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Subodh Ranjan Ghose v. Major N.A.O Callaghan And Anr.
Structured Summary of the Judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was a civilian employee in the Military Engineering Service (M.E.S.). He joined service in 1940 as a qualified overseer and rose to Superintendent (first grade). He was appointed by the General Engineer (G.E.) Ishapore and, on August 21, 1941, signed an Articles of Agreement in the form "IAFZ 2055" (a form described as applicable to civilian employees and to be pasted in service books). Clause 5 of that agreement originally provided for one calendar month's notice of termination by the Government or appointing officer; by an amendment in August 1947 the period was increased to three calendar months. The Articles also permitted summary termination for gross misconduct.
Between 1949 and 1952 the petitioner faced multiple departmental proceedings: (i) June 16, 1949 — charged with throwing away military stores; (ii) late 1949 — overstaying leave to Eastern Pakistan and alleged absence without leave and false leave address; (iii) December 28, 1949 — an order of transfer to Kashmir was communicated to the leave address but did not reach him; (iv) a disciplinary proceeding for disobedience of transfer resulted in reduction in rank to Superintendent (second grade); (v) April 4, 1951 — proceeding for incorrect measurement of bills resulted in reprimand; (vi) October 17, 1951 — proceedings for wrong entries regarding timber sizes; (vii) February 28, 1952 — charged with neglect of duty for failing to account for stores, representation filed March 5, 1952, and on April 25, 1952 he was found guilty and fined Rs. 50 to be deducted from pay and allowances.
On April 10, 1952 the G.E., Calcutta Division, passed an order stating that the petitioner had been found guilty of a charge and served him with three months' notice of discharge in terms of the Articles of Agreement, effective from 10 April 1952 until 10 July 1952.
The petitioner applied to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; a rule was issued on July 7, 1952 calling on respondents to show cause why the orders dated April 10, 1952 and April 25, 1952 should not be declared illegal and why the April 10 notice should not be stayed or set aside. At an earlier hearing before Bose, J., the petitioner relied on Article 311(2) (alleging denial of a chance to show cause). The respondents initially contended the service agreement did not comply with section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 or Article 299 of the Constitution (and was void), a point which Bose, J. accepted; that decision was reversed on appeal. On remand and at the hearing before the present judge, respondents abandoned the appointment/voidness contention and argued instead that the petitioner had been validly appointed and validly discharged under Clause 5 of the Articles of Agreement.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner — a civilian employed in Military (defence) service — is governed by Article 311 of the Constitution (protections against removal or dismissal) or falls outside Article 311 because he holds a post "connected with defence" rather than being a member of the civil service of the Union or holding a civil post under the Union.
- Whether the April 10, 1952 order of discharge is a termination under the contractual Articles of Agreement (three months' notice) or is in effect a removal/dismissal by way of punishment (thereby attracting Article 311 and related procedural protections).
- Whether the petitioner was required to make a prior demand for redress (and show denial) before seeking writ relief in the nature of mandamus, and whether absence of such demand is fatal to his Article 226 petition.
- Whether, if the Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952 apply, the petitioner was afforded the procedural protections required by those rules (notably rule 15 and rule 16) in respect of the penalties imposed.
- Whether an order that recites a departmental enquiry and a finding of guilt but purports to terminate service "in terms of the contract" should be treated as a contractual termination or as dismissal by way of punishment.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. I. P. Mukherji)
- The Articles of Agreement of 21 August 1941 exist, but the order of discharge dated 10 April 1952 is not a discharge in terms of that service agreement; rather it is a punishment and thus amounts to removal/dismissal attracting Article 311(2) protections (i.e., a right to a chance to show cause and second opportunity).
- The petitioner, though a civilian in military employment, should be classified as a civil servant within the meaning of Article 311 and thereby entitled to Article 311 protections; alternatively, under the applicable Army instructions he was entitled to a second chance to show cause, so the discharge was unlawful.
- Relying on authorities (e.g., Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas), in some circumstances demand for relief may be futile and excused; on the facts of this case, further demand from the military authorities would have been futile and thus a prior demand should not be required.
