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Union Of India v. Manmull Jain And Ors. Opposite Parties.

Calcutta High Court
Aug 11, 1954
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Union of India sought this Court's permission to prosecute three appeals instead of the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur of Chandernagore. On 2nd August 1951, the Percepteur issued “Commandments” to the respondents for payment of certain sums, leading the respondents to file “Oppositions” before the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge dismissed these oppositions, after which the respondents filed appeals to the District Judge, Chandernagore, who allowed the appeals on 16th June 1952.

Subsequently, on 9th September 1952, the Union of India filed three memoranda of appeal and applications for permission to continue the appeals. Before orders were passed on these applications, the appeals were listed for hearing under Order XLI, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court, unaware that the Union of India was not originally a party before the District Judge, ordered the second appeals to be heard. Later, the Registrar granted the applications allowing the Union of India to prosecute the appeals. However, these orders and the hearing order were vacated by the Court on 28th August 1953. The Union of India then renewed its applications, leading to the present Rules.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Union of India could prosecute the appeals in place of the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur of Chandernagore.
  2. Whether the treaty by which Chandernagore became part of India was legally valid without parliamentary legislation.
  3. The legal effect of the Regulation made by the President under Article 243 of the Constitution concerning the rights and obligations transferred from the Municipal Assembly of Chandernagore to the Union of India.
  4. Whether the Union of India had the right to prefer second appeals in its own name after the rights vested in it.

Arguments of the Parties

Union of India

  • Prayed for permission to prosecute the appeals in place of the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur of Chandernagore.
  • Asserted that rights in the subject matter of the appeals vested in the Union of India effective from 9th June 1952, based on a Regulation framed under Article 243 of the Constitution.

Opposite-Parties

  • Contended that the treaty by which Chandernagore was ceded to India lacked legal validity as Parliament had not legislated on the treaty.
  • Argued that consequently, the Regulation made under Article 243 had no legal force.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustam Khan (1941) L.R 68 I.A 109 Principle that acquisition of territory by a sovereign state is an act of State irrespective of mode of acquisition (conquest, cession, occupation). The Court applied this principle to hold that Chandernagore became Indian territory regardless of the treaty's parliamentary sanction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the nature of the treaty ceding Chandernagore from the French Republic to India and held that the treaty was a valid executive act made by the President under Article 53 of the Constitution. It rejected the contention that parliamentary legislation was necessary for the treaty's validity, clarifying that legislation may be required to implement treaty provisions but is not a condition precedent to the treaty's validity. The Court noted the treaty was published in the Gazette and ratified by the President of India, making it effective in law.

The Court further held that, following the treaty and the Regulation under Article 243, the territory of Chandernagore became part of India, and all rights and obligations of the Municipal Assembly vested in the Central Government. Since the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur acted as representatives of the Municipal Assembly in the litigation, after the vesting of rights, they became representatives of the Union of India. The Court reasoned that the Union of India had the right to prosecute the appeals in its own name, as the principal may step into litigation originally carried on by an agent.

Holding and Implications

The Court allowed the applications of the Union of India and permitted it to prosecute the appeals against the opposite parties in its own name.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Union of India is recognized as having the legal right to continue the litigation in place of the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur of Chandernagore following the vesting of rights under the treaty and Regulation. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing constitutional and legal principles concerning treaties, executive power, and transfer of rights in litigation.

Show all summary ...

Das Gupta, J.:— In these three applications, the Union of India prays for this Court's permission to prosecute three appeals in place of the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur of Chander-nagore. The Percepteur issued on the 2nd August, 1951, “Commandments” upon the respondents-opposite-parties for payment of certain sums of money who thereupon filed “Oppositions” calling upon the Percepteur to appear before the Subordinate Judge. Finally, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the three miscellaneous cases started on the three “oppositions”. The respondents-opposite-parties filed appeals against the decisions of the Subordinate Judge to the District Judge, Chandernagore, and on the 16th June, 1952, the appeals were allowed by the learned District Judge.

