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Sm. Priti Rekha Mitra v. Narayanchandra Dutta .

Calcutta High Court
Jul 21, 1955
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Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant (mortgagor) filed the present application seeking to redeem (set aside) a sale of mortgaged property (No. 3, Ram Kanta Mistry Lane, Calcutta) by deposit of money into Court under Order 34 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The plaintiff had earlier instituted a suit on 19-12-1951 for a preliminary mortgage decree for Rs. 14,521-5-6p, and a consent preliminary mortgage decree was passed on 21-8-1952 providing for payment by instalments with a provision that default would entitle the mortgagee to a final decree for sale. A final decree for sale was passed on 5-3-1954 following default. The sale took place on 14-5-1955 and the property was sold to respondent Sakti Pada Mitter for Rs. 29,200/-. The purchaser has paid the purchase money into Court and has applied for confirmation of sale; that application is pending and has not been disposed of because of the present application by the mortgagor. On 7-6-1955 the mortgagor's solicitor expressed an intention to set aside the sale by depositing the requisite amount; the mortgagee's solicitor on 8-6-1955 provided a calculation of total dues amounting to Rs. 21,264-12-7p (including estimated costs). The mortgagor offered to deposit that amount into Court and to pay 5% of the purchaser's deposit as compensation to the purchaser.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. When does a mortgagor finally and irrevocably lose his equity of redemption — specifically, whether the mortgagor can exercise the right of redemption by payment into Court under Order 34 Rule 5 of the CPC at any time before the sale is "confirmed".
  2. Whether confirmation of sale, so as to extinguish the equity of redemption, can occur by mere effluxion of time under the Original Side Rules of the Court (i.e., without an express Court order under Order 21 Rule 92 of the CPC).
  3. Whether the Original Side Rules (and practice under them) displace or are inconsistent with the Code provisions (in particular O. 21 R. 92 and O. 34 R. 5 of the CPC) governing confirmation of sale and the survival of the mortgagor's equity of redemption.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant (Mortgagor)

  • The applicant sought to exercise the right of redemption under Order 34 Rule 5 of the CPC by depositing the amount due (Rs. 21,264-12-7p) into Court and offering to pay 5% of the purchaser's deposit as compensation.
  • The applicant contended that the law permits redemption after sale but before confirmation of the sale, and that the sale had not been formally confirmed by Court order.

Respondents (Mortgagee and Purchaser)

  • The respondents contended that the sale had been confirmed by effluxion of time under the Original Side Rules of the Court, and therefore the mortgagor's equity of redemption had been finally and irrevocably lost.
  • They relied on provisions of the Original Side Rules (in particular Rules 29, 30, 31, 32 of Chapter 27 and Rules 89, 90, 92 of Chapter 26) to argue that the certificate/report of sale becomes confirmed after specified periods unless discharged or varied, and that these Rules make the certificate conclusive so as to preclude the mortgagor from redeeming after those periods.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sheonarain Sah v. Mt. Deolochan Kuer, 1948 Pat. 208 (AIR V 35) Quoted for the proposition that the right of redemption under section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act does not survive a final decree for sale and that thereafter the right of total redemption arises under Order 34 Rule 5 of the CPC. The court found that this authority did not assist the respondents on the narrow question before it — namely, the point of time at which the right under O. 34 R. 5 can be exercised (i.e., when 'confirmation' of sale takes place). The decision was held not to be an authority on the timing issue here.
Sm. Shamangini Roy v. Sm. Mahalaxmi Rakshit, 1942 Cal 44 (AIR V29) Noted for observations that, in practice, purchasers apply for confirmation of sale and that judgment-debtors seeking relief after sale should, as far as possible, observe relevant Code provisions. The court relied on this decision to show that where an application for confirmation is pending, relief under O. 34 R. 5 can be granted and that practice supports the applicability of confirmation procedures in sales by the Registrar.
Baruram Kalowar v. Upendra Nath Das, 1934 Cal 822 (AIR V21) Quoted for the statement that so long as Order 34 Rule 5 stands, the judgment-debtor may apply at any time before the confirmation of the sale, even if he has delayed confirmation for many years. The court treated this decision as supportive of the proposition that the right of redemption under O. 34 R. 5 survives until confirmation and is not lost by mere delay — it does not support the respondents' contention that effluxion of time alone effects confirmation within the meaning of the Code.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the central question as when a mortgagor irretrievably loses his equity of redemption. It proceeded in the following analytical steps, based only on the material in the opinion:

