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Panchu Gopal Mallik And Anr. v. The State And Anr. Opposite Parties.

Calcutta High Court
Jun 10, 1955
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Debabrata Mookerjee, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Jagabandhu Mallick left two sons: the petitioner Panchu Gopal Mallick and Akshoy Kumar Mallick (deceased). Akshoy left two sons, one being Arun Kumar Mallick (petitioner No. 2), and a daughter who was married and later died leaving one Shyamsundar, described as an absconding accused. Proclamation and attachment proceedings for Shyamsundar's apprehension were undertaken, including an order purportedly under section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a Magistrate in Ludhiana, East Punjab, attaching property certified to the district of 24-Parganas.

The attached property was a plot purchased by the petitioner Panchu Gopal Mallick's father; petitioners allege that Shyamsundar lived there merely as a licensee with no interest or title. The attachment was served on Panchu Gopal Mallick's property. In March 1952 the petitioners objected and preferred a claim before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Alipore, arguing that Shyamsundar had no interest in the property.

Because of the petitioners' old age and illness (including Panchu Gopal Mallick's hospitalization), the objection was not properly pursued and on 17th December 1952 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate directed the petitioners' objection to be "filed" (dismissed for default) without recording evidence. An application for revival was later allowed on 24th March 1954. The revived proceedings were transferred to Mr. M.L. Chatterjee, Magistrate 1st Class, Alipore, who held an inquiry, heard oral and documentary evidence from the petitioners, and disposed of the matter by order dated 6th December 1954. The petitioners then obtained the present Rule (revision).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate misconceived the scope of section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly the nature and extent of the enquiry to be conducted under the sub-sections added by the Amending Act of 1923 (sub-sections 6(A) to 6(E)).
  2. Whether the Magistrate had jurisdiction to revive proceedings that had lapsed for non-prosecution and whether the period of limitation in sub-section (6D) (and related sub-sections, including (6A) and (6E)) applies to an application for revival.
  3. Whether the Magistrate was competent to determine questions of "interest" in the property (rights and title) as distinct from mere "possession" when adjudicating claims or objections under section 88.
  4. Whether the dismissal for default (order dated 17th December 1952) could be treated as a final, conclusive order within the meaning of sub-section 6(D) so as to fix the limitation period and prevent revival or further enquiry.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioners' Arguments (as represented by Mr. Bhose)

  • The learned Magistrate misconceived the true scope of section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and its amended sub-sections.
  • When attachment is made under Chapter VI (processes to compel appearance), a claimant or objector must be given a reasonable opportunity to establish the claim or objection; the sub-sections (including 6(D)) imply a proper enquiry prior to any final/conclusive order.
  • The Magistrate cannot treat the matter as finally concluded without such enquiry; limitations under sub-section (6A) cannot be used to prevent revival where there are bona fide grounds (e.g., illness) for non-prosecution.

Respondent / State's Arguments (as represented by Mr. Sanyal)

  • Because the proceedings lapsed, the subsequent order of revival was bad and the petitioners are not entitled to rely on subsequent proceedings.
  • The six-month period within which a claim or objection must be preferred is fixed by statute and the Magistrate has no discretion to enlarge that time; therefore revived proceedings after the lapse of six months do not fall within the meaning of section 88 and cannot be questioned as improperly disposed of.
  • The Magistrate was not concerned with determination of "interest" in the property; that is a matter for Civil Courts, and the Criminal Court should be concerned only with possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the statutory framework of section 88 CrPC, particularly the sub-sections 6, 6(A) to 6(E) (incorporated by the Amending Act of 1923), and the nature of the proceedings under those sub-sections. The judge treated these sub-sections as creating a complete code for determination of claims and objections to property attached under section 88, obliging the Magistrate to give an opportunity and conduct a full enquiry into the claimant's or objector's case.

On the question of revival and limitation, the Court analyzed the sequence of events: attachment on 23rd February 1952; dismissal for default (direction to "file") on 17th December 1952; revival allowed on 24th March 1954; subsequent enquiry and disposal on 6th December 1954. The Court held that the Magistrate who allowed revival presumably acted on bona fide grounds (the petitioners' illness and old age), and that the State did not challenge the revival at the time; therefore the State could not belatedly object to the validity of revival.

The Court rejected the State's contention that the six-month statutory period left no discretion for extension and that revival after six months produced proceedings not contemplated by section 88. The judge concluded the material date is the initiation of proceedings, not the date of revival, and that the Magistrate's order of revival remained effective because it had not been set aside.

