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Bonbehary Roy Judgment-Debtor, v. Dhirendra Nath Roy Decree-Holder, .

Calcutta High Court
Jun 2, 1955
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order dismissing an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure raised by the judgment-debtor (appellant) against execution of a decree originally passed by the Jessore Court. The decree, obtained by a respondent Zamindar for recovery of putni rent against multiple puttanidars (including the appellant), was transferred to the Court of the First Subordinate Judge, Alipore on 21 May 1946. On 31 May 1946 the decree-holder filed a Tabular Statement (Miscellaneous Case No. 15 of 1946) to start execution proceedings against six judgment-debtors (not including the appellant). Proceedings against those six were subsequently compromised by solenamas in July 1949.

On 25 July 1949 the decree-holder petitioned the Alipore Court (as part of Misc. Case No. 15 of 1946) to proceed against judgment-debtor No. 1 (the present appellant) by attachment and sale of specified properties. The Subordinate Judge overruled objections and allowed the relief; the decree-holder amended the original Tabular Statement (by order dated 7 June 1951) to include judgment-debtor No. 1 and to add the prayer for attachment and sale.

After enactment of the East Bengal Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 (by which, it was alleged, zamindaries and arrears vested in the State), judgment-debtor No. 1 filed a petition under section 47 CPC in the pending execution, contending the decree could not be executed at the instance of the private decree-holder. The Subordinate Judge dismissed that petition. The present appeal by Bonbehary Roy (judgment-debtor No. 1) challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in light of the East Bengal Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, the private decree-holder remained entitled to execute the Jessore decree in an Indian Court.
  2. Whether the Alipore Court had jurisdiction to execute a decree originating in Jessore (now in East Pakistan) given the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947 — specifically whether there was a "proceeding pending immediately before the appointed day" (15 August 1947) as required by section 4 of that Order.
  3. Whether the initiation of execution against other judgment-debtors before the appointed day, and the subsequent amendment of the execution petition to add judgment-debtor No. 1, meant that proceedings against judgment-debtor No. 1 were to be treated as pending from 31 May 1946 (the date of the original execution petition).
  4. Whether the Subordinate Judge erred in dismissing the judgment-debtor's section 47 CPC objection to execution.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent (Decree-holder) — summarized submissions

  • Counsel (Mr. Hemendra Chandra Sen) conceded that, if execution proceedings were pending anywhere in East Pakistan, the decree would vest in the Pakistan Government under the East Bengal Act.
  • He argued, however, that after the Partition the execution in question was pending in a Court of the Indian Union (Alipore) and hence the East Bengal Legislature had no extraterritorial jurisdiction to divest property or proceedings situated and pending in India. The right to execute transferred with the decree to the Alipore Court and remained unaffected by the East Bengal Act.

Appellant (Judgment-debtor No. 1) — summarized submissions

  • Counsel (Mr. Apurba Charan Mukherjee) originally attempted to argue the decree-holder had been divested of the right to execute the decree, but ultimately abandoned that point and did not contest the respondent's extraterritorial-jurisdiction argument as advanced by Mr. Sen.
  • Mr. Mukherjee's remaining main contention was that, for the Alipore Court to have jurisdiction under section 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, the specific proceeding against judgment-debtor No. 1 must have been pending in an Indian Court immediately before the appointed day (15 August 1947). He argued that proceedings against JD No. 1 were not initiated until 25 July 1949 (after the appointed day), and that the prior proceedings (started 31 May 1946) were directed only to other judgment-debtors and therefore could not confer jurisdiction to proceed against JD No. 1 after the appointed day.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the jurisdictional question primarily under section 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947 (which preserves proceedings "pending immediately before the appointed day" in specified provinces). The opinion notes that there was no authority cited on the precise point and treats it as one of first impression.

The court then examined the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure governing execution of decrees transferred for execution:

  • The court referred to section 38 CPC (a decree may be executed by the court which passed it or by the court to which it is sent for execution) and section 39 CPC (power to send a decree to another court for execution).
  • The court discussed Order 21 Rules 6 and 7 CPC: the transferor Court sends copies of the decree, certificate of non-satisfaction and any order for execution to the transferee Court; the transferee Court files these documents; on petition of the decree-holder, execution proceedings are initiated.