Respondents' Arguments (Mr. Kar)
- The petition for a writ of mandamus is defective in limine because the petitioner did not make a prior demand for justice nor show an explicit denial; precedent requires demonstration of demand and refusal in mandamus proceedings (citing Union of India v. Elbridge Watson).
- The petitioner was properly appointed and the Articles of Agreement dated 21 August 1941 governed his terms of employment, including Clause 5 allowing termination on three months' notice; the April 10, 1952 notice effected a contractual termination under Clause 5 and therefore was not removal/dismissal subject to Article 311.
- Even if Article 311 were to be engaged, the Civilians in Defence Services Rules, 1952 (made under Article 309) apply; but Rule 3(c) excludes persons whose conditions are governed by agreement — thus the agreement could exclude the petitioner from those rules except as to matters not covered by the agreement.
- With respect to the April 25, 1952 penalty (fine), the petitioner had been given an adequate opportunity to make representations; rule 16 (requiring that a representation be considered before imposing specified penalties) was complied with.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Atindra Nath Mukherji v. G. F. Gillot (59 C.W.N. 835) | Context on status of civilians in military employment; prior consideration of civilian status and lack of sufficient information under Army instructions. | Referenced as prior difficulty in ascertaining the status of civilians in military service; used as background to the present inquiry into whether the petitioner is a "civilian in defence service." |
| Union of India v. Elbridge Watson (56 C.W.N. 232) | In mandamus petitions, the petitioner must show his rights, a demand for justice, and denial thereof. | Relied upon to hold that a prior demand and refusal is required in a mandamus-type application; the Court found absence of such demand was a substantive flaw affecting the petition. |
| Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas (A.I.R. (1952) S.C.A. 16) | On when demand may be deemed futile or an effective denial, and when demand can be excused. | Examined and distinguished: Court held that, unlike Gordhandas where further demand would have been futile, the facts here did not justify excusing the demand requirement; therefore the prior demand should have been made. |
| Dassmal v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1956 Punjab 42) | Held that personnel governed by the Indian Army Act (or holding army rank) do not attract Article 311 protections; army personnel hold office at the pleasure of the Crown/President. | Used by respondents/cited by the Court to illustrate situations where Article 311 does not apply; distinguished on facts because the petitioner here was not governed by the Army Act but was a civilian in defence service. |
| Satish Chandra Anand v. The Union of India (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 250) | Legal principle: termination of service in accordance with the terms of a contract does not amount to removal or dismissal under Article 311. | Relied on as authority for the proposition that contractual termination is not removal/dismissal; used in concluding the April 10 notice was contractual termination. |
| Shyamlal v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 369) | Reiterates the distinction between contractual termination (no stigma, not a bar to future employment) and removal/dismissal by way of punishment (stigma and bar to future employment). | Applied as part of the test to determine whether the April 10 termination was contractual or punitive; supported the Court's conclusion that the termination was contractual. |
| Bhagwandas v. Superintendent, Way & Works, Eastern Railway (A.I.R. 1956 Patna 23) | Judicial support for the proposition that a departmental enquiry preceding a contractual notice does not necessarily convert termination into dismissal by way of punishment. | The Court noted that a Divisional Bench had supported the Court's earlier position that departmental proceedings do not automatically turn a contractual termination into punitive dismissal; this reinforced the Court's view. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a structured manner, addressing procedural defects and substantive legal questions arising from the facts:
-
Procedural threshold — mandamus demand requirement:
The Court first considered whether the petitioner had satisfied the requirement (in mandamus proceedings) to show a demand for justice and its denial. Citing Union of India v. Elbridge Watson and the discussion in Gordhandas, the Court concluded that the petitioner had not made a prior demand for redress and that no adequate justification for excusing such a demand had been shown on the facts. The Court treated the absence of a prior demand as a substantive defect that could be fatal to the mandamus application, although it went on to decide the other points because the matter might again reach higher courts.
