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Krishna Mohan Samanta And Another Judgment-Debtors- v. Khandu Moyee Dasi Decree-Holder-.

Calcutta High Court
Jan 8, 1954
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from execution proceedings on a final mortgage decree. The preliminary decree was passed on 30-8-1939 and made final on 9-12-1939. Execution was first taken in 1941 (Title Execution Case No. 100 of 1941), which was dismissed on part satisfaction on 22-6-1943. On 19-7-1946 the decree-holder again applied for execution alleging limitation had been saved by a payment on 10-4-1944; that application was Title Execution Case No. 70 of 1946.

In the 1946 execution case notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) were served. The judgment-debtors did not appear on the first fixed date (6-1-1947); the court recorded an order directing the decree-holder to file complete requisites by 10-1-1947. On 10-1-1947 the court recorded that the decree-holder took no steps and was to show cause by 18-1-1947. On 18-1-1947 the execution case was dismissed for default against the decree-holder.

Thereafter, on 12-1-1950 a fresh execution case (the present execution) was filed. On notice under Order 21, Rule 22 the judgment-debtors appeared and filed objections under Section 47 of the CPC. Their principal objection was that the decree was time-barred because there had been no payment on 10-4-1944; they also contended that in the 1946 execution case there had been no service of the Order 21, Rule 22 notices. Both courts below overruled their objections and directed execution to proceed. The judgment-debtors have appealed against that concurrent decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree-holder's alleged payment on 10-4-1944 saved the decree from being time-barred for the purpose of execution.
  2. Whether notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the CPC were duly served in the second execution case (Title Execution Case No. 70 of 1946).
  3. Whether, having been served with notice and not having raised limitation then, the judgment-debtors are barred from raising the plea of limitation subsequently by reason of constructive res judicata (or estoppel) arising from a court order directing execution to proceed which attained finality.

Arguments of the Parties

Judgment-debtors' Arguments

  • The main objection was that the decree was barred by limitation and therefore execution should be refused.
  • They specifically pleaded that there was no payment on 10-4-1944 as alleged by the decree-holder; accordingly, the second execution (Title Execution Case No. 70 of 1946) was time-barred.
  • They also contended that in the second execution case there had been no valid service upon them of the notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the CPC.

Decree-holder's Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The decree-holder asserted that limitation had been saved by a payment made towards the decree on 10-4-1944.
  • In the second execution case the decree-holder relied on the notices under Order 21, Rule 22 and proceeded; the courts below found as a fact that notices were duly served.
  • The courts below also found as a fact that the alleged payment on 10-4-1944 was made by one of the judgment-debtors (Krishna Samanta) and that Krishna Mohan was the Karta of the joint family, facts relied upon to support the saving of limitation (though the appellate judge expresses doubt as to sufficiency of the evidence that the payment was made on behalf of the relevant persons or capacities).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri, 8 Ind App 123 (P.C.) Support for the proposition that if a judgment-debtor is served under Order 21, Rule 22 and the court orders execution to proceed, the plea of limitation must be raised then or is thereafter barred (constructive res judicata). The court cited this Judicial Committee decision as supporting the view that an order directing execution to proceed after notice, which becomes final, bars later pleas of limitation.
Raja of Ramnad v. Velusami Tewar, AIR 1921 P.C. 23 Authority for the proposition that it is not only competent but incumbent on a judgment-debtor to raise the limitation objection on receipt of an Order 21, Rule 22 notice if he proposes to rely upon it. The court relied on this authority (cite at p.24) to emphasize that failure to raise limitation upon that notice stage precludes later reliance on it once an order to execute attains finality.
Murlidhar Supal v. Narsingh Das, 17 Cal W.N. 113 Listed among decisions of the Court supporting the same approach regarding objection on notice and finality barring later pleas. Referred to as one of the supporting decisions of this Court for the general rule applied by the court in the present matter.
Aswini Kumar v. Keramat Ali, AIR 1948 Cal 165 Decision of this Court cited as supporting the view that limitation must be raised on the Order 21, Rule 22 notice or is thereafter barred. Placed among authorities that justify treating the failure to object on notice as barring later limitation pleas.
Sm. Akshoy Kuman Debi v. Nalini Ranjan Mukherjee, AIR 1950 Cal 493 Another decision of this Court cited for the same legal tendency on objections to execution after notice. Used as part of a group of authorities the court relied on to affirm the bar of constructive res judicata in the circumstances of this case.
Karali Prasad v. Probodh Chandra, AIR 1950 Cal 513 Contains contrary observations (at pp. 514-515) which the present court characterizes as mere obiter dicta and against the trend of other decisions. The court declined to follow the contrary observations in this case, treating them as obiter and not consistent with earlier trend; it explicitly refused to act upon those observations.
Chatterput Singh v. Daya Chand, AIR 1915 Cal 350 A case relied upon by a contrary judgment in Karali Prasad; the present court says it cannot be considered good law on the point (though its actual decision might be supported on narrow grounds). The court criticized its application in later decisions and held it not to be good law for the proposition relied upon by the contrary authority.
Jatindra Nath v. Uday Kumar, AIR 1931 P.C. 104 Referred to in relation to discussion of whether an order was still open to appeal (and therefore not final) in earlier cases addressing similar issues. The court noted that support for one narrow view of Chatterput Singh may be drawn from this decision but did not treat it as controlling here.
Bisseseur Mullick v. Maharaja, Dhiraj Mahtab Chund, 10 W.R. 8 (Full Bench) Full Bench case distinguished: there was merely service of notice after the decree was barred but no subsequent order was made; thus different from situations where an order directing execution was made and became final. The court cited the Judicial Committee's distinction of this Full Bench case as falling into the category where res judicata estoppel would not apply because no order was made after notice.
Umed Ali v. Abdul Karim, 8 Cal L.J. 193 An instance where bar of estoppel/res judicata was refused to be applied against a judgment-debtor under similar circumstances. The court noted this case as another illustration where estoppel was not applied, distinguishing factual or procedural differences from the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in several discrete analytical steps as reflected in the opinion:

  1. On the factual record the court accepted that the peon's returns (Ex. G and Ex. G(1)) read with the order-sheet (Ex. B) and the evidence of the serving peon clearly showed that notices under Order 21, Rule 22 had been duly served upon all the judgment-debtors in the second execution case.
  2. The court observed the order recorded on 6-1-1947 effectively constituted a finding that the decree was capable of execution and that execution could proceed provided the decree-holder took the necessary procedural steps (i.e., file processes and requisites). The judge treated that direction to the decree-holder as an order directing execution to proceed.
  3. The court found there was no appeal against the 6-1-1947 order and therefore it had attained finality in law. Having become final, that order operated to decide the question of limitation impliedly against the judgment-debtors.
  4. Applying the principles drawn from cited authorities, the court concluded that when a judgment-debtor, after being served under Order 21, Rule 22, fails to raise the limitation objection and the court orders execution to proceed and that order becomes final, the judgment-debtor is thereafter precluded by constructive res judicata from raising limitation in later proceedings. The court equated the practical effect of such a final order with actual res judicata: had the objection been taken and overruled and not challenged, the judgment-debtor could not later re-open it.
  5. The court noted that whether the alleged payment of 10-4-1944 was sufficient to save limitation was a close factual question. The lower courts had found that payment was made by Krishna Samanta and that Krishna Mohan was Karta of the joint family. The appellate judge expressed doubt whether a payment by Krishna Mohan, without expressly describing the capacity (Karta or shebait) would suffice and said there was little evidence to show the payment was made in that representative capacity; therefore the judge declined to rest the decision on the factual finding that the payment saved limitation.
  6. Nevertheless, the court held that the res judicata effect of the 6-1-1947 order rendered the limitation plea unavailable irrespective of the payment issue. The fact that the decree-holder later failed to prosecute and the execution was dismissed for default on 18-1-1947 was immaterial to the constructive res judicata analysis.
  7. The court articulated the legal test succinctly: if after service under Order 21, Rule 22 and after expiry of the time to show cause the court passes an order directing execution to proceed and that order becomes final, the plea of limitation does not survive. Conversely, if no such order was made or if it remained open to appeal (i.e., not final), the matter would remain open for challenge.
  8. The court reviewed and relied on authorities (both Judicial Committee and this Court) to support this approach, and it rejected contrary obiter remarks in Karali Prasad as inconsistent with the trend of binding authorities.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court affirmed the concurrent decisions of the courts below rejecting the judgment-debtors' objections under Section 47 of the CPC and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The execution is to proceed as directed by the courts below; the judgment-debtors are precluded from raising the limitation plea in the present execution because the earlier order dated 6-1-1947 (after service under Order 21, Rule 22) became final and impliedly decided the limitation point against them. The appeal is dismissed and costs are awarded against the appellants.
  • Broader implications: The opinion relies on existing authorities to apply the principle that failure to raise a limitation objection on an Order 21, Rule 22 notice followed by a final court order directing execution bars subsequent reliance on limitation by constructive res judicata. The opinion does not announce a novel legal principle beyond the cited authorities; it affirms and applies the precedents in the factual context described.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed." (Final order.)

