna Lahiri v. Rai Radhica Bhusan Roy Bahadur to support the proposition that assignment is part of the cause of action and confers jurisdiction.

Defendant's Arguments (Union of India)

  • Contended that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the Union of India.
  • Argued that the cited authorities relate to negotiable instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Act and that the principle of assignment conferring jurisdiction should not apply to insurance policies.
  • Relied on the distinction that no question of negotiability or law merchant arises in this case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kalooram Agarwalla v. Jonistha Lal Chuckroberty (40 C.W.N 161) Assignment is part of the cause of action and the place of assignment confers jurisdiction. Relied upon to support jurisdiction based on the place of assignment.
Daulatram Rawatmull v. Maharajlal (40 C.W.N 164) Same principle as above regarding assignment and jurisdiction. Relied upon to confirm the principle that assignment confers jurisdiction.
Harnathrai Binjraj v. Sew Prasad Sing (40 C.W.N 165) Assignment as a part of cause of action confers jurisdiction. Used to establish the principle that supports plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim.
Bhabani Prasanna Lahiri v. Rai Radhica Bhusan Roy Bahadur (40 C.W.N 1349) Endorsement effecting assignment of a promissory note is the most essential part of cause of action. Court relied on this to find jurisdiction on basis of assignment.
Harnathrai Binjraj v. Churamoni Shah (87 C.W.N 1139) Doctrine of assignment conferring jurisdiction applies beyond negotiable instruments to debts. Applied to support jurisdiction despite absence of negotiability issues.
Read v. Brown (22 Q.B.D. 128) Assignment of debt is part of cause of action conferring jurisdiction. Supported the conclusion that jurisdiction is not limited to negotiable instruments cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court accepted the evidence proving the insurance coverage, value of the goods, and valid assignment of rights from the Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Company to the plaintiff. The Court relied on prior binding judgment in a related suit confirming validity of such assignment under a similar insurance policy. The core issue was jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s counsel limited his argument to the assignment having taken place within the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court analyzed the doctrine that where assignment forms part of the cause of action, the jurisdiction lies with the Court of the place where the assignment occurred.

Although the Union of India argued that this doctrine applies only to negotiable instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court distinguished this case and held that the doctrine extends to assignments of debts or rights under insurance policies as well. The Court cited multiple precedents, including English and Indian decisions, to affirm that the assignment is a material part of the cause of action and thus confers jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Railway Receipts are documents of title that can be transferred and negotiated, reinforcing the applicability of the negotiability doctrine in this context.

Consequently, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to try the suit based on the assignment executed within its territorial jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

The Court held in favor of the plaintiff on all issues, specifically affirming its jurisdiction to try the suit because the assignment of rights occurred within its jurisdiction. The plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the Union of India for Rs. 3,680.31 with six percent interest and costs, with three months granted for payment.

The decision directly resolves the dispute between the parties without setting any new precedent beyond affirming the extension of the jurisdiction doctrine beyond negotiable instruments to insurance policy assignments. The ruling confirms that assignments executed within a Court’s territorial jurisdiction confer jurisdiction for related suits.

Show all summary ...

The judgment of the Court was as follows:

2. This is a suit by Alliance Assurance Co. Ltd., against the Union of India as the main defendant and the Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Company of India Ltd., as a proforma defendant only. The claim is for a sum of Rs. 3,680-5-0p. There is an additional claim for Rs. 1,000/- as damages for wrongful detention, but that has not been pressed before me by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. A short but important point of jurisdiction is the real bone of contention in the suit.

3. The plaintiff's claim arises in this way. The Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co. despatched by railway certain goods from Bansabati to Delhi and also insured those goods with the plaintiff. The Railway delivered most of the goods. There was, however, short delivery of 12 tyres. The value of these 12 tyres is Rs. 3,680-5-0 p. The Goodyear Tyres claimed this money from the plaintiff under the policy of insurance covering these goods. The plaintiff paid that amount to the Goodyear Tyres. The Goodyear Tyres thereupon assigned to the plaintiff all their right, title and interest in the goods and the relative Railway Receipts. The plaintiff Insurance Company thus became subrogated to the rights of the consignor. The plaintiff Insurance Company now sues the Union of India making their insured, the Goodyear Tyres, as a proforma defendant.

4. The following issues were raised by the learned Counsel for the Union:—

(1) Were the goods alleged to be short delivered insured with the plaintiff as alleged in paragraph 2 of the plaint?

(2) What is the value of the said goods?

(3) Has the defendant No. 2 validly transferred or assigned to the plaintiff the right, title and interest in the said goods?

(4) Has the Court jurisdiction to try this suit?

