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Messrs Sharma Electric Engineering Works v. Sm. Radha Debi .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Twelve ejectment suits were instituted by the plaintiff, Sm. Radha Debi, against tenants occupying different portions of premises No. 31, Mallick Street, Calcutta. The trial Court (Third Bench, Court of Small Causes, Calcutta) decreed these suits on 8-3-1954. Eight tenants appealed to the Special Bench; those appeals failed on 5-8-1954. Four tenants then filed second appeals to this Court.
The suits arose after the Rent Control Act of 1950 came into operation and are governed by that Act. In the four cases before this Court the ground of ejectment relied on by the plaintiff was her "reasonable requirement" of the premises for building and re-building.
The property is a large four-storeyed building on about 3–3½ cottahs of land, roughly 70–80 years old. Evidence (notably the plaintiff's engineer P.W.1 and the defendant's engineer D.W.13) indicates that most of the interior, especially around the courtyard, requires replacement (demolition and steel-framing), while the roadside outer wall needs only minor repairs. The plaintiff had a sanctioned plan (Ex. 1(a)) and proved that she had the means and bona fide intention to rebuild. The lower Courts found reconstruction would be for public benefit and accepted the landlady's claim of extended public accommodation to some degree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff had made out a case of re-building (necessitating removal of tenants) within the meaning of the Rent Control Act, 1950.
- Whether tenants' offers to shift temporarily for the short duration of reconstruction (estimated at four to six months) defeat or materially affect the reasonableness of the landlord's requirement for building/re-building.
- Whether the Explanation to proviso (h) of Section 12(1) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 requires, as an imperative test, that extended public accommodation must be established for a claim of reasonable requirement for building/re-building to succeed.
- Whether the particular tenement occupied by Kishori Lal Kailash Chand Jain (S.A No. 1154 of 1954) was unaffected by the proposed reconstruction and therefore not subject to ejectment.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (Tenants) — Arguments as presented by Mr. Sen
- No case of re-building necessitating removal of the tenants has been made out by the plaintiff.
- Even if re-building were necessary, the period of displacement would be short (about four to six months), and tenants offered to shift as necessary for temporary periods; therefore there was no reasonable ground for eviction.
- No case of public advantage by extended accommodation (within the mandatory Explanation to proviso (h) of Section 12(1) of the Rent Control Act, 1950) had been proved; reliance was placed on the decision of Chunder, J. in T.D. Nandi v. Manot and Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 Cal 80 (A).
- Specifically in S.A No. 1154 of 1954 (Kishori Lal Kailash Chand Jain), the tenant's portion reportedly lay between the roadside outer wall (needing only minor repairs) and the public road, and thus would not be affected by interior demolition; eviction was therefore unnecessary in his case.
Plaintiff / Respondent (Landlady) — Case as found by Courts and presented in evidence
- The landlady established a need for substantial reconstruction: replacement/demolition and steel-framing of practically the whole interior (particularly around the courtyard), with only the roadside outer wall requiring minor repairs.
- The landlady produced a sanctioned plan (Ex. 1(a)), proved she had means to rebuild, and asserted an honest and bona fide intention to carry out reconstruction.