Show all summary ...

1. This is the judgment-debtors' appeal arising out of proceedings in execution of a final mortgage decree. The preliminary decree in the mortgage suit was passed on 30-8-1939 and it was made final on 9-12-1939. It was first put into execution in 1941 in Title Execution Case No. 100 of that year. The said execution case was dismissed on part satisfaction on 22-6-1943. On 19-7-1946, the mortgagee decree-holder again applied for execution alleging that limitation had been saved by a payment made towards the decree on 10-4-1944. In that execution case (Title Execution Case No. 70 of 1946) notices were served upon the judgment-debtors under Or. 21, R. 22 of the CPC but none of them appeared in pursuance of the notices on the date fixed, viz., 6-1-1947. On this last mentioned date the court recorded an order to the following effect;

“Notice under O. 21, R. 22 of the CPC served. The judgment-debtors do not appear, process fee filed but written process not filed. To 10-1-47 for filing complete requisites.”

2. The next order was recorded on 10-1-1947 in these terms:

“Decree-holder takes no steps. He do show cause for not taking step by 18-1-47.”

3. And on this last mentioned date the execution case was dismissed for default by the following order:

“Decree-holder did not take step though sufficient time had already been allowed to him. Ordered that the execution case be dismissed for default.”

4. Thereafter on 12-1-1950, the present execution case was filed and on receipt of notice under O. 21, R. 22 of the CPC the judgment-debtors appeared and filed objections under S. 47 of the Code. The main objection taken to the execution of the decree was on the ground of limitation. It was pleaded by the judgment-debtors that there was no payment as alleged by the decree-holder on 10-4-1944 and that therefore, the second execution case (Title Execution Case No. 70 of 1946) was time-barred. Accordingly, the judgment-debtors contended that the present execution must be dismissed on the ground of limitation. In connection with this question of limitation, it was also contended by the judgment-debtors that in the second execution case there was no service upon them of the notices under O. 21, R. 22 of the Code. Both the courts below have overruled the judgment-debtors' objections and have directed the execution to proceed. Against this concurrent decision, the present appeal has been filed by the judgment-debtors. On the question of the payment, alleged to have been made on 10-4-1944, the courts below have found it as a fact that such payment was made by one of the judgment-debtors Krishna Samanta. The courts below have further found that Krishna Mohan was the ‘Karta’ of the joint family of which the other judgment-debtors were members. But it appears that the judgment-debtors also included a deity of which the other judgment-debtors were shebaits. It is at least open to doubt whether the payment made by Krishna Mohan Samanta without describing himself as the Karta or as the shebait of the Deity or as purporting to act on behalf of all the members of the joint family or on behalf of all the shebaits of the Deity can be taken as a sufficient payment for the purpose of saving limitation. There is also very little evidence that Krishna Mohan made the payments as ‘Karta’ or as Shebait of the deity. I am, therefore, not prepared to proceed in this case on the finding of the two courts below that the alleged payment of 10-4-1944 would be sufficient to save the second execution from being time-barred.

5. That, however, is of no material assistance to the judgment-debtors in the present case as, in my opinion, the plea of limitation, so far as the second execution case is concerned, and necessarily, therefore, so far as the present execution case goes, is barred by constructive res judicata. I am in entire agreement with the findings of the two courts below that under O. 21, R. 22 notices were duly served upon the judgment-debtors in the second execution case. The peon's returns, Ex. G and Ex. G(1), read with the order-sheet Ex. B, and the evidence of the serving peon, clearly show that the said notices were duly served upon all the judgment) debtors. It is also clear from the orders which I have quoted above that the judgment-debtors did not appear to object to the execution case although they duly received the notices under O. 21, R. 22 of the Code.

6. It further appears from the order recorded on 6-1-1947 that the court ordered execution to proceed and directed the decree-holder to take necessary steps in the matter. The order of that date can be construed only as a finding that the decree was capable of execution and such execution could be obtained provided only the decree-holder took, necessary steps by filing appropriate processes and other requisites. It appears also that there was no appeal from that order and it has consequently become final. That being so, the question of limitation must be held to have been impliedly decided once for all against the judgment-debtors and must be held to be barred by constructive res judicata in favour of the decree-holder by reason, of the said order dated 6-1-1947. The fact that the decree-holder did not take further steps in the matter and that in consequence the execution, case was dismissed for default. On 18-1-1947, is, in my opinion, immaterial so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned.