2. Against this three memoranda of appeals were filed on the 9th September, 1952, by the Union of India. The applications for permission to continue the appeals were filed on the same date. Before, however, any orders were passed on the applications, the appeals were placed for hearing under Order XLI, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, before a Bench of this, Court, and the Court unaware of the fact that the Union of India, which had preferred the appeals, was not a party to the appeals before the District Judge, ordered the second appeals to be heard. Sometime after this, the applications to prosecute the appeals in this Court came up for hearing before the Registrar and the Registrar passed orders granting the prayers.

3. The Registrar's orders granting the applications and the orders of the Bench ordering that the second appeals be heard were vacated by an order of this Court passed on the 28th August, 1953.

4. The applications which had been filed by the Union of India for prosecuting the appeals in this Court were thereafter moved in Court and the present Rules were issued.

5. The applicant bases its prayer on the allegation that the rights in the subject-matter of the appeals have become vested in the Union of India with effect from the 9th June, 1952. This allegation is founded on a Regulation framed by the President of India under Article 243 of the Constitution. On behalf of the opposite-parties it is said that the treaty by which Chandernagore is said to have become part of India is itself without legal validity, as the Parliament has not legislated on the treaty by which Chandernagore was ceded to India, and consequently, the Regulation has no legal validity.

6. Chandernagore was formerly under the sovereignty of the French Re- public. The French Republic, admittedly, claims no longer any sovereignty over the territory. The Government of the Republic has proclaimed that it has ceded the territory in full sovereignty to India. The treaty containing this proclamation was published in an extraordinary issue of the Gazette of India Oil the 19th August, 1952.

7. Even if it were assumed that this treaty was not legally valid without parliamentary legislation, the transfer of the territory to India remains an accomplished fact, which is accepted as such by both the interested parties, namely, the French Republic and the Union of India.

8. Consequently, it would be territory comprised within the territory of India, whether or not the treaty was legally valid. It is well to remember in this connection the prniciple laid down in the case of Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustam Khan (1) [(1941) L.R 68 I.A 109] that when a territory is acquired by a sovereign State for the first time, it is an act of State; it matters not how it was acquired; it may be by conquest, it may be by cession following a treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hitherto occupied by a recognised ruler—in all cases the result is the same.

9. There is absolutely no reason, however, in my opinion, for thinking that the treaty was not legally valid. Mr. Banerjee's contention that without parliamentary legislation making the treaty an Act of Parliament, the treaty cannot have any legal force or validity, is based, in my judgment, on a misconception of the nature of a treaty. Making a treaty is an executive act and not a legislative act. Legislation may be and is often required to give effect to the terms of a treaty. Thus if a treaty, say, provides for payment of a sum of money to a foreign power, legislation may be necessary before the money can be spent; but the treaty is complete without the legislation. Mr. Banerjee has drawn our attention to item 14 of the Union List which runs in these terms:—

“Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries.”

10. Undoubtedly, this provides for all legislation in connection with entering into treaties. This cannot, however, in my opinion, justify the conclusion that the makers of the Constitution intended that no treaty should be entered into unless the Parliament has legislated on the matter. The power of legislation on this matter of entering into treaties leaves untouched the executive power of entering into treaties: I can see no justification in principle or authority for the view that making a treaty requires legislation for its validity. The President makes a treaty in exercise of his executive power and no Court of Law in India, can question its validity.

11. My conclusion is that when the President, in whom Article 53 of the Constitution vests all the executives power of the Union, has entered into a treaty, the Municipal Courts cannot question the validity of the treaty. We find from the Notification No. S.R.O 1466, dated 19th August, 1952, which was published in the Extraordinary Issue of the “Gazette of India” on the 19th August, 1952, that a treaty of cession of the territory of the free town of Chandernagore was signed in Paris on the 2nd day of February, 1951, by the representative of the President of India and the President of the French Republic, which treaty, in Article 1, provided that France transfers to India, in full sovereignty, the territory of the Free Town of Chandernagore. We find further from this Notification that on the 30th day of May, 1952, the President of India having considered the treaty confirmed and ratified the same and undertook faithfully to perform and carry out all the stipulations therein contained. The Treaty became effective in law after exchange.