-
Characterization of the petitioner's employment and applicability of Article 311:
The Court analyzed the petitioner's status. Although employed in the Military Engineering Service, the petitioner was conceded not to be military personnel and was not governed by the Army Act; he was a civilian employed in defence service. Article 309 and Article 310 (dealing with services under the Union) were applicable, but Article 311 (protections against removal/dismissal for civil servants) was not, because the petitioner was neither a member of the civil service of the Union nor holding a civil post under the Union. The Court relied on the distinction between being a "member of the defence services" and "holding an office connected with defence," concluding the petitioner held a post connected with defence and thus fell within the category of "civilians in defence services" governed by rules made under Article 309.
-
Interaction between the Civilians in Defence Services Rules, 1952 and the Articles of Agreement:
The Court considered the Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952. Rule 3 sets out the scope and exceptions; Rule 3(c) excludes persons whose service terms are governed by an agreement entered into before the rules (or thereafter in pursuance of these rules), except that where an agreement does not cover a matter the rules will apply. Rule 13 enumerates penalties, and the Explanation to rule 13 states that termination of employment in accordance with a contract does not amount to removal or dismissal. Rule 15 prescribes procedural safeguards for dismissal, removal or reduction (charges, opportunity to defend, show cause if penalty is dismissal/removal/reduction). Rule 16 requires that representations be considered before passing certain specified penalties. The Court read these provisions together to ascertain what procedural protections (if any) applied to the petitioner.
-
Whether the April 10, 1952 order was contractual termination or a punitive dismissal:
A key legal test adopted by the Court (based on authority such as Satish Chandra Anand and Shyamlal) is whether the termination was effected "in accordance with the contract" (a contractual termination) or was imposed "by way of punishment," which would amount to removal or dismissal attaching stigma and consequences for future employment. The Court accepted the long-established principle that contractual terminations do not carry stigma and are not removals/dismissals within Article 311.
Although the April 10 notice recited the departmental enquiry and a finding of guilt, the notice explicitly stated that the discharge was "in terms of the service agreement." The Court held that the presence of a departmental enquiry and its recital in the termination notice did not, by themselves, convert a contractually-based notice into a punitive dismissal. Where the notice on its face purports to be a contractual notice, the Court would treat it as such. The Court acknowledged the borderline nature of the present case but concluded that the April 10 notice was a termination in terms of the contract.
-
Application of rule 16 to the April 25, 1952 penalty (fine):
Concerning the April 25, 1952 order fining the petitioner Rs. 50, the Court observed that rule 16 required an opportunity to make representations and consideration thereof before certain penalties are imposed. The petitioner had been given an adequate opportunity to make a representation in writing which was duly considered. Thus, the Court found compliance with rule 16 for the fine imposed on April 25.
-
Consequences of the foregoing analysis:
Because the petitioner was a civilian in defence service (not within Article 311), because his service was terminable under a contract containing Clause 5 (three months' notice), and because the April 10 termination was a contractual termination, the petitioner could not invoke Article 311 nor clause 15 of the Rules. The Court therefore concluded the appropriate remedy, if any breach of contract were to be alleged, lay in ordinary proceedings for breach of contract rather than by writ under Article 226 in these circumstances.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
DISMISSED. The petition under Article 226 was dismissed; the rule was discharged, interim orders (if any) were vacated, and there was no order as to costs (subject to any costs already passed).
Implications and consequences:
- The Court held that the petitioner is a civilian employed in defence service and that Articles 309 and 310 apply but Article 311 does not apply to him.
- The Civilians in Defence Services Rules, 1952 generally govern such persons, but Rule 3(c) makes those rules inapplicable where conditions of service are covered by an agreement; here the Articles of Agreement (21 August 1941) governed the petitioner's conditions and contained Clause 5 permitting termination on three months' notice.
- The April 10, 1952 notice was a contractual termination in terms of Clause 5 and therefore did not amount to removal or dismissal under Article 311. The petitioner cannot take advantage of Article 311 or of Clause 15 of the Rules in respect of that termination.
- With respect to the April 25, 1952 fine, the Court found that rule 16's procedural requirement (opportunity to make representation and consideration thereof) had been complied with.