7. I must, accordingly, hold that no question of limitation can now be raised as regards the second execution case and, necessarily, therefore, no such question can also be raised, in the circumstances of the present case, in regard to the present execution.

8. The view I am taking above is well supported by the decisions of the Judicial Committee in the cases of — ‘Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri’, 8 Ind App 123 (PC) (A) and — ‘Raja of Ramnad v. Velusami Tewar’, AIR 1921 P.C 23 (B); and the decisions of this Court in the cases of — ‘Murlidhar Supal v. Narsingh Das’, 17 Cal W.N 113 (C); — ‘Aswini Kumar v. Keramat Ali’, AIR 1948 Cal 165 (D) and — ‘Sm. Akshoy Kuman Debi v. Nalini Ranjan Mukherjee’, AIR 1950 Cal 493 (E), to cite only a few of the relevant authorities. The contrary observations in the case of — ‘Karali Prasad v. Probodh Chandra’, AIR 1950 Cal 513 (P) appearing at pp. 514-515 of this latter volume were mere obiter dicta and, in any event, they were against the trend of decisions in this Court and the decisions of the Judicial Committee, to which reference has been made above. I cannot, therefore, agree with the said observations or act upon the same.

9. For similar reasons the case in — ‘Chatterput Singh v. Daya Chand’, AIR 1915 Cal 350 (G), on which Banerjee, J. relied at pp. 514-515 of ‘AIR 1950 Cal 513 (F)’, cannot be considered to be good law on this point, although its actual decision may somehow be supported, on the authority of the decision of this Court, — not itself altogether free from doubt, — reported in — ‘Jatindra Nath v. Uday Kumar’, AIR 1931 P.C 104 (H); upon the view that possibly in that case — AIR 1915 Cal 350 (G), the relevant order, dated 6-5-1909, was still open to appeal and had not, therefore, become final when the plea of limitation was subsequently raised by the judgment-debtor.

10. The notice under O. 21, R. 22 of the CPC requires the judgment-debtor “to show cause” “why the decree should not be executed against him”. If, therefore, the decree is time-barred and if on that ground its execution ought to be refused such objection ought, in the fitness of things, to be taken by the judgment-debtor upon receipt of the above notice and in pursuance of it and there can be no question also as to the propriety of such objection at that stage and, if available, it may quite properly and legitimately be taken then. Indeed, it appears clear that it is “not only competent” for the judgment-debtor to take such objection at that stage but it is also “incumbent” upon him “to do so” if he “proposed to rely on it” vide — ‘AIR 1921 P.C 23 at P. 24 (B)’.

11. It is thus quite obvious that if the judgment-debtor fails to raise the objection in spite of service upon him of the notice under O. 21, R. 22 of the Code and the Court orders the execution to proceed, — and a direction upon the decree-holder to take further steps in the matter or to do something in aid of execution is nothing else, — and that order attains finality in law, the objection on the ground of limitation becomes barred by constructive res judicata just as if such objection is taken and overruled and that decision is not challenged by appropriate proceedings the rule of actual res judicata precludes the judgment-debtor from raising the question of limitation over again.

12. The real test is whether, after service of the notice under O. 21, R. 22 of the Code and expiry of the date or time for showing cause against the execution of the decree, the Court has passed an order directing in effect the execution to proceed. If such an order has been passed and it has attained finality in law the plea of limitation no longer survives. If, however, there is no such order, or possibly also, — and that at least is necessary, — if the order has not become final vide — ‘AIR 1931 P.C 104 (H)’, already cited, the matter remains at large. The Full Bench case of this Court in — ‘Bisseseur Mullick v. Maharaja, Dhiraj Mahtab Chund’, 10 W.R 8 (F.B) (I), falls within the first branch of this latter category. It was so held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in — ‘8 Ind App 123 at P. 131 (P.C) (A) of the Report where they distinguished the Full Bench Case by their observations to the following: effect:

“That case however is very different from the present. There was merely the service of a notice upon the judgment-debtor after the decree was barred; but no order was made.”

13. Similar, apparently, was the position in — ‘Umed Ali v. Abdul Karim’, 8 Cal L.J 193 (J), where also the bar of estoppel or res judicata was refused to-be applied against the judgment-debtor.

14. In the above view of the matter, I hold that the courts below were right in rejecting the judgment-debtor's objections under Section 47 of the CPC and their decision must be affirmed. I, accordingly, dismiss this appeal with costs.

B/D.R.R

15. Appeal dismissed.