On the scope of the Magistrate's functions, the Court disagreed with the Magistrate's apparent view (endorsed by the State) that the Criminal Court's concern was limited to possession and that questions of interest or title were the exclusive domain of Civil Courts. The Court held that the amended sub-sections require the Criminal Court to investigate "interest" — a broader concept than mere possession — because the procedures imported provisions cognate to the Civil Procedure Code (e.g., powers of a receiver) and because the legislature intended the order under sub-section 6(D) to be "conclusive" unless set aside by a Civil Court.

Regarding whether the dismissal for default (17th December 1952) could be treated as the conclusive order fixing limitation under sub-section 6(D), the Court found two defects in that view:

  • On plain reading, sub-section 6(D)'s limitation period cannot be made to run from the date of a dismissal for non-prosecution when that default was later wiped out by a valid order of revival that has not been challenged.
  • The Magistrate himself later held an enquiry, meaning his own view that limitation barred the enquiry would contradict his subsequent conduct of hearing evidence and determining the matter on merits.
The judge therefore held that the question of limitation did not arise in the circumstances because the revival order stands, and it is the final order made after the inquiry contemplated in sub-section 6(A) (and culminating in 6(D)) that is conclusive.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Rule is made absolute. The order of the learned Magistrate (disposing of the petitioners' objection) is set aside, and the matter is directed to be reheard and disposed of according to law by a Magistrate named in sub-section (6C) of section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Implications:

  • The Court affirmed that the sub-sections added to section 88 by the Amending Act of 1923 create a comprehensive procedure obliging the Criminal Court to inquire into claims and objections, including questions of "interest" (rights and title), not merely possession.
  • The decision emphasizes that an order of dismissal for non-prosecution can be revived where the Magistrate is satisfied of bona fide grounds; a valid revival prevents the earlier default from operating as the conclusive event for limitation under sub-section 6(D) where the revival has not been challenged or set aside.
  • The direct effect is that the petitioners are entitled to a fresh hearing before a properly constituted Magistrate under section 88(6C) to determine their claim; no broader novel precedent beyond the interpretation of section 88 sub-sections is claimed by the Court beyond these conclusions.

No other broader implications or new rules beyond the interpretation and application of section 88's sub-sections and the directions given in this case were stated in the opinion.

Rendered by: Debabrata Mookerjee, J. (opinion summarized)

Show all summary ...

Debabrata Mookerjee, J.:— This revision petition raises a rather interesting question of law.

1. One Jagabandhu Mallick left two sons, one of them being the petitioner Panchu Gopal Mallick and the other Akshoy Kumar Mallick since deceased. Akshoy left behind two sons of whom Arun Kumar Mallick petitioner No. 2 is one. Akshoy had a daughter who was given away in marriage and she died sometime ago leaving behind one Shyamsundar, who is said to be an abs-conding accused for whose apprehension proceedings by way of proclamation and attachment have been taken.

2. A plot of land was said to have been purchased quite a long time ago by the father of the petitioner Panchu Gopal Mallick where certain structures were later raised by the latter and in the house thus constructed the absconding accused Shyamsundar was permitted to live. The petitioners' case is that Shyamsundar lived there as a licensee and that he had no interests, claim or title to the property in question.

3. It appears that a Magistrate of Ludhiana in the East Punjab had made; an order under section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure purporting to attach the property of the absconding accused Shyamsundar. This order of attachment was certified in due course to the district of 24-Parganas and was served by the local police on the property mentioned above, belonging to the petitioner Panchu Gopal Mallick. Thereafter in March, 1952, the present petitioners objected to the attachment and preferred a claim in the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Alipore. The objection was based on the ground that the absconding accused had no interest whatever in the attached property and consequently the petitioners' interest was not liable to be affected by any process issued or purported to be issued under section 88 of the Code.

4. It is stated that on account of the old age of the petitioners and particularly the illness of petitioner Panchu Gopal Mallick which necessitated his removal to the Presidency General Hospital, Calcutta, for treatment, the application objecting to the attachment was not properly prosecuted with the result that on the 17th of December, 1952, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate without recording any evidence directed the petitioners' objection to be “filed”. Thereafter an application was made for revival of the proceedings and the prayer was allowed on the 24th of March, 1954. Presumably the Magistrate who dealt with the petitioners' application for restoration of the proceedings felt persuaded that the ground for non-prosecution was a bona-fide one. The proceedings thus revived were thereafter transferred for disposal to Mr. M.L Chatterjee, Magistrate, 1st Class, Alipore. In the enquiry that followed, the petitioners produced evidence both oral and documentary and it was contended that the absconding accused Shyamsundar had no interest whatever in the properties attached which the petitioners claimed as belonging to them. The learned Magistrate, however, by an order dated the 6th of December, 1954, disposed of the matter whereafter the present Rule was applied for and obtained.