- As a direct practical consequence, the petitioner’s remedy, if he wished to challenge an alleged breach of the contract of service, lies in appropriate contract or other proceedings rather than by an Article 226 writ in the circumstances found by the Court.
- The Court did not purport to lay down any broad new precedent beyond its application of existing authorities; the judgment is focused on applying established principles to the facts of this case and notes that the question whether rules can be enforced in the absence of Article 311 protections is a contentious point which the Court did not need to decide here.
Signed: A. K. D-G. (as appearing in the judgment)
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:
1. The facts in this case are shortly as follows: The petitioner was an employee in the Military Engineering Service known as M.E.S In 1940 he joined service as a qualified overseer and subsequently rose to the position of Superintendent of the first grade It appears that he was appointed by the G.E Ishapore, and subsequently on August 21, 1941 Articles of Agreement were drawn up, signed both by the G.E Ishapore as also by the petitioner. The Articles of Agreement recited the prior appointment and then proceeded to enumerate the terms and conditions of service. It is in a form known as Form “IAFZ 2055”. It is headed as “Form of agreement to be executed by permanent and temporary clerks, etc. —applicable to accountants, clerks, cashiers, copyists, agents, store-keepers and all other civilian employees and to be pasted in the service books upon execution”. The Articles of Agreement contained the following clause:—
“5. If the Government or the appointing officer shall at any time become desirous of dispensing with the services of the employee, the Government or the appointing officer shall, subject to clause 6 of this agreement, give the employee one calender month's notice in writing of such desire and in default of such notice the employee shall be entitled to receive one month's pay or salary then receivable by the employee,”
2. By a subsequent amendment made in August, 1947, the period of one month was increased to three calender months. The Articles further provided that in case of gross misconduct the services of the employee could be terminated at any time without notice.
3. Between 1949 and 1952, a succession of departmental proceedings were taken against the petitioner. On or about June 16, 1949, he was charged with the offence of having thrown away certain military stores. On December 22, 1949, the petitioner applied for ten days' leave in order to go to Eastern Pakistan where he had a home, but he overstayed his leave and did not rejoin till March 1, 1950. A proceeding was started against him on the basis that he had been absent without leave and it was further alleged that he had given a false leave address. On December 28, 1949, apparently when he was in Pakistan, an order had been made for his transfer to the operational area in Kashmir, and communicated to the leave address left by him. As he was not actually at the said address at the time, the information naturally did not reach him. Later on, when he became aware of the order, he made a representation of his inability to proceed to Kashmir. A proceeding was started against him for disobedience of order of transfer, which resulted in his reduction in rank to the position of Superintendent of the second grade. On April 4, 1951, another proceeding was instituted against him on the allegation that he had been guilty of incorrect measurement regarding technical examination of certain bills which had involved the Government in financial loss. That proceeding resulted in the petitioner being reprimanded. Yet another proceeding was started on October 17, 1951, on the allegation that the petitioner had made wrong entries regarding sizes and lengths of certain wooden beams which were to be sawed by a contractor. The petitioner showed cause. On April 10, 1952, the respondent No. 1 as the G.E Calcutta Division, passed the following order:—
“The competent authority has decided that you are guilty of the charge referred to above and according to the orders conveyed thereon, you are hereby served with three months' notice of discharge in terms of the service agreement executed by you on IAFZ 2055………….
4. The notice will take effect from 10.4.52 A.M and the period of three months' notice will expire on 10. 7. 52 A.M and you will be S.O.S of M.E.S w.e.f the same date, viz, 10. 7. 52. A.M”
5. On the 28th February, 1952, the petitioner was charged with neglect of duty by failing to account for stores received and disposing of stores for which he was not competent. On the 5th March, 1952 he filed his representation against it. On the 25th April, 1952, he was found guilty and fined Rs. 50/- to be deducted from his P & A due to him.