  1. The court first set out the factual matrix: a consent preliminary mortgage decree, default, a final decree for sale, an auction sale (14-5-1955), payment of purchase money into Court, and a pending application by the purchaser for confirmation of sale. The mortgagor sought to redeem by deposit under O. 34 R. 5 CPC.
  2. The respondents relied on the Original Side Rules to assert that the certificate of sale had been confirmed by effluxion of the periods specified in those Rules (references made to R. 29, 30, 31, 32 of Chapter 27 and R. 89, 90, 92 of Chapter 26), and that once so confirmed the mortgagor's right to redeem was lost.
  3. The court rejected the respondents' reliance on the Original Side Rules as determinative of the point of law in isolation because the mortgagor's objection was not to any intrinsic defect in the report or certificate of sale but to the timing of the extinguishment of the equity of redemption — i.e., whether the sale had been "confirmed" so as to bar redemption under O. 34 R. 5 CPC.
  4. Attention was directed to Order 34 Rule 5 of the CPC, which permits redemption "on or before the day fixed or at any time before the confirmation of a sale made in pursuance of a final decree". The court read those words as indicating that the right to redeem survives until confirmation of sale.
  5. The court held that the confirmation safeguard in the Code — notably Order 21 Rule 92 (which mandates that where no application is made under Rr. 89–91 or where such application is disallowed, the Court "shall make an order confirming the sale" and thereupon the sale becomes absolute) — is a clear and obligatory provision which determines when a sale becomes absolute under the Code. Therefore, the mortgagor can invoke his equity of redemption up to the point at which the Court makes an order confirming the sale and the sale becomes "absolute" pursuant to O. 21 R. 92.
  6. The court addressed two arguments advanced against applying O. 21 R. 92 to sales by the Registrar under final mortgage decrees: (a) that such sales are not technically "sales of immovable property in execution of a decree", and (b) that the Original Side Rules prescribe the entire scheme and do not require confirmation applications. The court rejected both contentions: it found a sale under a final decree for sale in a mortgage suit to be a sale in execution of a decree and held that Original Side Rules do not conflict with O. 21 R. 92; Rule 45 (Chapter 27) expressly permits the purchaser to apply for a certificate of sale (and in practice purchasers do apply for confirmation).
  7. The court examined precedents cited by respondents and concluded that some (notably Sheonarain Sah) did not speak to the timing question, while others (Sm. Shamangini Roy and Baruram Kalowar) supported the proposition that relief under O. 34 R. 5 is available while an application for confirmation is pending and that the mortgagor's right persists until confirmation.
  8. The court observed that the Original Side Rules' time periods (for example, 8 or 14 days for filing objections or certificates) are subject to the Court's power to extend or relax time under Rule 46 of Chapter 38, and that Rule 93 of Chapter 26 contemplates the Court having final consideration even after effluxion of time. Consequently, mere effluxion of time under the Original Side Rules cannot be allowed to operate automatically as confirmation of sale so as to extinguish the mortgagor's equity of redemption without the Court's intervention.
  9. On the basis of these statutory readings, practice and authoritative decisions, the court concluded that the mortgagor's equity of redemption survives until the Court makes an order confirming the sale under O. 21 R. 92 (or until the sale is made "absolute" thereunder), and that relief under O. 34 R. 5 can therefore be granted while a purchaser's application for confirmation is pending.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the mortgagor's equity of redemption survives until the Court makes an order confirming the sale under Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (or until the sale is made "absolute" thereunder). Consequently, the mortgagor can claim redemption under Order 34 Rule 5 at any time before such confirmation, including while a purchaser's application for confirmation is pending.