5. Mr. Bhose appearing on behalf of the petitioners has raised several contentions. He has contended that the learned Magistrate has misconceived the true scope of section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument is that when property is attached pursuant to the provisions of the law contained in Chapter VI of the Code which deals with processes to compel appearance of accused persons, the claimant or objector has to be given reasonable opportunity for the purpose of establishing the claim or objection as the case may be. It is contended also that the provisions contained in sub-section 6(D) and the sub-sections immediately preceding it imply a proper enquiry into the claim preferred and it is only after such enquiry that the order made by the Magistrate becomes conclusive. It has also been argued that it is not open to the Magistrate to review an order passed by his predecessor allowing the petitioners' application for revival of the proceeding and that the period of limitation under sub-section (6A) of section 88 of the Code cannot possibly apply to an application for revival. These contentions require to be examined.

6. Mr. Sanyal appearing on behalf of the State has argued that in view of the fact that the proceedings relative to the enquiry having lapsed, the order of revival was bad and the petitioners cannot be held entitled to the benefit of any subsequent proceedings. The period of six months within which the claim or objection has to be made or preferred, is according to Mr. Sanyal, a period fixed by the statute and does not leave any discretion whatever to the Magistrate to relax it or to enlarge the time in any circumstance whatever. In that view, the proceedings revived after the lapse of 6 months are not proceedings contemplated within the meaning of section 88 of the Code and consequently the petitioners cannot be heard to complain that the revived proceedings had not been properly dealt with and disposed of in accordance with law.

7. Section 88 of the Code authorises a Court issuing a proclamation under section 87 to order attachment of any property movable or immovable or both belonging to the proclaimed offender. Sub-section (2) authorises attachment outside the place where the proceedings originated and sub-section (3) prescribes the mode in which the property is to be attached. The mode of attachment varies according to the nature of the property and the sub-section provides even for the appointment of a receiver in suitable cases where the property to be attached is immovable. A somewhat unusual feature from the standpoint of criminal jurisprudence is incorporated in section 88 by sub-section (6) which defines the limits of power, duties, and liabilities of a Receiver appointed under the provisions of that sub-section and those duties, power and liabilities are expressly directed to be controlled by the cognate provisions contained in Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure. Then comes sub-section 6(A) which prescribes the procedure along with the four sub-sections that follow it to be adopted by the Magistrate in determining the question arising out of the claims made or objections preferred in respect of the attached property. As far as I can see these sub-sections 6(A) to 6(E) which have been incorporated by the Amending Act of 1923, prescribe a complete code for the purpose of determination of the questions which properly fall to be considered in the context of an application making a claim or preferring an objection with regard to attachment under section 88 of the Code. These sub-sections between them provide a complete machinery by which, so far as the criminal Court is concerned, the rights and interests of claimants or objectors with regard to attached properties have to be determined. It is only when the final stage envisaged in sub-section 6(D) is reached that the question arises as to the conclusive character of the order made by the Magistrate. sub-section 6(D) provides that any person whose claim or objection has been disallowed either in whole or in part, may within the period of one year from the date of such order, institute a suit to establish the right which he claims in respect of the property in dispute and the section adds that “subject to the result of such suit if any the order shall be conclusive”.

8. The question then is, when can art order made under this section be said to be conclusive? The scheme of the different sub-sections to which I have called attention seems to make the position clear that when a claim is made or an objection is proposed, opportunity has to be given by the Magistrate who deals with the matter to enable the claimant or the objector to establish his claim or objection as the case may be. That presupposes a full scale enquiry. To my mind the whole procedure envisaged is a judicial procedure the result of which is capable of being fraught with grave consequences to the person adversely affected by an order made at the conclusion of the enquiry. It is to be observed that the order made under sub-section 6(D) has been expressly made ‘conclusive’ with the result that it is not subject to appeal or even to revision. The legislature clearly intended that after an enquiry has been held into the claim made or objection preferred in respect of the attached property, the order that follows should have the attribute of finality about it and should not be allowed to be canvassed either in appeal or by way of revision. The order thus made continues to be effective unless and until it is set aside by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, Thus there can hardly be any doubt that the legislature meant orders passed under section 6(D) not to be disturbed further in the Criminal Court and therefore the language employed that the order “shall be conclusive” unequivocally declares that intention. It therefore follows that such an order should not be passed lightly in the absence of the party concerned; and where opportunity to make claim or prefer an objection could not be availed of for sufficient grounds the Magistrate certainly has jurisdiction to enlarge the time by giving the party affected further opportunity to contest the proceedings, provided of course the claim was initially made within the time limited by the law. In the present case the petitioners made the claim within the period of six months prescribed in Sec. 6E, but it could not be prosecuted on the ground of illness and after some time the petitioners applied to have the proceedings revived. The Magistrate dealing with the prayer for revival thought it right to accede to the prayer, presumably being satisfied that the grounds urged in support of such revival were bonafide grounds. This Court is not concerned at this stage with the sufficiency or inadequacy of the grounds upon which the revival was made. The fact remains that a revival was ordered and the proceedings which had lapsed for non-prosecution were revived under the authority of the Magistrate who was dealing with it. Mr. Sanyal's objection that revival should not have been allowed is, to my mind, a belated one. It was quite open to the State to take steps to prevent further progress of a proceeding which the State considered to be unwarranted in view of the order terminating it on the 17th of December, 1952. No such step was taken to question the revival and I do not think the State can be heard to say now that the order of revival was improperly or wrongly made. It must therefore be held that the material date is not the date of revival of the proceeding, but the initiation of it.