- The lower Courts found that reconstruction would provide public benefit and accepted the contention of extended public accommodation to some degree.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramesh Ch. Bhattacharjee & Another v. Nagendra N. Mullick, AIR 1951 Cal 435 | Practical test for adjudicating whether a case of re-building has been made out (P.B. Mookerjee, J.'s approach). | The Court accepted P.B. Mookerjee, J.'s practical test as appropriate to determine whether re-building had been proved by the landlady. |
| Bhulan Singh v. Ganendra Kumar, AIR 1950 Cal 74 | Earlier statutory language (“bona fide requirement”) was held to be more subjective on the part of the landlord. | The Court noted the Rent Control Act of 1950 uses "reasonable requirement" (wider discretion than "bona fide") and cited Bhulan Singh to contrast the earlier, more subjective test under the 1948 enactment. |
| T.D. Nandi v. Manot and Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 Cal 80 (Chunder, J.) | Held (as interpreted by appellants) that extended public accommodation is an imperative test under the Explanation to proviso (h) of S.12(1). | The Court considered and rejected the appellants' reliance on this decision as establishing an absolute rule; the Court declined to adopt that imperative interpretation of the Explanation. |
| Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, AIR 1943 PC 164 | Interpretive observations cited on statutory language and judicial approach (as supporting a non-imperative reading of certain statutory terms). | The Court relied on observations from this Judicial Committee decision to support the view that "the court shall have regard to" means the Court must consider the matter but it is not an absolute, controlling test. |
| Province of Bengal v. Pran Kissen Law and Co., AIR 1950 Cal 498 | Interpretation of statutory language and judicial approach in this Court (used to support non-imperative reading). | The Court cited this decision (AIR 1950 Cal 498 at p. 500) to reinforce the interpretation that the statutory phrase "the court shall have regard to" is not meant to be imperative in the sense of being determinative in every case. |
| Soorajmall Nagarmall v. Indian National Drug Co. Ltd., 59 Cal. W.N. 1023 | Authority referenced in discussing whether landlords can be compelled to undertake repairs and the limits of statutory obligations (S.38 context). | The Court referred to this authority to support the point that the landlord is not compelled by S.38 to undertake repairs that are unremunerative or to his prejudice, and that the statutory scheme should not be read to produce such a result. |
| Chunder, J.'s subsequent decisions (S.A Nos. 316 & 317 of 1952; S.A No. 39 of 1954) | Further judicial statements by Chunder, J. on the effect of the Explanation and on whether his earlier absolute statement could be maintained. | The Court observed that Chunder, J. in a subsequent decision could not adhere to the absolute statement in AIR 1954 Cal 80 (A) and suggested his earlier view in S.A Nos. 316 & 317 (under the 1948 Act) was more in accord with the present statute. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a step-by-step analysis confined to the evidence and legal text before it:
- Factual assessment: The Court accepted the joint thrust of the engineers' evidence (P.W.1 for the plaintiff and D.W.13 for the defence) that practically all internal walls, except the roadside outer wall, required replacement. This factual finding supported that reconstruction would necessitate removal of tenants when work proceeded in particular rooms.
- On the appellants' first argument (that no re-building case had been made out), the Court held the evidence eliminated doubt and rejected that argument. The engineers' evidence and the dimensions noted (rooms not exceeding 12 ft. in length) supported the necessity of tenant removal during reconstruction.
- On the second argument (tenants' offer to shift temporarily): The Court considered the offer but declined to give it decisive weight. It accepted P.B. Mookerjee, J.'s practical test from Ramesh Ch. Bhattacharjee as the appropriate approach but refused to adopt an absolute rule that a tenant's temporary undertaking would defeat a landlord's reasonable requirement. The Court observed there is no statutory time-limit for completion of reconstruction (S.15 only speaks of the time within which re-building would be started), and practical uncertainties (variable time required, difficulties in giving effect to offers) made the tenants' proposals impracticable and not conclusive against eviction.
- On the third argument (necessity of showing extended public accommodation under the Explanation to proviso (h) of S.12(1)): The Court analyzed the statutory language "the court shall have regard to" and concluded this phrase requires the Court to take the matter into consideration but does not make extended public accommodation an absolutely imperative or determinative condition for establishing reasonable requirement. The Court expressly disagreed with an interpretation that would render the Explanation an indispensable test (a position attributed to Chunder, J.'s decision in AIR 1954 Cal 80 (A)). The Court supported its non-imperative reading by reference to authorities (Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi; Province of Bengal v. Pran Kissen Law and Co.) and practical policy considerations: an absolute rule would produce absurd results (for example, preventing a landlord from seeking eviction to prevent a dilapidated building from falling down unless extended public accommodation were proved).
- On the special point regarding S.A No. 1154 (Kishori Lal Kailash Chand Jain): The Court examined the sanctioned plan (Ex. 1(a)) and the location of the tenant's premises and found that, given the plan, the tenant's portion lay such that his removal would not be necessary for the proposed work. The Court, on the materials before it, accepted this factual position and allowed that particular appeal rather than remanding.
- Remedies and temporal directions: For the three other second appeals (S.A Nos. 1153, 1155 and 1156 of 1954), the Court affirmed the decrees for ejectment passed by the lower Courts but granted each tenant time to vacate until the end of November 1955. The Court ordered no costs in any of the cases.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- S.A No. 1154 of 1954 (Kishori Lal Kailash Chand Jain) — Allowed: the judgments and decrees of the Courts below in this case are set aside and the plaintiff's suit (Suit No. 746 of 1952) is dismissed as to this tenant.
