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Satya Narayan Nathani v. Stats Of West Bengal And Anr.

Calcutta High Court
Feb 1, 1957
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Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Satya Narayan Nathani, owned a ground-floor flat at Premises No. 102G, Russa Road. In 1945 he sought and obtained an ejectment decree against a tenant; that tenant exhausted appeals up to this Court between 1945 and 1948. On 27 October 1948 an order under section 3(1) of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 requisitioning the premises was served on the appellant, but that order was rescinded on 7 November 1949 after a representation by the appellant that he required the flat for his own use. On 23 June 1951 a prohibitory order under section 3(3)(b) was made (preventing disposal without Government permission) and later rescinded on 15 April 1952 after the appellant again represented that he required the flat for his own use. The tenant remained in occupation until possession was obtained on 12 June 1952. On 10 July 1952 a fresh requisition order was passed under section 3(1) and the First Land Acquisition Collector directed the appellant on 12 July 1952 to place the flat at his disposal the same day; the appellant sought time and filed objections. An enquiry report by S.B. Das Gupta dated 13 August 1952 concluded the appellant did not really require the flat, and Government directed the Collector to pursue requisition. A valid notice under section 4(1)(a) was issued on 23 October 1952 directing surrender on 17 November 1952; service difficulties, interim letting to S.P. Lahiri (for a marriage) and further delays occurred. Possession was ultimately obtained with police assistance on 19 January 1953. The appellant moved this Court under Article 226 on 1 June 1953 and obtained a Rule which was discharged on 2 March 1954. The appellant then filed the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notice of requisition was invalid because it did not specify the public purpose for which the flat was requisitioned.
  2. Whether the requisition order of 12 July 1952 (the First Land Acquisition Collector's order) was bad for failing to give the ten days' notice required by section 4(1)(a) of the Act.
  3. Whether the purpose for which the requisition was made (providing accommodation to a State officer) amounted to a public purpose.
  4. Whether Article 31(2) of the Constitution applied to the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947, and, if so, whether the factual existence and character of a public purpose was justiciable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The notice of requisition was bad because it did not specify the public purpose for which the flat was requisitioned.
  • The First Land Acquisition Collector's order of 12 July 1952 was invalid because it did not give the ten days' notice required by section 4(1)(a) of the Act.
  • The stated purpose — providing accommodation to a State officer — was not a public purpose, and thus the requisition was unlawful.