(5) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

5. There is an admitted brief of documents marked Exhibit ‘A’ in this suit. The only oral evidence is that of Mr. Murthi who was called on behalf of the plaintiff. No oral evidence has been called on behalf of the Union of India. Mr. Murthi's evidence proves the consignment of the goods under the different Railway Receipts on the 10th June, 1953, the short delivery of the 12 tyres, the short certificates issued by the Railway, and the value of the goods on the basis of the price-lists which he has proved. He has also proved that the Goodyear Tyres made the claim on the policy against the plaintiff Insurance Company and has received the full amount of money being the sum of Rs. 3,680-5-0 p. I may state here that Mr. Murthi is in the employment of the Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co. ever since 1925. There was formal cross-examination of this witness by the Counsel for the Union, but Mr. Murthi's evidence remains unshaken, and in my opinion, must be accepted.

Issues Nos. 1 & 2.

6. On the basis of the evidence of Mr. Murthi and the documents I am satisfied and I hold that the goods short-delivered were covered by the Policy of Insurance and that the value of the said goods was Rs. 3,680-5-0 p. I answer the first two issues accordingly.

Issue No. 3:

This issue is covered by a judgment in Suit No. 1020 of 1954 between the same parties, Alliance Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Union of India and Goodyear Tyre, deciding this identical issue and on identical terms of insurance policy. I delivered that judgment on November 26, 1958 holding that the assignment and the transfer in such case is good, valid and enforceable on a Policy of this nature. As I still remain of the same view, it is, therefore, unnecessary for me to discuss this issue any further. I, therefore, answer Issue No. 3 in the affirmative.

Issue No. 4:

This issue relates to the issue of jurisdiction and is the only issue which was seriously argued before me. It is contended on behalf of the Union of India that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit as against the Union of India. The plaintiff pleaded jurisdiction in the plaint on the ground of the issue of the Insurance Policy within jurisdiction, the assignment within jurisdiction of the consignor's right, title and interest in the said goods to the plaintiff Insurance Company, service of the notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code within jurisdiction, and of the notice under section 77 of the Railways Act within jurisdiction.

7. Mr. Sen, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff, has not urged the ground of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 77 of the Railways Act as conferring jurisdiction to this Court to entertain the suit. He has confined his arguments to the fact of the assignment of the right, title and interest of the consignor to the Insurance Company having taken place at No. 2, Hare Street, Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court. The assignment is contained in a document duly stamped and dated the 15th September, 1953. The assignment is an admitted document and is also described as a letter of subrogation, Mr. Murthi proved this document. He proved that it was executed at No. 2, Hare Street, Calcutta, within the jurisdiction of this Court.

8. The material portion of this assignment and subrogation reads as follows:

“We hereby assign transfer and abandon to you all our rights against the Railway Company or other persons whatsoever” ***

“and grant full power to take and use all lawful ways and means in your own name and otherwise at your risk and expense to recover the said damage” ***

“We hereby subrogate to you the same rights as we have in consequence of or arising from the said loss or damage”. ***

“We hereby undertake and agree to make and execute at your expense all such further deeds, assignments and documents and to render you such assistance as you may reasonably require for the purpose of carrying out this agreement.” ***

9. This assignment and letter of subrogation sets out the goods with marks, numbers of Railway Receipts and date with the value of the goods shown against different items amounting to a total sum of Rs. 3,680/5/-. Mr. Sen argues that the assignment is a part of the cause of action and as the assignment took place within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court is competent to entertain and try this suit.

10. He relies on the well-known trilogy of cases decided by Panckridge, J. in Kalooram Agarwalla v. Jonistha Lal Chuckroberty (1) 40 C.W.N 161; Daulatram Rawatmull v. Maharajlal (2) 40 C.W.N 164 and Harnathrai Binjraj v. Sew Prasad Sing (3) 40 C.W.N 165 in support of the proposition that assignment is a part of cause of action and that the place where the assignment takes place gives the Court of that place jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the basis of that assignment. Mr. Sen further relies on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Bhabani Prasanna Lahiri v. Rai Radhica Bhusan Roy Bahadur (4) reported in the same Volume 40 C.W.N 1349. The Court of Appeal in that case comes to the conclusion that in a suit by the assignee of a promissory note, the making of an endorsement which effects the assignment, is not only a part of the cause of action but is the most essential part thereof. On the basis of this authority and specially the last decision of the Court of Appeal I must find in favour of the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this suit.