- S.A Nos. 1153, 1155 and 1156 of 1954 — Dismissed: the decrees for ejectment passed by the two Courts below in these cases are affirmed, subject to the tenants being given time to vacate the disputed premises until the end of November, 1955.
- No order as to costs in any of the cases, either in this Court or in the Courts below.
- Leave to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is granted to the appellants in S.A Nos. 1153, 1155 and 1156 of 1954 and to the respondent in S.A No. 1154 of 1954.
Immediate effects on the parties:
- The landlady succeeds in three of the four second appeals before this Court and obtains affirmed ejectment decrees subject to the vacating timeline provided.
- The tenant in S.A No. 1154 is relieved from eviction in this suit by dismissal of the landlady's claim against him.
- No party was awarded costs at any level in these matters.
Broader legal implication stated by the Court (as recorded in the opinion): the Court rejected an interpretation that the Explanation to proviso (h) of Section 12(1) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 imposes an absolute, imperative requirement of extended public accommodation for every claim of reasonable requirement to succeed. The phrase "the court shall have regard to" was held to require consideration of extended public accommodation but not to make its presence an automatic determinant of the outcome. The Court expressly recorded a respectful dissent from any contrary absolute reading attributed to an earlier decision (AIR 1954 Cal 80 (A)).
Order: As concluded in the text, S.A No. 1154 of 1954 is allowed; S.A Nos. 1153, 1155 and 1156 of 1954 are dismissed with time allowed to vacate to the end of November 1955; no costs; leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is granted as set out above.
1. Twelve ejectment suits, instituted by the plaintiff Sm. Radha Debi against her tenants in occupation of different portions of her premises No. 31, Mallick Street, Calcutta, were decreed by the trial Court (Third Bench, Court of Small Causes, Calcutta) on 8-3-1954. Eight of the tenants went up on appeal to the Special Bench. The appeals failed on 5-8-1954, and four tenants have now come up in second appeal to this Court.
2. The suits were brought long after the coming into operation of the Rent Control Act of 1950 and they are admittedly governed by that Act. The ground of ejectment, so far as rent control law is concerned, in the four cases which have now come up to this Court, was the plaintiff's reasonable requirement of the suit premises for building and re-building.
3. Premises No. 31, Mallick Street, Calcutta, comprises a fairly big four-storeyed building on about 3 to 3 1/2 cottahs of land. It is about 70 or 80 years old. The immediate requirement, as it appears from the evidence of the plaintiff's engineer witness (P.W 1), — and this is not so much denied by the defendant's engineer (D.W 13), — is the replacement of about the whole of the interior, specially round the courtyard, that is, its demolition and steel-framing. The other wall of the building on the road side requires only some minor repairs. The plaintiff has got a plan sanctioned by the Calcutta Corporation which is Ex. 1(a). The plaintiff has also proved sufficiently to the satisfaction of the Court that she has the means to build and intends to build honestly and bona fide. The Courts below have also found that the reconstruction or re-building will be for public benefit and they have also accepted more or less in express terms the plaintiff's case of extended public accommodation.
4. On the above findings, the suits have been decreed by the two Courts below and, in the four second appeals before me, the learned Junior Standing Counsel, who with Mr. Bejoy Bhose, Advocate, appeared for the different tenants appellants, submitted first that no case of re-building, necessitating or involving removal of the tenants, has been made out by the plaintiff.
5. In the second place, he submitted that, even at the highest, the necessity of shifting, so far as a particular tenant is concerned, would be for a short period, as, according to the evidence, adduced by the plaintiff herself, the time the entire proposed reconstruction would take would be about four to six months and, as the tenants were agreeable and ready to undertake that they would shift to the extent necessary for the respective temporary periods unconditionally, the landlady would have no reasonable ground for evicting them. Mr. Sen's third argument was that no case within the relevant mandatory Explanation to proviso (h) of Section 12(1) of the Rent Control Act of 1950, namely, of public advantage of extended accommodation, has been made out and, accordingly, the imperative test under the said proviso the plaintiff has not been able to satisfy in these cases and he relied particularly, in this connection, upon the decision of Chunder, J. in the case of ‘T.D Nandi v. Manot and Co. Ltd.’, AIR 1954 Cal 80 (A).