Respondents' / State's Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • Before the trial judge it was argued the requisition notice need not specify the public purpose because, by precedent, the factual existence of a public purpose depends on the subjective satisfaction of the State Government.
  • The factual basis relied upon (including the reasons for selecting the flat) was properly placed on record by affidavit of the First Land Acquisition Collector who had referred to official records.
  • Affidavit-in-opposition disclosed that the flat was requisitioned to provide accommodation to S.R. Mukherjee, Labour Officer (Statistics), who was said to be in urgent need of accommodation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Srinivas Khedwal v. The State Of West Bengal (57 C.W.N 719) Held that under section 3(1) of the Act factual existence of a public purpose depended on the subjective satisfaction of the State Government and was not justiciable in courts (as earlier decided by G.N. Das, J.). The trial Judge had felt bound by this decision; the present Court reviewed and distinguished its applicability because of later considerations regarding Article 31(2) and subsequent extensions/amendments of the Act.
State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji [(1954) S.C.A 1286] Supreme Court decision relevant to whether orders of requisition must specify a public purpose; also examined whether an Act extended after the Constitution came into force remained an "existing law" for Article 31(5). The present Court relied on the Supreme Court's approach to conclude that the Act as extended fell within the ambit of Article 31(2), and that orders under such an Act are justiciable as to existence and character of public purpose.
Biswabhusan Naik v. State Of Orissa [(1954) S.C.A 928] Held that it is not necessary to set out the purpose of requisition in the order itself; purpose may be established by facts. Used, with State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, to dispose of the appellant's first point that an order was invalid merely because it did not name the purpose.
A.C. Mohammad v. Sailendra Nath Mitra (54 C.W.N 642) Construction of section 3(1) before the Constitution: held language suggested that whether premises were needed depended on Government satisfaction (pre-constitutional context). The Court observed that this case dealt with orders made before the Constitution and so did not consider Article 31(2); it was noted but not decisive for post-Constitution requisitions.
Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas Advani [(1951) S.C 1 (C.W.N)] Interpreted similar language in a pre-constitution ordinance as making the subjective opinion of the executive authority the condition precedent for exercise of power. The Court noted this decision applied to pre-constitutional instruments and distinguished its force where Article 31(2) now applies.
The State Of Bombay v. Heman Santlal Alreja [A.I.R (1952) Bombay 16] Bombay High Court held that an Act passed before the Constitution but extended by later legislation could be treated as an "existing law" for Article 31(5) because the original Act contained a provision for extension. The present Court discussed this Bombay High Court reasoning but observed that the Supreme Court in Bhanji Munji did not accept that view; the present Court followed the Supreme Court's approach.
State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee (1954 S.C.A 41) Where Article 31(2) applied, provisions making a Government declaration conclusive as to public purpose were held unconstitutional; factual existence of public purpose must be established objectively. Relied upon to support the proposition that where Article 31(2) applies, courts can examine both existence and character of a public purpose and that conclusive-declaration clauses cannot protect Government action from judicial review.
Sudhindra Nath Datta v. Sailendra Nath Mitra (87 C.L.J 140) Similar construction to A.C. Mohammad case; concerned requisition orders made in 1949 (pre-constitutional context). Mentioned as having similar pre-constitutional context and thus not determinative of post-constitutional issues arising under Article 31(2).
Wiievesekera v. Festing (1919 A.C 646) Judicial Committee interpreted language similar to section 3(1): held the Governor's decision that land was needed for a public purpose (necessity) was final as to need (in that factual context). The Court noted the limited scope of that decision: it concerned the finality of the executive as to necessity for a stated public purpose, not the character of the purpose where Article 31(2) applies.
Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State for India (L.R 42 I.A. 44) Illustrates when provision of accommodation to Government servants can be a public purpose (resumption to build quarters for officials because lack of housing prejudiced public services). Referred to as an example of circumstances in which providing accommodation to government servants was held to be a public purpose; used to illustrate that some cases may amount to public purpose but facts matter.
State of Bombay v. All Gulshan [(1956) S.C.A 17] Supreme Court decision on requisition/acquisition issues (cited among other Supreme Court decisions). Referred to as one of the Supreme Court authorities bearing on whether requisition/acquisition was for public purpose; not said to directly resolve the present factual issue.
State Of Bombay v. R. S. Nanji [(1956) S.C.A 308] Supreme Court decision containing a full analysis of prior decisions concerning requisition/acquisition and public purpose. Noted as providing comprehensive analysis of earlier decisions but not directly deciding the present case's facts; cited for broader context.
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [(1953) S.C.A 53] Supreme Court authority relevant to challenges to legislation as ultra vires; cited to show that if the Act itself were challenged as unconstitutional the Court would be constrained by precedent. Mentioned to indicate that the appellant did not challenge the Act itself as ultra vires; had that been raised, precedent indicated the Court would rule against the appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages, addressing the appellant's three principal contentions and examining the constitutional backdrop.

  1. First and second contentions (notice not specifying public purpose; alleged failure to give statutory notice under section 4(1)(a)):
    • The Court observed that recent Supreme Court authority (State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Biswabhusan Naik v. State of Orissa) had established that an order of requisition need not set out the purpose in express terms; the purpose may be proved by facts established in the case. On that basis the Court rejected the technical objection that the requisition order was invalid merely because it referred only to a "public purpose" without specifying it.
    • Regarding the 12 July 1952 order by the First Land Acquisition Collector, the Court accepted that the Collector may have acted irregularly by demanding immediate surrender rather than giving the statutory period. Nevertheless, the appellant could not seek relief based on that irregularity because he had not complied with directives and had, in effect, prolonged possession for more than six months — far exceeding the notice he could have legitimately claimed. The Court therefore refused to allow the appellant to pick an earlier irregular order as a basis for relief after having failed to surrender possession and having obtained de facto delay.
  2. Third contention (whether the stated purpose was a public purpose):
    • The Court undertook detailed consideration of whether Article 31(2) of the Constitution applied to the West Bengal Act. It reviewed legislative history: the Act originally came into force 1 January 1948 and contained a provision permitting extension by notification; subsequently the Act was amended and its life was extended repeatedly by Acts of the Legislature (not merely by executive notification), including Act XV of 1950 which fixed a definite extension period. The requisition order in the present case was made on 10 July 1952 during a period of extension effected by later legislation.
    • Relying on the Supreme Court's treatment in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, the Court concluded that the Act, as extended, fell within the ambit of Article 31(2). Where Article 31(2) applies, the existence and character of a public purpose are objectively justiciable; a provision in an Act making the executive's subjective satisfaction final cannot prevent judicial scrutiny.
    • The Court therefore held that the earlier line of authority treating the executive's subjective satisfaction as final (as in pre-constitutional cases) could not be applied to requisitions made when Article 31(2) governed the Act; the Court must examine whether a public purpose actually exists and whether it is a public purpose in character.
    • On the merits, while acknowledging the affidavit-in-opposition that the flat was required to house S.R. Mukherjee (a Labour Officer (Statistics) said to be sorely in need of accommodation), the Chief Justice expressed difficulty in holding that mere provision of residential accommodation to a government servant, without evidence that such accommodation was essential for public service performance or that other efforts to secure accommodation had failed, necessarily amounted to a public purpose. He noted examples where housing public servants could be a public purpose (e.g., housing fire brigade members adjacent to a fire station), but found no factual material in the record to show such special circumstances in this case.
  3. Discretionary relief and appellant's conduct:
    • The Court emphasized the appellant's conduct: despite eviction of the tenant and the lapse of a month before requisition, the appellant did not occupy the flat; he let it out for a marriage; he delayed moving the Court for many months after notice to surrender; he allowed possession under requisition to mature for six months; and he sought writ relief only after considerable delay. The Court treated a writ of mandamus as an extraordinary remedy that requires diligence and good faith in the applicant.
    • Given these facts and the appellant's delay and conduct (which suggested the asserted personal need might be a pretence), the Court concluded that the appellant was not entitled to relief by way of mandamus even if questions about public purpose remained open.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal fails and is DISMISSED. There will be no order for costs.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's challenge to the requisition is unsuccessful; the requisition stands and the appellant receives no costs.
  • On justiciability and constitutional principle: The Court held that where Article 31(2) of the Constitution applies to an Act authorising acquisition or requisition, the existence and character of a public purpose are matters for objective judicial inquiry. A statutory provision making the executive's subjective satisfaction conclusive does not bar judicial scrutiny when Article 31(2) governs the Act.
  • On procedural relief: Even if legal defects or close questions exist, relief by extraordinary writ (such as mandamus) may be refused on grounds of delay, lack of diligence, or conduct suggesting an absence of bona fide need.
  • Limitations: The Court did not finally decide that the particular purpose (housing the named officer) was or was not a public purpose; rather, it found the appellant was not entitled to writ relief in the circumstances. The opinion also engages with precedent chronology and legislative amendments in determining the applicability of Article 31(2).

