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Kanai Lal Chatterjee v. Union Of India And Ors.
Legal Opinion Summary — Sinha, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was a clerk in the Money Order Department of the General Post Office, Calcutta. On or about 26 February 1949 complaints were received alleging non-payment of several money orders (including one for Rs. 300 remitted by Mr. Menon dated 11 February 1949). An enquiry disclosed that a whole page of money order receipts was missing (presumably containing entries for these sums). Identifications were attempted: Menon identified the counter and pointed to the petitioner; other remitters identified the counter but it is unclear whether they identified the petitioner.
The petitioner said he worked at the third “Batch Counter” which, he stated, accepted only cheques and where the missing money orders could not have been paid; he said he merely assisted Tulsi Charan Chatterjee at the second counter. Respondents asserted that in busy times all counters accepted cash.
The police were informed and the petitioner was arrested on 6 May 1949 under section 409 IPC and section 52 of the Post Office Act. He was suspended on 7 May 1949. The criminal proceedings resulted in a discharge by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, on 31 August 1949. On 4 November 1949 the suspension was revoked and the petitioner rejoined service (the opinion notes “reinstatement” is a misnomer since he had not been dismissed).
On 6 March 1950 a departmental charge-sheet alleged unauthorised possession/use of money order receipts Nos. 1081–1085 and non-accountal of money collected; the petitioner was called upon to show cause and (he says) to be heard in person. He was present at the enquiry. The enquiring officer relied on a statement of Tulsi Charan Chatterjee (the second counter clerk) and on police reports. Chatterjee had not been called as a witness at the departmental enquiry; at least one police report relied upon was not shown to the petitioner or its existence communicated to him.
An order of dismissal was passed on 16 August 1950. The petitioner appealed; the appellate authority confirmed the dismissal in April 1953. The petitioner filed the present Rule (dated 13 July 1953) seeking mandamus and certiorari to prevent giving effect to the dismissal and to quash the dismissal and the appellate order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Regulation 149A of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual (Volume II) or the respondent's actions prevented departmental proceedings after the criminal discharge and apparent re‑joining of service (i.e., whether reinstatement amounted to condonation of misconduct).
- Whether the departmental enquiry complied with Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and the requirements of natural justice (in particular whether the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to inspect and meet the evidence relied upon, and to cross‑examine witnesses whose statements were used against him).
- Whether reliance upon statements and police reports that were not produced at the departmental enquiry (and, in at least one instance, not communicated to the petitioner) rendered the disciplinary findings unsupportable.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner contended that he was stationed at the third “Batch Counter” which only accepted cheques and thus could not have delivered the missing money orders; his role was to assist Tulsi Charan Chatterjee on the second counter.
- He argued that Regulation 149A or the fact of his rejoining service (described as “reinstatement”) amounted to condonation, preventing subsequent departmental punishment — relying on authorities supporting the condonation principle.
- He asserted procedural unfairness: statements of witnesses (notably Tulsi Charan Chatterjee) and police reports were relied upon without being produced at the departmental enquiry; he had no opportunity to cross‑examine those witnesses or to see or meet certain police reports.
- He sought an opportunity to be heard in person and to meet the material relied upon against him.
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondents contended that the third counter accepted cash in times of rush, which would explain how payments could have been received there.
- They asserted that no request for a personal hearing had been (formally) received from the petitioner, although the record also shows the authorities in fact granted him an opportunity to be heard and he attended the enquiry.
- Respondents relied on the identifying material (including statements and police reports) to support the departmental findings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| L.W. Middleton v. Harry Play-fair (A.I.R. 1925 Calcutta 87) | Principle that reinstatement or condonation can preclude subsequent disciplinary punishment (condonation principle). | The court acknowledged the principle but held it inapplicable on these facts: the word “reinstatement” was a misnomer (the petitioner had been suspended, not dismissed) and allowing him to rejoin service after discharge by the criminal court did not amount to condonation of misconduct. |
| District Council, Amraoti v. Vithal Vinayak Bapat (A.I.R. 1941 Nag. 125) | Principle concerning condonation/reinstatement and consequent bar to disciplinary action. | The court noted the authority for the condonation principle but concluded it did not apply to the present facts for the same reasons described with reference to Middleton. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two parts: first addressing the contention about Regulation 149A and reinstatement/condonation; second addressing procedural fairness under Rule 55 and the rules of natural justice.
On Regulation 149A the judge observed that the Manual (including Regulation 149A) appeared to be departmental instructions without clear statutory authority, and in any event the regulation did not prevent departmental proceedings simply because the criminal proceedings had ended in discharge.
Regarding the condonation argument, the court accepted the general legal principle (as laid down in the cited cases) that condonation upon reinstatement may bar later punishment. However, the court distinguished the present facts: the petitioner had been suspended due to arrest and, upon release, the proper administrative act was revocation of suspension and allowing him to rejoin service. That administrative step did not amount to condoning the alleged misconduct and did not preclude a subsequent disciplinary enquiry.