12. I hold that thereafter, the territory of Chandernagore became comprised within the territory of India within the meaning of Article 243 of the Constitution. The Regulation that was made by the President was, therefore, validly made and it has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament applying to such territory. Section 7 of the Regulation runs as follows:—

Rights and obligations.

13. All rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of the French Republic or the Municipal Assembly or the Administrative Council in relation to Chandernagore shall, as from the appointed day, be the rights, liabilities and obligation of the Central Government:

Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the settlement of any financial issue between the Government of India and the French Republic arising out of the transfer of the free town of Chandernagore.”

14. If, therefore, the Municipal Assembly had the right of litigation in respect of any matter immediately preceding the 9th day of June, 1952, the appointed day in the Regulation, that right became the right of the Central Government of the Union of India.

15. The question arises if there was any right in regard to the present litigation in the Municipal Assembly immediately before the 9th June, 1952. For an answer to this question we have to consider the nature and subject-matter of the litigation.

16. The opposite-parties are dealers of motor spirits in the town of Chandernagore and had petrol pumps from which petrol was sold to the consumers. The Municipal Assembly of Chandernagore passed a resolution on the 18th November, 1949, imposing a duty of 1 anna P pies per gallon upon the consumption of petrol and provided for the collection of the duty from petrol dealers upon the basis of their sales of petrol. By a resolution of the 28th December, 1950, the Municipal Assembly in revision of its former resolution raised the duty on the consumption of petrol from 1 anna 6 pies to 4 annas per gallon with effect from 1st January, 1951. Thereafter the Percepteur or Municipal Reserveur of Chandernagore issued “commandments” against these opposite-parties for collection of this duty. On this, the opposite-parties filed “oppositions” in respect of each of the “commandments” questioning the legalitv and validity of the “commandments” for realisation of petrol consumption duty from them. The “oppositions” were rejected, and the question which the learned District Judge had to consider in the appeals was whether the “oppositions” had been rightly rejected.

17. It seems to me abundantly clear from these facts that the persons who started the present litigation brought their action to get relief against certain impositions by the Municipal Assembly. They did not make the Municipal Assembly a party to the action but made the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur of Chandernagore a party instead.

18. When they lost in the first Court and preferred appeals to the District Judge's Court the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur was again made the respondent. It is as plain as day, however, that the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur was made party only as representing the Municipal Assembly and not in his personal capacity.

19. The Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur was there only representing the Municipal Assembly. The right of litigation in the trial Court as also the appellate Court was in the Municipal Assembly, but it was being exercised by the Assembly through the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur. When, therefore, on the 9th June, 1952, all rights of the Municipal Assembly became the rights of the Central Government of the Union of India, the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur became henceforth the representative of the Central Government of India for the purpose of this litigation.

20. The appeals were allowed and the question now is whether the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur alone can prefer appeals to this Court against the decision of the Appellate Court, the District Judge of Chandernagore. I can see no reason for such conclusion. Where litigation is being carried on by any person in the name of an agent, the agent can certainly continue td carry till the last stage of litigation, But there appears to be nothing in authority or principle to justify the view that the principal cannot step in to carry on the litigation in his own name.

21. In my opinion, it is, in such a case, open to the principal to carry on the litigation in his own name.

22. Consequently, the Union of India, which was being represented by the Percepteur and Municipal Reserveur at the time the appeals were allowed, had the right to prefer second appeals against the appellate decree in its own name.

23. I would, therefore, make these Rules absolute, allow the applications of the Union of India and permit them to present the appeals against the opposite-parties.

24. There will be no order as to costs,

Debabrata Mookerjee, J.:— I agree.

A.K.D.G