6. In S.A ‘No. 1154 of 1954’, in which Kishori Lal Kailash Chand Jain was the tenant, Mr. Sen made a further and special submission that the portion of the building, occupied by him, practically stood between the roadside outer wall (which, as already stated, requires only some minor repairs) and the public road and, accordingly, he would not be affected by the replacement or demolition of the interior and no necessity for his removal so as to make out a case of requirement for building and rebuilding within the meaning of S. 12(1) proviso (h) has been established at least in his case. I shall examine these arguments in the order in which they have been set out above.
7. On the first point, the matter is really concluded against the appellants by the evidence on record. The evidence of the two engineers (P.W 1 and D.W 13), read as a whole, leaves no room for doubt as to the necessity of replacing practically all the walls of the different rooms except the outer roadside wall in all the different cases barring the tenement of Kishorilal Kailash Chand Jain (S.A No. 1154 of 1954).
8. Admittedly, also, this would mean the removal of the particular tenant or tenants when the work of reconstruction proceeds in a particular room or rooms. The two engineers practically agree on this point, — and I may note here that the length of none of the disputed premises (rooms) exceeds 12 ft. as given by the learned advocates, — except that, according to the defence (D.W 13) the work may be carried on piecemeal thus obviating the necessity of removal of all the tenants at one and_ the same time. P.W 1 I.A Parks, however, holds a different view. In the above premises, I am not disposed to accept Mr. Sen's first argument.
9. The second point raises a novel and interesting question. Stress is laid by Mr. Sen on the tenants' offer and proposed undertaking. In this form, the cases were not presented in the two Courts below, but, giving the matter my best consideration, I have been unable to accept Mr. Sen's submission. Upon earlier finding, a case of re-building has been made out by the landlady and I accept P.B Mookerjee, J. practical test for the purpose as laid down in ‘Ramesh Ch. Bhattacharjee, & Another…Pltfs; v. Nagendra N. Mullick…Deft.’, AIR 1951 Cal 435 (B).
10. I am, however, unwilling to lay down any absolute general proposition in this behalf. The matter would largely depend upon the circumstances of a particular case and, in extreme cases, the difference between repairs and re-building may eventually turn out to be one of degrees, the ultimate conclusion depending upon the Court's judicial approach to the particular problem.
11. The question now is whether the tenants' offer of undertaking alters the position and materially affects the reasonableness of the landlady's requirement for building and re-building purposes. At one stage, I was inclined to find in favour of the tenants appellants, but, on further consideration, I have reached a different conclusion. I do not think that the tenants' offers, as set out above, would be, strictly speaking, very relevant or of much consequence and I do not find them practicable either to give effect to them.
12. There is no time-limit in the statute (S. 15 only speaks of the time within which re-building would be started), — and there should be none, — within which the landlord should be compelled to complete the work of reconstruction. This time factor would depend on so many elements, so variable and uncertain in their nature, that it would be hardly proper to lay down any limit to the same and the resulting uncertainty would militate against the advisability of accepting the tenants' offer.
13. The Rent Control Act of 1950 again speaks of the landlord's reasonable requirement of the premises for building and re-building. This no doubt gives a wider discretion to the Court than under the earlier enactment of 1948 where the expression was “bona fide requirement” which was held by this Court to be more or less subjective on the part of the landlord (Vide, Bhulan Singh v. Ganendra Kumar’, AIR 1950 Cal 74 (C), but I do not think that the tenants' offer, as noted above, would necessarily involve rejection of the landlord's claim of eviction.
14. The utmost that can be said is that this offer would have to be considered by the Court along with other circumstances to judge the reasonableness of the landlord's requirement. Considering the matter in the above light, I do not think that the tenant's offer in any of the instant cases effectively repels or destroys the landlady's plea of reasonable requirement. I, accordingly, reject the appellants' second argument too.
15. The appellants' third point entirely rests on the decision of Chunder, J. in ‘AIR 1954 Cal. 80 (A)’. The trial Judge no doubt finds, in effect, that there would be extended public accommodation of a substantial nature, ‘But the learned Appellate Bench has pointed out, — and I think quite rightly, — that “the additional space that will be available to the public as a result of reconstruction of the building will not be very extensive.”