9. It is next urged by Mr. Sanyal that the Magistrate was not concerned with the question of determination of ‘interest’ in the property and that it would be the business of the Civil Court to go into such question if and when raised. I am afraid I cannot accept this contention which seems to me to negative, in letter and in spirit, the detailed provisions of section 88 of the Code which prescribes with as much clarity the object or purpose of the inquiry as the mode in which claims are to be made and objections are to be preferred and the procedure as to how they should be heard and disposed of; nor it is easy to appreciate the Magistrate's view that the Criminal Court is concerned with the question of “possession” only. This would be to my mind a complete negation of the provisions of the Code if the Criminal Court was to be limited merely to the question of possession of property. The sub-sections which I have read above do not import any such notion. On the other hand by the express provision contained in sub-section 6(A) the Criminal Court is called upon to consider the question of interest to determine the claim or objection and this must necessarily involve consideration of rights giving rise to the interest of the person concerned. It is indeed significant that the legislature thought fit to incorporate the provisions relating to the powers and functions of a receiver under the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to attachment made of property under the provisions of section 88 of the Code. I wonder what could possibly have been meant by the Magistrate when he said that the Criminal Court is concerned with the question of possession only and has nothing to do with the question of “interest” of the party concerned.

10. It is therefore quite clear that by the amendment made in 1923 the legislature provided a complete machinery for the investigation of claims and objections roughly comparable to the cognate provisions contained in Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. The ascertainment of claims and objections is bound in a way to involve investigations of right to property and the Magistrate is not relieved of his duty to do so by merely pleading that the Criminal Court is concerned with question of possession only. That would be an evasion of the statute. In this view, the new sub-sections are a departure from the established point of view that a Criminal Court usually concerns itself with questions of possession and rarely, if ever with questions of right or interest; but the exigency of the attachment of an absconder's property left the legislature no choice but to cast a duty on the Magistrate to hold an enquiry into the interest of the party claiming or objecting the result of which is expressly made conclusive subject only to determination by a civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The word “interest” is a word of wider import and cannot be limited to mere claim of possession.

11. It remains to consider the question as to whether the period of limitation laid down in sub-section 6(D) of section 88 is to be given an extended interpretation as suggested by the Magistrate in his order. The petitioners' application was, as I have said, dismissed for default on the 17th of December, 1952. The attachment had been made on the 23rd of February of that year and according to the learned; Magistrate the period of limitation would expire in terms of section 6 (D) on the 16th of December, 1953. The learned Magistrate seems to think that the order by which the petitioners' application was disposed of upon their failure to prosecute it on the 17th of December finally determined the matter, and was conclusive within the meaning of sub-section 6(D). I am afraid this contention is liable to be questioned from two points of view. In the first place, on a plain reading of sub-section, 6 (D) the period of limitation cannot possibly be said to extend back to a date on which the petitioners' application was dismissed for non-prosecution, in view of the fact that the default was wiped out by an order of the Magistrate which has since not been set aside or even challenged.

12. In the second place, it is to be observed that the learned Magistrate himself has held an enquiry since, and consequently the proceedings before him stand self-condemned if his view of the law as regards limitation and revival were to prevail. I am afraid the position has been completely misunderstood. The question of limitation in the circumstances of the present case must be said not to arise at all in view of the order of revival of the proceedings which order stands good even to-day and the alleged conclusiveness of the order cannot possibly relate back to a point of time when the proceedings were said merely to lapse on account of non-prosecution. It is only the final order made after an inquiry contemplated in sub-section (6A) which is to be considered as conclusive and not liable to be disturbed in any criminal Court. The Magistrate was, in my judgment, in error in thinking that he had not power to consider the matter on the merits in the view of the law which he took.

13. The result, therefore, is that this Rule is made absolute and the order of the learned Magistrate is set aside and the matter is directed to be reheard and disposed of in accordance with law by a magistrate named in sub-section (6C) of section 88 of the Code.

A.K.D-G.