6. The petitioner thereupon made an application to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. A rule was issued on the 7th July, 1952, calling upon the respondents to show cause why the orders dated 10th April, 1952, and 25th April, 1952, and the proceedings relating thereto should not be declared illegal and ultra vires and invalid and why the operation of the notice dated the 10th April, 1952, should not be stayed or set aside. Before Bose, J., who dealt with the matter, it was urged by the petitioner that that there was contravention of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as the petitioner had not been given any chance of showing cause against the proposed punishment. A point was taken however by the respondent in that application that the service agreement of the petitioner was not in conformity with the requirements of section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, or Art. 299 of the Constitution, and it was therefore void, and the petitioner was not at all a servant of the Union of India. The learned Judge thought that it was an unreasonable and unfair attitude on the part of Government to take up, and did not merit any encouragement. He however felt himself reluctantly compelled to give effect to this contention, holding that the service agreement was not in compliance with law. The petitioner thereupon appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the document dated August 21, 1941, was not the contract of appointment. As will appear from the extract given above, this so-called Articles of Agreement itself recited that the petitioner had been previously appointed by the G.E Ishapore. The result was that the appeal was allowed, the judgment and the order of Bose J. were set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial Court for a fresh decision on the merits. The respondent in the appeal was to have an opportunity of proving the actual contract upon which the appellant entered the service of the Union of India. This is how the matter has come up before me.
7. At the hearing before me however, the matter took an unexpected turn. Mr. Kar on behalf of the respondents stated that he ho longer relied on the point that the petitioner had not been properly appointed or that his appointment was void as not being in compliance with Sec. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act. He said that he was going to argue that the petitioner had been properly appointed and properly discharged. He rightly said that although neither party was in a position to produce the original agreement, it was clear from the Articles of Agreement dated August 21, 1941 that the petitioner had agreed to certain terms and conditions of service including condition No. 5 set out above. It was argued that the petitioner had been discharged in terms of Clause 5 of the Articles of Agreement by being served with three calendar months” notice.
8. While it is clear that the petitioner, whatever be the nature of his original appointment, is governed by the Articles of Agreement, the question arises as to what is the nature of his employment. Although he is in the Military Engineering Service, it is conceded that he is not a military personnel and is not governed by the Army Act. In fact it is conceded that he is a civilian employed in military ser vice. This is a point which had arisen in a case which was originally decided by me and which went up on appeal—Atindra Nath Mukherji v. G.F Gillot (1) (59 C.W.N 835), In spite of every effort, the learned Chief Justice was unable to secure sufficient information as to the status of persons in civilian employment in military service. All that was produced before the learned Chief Justice was Army Instructions No. 212 of 1949, which of course could not be considered as a law under Art. 872(1) or Art. 313 of the Constitution A1 though the matter was decided in March, 1955, the attention of the Court was not drawn to the fact that rules had been made by the President acting under the powers conferred by Art. 309 of the Constitution, published in the Gazette of India on February 2, 1952 called “The Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘rules’)” For convenience I set out below some of the relevant rules:—
3. Those rules shall apply to every person paid from Defence Services Estimates and not subject to the Army Act, 1950, the Indian Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934, and the Air Force Act, 1950, who is in the whole time employment of the Government of India under the Ministry of Defence, except
(a) persons so employed only casually or subject to discharge at less than one month's notice.
(b) Persons for whose appointment and conditions of employment special provision is made by or under any law for the time being in force.
(c) Persons in respect of whose conditions of service, pay and allowances, pension, discipline and conduct, or any of them, special provision has been made by agreement entered into before these rules were made or enter ed into thereafter in pursuance of the provisions of these rules.
Provided that in respect of any matter not covered by the provisions special, to him, his service or his post, these rules shall apply to any person coming within the scope of exception (b) or (c) to whom but for either of these exceptions these rules would apply.
……. …….. …….
13. The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon persons subject to these rules, namely:
……. …….. …….
(vi) Removal from the civil service of the Government, which does not disqualify from future employment.
(vii) Dismissal from the civil service of the Government which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment.
Explanation 1—The termination of employment—
(c) of a person engaged under a contract, in accordance with the terms of his contract within the meaning of this rule or of rule 15;
does not amount to removal or dismissal.
