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Kartick Chandra Ghosh And Others v. Panna Lal Chatterjee Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Five petitioners were ordered by Sri T.B. Sing, Magistrate, First Class, Barrackpore, to execute a bond under Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) of Rs. 1,000 each with two sureties of like amount for a period of one year. Their appeal to the Additional Sessions Judge of Alipore was dismissed.
The petitioners are young men, residents of Kumarpara (Titagarh Police Station jurisdiction) and members of a local club called "Kishore Sangh". Since about 1950, they and others are alleged to have followed school-going girls on their way to school, causing annoyance to the girls and concern to their guardians. The petitioners and their associates are further alleged to have insulted, threatened, and assaulted guardians and residents, thrown stones and crackers at houses, and generally disturbed public tranquility. Numerous complaints and general diary entries were made to local administrative and police authorities.
A daughter of the opposite party Pannalal Chatterjee was alleged to have been kidnapped and subsequently married by Mukunda Ghose (a cousin of petitioner No. 5), a marriage opposed by Pannalal Chatterjee. There had been a previous proceeding against the petitioners which was dropped after the petitioners gave an undertaking not to disturb public tranquility. After a lull, the alleged activities resumed, leading to a petition to the Sub-divisional Officer and a police enquiry. Proceedings were drawn up under Section 107 CrPC. The predecessor Magistrate (Sri B.B. Mukherji) recorded evidence for both sides but was transferred before final orders were passed; Sri T.B. Sing heard arguments and passed final orders requiring security.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the successor Magistrate (Sri T.B. Sing) was obliged to hold a de novo trial instead of proceeding on evidence recorded by his predecessor.
- Whether proceedings under Section 107 CrPC were maintainable when a previous proceeding against the same persons had earlier been dropped (on undertaking) and therefore "terminated".
- Whether an examination of the persons proceeded against under Section 342 CrPC was required in an enquiry under Chapter VIII (Section 107) of the CrPC.
- Whether the preliminary order (dated 19th August 1953) properly showed a breach of public tranquility, or merely a likelihood, and whether the order was at variance with the proceedings drawn up.
- Whether Sections 118 and 112 CrPC require a fixed class of sureties and whether the Magistrate's order complied with those sections.
- Whether the Courts below failed to consider and make specific findings as to the individual cases of the petitioners (i.e., lack of separate findings as regards each petitioner).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The successor Magistrate should have held a de novo trial rather than acting on evidence recorded by his predecessor.
- The present proceedings under Section 107 CrPC were not maintainable because a previous proceeding had ended in the discharge of the petitioners (they argue res judicata or effect of prior termination).
- There was no examination of the petitioners under Section 342 CrPC, which they contended was required.
- The preliminary order only indicated a likelihood of disturbance and did not show any actual breach of public tranquility; therefore the order might be at variance with the proceedings.
- Sections 118 read with 112 CrPC mandate that the class of sureties be fixed; the Magistrate's order (requiring two sureties of like amount) was challenged as inconsistent or unclear.
- The cases of the individual petitioners were not separately considered and the courts below did not make specific findings as to each petitioner.
The opinion records Mr. Chintaharan Roy as appearing for the petitioners and pressing most of the points summarized above.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kali Charan Duary v. State, 58 Cal WN 1035 : AIR 1954 Cal 577 | Illustrated that an order requiring security is not in substance a conviction; repelled argument that provisions relating to trial apply automatically by virtue of sub-s. (2) of S.117; drew distinction between enquiry and trial; noted Ch. VIII deals with prevention of offences and that a person proceeded under S.107 is competent witness in his own case. | Relied upon to reject the contention that the successor Magistrate had to hold a de novo trial and to support that Chapter VIII procedures differ from trial procedures (i.e., full trial formalities are not necessarily attracted). |
| Binode Behari Nath v. Emperor, ILR 50 Cal 985 : AIR 1924 Cal 392 | Authority for the proposition that Section 342 CrPC (examination of accused) does not apply to enquiries under Chapter VIII because the person called to give security is not an 'accused' within Section 342. | Applied to hold that no examination under Section 342 CrPC was necessary in the present proceedings under Section 107 CrPC. |
| Hopcroft v. Emperor, ILR 36 Cal 163 | Decided in 1908 regarding applicability of S.443 (as then) to an enquiry under S.107 in respect of European British subjects; raised issues about applicability of certain trial provisions to security/enquiry proceedings. | Noted by the Court and by earlier deciding authorities (including the Kali Charan case). The opinion records it was cited by petitioners but does not treat it as overruling the propositions relied upon (i.e., it did not establish a requirement for S.342 examination in these proceedings). |
| Raghubar Dayal v. Emperor, 36 Cr LJ 33 : AIR 1934 All 735 | Decision of a single judge of the Allahabad High Court; cited by petitioners in support of the proposition that examination under S.342 might be necessary. | The Court observed that this single-judge decision is not authority for the proposition that Section 342 examination was necessary in proceedings like the present. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed each point raised by the petitioners in turn, applying statutory interpretation and precedent cited in the opinion:
- De novo trial: The Court found no merit in the contention that the successor Magistrate was required to hold a de novo trial. Two reasons were given: (a) the petitioners did not request such a trial before the learned Magistrate, and (b) the amended Code of Criminal Procedure does not make it obligatory for a successor Magistrate to hold a de novo enquiry. The Court referred to Kali Charan Duary to support the distinction between enquiry (Chapter VIII security proceedings) and trial and to reject the proposition that trial provisions automatically apply to these security proceedings.