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that opinion.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

Chakravartti, C.J:— The appellant, Satya Narayan Nathani, complains of the requisition of a flat in the ground-floor of Premises No. 102G, Russa Road which is owned by him. He says that the requisition was not for a public purpose and such requisition being forbidden by the Constitution, it was unlawful and void.

1. The history of the requisition which is spread over a period exceeding four years makes strange reading. It appears that in 1945, there was a tenant in the flat whom the appellant did not wish to be there. Accordingly, he filed a suit for his ejectment and obtained a decree. The tenant appealed and having failed before the District Court, preferred a second appeal to this Court in which he failed again. Those proceedings lay between 1945 and 1948. Thereafter, on the 27th cf October, 1948, an order under section 3(1) of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions), Act, 1947, requisitioning the premises, was served on the appellant, but it was rescinded on the 7th of November, 1949 on a representation being made to the Government that the appellant required the flat for his own use and occupation. Seven months later, a prohibitory order under section 3(3)(b) of the Act was made on the 23rd of June, 1951, wnereby the appellant was asked not to dispose of the nat without the permission of the Government. Once again, the appellant made a representation and once again the order was rescinded. That rescission was on the 15th of April, 1952. During all that time, the tenant had managed to remain in occupation of the flat. Ultimately, on the 12th of June, 1952, possession was obtained from him. About a month later, on the 10th of July, 1952, a fresh order of requisition was passed under section 3(1) of the Act and the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, was directed to take such further action as was necessary. The further action taken was strong action. The First Land Acquisition Collector made an order on the 12th of July, 1952, and directed the appellant to place the flat at his disposal and control at 2-30 p.m of the same day. In issuing that order, the First Land Acquisition Collector must have overestimated his powers or forgotten the provisions of section 4(1)(a) of the Act which requires ten days' time to be given for vacating any requisitioned premises. Be that as it may, the appellant refused to comply with the notice and byan application made on the 14th of July, 1952, asked for time to file an objection. Time till the 16th of the month was granted and on the next day the appellant's objection was filed. He repeated his contention that the flat was required by him for his own use and occupation and thereupon one S.B Das Gupta, Additional Land Acquisition Collector, was directed to make an enquiry. Das Gupta made his report on the 13th of August, 1952 in which he said that the hat was not really required by the appellant, because he had another house at 177A, Chittaranjan Avenue to live in which was “a magnificent building”. On receipt of that report, Government directed the First Land Acquisition Collector to pursue the requisition.