15. Without prejudice to the pro visions of the Public Servants Enquiries Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed on a member of a Service (other than an order passed on facts which had led to his conviction in a criminal Court or by a Court Martial) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of definite charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case……. On completion of the enquiry after the authority empowered to impose the penalty has considered the defence and arrived at a provisional conclusion in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the person charged shall, if the penalty is dismissal, removal or reduction, be called upon to show cause within a reasonable time, not ordinarily exceeding a fort night, against the particular penalty to be imposed. Any representation submitted by the person charged shall be duly taken into consideration before final orders are passed.
9. Mr. I.P Mukherji on behalf of the petitioner has framed his argument in the following manner: He admits the existence of the Articles of Agreement, dated August 21, 1941. He says, however, that the order of discharge that was made on April 10, 1952, is not a discharge in terms of the service agreement, but it is a punishment and therefore amounts to removal or dismissal. That being so, he says that Art. 311(2) is attracted. Mr. Mukherji argues that although his client is a civilian in military employment he should be classified as a civil servant within the meaning of Art. 311. In any event, even under the Army Instructions, his client was entitled to have a second chance to show cause and therefore the order of discharge has not been lawful.
10. Mr. Kar opposing the application on behalf of the respondents took several formidable points which I shall now enumerate. The first point which he has taken is that this application for a writ of mandamus must fail in limine because there has been no demand for justice or denial thereof. I must mention here that Mr. Mukherji on behalf of his client asks for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to act on the notice dated April 10, 1952 mentioned above. He has not pressed before me the relief asked for regarding the order dated 25th April, 1952. In this respect the rule issued is defective because it simply asks for the notice dated 10th April, 1952, to be set aside and/or declared illegal, ultra vires and invalid. It also asks for its operation to be stayed. Since it is not a judicial order, I do not see how it can be set aside or declared illegal or ultra vires. If the petitioner is successful, the proper order would be to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to it. In that view of the matter, the absence of any demand for justice seems to be fatal. It has been laid down by the appeal Court in Union of India v. Elbridge Watson (2) (56 C.W.N 232), that in a petition for mandamus the petitioner must state his rights in the matter in question, his demand for justice and the denial thereof. The demand for justice and the denial thereof is not merely a technical point but a point of substance. Banerji, J., said as follows:—
“Therefore if the circumstances warranted it, the proper writ would be a writ of mandamus. The prayers in the petition are not in order. However, considering this application as an application for a writ of mandamus which we do with great reluctance—we hold there was no previous demand or refusal of the right which the petitioner sought to enforce before the learned Judge. This is not merely a technical point. This is a point of substance which must be taken into consideration, when the Court issues a writ of mandamus.”
11. Mr. Mukherji referred me to the case of Commissioner of Police v. Gor-dhandas (3) [(A.I.R (1952) S.C.A 16 at page 22]. It was there held that there had been a substantial demand and a denial Bose J. said as follows:—
“In any event, an evasion or shelving of demand for justice is sufficient to operate as a denial within the meaning of Sec. 46. In England the refusal need not be in so many words. All that is necessary is to show that the party complained of has definitely determined not to do what is demanded (see IX Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham edition, page 722) and in the United States of America a demand is not required ‘where it is manifest it would be an idle ceremony’ (see Ferris on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, page 281). The law in India is not different except that there must be demand and denial in substance though neither need be made in so many words.”
12. Mr. Mukherji argues that on the facts of this particular case, it would have been futile for his client to ask for any further relief from the military authorities. This, I am afraid, I cannot accept. The idea underlying the making of demand is that the authorities may have an opportunity of redressing the wrong. It is no argument to say that the authorities are bound to be hard-hearted. That would mean the absolute abolition of the giving of any demand notice. Special circumstances must exist to make such an inference permissible. In Gordhandas' case (3) cited above, the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, entirely washed his hands in the matter, saying that he was acting under directions of the Government and could do nothing in the matter. It was held that any further demand from him was useless, and that demand of Government was sufficient compliance with the rule. Those are not the facts of this case. In my opinion, there has been no valid excuse put forward for not complying with this salutary rule of Jaw. This would be sufficient to dispose of the matter, but in view of the fact that this matter may again go up to higher Courts, it would be advisable to decide the other points raised.