11. But Mr. Mukherjee, learned Counsel for the Union of India, has tried to distinguish these cases from the present one on the ground that all these decisions reported in 40 C.W.N are based on the doctrine of negotiability of a promissory note. He relied on the observation of Costello, J. approving the remarks of Cunliffe, J. as reported in (4) 40 C.W.N 1349 that not to recognise assignment as a part of the cause of action in the case of promissory note would be to strike at the whole root of the law of negotiability as laid down not only in the Negotiable Instruments Act but in the time-honoured’ principles of the law merchant. Mr. Mukherjee contends that as no question of Negotiable Instruments Act or of negotiability or law merchant arises in this case, the principle of those cases should not be applied or extended to the present case of assignment of rights on an Insurance Policy. Mr. Mukherjee's argument requires careful consideration. No doubt all these cases adumbrating this principle relate to promissory notes. That fact distinguishes signally the present case. But the question still remains, where an assignment is a part of the cause of action, is the jurisdiction of the Court within which the assignment takes place to entertain and try the cause of action limited only to cases of assignment of negotiable instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Act? I have come to the conclusion that it is not so limited. It will be a limitation, unwarranted both by law and practice, to confine the doctrine of assignment providing a part of the cause of action and thereby affording jurisdiction to the Court of the place where assignment took place, only to cases of assignment of negotiable instruments.

12. My reasons are first that all the authorities are against this contention. In the case of Harnathrai Binjraj v. Churamoni Shah (5) reported in 87 C.W.N 1139, Ameer Ali, J. applied this doctrine to a case of assignment of a debt and not a negotiable instrument. In that case the plaintiff was the assignee of a debt and except for the assignment of the debt which was made in Calcutta no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Judge held that in a suit by the assignee the assignment itself was a part of the cause of action and was thereby sufficient to invest the Court of the place of assignment with the jurisdiction to entertain and try that cause of action. At page 1141. Ameer Ali, J, referred to the well-settled practice on this point and made the following observations:—

“It might have been more satisfactory if the rule were otherwise, i.e, that an assignee in taking an assignment of a debt should take such assignment with only such right of suing as the assignor had and could sue where the assignor could sue and nowhere else. I do see difficulties in the present system under which an assignor can create jurisdiction in any place where the Civil Procedure Code applies but I do not think it would be right for me to attempt to change it.”

13. This was a case of assignment of a debt. No question of negotiability or of Negotiable Instruments Act arose there. The well-known English decision in Read v. Brown (6) reported in 22, Queen's Bench Division, 128 is also against the contention of Mr. Mukherjee. In that case the plaintiff brought an action in Mayor's Court as assignee of a debt alleged to be due in respect of the prices of goods sold and delivered to the defendant by the assignor. The sale and delivery had taken place outside the city of London but the debt had been assigned within the city of London. A strong English Court of Appeal presided over by Lord Esher, Master of the Rolls with Fry, L.J and Lopes, L.J decided that the assignment of the debt was part of the cause of action and the Mayor's Court of London had jurisdiction to entertain the action.

14. That also was a case of assignment of a debt and no question of negotiability arose there. It is therefore clear from these authorities that the doctrine where assignment forms part of the cause of action and thereby the place of assignment gives jurisdiction to the Court of the place where the assignment takes place, is not limited only to cases under law merchant or to negotiable instruments negotiable by statute or common law.

15. Secondly, the assumption of the learned counsel for the Union that no question of negotiability arises in this case and by which assumption he attempts to extricate himself from the authority of the decided cases is not fundamentally sound on the facts of this case. It is quite true that the carriage was from Bangsabati to Delhi, Neither Bangsabati nor Delhi nor any part of this route is within the jurisdiction of this Court. The Railway Receipts by themselves therefore would not give jurisdiction. But the point is that the Railway Receipts are themselves documents of title and can be negotiated and transferred. By the assignment or letter of subrogation in this case these Railway Receipts or the claims thereunder were transferred or negotiated in favour of the plaintiff Insurance Company. The letter of subrogation or assignment which I have quoted above shows that the Insurance Company is subrogated to all the rights of the consignor. In other words, the Railway Receipts therefore stand transferred in favour of the Insurance Company. In that view of the matter even the doctrine of negotiability can be invoked in this case to grant jurisdiction to this Court. The transfer of these Railway Receipts and the rights thereunder were made by the subrogation and assignment which took place within the jurisdiction of this Court.

16. For these reasons I answer this issue in the affirmative and hold that this Court has jurisdiction to try this suit.

17. As Mr. Sen, Counsel for the plaintiff, has not urged the grounds of service of notices under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code and under section 77 of the Railways Act as creating jurisdiction in this Court, I do not, therefore, propose to discuss those questions or the cases relating thereto which have been cited before me by the learned Counsel for the Union of India.

18. I hold and find that this Court has jurisdiction on the ground that the assignment in this case took place within the jurisdiction of this Court and such assignment in favour of the plaintiff is a material part of the plaintiffs cause of action in this suit.

Issue No. 5:

Relief follows from my findings on the issues above.

19. There will, therefore, be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant, Union of India, for the sum of Rs. 3,680.31 n.P with interest on judgment at six per cent and costs. The defendant, Union of India, is granted three months' time from date to pay this money.

S.K.B