2. Thereafter, on the 23rd of October, 1952, a fresh notice under section 4(1)(a) of the Act was issued and this time the provisions of the section were not overlooked. The notice, however, could not be served on the appellant, as he could not be found and ultimately it was sent by registered post to 177A, Chittaranjan Avenue. By the notice the appellant was directed to make over possession of the flat on the 17th of November, 1952. Even on that date, possession could not be obtained, inasmuch as, in the meantime, the appellant, had let out the flat to one S.P Lahiri for the purpose of his celebrating a marriage there. The next date fixed for delivery of possession was the 5th of December, 1952, but even on that day possession could not be taken, as Lahiri was still in occupation and said that he would not be able to vacate the flat before the 8th of December next. The 8th of December was then fixed as the date for delivery of possession, but once again possession could not be taken, as the appellant refused to make over the property. Direction was then sought from the Government as to whether the Land Acquisition Collector should proceed under section 9 of the Act and such direction being given, possession was at last obtained on the 19th of January, 1953, with police help. About seven months later, on the 1st of June, 1953, the appellant moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained a Rule. On the 2nd of March, 1954, the Rule was discharged. Thereupon, the present appeal was filed.

3. The facts I have briefly narrated indicate very clearly that the appellant was clinging to the property with a great deal of tenacity but it is not equally clear why the Government if they were minded to requisition this particular flat, should have withdrawn the order of requisition twice merely on representations made by the Appellant and then returned to the attack.

4. Before Sinha, J., it was contended that the notice of requisition was bad, inasmuch as the public purpose for which the flat was being requisitioned had not been specified in it. The only other contention was that the facts on which the respondents were relying had not been properly brought on the record, because they had been spoken to only by the First Land Acquisition. Collector who could not have known why the Government had taken action in the matter or selected the particular flat for requisition. The learned Judge repelled both the contentions. In regard to the first, he held that by reason of the decision of the Appeal Court in Srinivas Khedwal… v. The State Of West Bengal…. (1) (57 C.W.N 719), he was bound to hold that the factual existence of a public purpose in respect of a requisition under section 3(1) of the Act depended entirely on the subjective satisfaction of the State Government and that it was not necessary for the State to specify in the order of requisition the public purpose for which it was made. The second contention was disposed of summarily. The learned Judge held that he could see no reason why the First Land Acquisition Collector, who had affirmed the affidavit-in-opposition, could not swear to the facts stated by him, if he had referred to the official records which he said he had done.

5. In the present appeal three points were urged. It was contended, in the first place, that the notice of requisition was bad, inasmuch as the public purpose for which the fiat was being requisitioned had not been specified in it. It was contended in the second place that the order made on the 12th of July, 1952, which was the basic requisition order, was also bad, because the time required to be given by section 4(1)(a) had not been given. It was contended, in the third place, that the purpose for which the requisition had been made was not a public purpose at all.

6. The first and the second points taken on behalf of the appellant can be shortly disposed of. It is true that the order of requisition did not specify the public purpose for which the flat was being requisitioned, because all that it said was that the premises were “needed for a public purpose.” It has, however, now been finally decided by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji (2) [(1954) S.C.A 1286] and in the earlier case of Biswabhusan Naik v. State Of Orissa (3) [(1954) S.C.A 928], that in order to make an order of requisition valid, it is not necessary to set out the purpose of the requisition in the order itself A purpose and a public purpose must undoubtedly be made out to the satisfaction of the Court, if the order is to be upheld as valid, but if such a purpose is proved by the facts established in the case, which may properly be done, the order cannot be impugned as invalid for the mere reason that the purpose was not specified in it. In the present ease, it was disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition that the appellant's flat had been requisitioned for the purpose of providing accommodation to one S.R Mukherjee, Labour Officer (Statistics), who was said to be sorely in need of accommodation. Whether that purpose could be said to be a public purpose is a different and a separate question. But a purpose claimed to be a public purpose, having been disclosed by the facts as the purpose of the requisition, the order of the requisition made thereby cannot be challenged on the technical ground that the purpose was not specifically mentioned in the order, but was only referred to in general terms as a public purpose. The Appellant's attempt to prove that the purpose alleged was not the real purpose of the acquisition did not succeed

7. With regard to the second point of the appellant it will be enough to say that however contrary to law the order of the 12th of July, 1952, made by the First Land Acquisition Collector on the basis of the requisition order of the 10th of July, may have been, the appellant cannot claim any relief on the ground of the irregularity of that order, because, in fact, he did not make over possession in accordance with its terms. Instead of ten days under section 4(1)(a) of fifteen days under section 4(1)(aa) which was the maximum that he could claim, he contrived to have more than six months. Not having given up possession in accordance with the order of the 12th of July, 1952 and, in fact, a second order of requisition having been issued on the 23rd of October following, which also was not complied with by the appellant, he cannot now turn round and select an old order made on a past date for the purpose of challenging the requisition.