13. The next point raised by Mr. Kar is that the petitioner is not governed by Art. 311 at all. In order to come under Art. 311, the petitioner would have to be a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or *a civil service of a State or hold a civil post under the Union or State. Regard being had to the facts and circumstances of this case, I fail to see how he could be called a member of the civil service of the Union or as holding a civil post under the Union. It is of course conceded that it does not come under the other categories. Part XIV of the Constitution deals with “Service under the Union and the States”. Article 309 corresponds to Sec 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and empowers the appropriate legislature to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. It is also provided that until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate legislature, it would be competent for the President or his delegate to make rules for the purpose thereof. Article 310 provides that every person who is a member of the defence services or of the civil service of the Union or of an all-India service or holds any office connected with defence or any civil post under the Union, holds office during the pleasure of the President. It will be observed that this Article not only speaks of the defence services but of any post connected with defence. It is clear to me that the petitioner holds a post connected with defence. In other words, he is not a member of the defence services but is a holder of a post connected with defence. The correct description of such a post is given in the rules that have been framed by the President under powers conferred by Art. 309, namely, civilians in defence services.
14. Mr. Kar has drawn my attention to a recent case decided by the Punjab High Court, Dassmal v. Union of India, (4) [A.I.R (1956) Punjab 42]. The plaintiff there was a civilian clerk in the R.I.A.S.C He was given a rank of Subadar and it was conceded during the course of the trial that he was governed by the Indian Army Act. It was held that Art. 311 did not apply and that all army personnel whether belonging to the defence services or coming within the phrase “connected with defence service”, held office at the pleasure of the Crown and now, at the pleasure of the President, and a suit could not be brought for infringement of any rules.
15. In the present case of course, the petitioner never held an army rank and was not governed by the Army Act. But nevertheless he was a civilian in defence service and not a member of the civil service of the Union nor holding a civil post under the Union. He was holding a post connected with defence Thus, while articles 309 and 310 apply in his case, there is no application of Article 311.
16. The next line of argument advanced by Mr. Kar is as follows: He says that assuming that Art. 311 applied to the kind of service held by the petitioner, he is out of Court because he is governed by his contract of service, which excludes him both from the operation of the rule applicable to civilians in army employ as well as of Art. 311. As set out above, Rule 3 (c) of the Rules excludes the case of persons whose conditions of service etc. are covered by sin agreement. The agreement in this case, although not an agreement whereby the petitioner was originally appointed, is certainly a collateral document containing the terms of employment. That document provides for dismissal upon three months' notice. According to Mr. Kar, the petitioner's service having been terminated in accordance with his contract, it is neither removal nor dismissal under Art. 311. This brings us to the old question as to whether the particular order of discharge is an order in terms of the contract of appointment, or is by way of punishment dehors it. It has been held that termination of service in terms of the contract is neither removal nor dismissal—Satish Chandra Anand v. The Union of India (5) [A.I.R (1953) S.C 250] ! Shyamial v. State of U.P (6) [A.I.R (1954) S.C 369]. If the order of discharge simply enumerated that the petitioner was discharged in terms of his contract of service upon three months' notice, then of course there would be nothing to say. The problem has arisen because of the enumeration in the order itself that the petitioner has been found guilty of a certain offence. The point arose before me in an earlier case as to whether, if a charge-sheet was framed and a departmental enquiry was held and decided, it could be said that a particular order discharging the employee is not by way of punishment but under the terms of the contract. I have held that the mere fact that there were departmental proceedings does not make a discharge necessarily by way of removal or dismissal. The Government does not act arbitrarily or capriciously, and although it need not advance any reason for terminating the services of an employee, it generally holds an enquiry to determine whether it will take such a step. This does not convert the termination into removal or dismissal by way of punishment (judgment in Civil Rule No. 3558 of 1953, dated May 11, 1954). I have pointed out that the most important document to see was the order itself. This view has been supported by a Divisional Bench of the Patna High Court in Bhagwandas v. Superintendent, Way & Works, Eastern Railway, (7) [A.I.R (1956) Patna 23].