- Maintainability in view of previous proceedings: The Court held the present proceedings were maintainable. The earlier proceedings had been dropped after the petitioners gave an undertaking not to disturb public tranquility; they did not terminate after a full enquiry. The present proceedings dealt with fresh happenings not covered earlier, and the nature of Chapter VIII proceedings allows fresh proceedings for fresh incidents.
- Applicability of Section 342 CrPC: The Court held that Section 342 CrPC does not apply to an enquiry under Chapter VIII because a person required to give security is not an "accused" within the meaning of Section 342. The Court relied on Binode Behari Nath and the reasoning in Kali Charan Duary (including the phrase "as nearly as may be practicable" in sub-s. (2) of S.117) to conclude that Ch. XXIV and XXV (general character provisions) may be attracted as appropriate, but a formal Section 342 examination is not necessary.
- Preliminary order showing likelihood vs. breach: The Court rejected the argument that the Magistrate's order was at variance with the proceedings because it mentioned likelihood rather than an actual breach. The Court considered this a hollow objection, noting that securing a bond to keep the peace is meant to prevent breach of public tranquility; the Magistrate's concern with the likelihood of disturbance justified the order.
- Sections 118 and 112—class of sureties: The Court considered the complaint that the class of sureties should be fixed. It held that the Magistrate's order (requiring each petitioner to execute a bond of Rs.1,000 with two sureties of like amount for one year) was clear and within the proceedings. The Court specifically noted the words "if any" in S.112 and considered the Magistrate's direction consistent with the statutory framework.
- Individual findings as to each petitioner: The Court acknowledged that the appellate court had said specific findings for each member were not necessary, but the present Court disagreed with that absence of specific findings. The Court therefore examined the evidence itself and found abundant evidence against all petitioners except petitioner No.2 (Arun Ghose). The Court also addressed an omission in the record regarding petitioner No.3 (Nitya Ranjan Ghose): a subsequent magistrate's order corrected an oversight and made the order binding on him as well.
After reviewing the evidence and the legal points, the Court concluded that the order requiring security was justified in respect of all petitioners except Arun Ghose.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court's final decision was as follows:
- The order is set aside so far as petitioner No. 2, Arun Ghose, is concerned; the rule is made absolute in his favor.
- The rule (petition) so far as the other petitioners is discharged and the order against them is confirmed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: Petitioner No. 2 (Arun Ghose) is relieved of the obligation created by the Magistrate's order (the order is set aside in his case). The remaining petitioners remain bound by the Magistrate's order to execute the bond as directed.
- On precedent and broader law: The opinion applies existing authorities (as cited) to delineate the procedural difference between chapter VIII security enquiries and formal trials, and to confirm that certain trial-stage protections (such as Section 342 examination) are not necessarily attracted. The opinion does not announce or purport to establish a new legal principle beyond its application of existing authorities to the facts. The decision primarily resolves the parties' rights in respect of the Section 107 proceedings described.
Order accordingly. (The opinion records the author's gratitude to counsel who assisted.)
1. The five petitioners in this case were ordered by Sri T.B Sing, Magistrate, First Class, Barrackpore, to execute a bond, under Section 107 of the Cr PC, of Rs. 1,000 each with two sureties of the like amount for a period of one year. Their appeal to the Additional Sessions Judge of Alipore was also dismissed.