8. The third point urged by the appellant, however, requires close consideration. The decision of this Court in the case of Srinivas Khedwal… v. The State Of West Bengal…. (1) (57 C.W.N 719) was on this very Act and on this very point. G.N Das, J., who delivered the judgment proceeded on the language of section 3(1) of the Act which says that “whenever it appears tothe State Government that any premises in any locality are needed or are likely to be needed for any public purpose” it may requisition such premises. That language, the learned Judge held, made it perfectly clear that whether or not the premises concerned were required for a public purpose depended entirely on the satisfaction of the State Government and the question was not justiciable in Courts of law. The same section, it was pointed out, had been construed in the same sense in the earlier case of 4. C. Mohammad v. Sailendra Nath Mitra (4) (54 C.W.N 642) and that in construing similar language of a Bombay Ordinance, the Supreme Court had held in Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas Advani (5) [(1951) S.C 1 (C.W.N)] that, under the language of the Ordinance, the condition precedent for the exercise of the power conferred by it was not the actual existence of the matter, but the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority that it existed. As against such construction of the section, it was argued before the learned Judges that since the enactment of Article 31(2) of the Constitution, it was no longer feasible, because where an Act provided for the acquisition or taking possession of any property which could only be done for public purposes, the purpose in the contemplation of the Act and the purpose of orders made under the Act were now both justiciable in Courts of law. G.N Das, J., held that Article 31(2) would not apply to the Act before him at all, because it had been passed more than eighteen months before the date of the Constitution and, therefore, it was an existing law within the meaning of Article 31(5) which was not affected in any way by the provisions of Article 31(2). The learned Judge did point out that with regard to the justiciability of a public purpose, there were really two questions—one bearing upon the constitutionality of the Act concerned and another bearing upon) the validity of orders passed under it. He appears to have held that if the factual existence of the public purpose could not be enquired into in the case of Acts to which Article 31(2) did not apply, it was immaterial to the validity of an order passed under the Act whether the public purpose of the order itself was specified in it or not

9. With great respect, it appears to me that G.N Das. J., was not right in holding that Article 81(2) did not apply to the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947. It is true that the original Act came into force on the 1st of January, 1948. It was to remain in force up to the 31st of March, 1950, but section 1(4) of the Act provided that the Provincial Government might by Notification in the Official Gazette direct that it would remain in force for a further period or periods not exceeding in the aggregate three years. Even before the 31st of March, 1950, the Act was amended by. Act IV of 1949 which came into force on the 3rd of March, 1949 and by that Act several sections, including sections 3 and 4, were amended. When the life of the Act, as it stood originally, was drawing to a close, it was not extended by the State Government as it might have been, but the Legislature itself passed an Act, being Act XV of 1950, which came into force on the 30th of March, 1950 and provided thereby that the principal Act would remain in force up to the 31st of March, 1953. The extension of the Act's life was effected by substituting for the old section 1(4) a new section fixing a definite date, on the expiry of which the Act would cease to be in force. It will be noticed that the period of the extension was the same as the maximum which the State Government might confer on the Act by a Notification. The Act, however, was not allowed to expire on the 31st of March, 1953. By two other Acts its life was further extended. Act X of 1953 which came into force on the 28th of March, 1953. extended the life of the Act up to the 31st of March, 1954 and Act VII of 1954 which came into force on the 29th of March, 1954, extended its life up to the 31st of March, 1957. The order of requisition in the case before G.N Das, J., had been made on the 31st of October, 1950. It was thus made not within the period of the original life of the Act, but within the period of the first extension, effected by Act XV of 1950. G.N Das, J., did take notice of Act IV of 1949 by which some of the sections of the original Act were amended, but his attention does not appear to have been drawn to Act XV of 1950, nor to the question whether it was the Act, as passed in 1948, which was then in force or a new Act passed after the Constitution had come into force. The learned Judge did not consider the question.

10. In a case decided by the Bombay High Court to which G.N Das, J., referred, namely, The The State Of Bombay… v. Heman Santlal Alreja…. (6) [A.I.R (1952) Bombay 16], a question arose as to whether an Act, which had been passed more than eighteen months before the date of the Constitution, but the life of which had been extended by another Act passed after the Constitution had come into force, would come within the ambit of Article 31(2) of the Constitution. The Act concerned was the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) and it was due to expire on the 31st of March, 1950. Like the Act before us, however, it contained a provision that the Provincial Government might by a Notification in the Official Gazette direct that the Act would remain in force for a further period of two years. As in the case of the Act before us, so in the case of the Bombay Act also, the life of the Act was not in fact extended by a Notification of the Government, but it was extended by another Act of the Legislature. That Act was Act II of 1950 which came into force on the 28th of March, 1950 and extended the life of the pnncipal Act up to the 31st of March, 1952. Then followed another Amendment Act, Act XXXIX of 1950. On those facts, the Bombay High Court held that although the Legislature had delegated the power of extending the life of the Act to the Provincial Government, it could nevertheless exercise the power itself, if it desired to do so. The Court held further that inasmuch as the Original Act) itself contained a provision for its extension, what was an existing law for the purposes of Article 31(5) was not merely the Act of 1948, limited as to its duration up to the 31st of March, 1950, but also as that Act containing, as it did, an inherent potentiality for further extension.