17. The test is really a simple one namely, whether the termination is under the contract or as and by way of punishment. It was pointed out in Shyamlal's case (6) (supra) which was a case of compulsory retirement, that termination of employment under a contract dues not attach any blame or stigma to the individual and is not in the way of further employment, whereas removal or dismissal by way of punishment attaches a personal stigma to the employee and is a bar to further employment. The trouble arises in this case because of the form of the order which purports to be in terms of the contract and yet recites the departmental enquiry and the finding of guilt. Although it is a case on the border line. I am of the opinion, upon an application of the principles enunciated above that the order of discharge is in terms of the contract, even though the departmental enquiry and the finding of guilt is recited therein. I hope in future the authorities will consider the futility of reciting the departmental enquiry or the results thereof in an order of this description which is really a notice in terms of the contract and does not require any reasons to be given. However, since I have held and supported the view that a departmental enquiry preceding such a notice is not illegal, but on the other hand desirable, I cannot, consistently with such a view hold that the mere fact that there is a recital in the notice of the fact of the holding of such a departmental enquiry and the results thereof, renders the notice a notice not under the contract. Either it is a notice under the contract or it is not. If the notice did not purport on the face of it to be a notice under the contract, then indeed it would be possible to hold that it is a dismissal dehors the contract. Since the notice itself states that it is in terms of the contract, I must hold that it is not a removal or dismissal in terms of Art. all, but termination of contract in accordance with the articles of agreement mentioned above.
18. The result may be summarised as follows:—
(1) The petitioner is a civilian employed in defence service.
(2) To such a person, article 309 and 310 applies but not Article 311.
(3) Normally, such a person would be governed by a set of rules promulgated by the President, under Article 309, called the “Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules” (Army instruction No. 176 of 1955).
(4) But the said rules have been made inapplicable (By virtue of clause 3 (c) of the rules) to persons in respect of whose conditions of service special provision has been made by agreement, except as to matters not covered by such an agreement.
(5) In the present case, the conditions of service of the petitioner are contained in the articles of agreement dated August 21, 1941.
(6) Under clause 5 of the articles of argeement, the services of the petitioner can be terminated by three months' notice.
(7) The services of the petitioner has been terminated by three months' notice.
(8) Such a termination is neither removal nor dismissal under Article 311, even if that Article applied to the petitioner.
(9) Thus, the petitioner is neither able to take advantage of Article 311, nor of clause 15 of the rules.
(10) The petitioner is governed by his contract of service, and if he intends to urge that there has been a breach thereof he must take proper proceedings for that purpose. An application under Article 226 does not lie.
19. Lastly, Mr. Kar has advanced the argument that even if the rules applies, a breach thereof is not justifiable in this Court, because Article 311 does not apply. This is a highly controversial point, and although there is considerable authority in favour of the argument, in view of my findings adumbrated above, it is unnecessary to decide it in this case. I have already stated that Mr. Mukherjee did not press the relief asked for in respect of the order dated the 25th April, 1952. In regard to that order, it is certainly a punishment inflicted under clause 13 (iv) of the rules. It might certainly be argued that the imposition of such a penalty could not have been based upon the articles of agreement which does not deal with it. Under the Proviso to rule 3, the matter will be governed by the rules. This however would attract the operation of rule 16, which runs as follows:
“No order imposing the penalty specified in clause (i), (ii) or (iv) of rule 13……….. on any Government servant to whom these rules are applicable shall be passed unless he has been given an adequate opportunity of making any representation that he may desire to make, and such representation, if any, has been taken into consideration before the order is passed.”
20. In the present case, the petitioner was given an adequate opportunity of making a representation and he had made a representation in writing and the representation was duly considered.
21. Therefore the provision of rule 16 was complied with. In this case, neither rule 15 nor Article 311 applies and so there was no necessity of an enquiry or a second show cause notice.
22. For the reasons aforesaid, no grounds have been shown for interference by this Court and the application must be dismissed. The rule is discharged, Interim orders, if any, are vacated. There will however be no order as to costs. This does not affect-orders as to costs already passed.
A.K.D-G.
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