From these provisions the court distilled the following legal propositions (as applied in this case):

  • Receipt and filing of a copy of the decree by the transferee Court is a ministerial act that vests the transferee Court with jurisdiction to deal with the decree and to execute it if required.
  • Filing of the decree in the transferee Court does not itself constitute initiation of execution proceedings by the decree-holder (which occurs on application), but it may be viewed as part of the execution-process and — in a broad sense — can render the decree "pending" in the transferee Court.
  • The court adopted a liberal and wide interpretation of the phrase "pending proceedings" in section 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, to include not only execution proceedings that were actively pending on the appointed day, but also decrees that had been filed on or before the appointed day even if an execution petition had not yet been filed against every judgment-debtor named in the decree.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court observed that:

  • The Jessore decree had been transferred to and filed in the Alipore Court before the appointed day (21 May 1946), and execution proceedings had commenced in Alipore on 31 May 1946 (albeit against other judgment-debtors).
  • Given the filing and the commencement of execution proceedings before the appointed day, the decree was "before the Court in the process of execution" and thus constituted a "pending proceeding" within the meaning of section 4 of the Order. Consequently the Alipore Court possessed jurisdiction to execute the decree, including against other judgment-debtors who could be brought in by amending the execution petition.
  • Separately, the court noted a simpler dispositional point: this Court (Division Bench) had on 20 February 1951 directed amendment of the execution petition (F.M.A No. 38 of 1950), and the Alipore Court by order dated 7 June 1951 effected that amendment. As a result of that amendment, the execution petition as against judgment-debtor No. 1 was to be treated as pending from the date of the original petition (31 May 1946). Therefore, even if one were to focus on the date when execution was sought specifically against JD No. 1, the amendment rendered the proceeding against JD No. 1 pending from before the appointed day.

The court concluded that, for these reasons, the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction and the section 47 objection should have been dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal fails and is DISMISSED.

Implications and direct effects on the parties:

  • The Subordinate Judge of Alipore had jurisdiction to execute the Jessore decree against judgment-debtor No. 1 because the decree had been filed and execution proceedings had been instituted in that Court before the appointed day (15 August 1947), and because the execution petition was properly amended to include judgment-debtor No. 1 (thereby treating the execution against him as pending from 31 May 1946).
  • The section 47 CPC objection by judgment-debtor No. 1 was rightly dismissed and the decree-holder may proceed with execution as permitted by the Alipore Court's orders.
  • The court ordered no costs in the circumstances of this case (i.e., "we make no order for costs").

The opinion does not set out any statement that it is laying down a binding new precedent beyond the application to these facts. Accordingly, this summary confines itself to the direct effect on the parties as set out above.


Bench: Mallick, J. (author); S.R. Das Gupta, J. (concurring). Reference in text to A.K.D-G. appears as initials in the original opinion.

Show all summary ...

Mallick, J.:— This appeal is directed against an order dismissing an objection taken by the judgment-debtor under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the execution of a decree passed by the Jessore Court and transferred to the Court of First Subordinate Judge, Alipore, for execution. The respondent who was a Zamindar obtained a decree from the Jessore Court for the recovery of putni rent of an estate included in Jessore Collectorate against a number of puttanidars including the appellant. On 21st May, 1946, the decree was transferred to Alipore Court for execution. On 31st May, 1946, the decree-holder started execution against 6 judgment-debtors but not against the appellant by filing a Tabular Statement in the Court of the said Subordinate Judge at Alipore. This was numbered as Miscellaneous Case No. 15 of 1946. The proceedings against the said 6 judgment-debtors were however compromised and two solenamas dated 11th and 18th July, 1949, were filed recording the said compromise. After having finished with the said 6 judgment-debtors, the decree-holder intended to proceed against the judgment-debtor No. 1, the present appellant and with that object the decree-holder filed a petition on 25th July, 1949, before the said Subordinate Judge stating that he wished to proceed in Misc. Case No. 15 of 1946 against the Judgment-debtor No. 1 and asked for attachment and sale of certain properties belonging to the said Judgment-debtor No. 1 as set out in the Schedule. It was not a fresh application under Order 21, Rules II of the Code of Civil Procedure, but was an application in the said execution case being Misc. Case No. 15 of 1946. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled all the objections and granted the relief prayed for by the decree-holder. Against that order an appeal was taken to this Court being F.M.A No. 38 of 1950. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Sen and Chunder, JJ. Their Lordships dismissed the appeal on 20th February, 1951, with the following observations:—