Direct Consequences (as ordered in this opinion)

  • The petitioner (mortgagor) was granted leave to pay into Court to the credit of the suit the sum of Rs. 21,264-12-7p (the amount stated in the petition).
  • The Registrar and the Accountant-General were authorized to accept that payment in the terms of the petition.
  • The petitioner was granted leave to pay to the Court 5% of the amount deposited by the purchaser as compensation to the purchaser, and the Registrar was authorized to accept that payment.
  • Upon those payments being made, the sale of the mortgaged premises dated 14-5-1955 was ordered to be set aside and satisfaction entered in terms of the petition.
  • Incidental orders were to be made in respect of title deeds as prayed in the petition.
  • The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the application to the plaintiff (mortgagee) and also to the purchaser; the Chamber Summons was certified fit for the employment of counsel; and the Court ordered accordingly.

Broader Legal Implication

The opinion articulates and applies the legal principle that a final decree for sale and an actual sale do not by themselves extinguish the mortgagor's equity of redemption; the equity survives until the sale is confirmed and becomes absolute by the Court's order under O. 21 R. 92 of the CPC (or by issuance of a certificate of sale under Original Side Rule 45 in conjunction with the Code). The court also emphasized that procedural time periods in the Original Side Rules are subject to the Court's power to extend or relax time, and therefore cannot be allowed to operate automatically to effect confirmation in the absence of Court action.

Note: This summary is confined to the statements, findings and orders contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal materials beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. This application raises a short but an important point of procedure and substance. The point shortly is, when does a mortgagor finally and irrevocably lose his equity of redemption?

2. Before dealing with this point, I shall set out very briefly the facts. The present application is by the defendant-mortgagor. The respondents to this application are the mortgagee and the purchaser. The plaintiff filed this suit against him on 19-12-1951 for a preliminary mortgage decree for Rs. 14,521-5-6p. The preliminary mortgage decree was passed on 21-8-1952 by my learned brother, J.P Mitter, J. The preliminary mortgage decree was a consent decree providing for payment in instalments. There was default in the payment of instalments and the consent decree provided that in such default the mortgagee-plaintiff would be entitled to an order for a final decree for sale of the mortgaged property. The mortgaged property is No. 3, Ram Kanta Mistry Lane, Calcutta. The final decree for sale was passed on 5-3-1954 as the mortgagor had defaulted in his payments under the consent preliminary decree. Thereafter sale reference proceeded, and on 14-5-1955 the property was sold to respondent Sakti Pada Mitter being the highest bidder at the auction for the sum of Rs. 29,200/-. On 7-6-1955 the mortgagor's solicitor wrote to the mortgagee's solicitor stating that his client would like to set aside the sale by deposit of the amount in Court. The mortgagee's solicitor responded on 8-6-1955 stating that the total amount due, both on account of principal and interest as well as on account of costs, taxed and untaxed, came up to a figure of Rs. 19,234-12-7 p. To that figure is added an approximate cost of Rs. 2,000/-. The total dues, therefore, on the mortgage would be Rs. 21,264-12-7p. The mortgagor-applicant now wants to pay in this money. He is also prepared to pay 5 per cent of such money deposited by the purchaser to be paid as compensation to him. The applicant now wants relief and to save the mortgaged property which is his ancestral dwelling house, from passing out of his hands. In short, his application is under O. 34 R. 5 of the CPC. On behalf of the respondents, the plaintiff-mortgages and the purchaser, it is contended that the sale has been confirmed by efflux of time under the Rules of this Court and, therefore, the mortgagor has lost his equity of redemption completely and irrevocably, so that he cannot now put in the money and set aside the sale. Reliance is placed, first, on R. 89 of Chapter 26 of the Original Side Rules. It is said that Rule lays down the procedure to discharge or vary a report made by the Registrar. It is argued that 14 days' time is given to an applicant to discharge or vary a certificate or a report in a reference from the date of the filing of such report or certificate. Reference also is made to R. 90 of the same Chapter which provided that unless discharged or varied in that manner, the report is conclusive evidence of the facts found there. Then R. 92 of the same Chapter is invoked to say that the certificate or the report has become binding in this case and except on ground of fraud, surprise or mistake or such other special ground as may be allowed by the Court, it cannot be reopened. In further aid of the argument reliance is placed on R. 29 of Chapter 27 of the Original Side Rules which provides that the Registrar shall as soon as possible after the sale proceed to certify the result and such report shall within 8 days after the sale be filed and at the cost of the party having the carriage of proceedings. This line of argument is developed by invoking Rule 30 of Chapter 27 which states that a certificate of sale of movable property shall not be liable to objection but a certiacata of the result of sale of immovable property or a certificate upon any question of title may be objected to like any other certificate or report of an officer. The argument is advanced further by reliance on R. 31 which expressly provides:

“Where no application is made to discharge or vary a certificate of the result of a sale of immovable property within the time allowed for applying to discharge or vary a certificate or report of an officer, or where made, has been refused, such certificate, except as provided in Rule 29 and Rule 56, shall be deemed to be confirmed from and after the expiration of the term aforesaid, or from the date of such refusal”.

It is, therefore, said that the sale in this case having taken place on 14-5-1955, the certificate of sale stands confirmed by effluxion of time. There is provision in R. 32 of Chapter 27 of the certificate being confirmed by an order of Court even before the expiration of the time allowed if a purchaser applies on summons at his own expense.

3. Much of this part of the argument is really beside the point. Here the objection is not to the report or the certificate of the sale. The objection is not inherent in the report or the certificate but extrinsic to it. The objection is not that the sale is bad or defective or illegal or tainted with any irregularity. The applicant's contention is more fundamental. He says that true a sale has been duly held but the law gives him a right to redeem his mortgage which he can still exercise after sale but before confirmation of the sale. The whole question here is, has the sale been confirmed.

4. The fact that must be stated here at this stage is that no formal confirmation of the sale has yet been made by the Court. In fact the purchaser has applied for confirmation of sale. But that application is pending and has not been disposed of because of the present application. Certificate of sale is obtainable under R. 45 of Chapter 27 of the Original Side Rules. The purchaser in this case has put in the entire purchase money which is lying in Court.

5. The point for decision cannot be disposed of entirely on the basis of the Original Side Rules without reference to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 34 R. 5 of the Code uses the words “Where on or before the day fixed or at any time before the confirmation of a sale made in purusance of a final decree” the defendant makes payment into Court of the sums of money/specified there, then certain consequences would follow. That apparently indicates the point of time until which equity of redemption can be claimed by the mortgagor. In other words, that point of time on the basis of the language in R. 5 of O. 34 of the CPC is “on or before the day fixed” or “at any time before the confirmation of sale”. The question now is, what is the day fixed or what is the time for confirmation of the sale? On behalf of the plaintiff-mortgagee it is said that the point of time is reached as stated in the Original Side Rules of this Court, which I have discussed, and in this case the sale has been confirmed by effluxion of time. Rule 5 was substituted for old Rule 5 by the Transfer of Property Amendment Supplementary Act 29 which came into operation on 1-4-1930. Comparing the old Rule with the new, it is clear that the words, “or at any time before the confirmation of a sale” are new. These words were intended to recognise the principle that a decree for sale is not sufficient to extinguish the equity of redemption until the sale is confirmed. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a sale of immovable property in execution of a decree has to be confirmed under O. 21 R. 92 which provides that where no application is made under R. 89 or R. 90 or R. 91 or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute. That is a clear mandate upon the Court. It is obligatory upon the Court under that provision to make an order confirming the sale when circumstances require it and it is upon such confirmation that the sale becomes “absolute”. Having regard to O. 49, R. 3 of the CPC, neither O. 34 R. 5 nor O. 21, R. 92 of the CPC is excluded from operation in the chartered High Courts. Reading, therefore, O. 21, R. 92 with O. 34, R. 5 of the CPC, I am of the opinion that the mortgagor can invoke his equity of redemption at any time before the Court makes an order confirming the sale and until the sale becomes “absolute” thereunder.