11. The extension of the life of the Act by Act II of 1950, it was accordingly held, did not make the Act a new Act passed after the commencement of the Constitution, but, on the other hand, the original Act, as extended up to the 31st of March, 1952, by reason of the provision for extension contained in it, was and remained an existing law. If, even as current during the period of extension, the Act was anexisting law, Article 31(2) was obviously excluded.

12. The above view of the Bombay High Court does not seem to have been accepted by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji (2) [(1954) S.C.A 1286]. The Supreme Court had to deal with the same Act and the effect of its amendments as regards the applicability of Article 31(2). It was contended before the Court that as the later Acts had been enacted after the commencement of the Constitution and as the life of the main Act had been extended after the Constitution had come into force, Article 31(2) of the Constitution was attracted and the Act was bad, because it did not require that for requisitions made under it, there should be a public purpose. The Supreme Court did not repel that contention and did not hold that the principal Act having been passed more than eighteen months before the date of the Constitution and the extension of its life having been made under the authority of a provision contained in the principal Act itself, the Act, as extended, was also an existing law. On the other hand, the Court proceeded to examine first whether the Act offended against Article 31(2) by not requiring a public purpose for requisitions or acquisitions to be made under it and, secondly, whether the orders of requisition in the case then before the Court were bad for the reason that there was no supporting public purpose. In view of that decision of the Supreme Court, it must, it seems to me, be held that the Act before us, as extended from the 31st of March, 1950, to the 31st of March, 1953, was not an existing law within the meaning of Article 31(5), but an Act to which the provisions of Article 31(2) applied. The roder of requisition in the present case was made on the 10th of July, 1952. We, therefore, do not require to consider the Act, as further extended up to the 31st of March, 1954 and the 31st of March, 1957 respectively. The contrary view was held by G.N Das, J., sitting with Debabrata Mookerjee, J., because the enactment of Act XV of 1950 and the effect of the extension of the life of the principal Act brought about by it after the date of the Constitution were not present to their minds.

13. The Act under which the requisition order in the present case was made must, therefore, be held to be governed by Article 31(2) of the Constitution. If it is so governed, the question whether the Act at all purports to authorise acquisition or requisition for a public purpose or whether the purpose it mentions or contemplates is a purpose of a public character and the question whether a particular order made under it is actually supported by a public purpose as contemplated by the Act, are both justiciable. Obviously, an Act to which Article 31(2) applies cannot by enacting that Government may acquire or requisition any property which may appear to it to be needed for a public purpose, create a wall of immunity around orders made under the Act and exclude judicial scrutiny as to the existence or the character of the purpose. If such a provision does occur in such an Act, it may, as a matter of language, mean that Government will be the sole judge of whether a public purpose exists and also of whether the property is needed for such a purpose, but it would be wholly unconstitutional and wholly ineffective as to taking away the power of the Court to look into the matter for itself and uphold or quash an order according to its own conclusion. To allow such a provision to take the effect which its language contemplates will be to make the question unjusticiable and, therefore, to thwart the Constitution. That, to my mind, is wholly impossible. Where Article 31(2) applies to an Act, a provision contained in it, which makes the subjective satisfaction of the Government the sole condition precedent to the exercise of the power of acquisition or requisition, will be of no avail against Courts and in spite of such a provision, the Courts will have jurisdiction to judge both the existence or otherwise of a purpose and its character.

14. That appears to be the view taken by the Supreme Court in several cases, among which it will be sufficient to refer to the case of State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee (7) (1954) S.C.A 41. The West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, with which that case was concerned, authorised the Government to acquire such land as it thought was meeded for a public purpose. To that end, the Act, by section 4, authorised Government to declare by a Notification an area to be a notified area, if it was satisfied that any land within it was needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose and then by section 6, it authorised Government to declare after some investigation what land within that area was actually needed. Section 8 provided that a declaration under section 6 would be conclusive evidence that the area, in respect of which the declaration was made, was needed for a public purpose. There was thus not only a section, making the subjective satisfaction of the Government the sole condition precedent to the making of a declaration, but also a section expressly enacting that such declaration would be irrebuttable evidence of the existence of a public purpose. Article 31(2) applied to the Act. Dealing with the provision to which I have just referred, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“The Attorney-General appearing for the appellant, rightly conceded that inasmuch as Art. 31(2) made the existence of a public purpose a necessary condition of acquisition, the existence of such a purpose as a fact must be established objectively, and the provision in section 8 relating to the conclusiveness of the declaration of Government as to the nature of the purpose of the acquisition must be held unconstitutional.”