“We treat the application of the respondents for relief against appellant as a prayer for amendment of the execution petition filed in Miscellaneous Case No. 15 of 1946 and we see no reason why we should refuse to allow the execution petition to be so amended. The respondent shall amend his petition for execution in Misc. Case No. 15 of 1946 by adding the name of the judgment-debtor No. 1 in the appropriate column and by stating the manner in which execution should be levied against him in the appropriate column”. Thereupon on the petition of the decree-holder, the original Tabular Statement filed on 31st May, 1946, was amended by the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, dated 7th June, 1951, whereby the name of judgment-debtor No. 1 was included in the 9th column of the Tabular Statement and the 11th column was also amended by adding a prayer for attachment and sale of properties belonging to judgment-debtor No. 1.

1. In 1950, East Bengal Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act 1950, was passed whereby the Government of East Pakistan purported to acquire all Zamindaries. Under the Act not merely the Zamindary but all arrears of rent due to the zamindars including decrees obtained therefor vested in the State. The decree sought to be executed being a decree for the recovery of patni rent of an estate situate in Touzi No. 243 of Jessore Collectorate would prima facie be hit by the mischief of the Act. Thereupon the judgment-debtor No. 1 filed a petition under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the pending execution case contending that by reason of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, the decree is no longer executable at the instance of the decree-holder. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the application on the finding that the decree in execution could not have vested in the Government of East Pakistan. Against this order of dismissal the present appeal has been filed by judgment-debtor No. 1 Bonbehary Roy.

2. Mr. Hemendra Chandra Sen, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent decree-holder concedes that decree in execution would vest in the Pakistan Government under the Act, if the execution proceeding was pending anywhere in East Pakistan. But he contended that after the creation of two Dominions by the Indian Independence Act, the present Union case was pending in a Court of the Indian Union and the East Bengal Legislature has no extraterritorial Jurisdiction to legislate on property which is now situate in Indian Union belonging to a citizen of the Indian Union. The right given by the Indian Independence Act and/or the Orders passed by the Governor-General thereunder cannot be affected by the unilateral Act of one Dominion. The right of property in the decree and the right to execute the decree transferred to this Court for execution remains therefore unaffected by the East Bengal Act above referred to Mr. Apurba Charan Mukherjee, the learned Advocate, appearing for the appellant though originally attempted to argue that the decree-holder is divested of his right to execute the decree, gave up the point ultimately and did not dispute the above contention of Mr. Sen By reason of the attitude taken by Mr. Mukherjee the point of dispute before us has been narrowed down.

3. The ground on which Mr. Mukherjee urged that the order complained of should be set aside is that a decree passed by a Court in the territory now included in the Dominion of Pakistanis not executable in a Court of Indian Union unless proceeding is pending in a Court of Indian Union immediately before the appointed day which is 15th August, 1947. There must be a pending proceeding in an Indian Court immediately before the appointed day otherwise the Indian Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. In the present case, it is urged, that execution proceeding, so far as judgment-debtor No. 1 is concerned, was initiated by the application on 25th July, 1949, i.e, long after the appointed day. Hence as against his client no proceeding was pending immediately before the appointed day and as such the Court of Subordinate Judge of Alipore is not competent to execute the decree of Jessore Court against judgment-debtor No. 1. According to Mr. Mukherjee it is immaterial that the decree was transferred to this Court on 21st May, 1946, or that execution proceeding was started in this Court on 31st May, 1946, against other judgment-debtors and both these dates are prior to the appointed date. What is material is the date in which decree-holder sought to proceed against judgment-debtor No. 1 and this date is 25th July, 1949, when the decree-holder sought to proceed against judgment-debtor No. 1 in execution — which date is admittedly after the appointed date. Mr. Mukherjee contended that on the ground the learned Subordinate Judge should have allowed his client's petition under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and dismissed the execution case.

4. Relevant portions of sections 2 and 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, on which the above argument is based read as follows:

“Section 2(1). In this Order, ‘appointed day’ means the fifteenth day of August, 1947.

Section 4(1). All proceedings pending immediately before the appointed day in any civil or criminal Court (other than a High Court) in the Province of Bengal, the Punjab or Assam shall be continued in that Court as if the said Act had not been passed, and that Court shall continue to have for the purposes of the said proceedings all the jurisdiction and powers which it had immediately before the appointed day”.