6. Here it may be argued that O. 21 R. 92 of the CPC does not apply to sales held by the Registrar on the Original Side under a final mortgage decree for sale first because it is not technically speaking a sale of immovable property “in execution of a decree”, and secondly because the Original Side Rules prescribe the entire scheme in such sales under final mortgage decree without enjoining an application for confirmation of the sale. Neither of these two reasons appears to me to be sound. Final decree for sale in a mortgage suit itself prescribes a mode of execution of the mortgage decree by directing the sale of the mortgage property and its ultimate distribution. It is an “execution of decree” although the method prescribed may be not by way of attachment as under ordinary decrees, and it is also sale of immovable property in execution of mortgage decree. Even technically speaking a sale under a final decree for sale in a mortgage suit is a “sale of immovable property in execution of a decree” as referred to in O. 21 Rr. 89, 90 and 91 of the CPC. That is the answer to the first argument. The answer to the second point is that the procedure prescribed by the Rules on the Original Side Rules by the Registrar under a final decree for sale in a mortgage suit is not inconsistent with O. 21, R. 92 of the Code. No rule on the Original Side actually conflicts with O. 21, R. 92. On the contrary, R. 45 of Chapter 27 of the Original Side Rules expressly permits the purchaser to apply to the Court for a certificate of sale (no longer a certificate of the result of sale as in Rule 30) as evidence of title. It is true that the word used in R. 45 is “may” and in that sense the rule is permissive and not obligatory but that is only to bring it in line with and not to override O. 21, R. 92 of the Code. Besides the practice on the Original Side has been for the purchaser “invariably” as put by McNair, J. in the case of Sm. Shamangini Roy v. Sm. Mahalaxmi Rakshit, 1942 Cal 44 (AIR V29) (A) which I shall presently quote, to apply for confirmation of sale. The learned Judge in that case also observed dealing with sales by the Registrar, “the Court has held that the judgment-debtor after a sale who seeks relief after a sale has been held, should so far as possible, observe the relevant provisions of the Code”.

7. On behalf of the plaintiff-mortgagee, and the purchaser reliance has been placed on certain decisions to which I shall make a brief reference. In my judgment none of these decisions help them and two are definitely against them. One such decision is Sheonarain Sah v. Mt. Deolochan Kuer, reported in 1948 Pat. 208 (AIR V 35) (B). It is a decision given by Imam and Benett, JJ. of the Patna High Courts and relates to the right of contribution under Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act. Benett, J. at pages 213-14 of that report observed:

“Neither the right of total redemption nor the right of partial redemption conferred upon the mortgagor by section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 survives the final decree for sale; all that remains thereafter is the different right of total redemption by Order 34 Rule 5 of the CPC.”

This, I am afraid, does not help the contention of the mortgagee or the purchaser. It is not argued that there is any right of redemption apart from O. 34, Rule 5 of the CPC in the present case before me. What is argued is the point of time at which the right of redemption conferred by O. 34 R. 5 of the CPC can be exercised. On that point the Patna decision is no authority. The question on this application is the determination of “the day fixed” or the time for the “confirmation of a sale.” In other words, the short point is, when does a confirmation of sale within the meaning of O. 34, R. 5 of the CPC takes, place? In the view that I have taken, it cannot be by mere effluxion of time under the Rules of the Original Side of this Court. The other decision far from helping the mortgagee or the purchaser is really against their contention and in favour of the conclusion that I have reached. That is a Calcutta decision of McNair, J. in 1942 Cal 44 (AIR V29) (A). At page 45 McNair, J., says:

“I cannot accept the argument based on the alleged absence of any provision in the Original Side Rules for the confirmation of a sale. The scheme of the Rules has been explained in reported judgment and I do not propose to analyse that scheme again.”