15. It will thus appear that no provision contained in an Act to which Article 31(2) applies can avail the! Government against the Constitution, even if it provides in the strongest language that the Government will be the sole judge of whether a public purpose warranting the acquisition or requisition exists. The decision of the Supreme Court in Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas Advani (5) [(1951) S.C 1 (C.W.N)] was concerned with a pre-constitution Ordinance to which Article 31(2) did not apply. I may add that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act has since been included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, but whether by reason of that, judicial examination of the public purpose is now barred is a question, not free from difficulty.

16. In the case of the Act before us, it is thus immaterial that the only condition precedent to a requisition order under section 3(1) is that it should appear to the State Government that any premises in any locality are needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose. In spite of that provision, the jurisdiction of the Court to enquire whether an order of requisition is supported by a public purpose remains. The earlier decision in A.C Mohammad v. Sailendra Nath Mitra (4) (54 C.W.N 642), to which the learned Judges who decided the case in Srinivas Khedwal… v. The State Of West Bengal…. (i) (57 C.W.N 719), relied was concerned with an order made in 1949 under the Act as originally enacted and before the Constitution had come into force. Naturally, it proceeded merely on the language of section 3 and the effect of Article 31(2) did not fall to be considered. The order of requisition in that case was made on the 25th of February, 1949. Exactly similar was the position in Sudhindra Nath Datta… v. Sailendra Nath Mitra…. (8) (87 C.L.J 140), cited before us, where the requisition order was made on the 22nd of May, 1949.

17. In the view I am taking of the effect of section 3(1) it is unnecessary to consider what its true meaning, as a matter of language, is. I am, however, be permitted to say, with respect, that I entertain some doubt as to whether it does really carry the meaning which has been ascribed to it in the cases. The words “whenever it appears to the State Government that any premises in any locality are needed or are likely to be needed for any public purpose” seem to me to suggest that what is left to the opinion of the Government is not the existence of the public purpose, but the! need for the land. The learned Judges who decided the case in Srinivas Khedwal… v. The State Of West Bengal…. (1) (57 C.W.N 719), relied on the decision in A.C Mohammad v. Sailendra Nath Mitra (4) (54 C.W.N 642), and that decision in its turn relied on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Wiievesekera v. Festing (9) [(1919) A.C 646]. The words of the Ceylon Ordinance which the Judicial Committee had to construe were these: “Whenever it shall appear to the Governor that land in any locality is likely to be needed for any public purpose, it shall be lawful for the Governor to direct the Surveyor-General or other officer generally or specially authorized by the Governor in this behalf, to examine such land and report whether the same is fitted for such purpose.” In the case before the Judicial Committee, the Governor had ordered the acquisition of some land “for a public purpose-namely, the making of a road.” It appears to me that the question raised before the Judicial Committee was not whether the order was conclusive as to the purpose of the acquisition being a public purpose, but whether it was conclusive as to the necessity of acquiring the land in the interest of that purpose. The purpose was the making of a road and no one appears to have disputed that such a purpose was a public purpose. The Judicial Committee undoubtedly said that in view of the language of the Ordinance, the decision of the Governor would be binding, but what they considered to be binding appears from an extract quoted by them with approval from the head-note to the report of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Ceylon. The extract reads thus:

“In the acquisition of a private land for a public purpose, the Governor is not bound to take the report of the Surveyor-General as to its fitness for such a purpose. His decision on the question whether a land is needed or not for a public purpose is final.”

18. It would, therefore, seem that there was no question before the Judicial Committee as to whether making of a road was or was not a public purpose. What they decided was that the Governor's decision to the effect that the appellant's land was needed for that purpose was final. As Harries C.J pointed out in the case of Sudhindra Nath Datta… v. Sailendra Nath Mitra…. (8) (87) C.L.J 140), at page 142, the language which the Judicial Committee were called upon to construe was precisely the same as the language of section 3(1) of the Act before us. On the construction put by the Judicial Committee on that language, it would seem that even if the effect of an order under section 3(1) fell to be determined on its language alone, the decision of the Government as to the existence of a public purpose would not be final, but only its decision that for furthering the purpose mentioned, the premises concerned were needed. This question, however, need not be pursued further in the present case, because for the reasons I have already given, nothing turns on the language of section 3(1).

19. It was not contended before us that the Act itself was ultra vires the Constitution, either for the reason that it did not require requisitions or acquisitions to be made for a public purpose or for the reason that no such purpose was specified in it. If that question was raised, we would be bound to hold against the appellant by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (10) [(1953) S.C.A 53] and State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji (2) [(1954) S.C.A 1286 at page 1290]. The Act before us does speak of a public purpose in section 3(1) and by the amendment made by Act VII of 1954, ‘public purpose’ was defined as not including a purpose of the Union. What was argued before us, however, was that the purpose for which the requisition order in the present case was made was not a public purpose.