16. Even then, however, I do think that a case of reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding has been made out by the landlady. The statutory Explanation does not, in my opinion, lay down any imperative test in the sense that, without extended public accommodation, no case of reasonable requirement or the premises for building and re-building can be made out under the Act.
17. If that was the intention and effect of the decision cited, I must respectfully dissent from it as, in my view, the question of extended or diminished public accommodation, though undoubtedly relevant, in view of the Explanation, in the consideration of a case of reasonable requirement for building and re-building, is not of so essential a character that the presence or absence of the one or the other would necessarily affect and, indeed, absolutely control the final conclusion.
18. It may be pointed out here that Chunder, J. also could not, — and, indeed, he did not, — stick, to the absolute statement of the law, made in. ‘AIR 1954 Cal. 80 (A)’, (Vide his subsequent decision ‘in S.A No. 39 of 1954, D/- 24-8-1954 (Cal) (D)’, and, although, so far as the present point is concerned, he practically reaffirmed the decision in ‘AIR 1954 Cal. 80 (A)’, it seems to me that his earlier view in ‘S.A Nos. 316’ and ‘317 of 1952 (Cal) (E))’, though given under the 1948.’ Act, is more in accord even with the present, statute.
19. The Act uses the phrase “the court shall, have regard to” which should not, in my opinion, be taken to mean or imply anything more than, this that “the Court shall take into consideration”, thus emphasising the relevancy and appropriateness of such consideration and recommending it to the Court and drawing its attention thereto with some sort of statutory injunction, but not making this element absolutely essential or imperative in the sense that the presence or absence of it would necessarily involve a change in the ultimate situation.
20. I am supported in this view by the observations of the Judicial Committee in the case of ‘Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi’, AIR 1943 PC 164 at pp. 180-181 (F) and-of this Court in the case of the ‘Province of Bengal v. Pran Kissen Law and Co.’, AIR 1950 Cal 498 at p. 500(G) and I would not put any more-absolute or imperative interpretation on those words. The other view would not be reasonable as that would mean that, even when a dilapidated building would be falling down, the landlord’ would not be entitled to ask for eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement for building and re-building unless he has the means to-reconstruct with extended public accommodation.
21. He has, therefore, to play the role of a powerless and silent spectator who will be witnessing the falling down of his premises bit by bit before his very eyes or to take up unremunerative and disproportionate repair works which may ultimately prove useless. I do not think that S. 38 of the Act compels the landlord to undertake such repairs and he cannot also be reasonably expected to undertake them to his own prejudice (Vide ‘Soorajmall Nagarmall v. Indian National. Drug Co., Ltd.’, 59 Cal. W.N 1023 (H); see also Chunder, J.'s observation in ‘S.A Nos. 316’ and ‘317 of 1952 (Cal) (E)’ above cited). The appellants' third point also must, therefore, fail.
22. On the last question which relates to S.A No. 1154 of 1954 alone, Mr. Sen appears to have a strong case. The plan (Ex. 1(a)) sufficiently proves his case on the point and, although it is true that this aspect of the matter was not specifically presented in the Courts below, in the circumstances of this case and on the materials before me, namely, the sanctioned plan (Ex. 1-a) of the landlady herself, I am inclined to accept it here rather than making a remand for this small matter.
23. The location of this tenants' premises appears to be clear and almost admitted, and, upon that location, it is almost beyond question that his removal or eviction would not be necessary for the building and re-building as proposed by the landlady. I, therefore, accept this appeal and dismiss the landlady's suit against this particular tenant.
24. In the result, therefore, S.A No. 1154 of 1954 is allowed, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below in this case are set aside and the plaintiff's suit (Suit No. 746 of 1952) is dismissed.
25. The other three second appeals viz., S.A Nos. 1153, 1155 and 1156 of 1954, are dismissed and the decrees for ejectment, passed by the two Courts below in these cases, are affirmed subject to this that the tenant appellant in each of these appeals is given time to vacate the disputed premises till the end of November, 1955.
26. There will be no order for costs in any of these cases either in this Court or in any of the two Courts below.
27. Leave to appeal under Cl. 15, Letters Patent is granted to the appellants in Second Appeals Nos. 1153, 1155 and 1156 of 1954 and to the respondent in Second Appeal No. 1154 of 1954.
D.S.P
28. Order accordingly.
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