The learned Judge proceeds further to say:

“Whether the sale has to be confirmed or not under these Rules, in practice the purchaser applies, so far as I am aware, invariably, for confirmation of the sale, & there is before me the application by the purchaser in this case for confirmation of the sale. In previous decision where questions have arisen as to the necessity for strict compliance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, when dealing with sales by the Registrar, the Court has held that the judgment-debtor who seeks relief after a sale has been held should, so far as possible, observe the relevant provisions of the Code, and in my opinion, in this application, relevant provisions both of the Code and of the Original Side Rules have been observed by the present applicants.”

In that case McNair, J. ordered relief under O. 34, R. 5. Here also this decision, therefore, is an authority that while the application for confirmation by the purchaser is pending before me, relief under O. 34 R. 5 can be given. The only other decision referred to is Baruram Kalowar v. Upendra Nath Das, reported in 1934 Cal 822 (AIR V21) (C). But that again is not a decision which says that there can be a confirmation of sale within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure by effluxion of time alone. On the contrary, the observations of M.C Ghosh, J., the learned Judge who delivered judgment there, are against the contention of both the mortgagee and the purchaser. In fact M.C Ghosh, J. at p. 823 of that report observes:

“But so long as Rule 5 (Order 34) stands, the judgment-debtor may apply at any time before the confirmation of the sale even though he has by his own action delayed confirmation for many years.”

8. There is yet one more reason why I feel I cannot accept the contention that effluxion of time alone confirms a sale within the meaning of O. 34, R. 5 of the CPC in sales held by the Registrar of this Court on the Original Side. Now the main basis of the argument on this point has been that within the time specified by the Rules of the Original Side the certificate of sale is confirmed. But any time specified by the Rules of this Court is time which can be relaxed by the Court under R. 46 of Chapter 38. Time fixed by the Rules of the Original Side Rules is not inviolate. Therefore, such time whether it is 14 days or 8 days after the certificate of sale, the Court can always extend with a view to enable a party so willing to apply for setting aside the certificate of sale. Were it necessary I would have relaxed the time here. Therefore, it cannot be fixed or the sale confirmed by mere efflusion of time alone without Court's further flat. That appears to be borne out by the further Rule, being R. 93 of Chapter 26, where even after effluxion of time when a report is ordinarily binding, the matter is set down for further consideration finally before the Court. That Rule 93 would seem to indicate, therefore, that the Court has seisin of the matter in the sense that it has to finally put its seal or make an offer confirming the sale quite independently of Order 21 Rule 92 which, in my view, also applies to sales on the Original Side.

9. For these reasons, I hold that in a mortgage suit for sale the equity of redemption in a mortgagor survives under Order 34 Rule 5 until the Court makes an order confirming the sale under Order 21 Rule 92. It can be claimed by the mortgagor when an application by the purchaser himself is pending for confirmation of the sale. The equity of redemption in such cases is not extinguished by the final decree for sale nor by the actual sale itself but survives until the sale is confirmed and made absolute under O. 21, R. 92 of the CPC or Rule 45 of Chapter 27 of the Original Side Rules by the issue of certificate of sale. This conclusion is approved by the general principle of law that there should be no clog on the equity of redemption until the sale is concluded finally by Court's order of confirmation or what is said by the sale becoming “absolute” under Or. 21, R. 92 of the CPC.

10. There will, therefore, be an order granting leave to the petitioner to pay into Court to the credit of the suit the sum of Rs. 21,264-12-7p. as mentioned in Prayer (a) of the petition, and the Registrar and the Accountant-General shall be at liberty to accept the same in terms of Prayer (b) of the petition. There will be also an order granting leave to the petitioner to pay to the Court 5 per cent of the amount deposited by the purchaser for payment as compensation to him, and the Registrar will be at liberty to accept the same in terms of Prayer (c) of the petition. I further order and direct that upon these payments being made, the sale of the mortgaged premises on 14-5-1955 be set aside and satisfaction entered in terms of Prayer (d) of the petition. There will be incidental orders in respect of title deeds in terms of Prayer (e) of the petition.

11. The applicant will pay the costs of this application to the plaintiff in terms of Prayer (i) of the petition and will also pay the costs of this application to the purchaser. I certify the Chamber Summons to be a fit one for the employment of Counsel.

K.S.B

12. Order accordingly.