20. For reasons I am going presently to state, it is not necessary for us to decide that question, but, speaking for myself, I find it difficult to hold that, without more, the purpose disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition can properly be held to be a public purpose. It was a purpose of providing accommodation to an officer of the State Government who, it was said, was sorely in need of accommodation. It was not said that he had made every possible effort on his own account to secure accommodation and such efforts had failed, nor that in order to the efficient discharge of the duties of his office, it was essential that he should find accommodation in Calcutta and could not come from the suburbs or from any of the neighbouring localities. An exposition of ‘public purpose’ which has received the approval of the Judicial Committee is that whatever else public purpose may mean, it must include a purpose that has an object and an aim in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned. A Government servant is undoubtedly a public servant in the broad sense of the term though very remotely a servant of the public, and it may also be said that the public are interested in the proper discharge by a Government servant of the duties of his office. But where the conditions of a Government servant's service do not require that accommodation is to be provided for him or there is nothing to show that there is some special reason for which it is essential to provide him with residential facilities or to find accommodation for him in a particular locality in order that he may be enabled to perform or perform efficiently the duties of his office, I find it difficult to hold that the purpose of providing accommodation to a person merely because he is a Government servant and merely because he is in need of accommodation, is a purpose in which the public, who pay him by a salary for such services as he renders are further interested, not to speak of being interested directly or vitally. I can, however, think of special cases. If, for example, it was considered expedient to provide accommodation to the members of a fire-brigade in the neighbourhood of the fire-station on the ground that they should be easily available and land situated near the fire-station was for that purpose acquired, I would be prepared to hold that the purpose would be a public purpose. Whether there were any special circumstances present in the case before us, does not appear.

21. Certain decisions on the question were cited before us to which I shall refer in the briefest terms. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State for India (11) (L.R 42 I.A, 44), appears to furnish an apt illustration of when provision of accommodation to Government servants can; be a public purpose. The facts in that case were that owing to the dearth of suitable houses in Bombay and the high rents demanded, officials were reluctant to accept appointments there and as that circumstance was prejudicial to the efficiency of the various public services, certain lands held by a person under a lease, dating from the time of the East India Company were resumed, in order that quarters for Government servants might be built thereon.

22. Other decisions cited before us were all decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji (2) [(1954) S.C.A 1286]; The State of Bombay v. All Gulshan (12) [(1956) S.C.A 17] and State Of Bombay … v. R. S. Nanji… (18) [(1956) S.C.A 308]. In the decision last cited, there is a full analysis of all the previous decisions None of them covers exactly the case before us and they certainly do not make the decision of the question, whether the purpose in the present case was a public purpose, easier.

23. I need not however, proceed further to decide the question finally, because, in my opinion, the appellant in the present case is not entitled to any relief by way of a writ of mandamus, as prayed for by him. His case is that the house at 177A, Chittaranjan Avenue was allotted to other co-sharers on partition and that although he was living there, he was doing so on sufferance. The officer who held an investigation in the case does not appear to have believed that the appellant had no right of residence at 177A, Chittaranjan Avenue, but with that question of fact we are not concerned. On his own showing, the appellant owns, besides Premises No. 102G, Russa Road, Premises! Nos. 102A, 102B, 102C, 102D, 102H and 102J Russa Road. Whether or not they or any of them is available to him is again a question of fact into which we are not required to enter.

24. He may be judged by the case with which he came to the Court and his own conduct in relation to that case. If he was desperately in need of the flat in question for the purpose of his own residence, it is surprising that although a whole month elapsed between the eviction of the tenant and the present order of requisition, he took no steps whatever to move into the occupation of the flat. He may have taken symbolical possession, but was obviously not residing there, because if he was, he could not have lent the use of the flat to S.P Lahiri for the purpose of holding a marriage ceremony there. If, again, he felt aggrieved by the present order of requisition, it is not explicable why he did not move this Court after the notice to surrender the flat was issued on the 23rd of October 1952. Even after possession had at last been wrested from him with police help, he did not move for about six months and approached this Court only on the 1st of June, 1953. By way of an explanation of this delay, his learned Advocate referred to a statement in paragraph 9 of the petition that after possession had been taken, the appellant had called upon the respondents to, withdraw the requisition order and restore possession of the flat to him. No dates are given and it is not explained why as much as six months should have been required for demanding justice and obtaining a refusal. A writ of mandamus is not a writ of right. A person invoking the special jurisdiction of the Court for the extraordinary remedy by way of a writ is required to be diligent. If he was not, and if his conduct shows that his supposed need for the premises was probably a pretence and if he allowed possession under the order of requisition to mature for six months, the Court will not be inclined to come to his assistance by way of a writ, whatever other remedies he may or may not have.

25. The appeal, accordingly, fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order for costs.

Lahiri, J.:— I agree.

A.K.D-G.