2. The petitioners, who are all young men and residents of Kumarpara within the jurisdiction of Titagarh Police Station, are members of a local club named ‘Kishore Sangh’. In the locality of Kumarpara there are several residential houses in some of which several Government servants, mostly optees from Pakistan, live with their families. Some of the residents have school-going grown-up daughters. It is alleged that since 1950 some young men of the locality including the petitioners have been indulging in unbecoming activities by following the girls on their way to school much to the annoyance of the girls themselves. This conduct was resented by the guardians. The matter did not end there. The petitioners and their associates then started insulting and threatening the guardians and began throwing stones and crackers etc. at their houses. A number of complaints were made to the Sub-divisional Officer and Sub-divisional Police Officer, Barrackpore. A large number of general diary entries were also made against them at the thana. Sometime back a daughter of the opposite party Pannalal Chatterjee was kidnapped and one Mukunda Ghose, a cousin of petitioner No. 5, Sudhir Ghose, married her which marriage was against the consent of the opposite party Pannalal Chatterji and was not approved of by him. There was a previous proceeding against the petitioners which was dropped on the undertaking given by the petitioners and others that they would not disturb public tranquility. After the previous proceedings were dropped, there was a lull in their activities for some time but they again began to insult the opposite party, threatened him and assaulted his son. They continued again troubling the residents of the locality. On a petition by the opposite party made to the Sub-divisional Officer, Barrackpore, there was a police enquiry and on the police report proceedings were drawn up under Section 107 of the Cr PC. Sri B.B Mukherji, Magistrate, to whom the case was transferred recorded the evidence of both the parties but before he could pass final orders he was transferred and the case taken up by the successor-in-office Sri T.B Sing who heard arguments and passed final orders.
3. The point urged before me in the first instance is that Sri T.B Singh should have held a de novo trial and should not have proceeded to judgment on the evidence recorded by his predecessor. There is no substance in this point, firstly, because the petitioners did not make any such prayer before the learned Magistrate and next, the amended Code of Criminal Procedure does not make it obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to do so. Mr. Chintaharan Roy appearing on behalf of the petitioners did not, however, seriously urge this point. In this connection the case of Kali Charan Duary v. State, 58 Cal WN 1035 : (AIR 1954 Cal 577) (A), may be seen. That was a judgment of Das Gupta and Debabrata Mookerjee, JJ., in a case where the question of applicability of S. 350 of the Code arose in connection with a proceeding under Section 110 of the Cr PC. At p. 1039 (of Cal WN) (at pp. 578-579 of AIR), their Lordships repelled the argument advanced that an order requiring security was in substance a conviction and also the argument that by reason of sub-s. (2) of S. 117 of the Code, all the provisions of the Code relating to trial, wherever they occur, were attracted. Their Lordships pointed out that Ch. VIII of the Code dealt with prevention of offences and a person proceeded against under S. 107 of the Code was a competent witness to his own case. The difference between enquiry and trial was also pointed out.
4. The next point raised by the petitioners was that the present proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr PC were not maintainable inasmuch as a previous proceeding ended in the discharge of the petitioners. In my view, there is no substance in this point either. The previous proceedings did not terminate after a proper enquiry. The petitioners there gave an undertaking not to disturb the public tranquility or cause breach of the peace whereupon the matter was not allowed to proceed any further and dropped. The present proceedings cover instances not covered by the former. Moreover, the very nature of the proceedings indicate that for fresh happenings fresh proceedings can be drawn up.
5. The point which had been urged with some amount of force was that there was no examination of the petitioners under the provisions of Section 342 of the Cr PC. This argument is untenable. S. 342 does not apply to an enquiry under Ch. VIII of the Code because the person called upon to give security is not an accused within the meaning of Section 342 of the Cr PC. The case of Binode Behari Nath v. Emperor*, ILR 50 Cal 985 : (AIR 1924 Cal 392) (B), is an authority on the point. In the case of 58 Cal WN 1035 : (AIR 1954 Cal 577) (A), their Lordships also pointed out that sub-s. (2) of S. 117 only enjoined compliance with the types of procedure for two types of security proceedings. The significant words are ‘as nearly as may be practicable’. Their Lordships also held that by reason of this sub-section provisions of general character like Chs. XXIV and XXV are attracted to enquiries. I am therefore unable to hold that an examination under Section 342 of the Cr PC of the persons proceeded against was at all necessary. The point therefore fails.
6. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has cited the case of Hopcroft v. Emperor, ILR 36 Cal 163 (C), decided in 1908 by Sharfuddin and Coxe, JJ. It was in connection with the applicability of S. 443, as it then was, to an enquiry under S. 107 to European British subjects. This case was noticed by their Lordships when deciding the case reported in 58 Cal WN 1035 : (AIR 1954 Cal 577) (A). Another case cited before me, reported in Raghubar Dayal v. Emperor, 36 Cr LJ 33 : (AIR 1934 All 735) (D), a decision of single sitting Judge of the Allahabad High Court, is no authority for the proposition that an examination under S. 342 in these proceedings was necessary.
7. The next point urged is that the preliminary order dated the 19th of August 1953, only indicated that it was only the likelihood of the disturbance of the public tranquility which disturbed the Magistrate's mind but the learned Magistrate did not show anywhere that there was any breach of public tranquility. On this it was argued by Mr. Roy that the order passed by the learned Magistrate was at variance with the proceedings drawn up. To my mind, this is an extremely hollow argument. There can be no purpose for asking for a bond for keeping the peace unless it was for the prevention of a breach of public tranquility.
8. Mr. Chintaharan Roy on behalf of the petitioners has also argued that S. 118 of the Code read with S. 112 lays down that the class of sureties should be fixed. The order of the learned Magistrate requires that the persons proceeded against should execute a bond of Rs. 1,000 each with two sureties of like amount for a period of one year. In consideration of all the facts and circumstances the learned Magistrate held that the order was necessary for keeping the peace. This is quite in accordance with the terms of the proceedings dated the 19th of August 1953. I do not think that the order of the learned Magistrate could be clearer. One cannot omit to notice the very important words ‘if any’ appearing in S. 112.
9. On the merits, it will be seen that both the Courts below have discussed the evidence of witnesses and have elaborately referred to the activities of the petitioners which required action to be taken against them for preventing them from committing the breach of the peace or disturbing the public tranquility. The learned appellate Court has aptly put the matter and I entirely agree with him that “the ‘kishores and ‘kumars’ of Kumarpara have organized themselves into a fraternity of local bullies and have their own way of doing things according to their pleasure.”
10. Mr. Roy has argued with a great deal of force and in fact he urged that this was his strongest point that the cases of the individual petitioners have not been separately considered and neither of the Courts below has come to any findings as regards the cases of individual petitioners.
11. I am not unmindful of the fact that when called upon to show cause the petitioners never showed any. This is noted in the order sheet of the learned Magistrate dated the 21st of November 1953, but there is a good deal of force in Mr. Roy's argument on this point. I do not agree with the Court of appeal below that there was no need of any specific finding against each of the members of the second party. In view of this, I have myself examined the evidence and I find that evidence is abundant against all the petitioners except petitioner No. 2 Arun Ghose.
12. Ground No. 16 in the petition before this Court shows that the order of the learned Magistrate does not require the petitioner No. 3 Nitya Ranjan Ghose to execute any bond and that this was pointed out to the learned Judge in the Court below. It is true that there is no reference to this in the judgment of the Court of appeal below. It may be mentioned that the said Nitya Ranjan Ghose preferred an appeal to the learned Sessions Judge although it was contended that there was no order passed against him to execute any bond. In this connection the order of the learned Magistrate dated the 15th of December 1956, may be seen. It runs thus:
“Seen petition filed by the 1st party. It appears that through oversight the name of opposite party Nitya Ranjan Ghose has been omitted. The order under Section 107 of the Cr PC, binding all the members is equally binding upon him also 1st party is ordered to bring this matter to the notice of the learned Sessions Judge.”
In the circumstances, it is quite clear that Nitya Ranjan Ghose was also ordered by the learned Magistrate to execute the bond in question.
13. While I am fully satisfied that the order passed in the case was justified, I do not feel so in the case of petitioner No. 2 Arun. I, therefore, set aside the order so far as petitioner No. 2 Arun Ghose is concerned and make the rule absolute so far as he is concerned.
14. The rule so far as the other petitioners are concerned must be discharged and the order against them confirmed.
15. I am grateful to Mr. Chintaharan Roy and Mr. S.S Mookerjee for rendering me valuable assistance in this case.
V.R.B
16. Order accordingly.
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