5. It follows from the above that unless a proceeding is pending immediately before the appointed day, the Court will have no jurisdiction to execute the decree of a Court which has now fallen within the territory of another Dominion. In the present case the decree sought to be executed was transferred to this Court on 21st May, 1946, and in fact execution was started on 31st May, 1946, and in consequence was pending in this Court though not against the present judgment-debtor. Would this be sufficient to comply with the provisions of section 4 of the Act? No authority on the point has been cited to us by the learned Advocates appearing for the parties and the point has to be decided as a point of first impression.

6. Under section 38 of the Code a decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. Under section 39 of the Code, the Court which passed a decree may send it to another Court for execution. Order 21, Rule 6 lays down the procedure to be followed when the decree is to be transferred to another Court for execution. The transfer Court is directed to send to the transferee Court a copy of the decree, a certificate of non-satisfaction and a copy of any order for execution if any. Under Order 21, Rule 7 the transferee Court on receipt of a copy sent as aforesaid shall cause such copies and certificates to be filed. Thereafter on the petition of the decree-holder, execution proceeding is initiated. It is the application for execution to the transferee Court which initiates the proceedings in execution. The receipt of the decree by the transferee Court is a ministerial act. After receipt of a copy of the decree the transferee Court shall cause the same to be filed. When the decree is filed the transferee Court is vested with jurisdiction to deal with the decree, i.e, to proceed to execute it if so required by the decree-holder. Filing of the decree does not amount to initiation of execution proceedings but does vest jurisdiction to the transferee Court to deal with and execute the decree. Filing of the decree in the transferee Court is the first step to be taken before the decree can be executed by the transferee Court. It, may be considered, therefore, in a broad sense to be a part of the execution proceedings. In any event after the decree has been filed the decree becomes pending to be executed even though no execution proceeding has been started yet by filing a tabular statement. I would give a liberal and wide interpretation to the words “pending proceedings” in section 4 of Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947 so as to cover not merely execution proceedings pending on the appointed date, but also decree which has been filed on or before the appointed day but in respect of which execution petition had not been filed on the appointed day.

7. In the present case, before the appointed day not merely the decree of the Jessore Court had been filed in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Alipore, but in fact execution proceedings had started on 31st May, 1946, though against the other judgment-debtors. In such execution proceeding the decree-holder in law was competent to proceed against the present judgment debtor and his property by amending the execution petition. The decree was therefore before the Court in the process of execution from before the appointed day and hence in my judgment there was a “pending proceeding” in the Alipore Court within the meaning of section 4 of the Order, so as to give jurisdiction to the Subordinate Judge of Alipore to execute the decree not merely against the judgment-debtors against whom execution was pending on the appointed day, but also against other judgment-debtors who can be brought in later on by way of amendment of the tabular statement.

8. The present case can however be disposed of in a much simpler way. Execution proceeding was started on 31st May, 1946. We have seen that by its judgment and Order, dated 20th February, 1951, in F.M.A No. 38 of 1950, this Court directed the decree-holder to amend the execution petition dated 31st May, 1946, by adding the name of the judgment-debtor No. 1 in the appropriate column and by stating the manner in which execution should be levied against him in the appropriate column. Thereupon on the petition of the decree-holder the Alipore Court by its order, dated 7th June, 1951, ordered amendment of the petition as indicated above whereby execution was sought not merely against the judgment-debtors Nos. 15 to 21 but against the judgment-debtor No. 1, as well. The result of this amendment is that even as against the judgment-debtor No. 1 the execution proceeding is deemed to be pending from 31st May, 1946, i.e, the date of the original petition for execution. In law therefore the execution petition even against the judgment-debtor No. 1 was pending from before the appointed date and the Subordinate Judge of Alipore had full jurisdiction to proceed in execution of the decree of the Jessore Court. Clearly the consequence of the amendment was not realised when the F.M.A No. 38 of 1950 was argued in this Court. Possibly the judgment-debtor could have argued the point now urged before us at that time against allowing amendment of the original execution petition.

9. The amendment however having been effected it is no longer open to the judgment-debtor to contend that the application for execution against the judgment-debtor No. 1 has been initiated on 25th July, 1949, i.e, long after the appointed day. The argument of Mr. Mukherjee becomes untenable, in any event, on this ground.

10. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case we make no order for costs.

S.R Das Gupta, J.:— I agree.

A.K.D-G.