On the crucial procedural point the court relied on Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (quoted at length in the opinion). The court identified several mandatory protections in the rule: communication of definite charges with supporting allegations; reasonable time for a written defence and a statement whether an oral hearing is desired; holding oral inquiry if desired; oral evidence should be heard at the inquiry and the person charged should be entitled to cross‑examine witnesses, give evidence in person and call witnesses; documents relied upon should be made available for inspection; the inquiry proceedings must record evidence and findings with reasons.
Applying these requirements the court found multiple breaches: the enquiring officer relied on oral statements (not taken at the departmental enquiry and in some cases made in the absence of the petitioner) and on police reports which were not made available to the petitioner (and at least one of which he did not even know existed). Tulsi Charan Chatterjee's statement, which was influential, was not produced in the departmental enquiry and Chatterjee was not called for cross‑examination. The petitioner had no opportunity to meet that evidence.
The court emphasised that while departmental enquiries need not follow the strict technicalities of a judicial trial (e.g., the Evidence Act), they must observe fundamental rules of natural justice. A person cannot be found guilty on evidence he had no chance to challenge. Where Rule 55 applies, oral evidence to be used must be adduced at the inquiry and documents relied upon must be shown to the delinquent and made available for inspection.
Because the enquiry used material that the petitioner had no realistic opportunity to inspect or rebut, the court concluded that the departmental proceedings violated Rule 55 and the rules of natural justice and therefore could not be sustained. The judge declined to rule on the substantive merits of the charges themselves, limiting review to procedural safeguards guaranteed by Article 311 and the statutory rules.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The Rule was made absolute. The court issued a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the order of dismissal dated 16 August 1950 and the appellate order confirming it (13/15 April 1953). The court also issued a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the departmental findings. The respondents were directed to give the petitioner another opportunity to show cause against the charges and the punishment proposed; the respondents remain free to abandon the charges if they so choose.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the dismissal and its confirmation were set aside, and the petitioner is to be given a fresh opportunity to be heard in accordance with Rule 55 and the requirements of natural justice.
- The court expressly limited its intervention to correction of procedural defects; it did not decide on the substantive guilt or innocence of the petitioner.
- No costs were ordered.
- The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond enforcing existing requirements of Rule 55 and the basic rules of natural justice; the court emphasised adherence to Article 311 and the statutory rules in departmental proceedings.
Signed: A.K.D.G. (as noted in the original opinion)
Sinha, J.:— The petitioner was working as a clerk attached to the Money Order Department, General Post Office, Calcutta. On or about the 26th of February, 1949, a complaint was received from one Mr, Menon of 8, Dalhousie Square, Calcutta, alleging that he had remitted a sum of Rs. 300 by Money Order Receipt No. 1084, dated the 11th of February, 1949, from the General Post Office, Calcutta, to the address of C. Raiu. C/o Raghaban Tailor, Chittur. Cochin State, but no such money order was remitted. Four more complaints of non-payment on the same day were received aggregating to more than Rs. 1000. Upon this complaint an enquiry was made and it was found that a whole page of receipts was missing a page which presumably contained entries in respect of these sums. The Postal Department of course had to meet the claims of the remitters. Mr. Menon wrote to say that he would be able to point out the counter and identify the official to whom the money was paid and it appears that there was an identification held and Mr. Menon pointed out the counter as also the petitioner as being the person to whom ho had handed over the money. The other persons whose monies had gone astray also attempted to identify and they certainly identified the counter, but it is not clear whether they or any of them identified the petitioner. The counter at which the petitioner was said to have been sitting was the third counter and one Tulsi Charan Chatterjee was in the second counter. According to the petitioner the third counter was what is called a “Batch Counter” and only cheques were received there. He says that his duty was merely to assist Tulsi Charan Chatterjee who was in the second counter and he says that the missing money orders could not have been delivered at the third counter where only cheques were accepted. As against this it is said thus although the third counter was ??? counter, In times of rush all the counters accept cash payments. The Postal authorities informed the local police and the petitioner was arrested on the 6th of May, 1949, on charges under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code and section 52 of the Post Office Act. On the 7th of May, 1949, the petitioner was suspended from office. The police, however, did not find sufficient evidence against the petitioner and on the 31st of August, 1949, the Chief Presidency Magistrate. Calcutta, discharged the accused. Then on the 4th of November, 1949, there was an order of reinstatement. It is obvious that the word ‘reinstatement’ has been improperly used because the petitioner had never been dismissed. The proper order would have teen to revoke the order of suspension. Be that as it may, what actually happened was that he rejoined service and was transferred to the Delivery Department. On or about the 6th of March, 1950, a charge-sheet was delivered to the petitioner charging him with unauthorised possession and use of money order receipts Nos. 1081-1085 and not bringing into account the money collected thereon. He was called upon to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. He was also called upon to state whether he wanted to be heard in person. According to the petitioner, he wanted to be heard in person. Although it is said on behalf of the respondents that no such request was received, it is admitted that the authorities granted him the facility of being heard in person and that he was actually present at the time of the enquiry. The petitioner duly showed cause against the charges and there was the hearing; and it appears that the charges were found against the petitioner. This will appear from the annexure ‘I’ to the petition, in which the Presidency Post Master, Calcutta, the enquiring officer, records his findings and calls upon the petitioner to show cause why the punishment of dismissal should not be inflicted. From this annexure it will also be found that the enquiring officer relied on a statement of the Counter Clerk Sri Tulsi Charan Chatterjee who is said to have been sitting on the second counter on the relevant date. This is what he said:
“This office records and the statement of the 2nd Batch Counter Clerk Shri Tu'shi Charan Chatterjee go to prove without any stretch of doubt that Shri Kanailal Chatterjee was the clerk who took his seat at the 3rd counter on the 11.2.49”
2. Tulshi Charan Chatterjee was not called as a witness at the departmental enquiry. He seems to have made some statements previous to the handing over of the case to the police and it certainly had not been made in the presence of the petitioner and there was no question of his having any opportunity of cross-examining Chatterjee. Nor does it appear from the record that the attention of the petitioner was drawn to the fact that such a statement will be used for the purposes of the departmental enquiry and would colour the verdict. The petitioner showed cause against this notice and on the 16th of August, 1950 an order of dismissal was passed. The petitioner thereafter Pled an appeal which was kept pending for a very long time and ultimately in April, 1953, the appellate authority confirmed the order of dismissal. It is quite clear from the Various annextires setting out the orders of the various authorities who dealt with the case that two police reports were also relied upon and were used as evidence against the petitioner. At least one of the police reports, it is admitted, was never shown to the petitioner nor his attention was drawn to the fact that such a report ever existed or what the contents of it were. The authorities have drawn, adverse inference from these Police reports without giving the petitioner an opportunity of meeting the same. This Rule was issued on the 13th of July, 1953, and calls upon the opposite parties to show cause why a writ in the nature of Mandamus should not be issued directing them to forbear from giving effect to the order of dismissal passed upon the petitioner complained of in the petition and/or why a writ in the nature of certiorari should not be issued quashing the said order of dismissal including the order of the appellate authority and why such further or other order or orders should not be made as to this Court may seem fit and proper.
3. The first point made on behalf of the petitioner is that there has been a violation of Regulation 149A in the; Posts and Telegraphs Manual, General Regulations, Volume II. I am not at all satisfied that these regulations have statutory authority. At least the preface seems to indicate that these are merely departmental instructions. In any event, I do not find anything in Regulation 149A which could prevent the authorities from proceeding with the departmental proceedings notwithstanding that the criminal case ended in a discharge It is argued that once there has been a reinstatement there has been a condonation and, therefore, the master cannot punish the servant after having condoned his misconduct. Reliance has been placed on the cases of L.W Middleton v. Harry Play-fair (1) (A.I.R 1925, Calcutta, 87) and District Council, Amraoti v. Vithal Vinayak Bapat (2) (A.I.R 1941 Nag. 125). While the principle enunciated in these cases is well-known, I do not think that it has any application to the facts of this case. As I have pointed out, the word ‘re-instatement’ is a misnomer. The petitioner had been suspended because of his arrest. Upon his ceasing to a in the custody of the police, his right was to have the suspension order dated. Simply because the Postal Department did what they should have done, namely, allowed him to rejoin service they cannot be taken to have condoned his misconduct, and I see nothing to prevent a subsequent departmental enquiry. But the second point, namely that the departmental enquiry had not been conducted as it should have been and that the petitioner has not had a reasonable opportunity of defending himself, is to my mind a point which has been made out. According to Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules certain formalities have been prescribed which must be followed in departmental proceedings and they are as follows:—
“…………The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the ease. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if the authority concerned so direct, an oral inquiry shall be held. At that inquiry oral evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called, as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof……………..”
4. So far as the framing of the charges is concerned there has been no violation of this Rule, but surely there has been a violation of nearly all the other rules laid down above. The enquiring officer relied on oral evidence which was not taken at the departmental enquiry and not even in connection therewith. The attention of the delinquent was not drawn to the fact that a statement made in some other proceedings will be considered as evidence against the petitioner or will be allowed to colour the mind of the enquiring officer. He was never given any opportunity of cross-examining such a witness. Then again, reports were relied upon which were not made available to the petitioner and so far as one of the police reports is concerned he was not even told of its existence. Nevertheless, the enquiring officer allowed his mind to be coloured by such a report which the petitioner had no opportunity of dealing with. It is true that departmental enquiries are not to be conducted with the strictness of a judicial trial, but they are never-the-less enquiries in which certain formalities must be observed. To start with, the rules of natural justice cannot be dispensed with and a man cannot be found guilty upon evidence which he had no opportunity of meeting. Where Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules applies, the oral evidence that has to be used must be adduced at the time of the enquiry. Where documents have to be used, it may not be necessary to prove them under the Evidence Act as in a judicial trial, but they must be made available to the delinquent and he must have an opportunity of inspecting them and meeting them. Documents which are kept back beyond his knowledge ought not to be used in order to find him guilty.
5. The persons holding departmental enquiries are not men with judicial training and it is not to be expected that they should proceed according to the Evidence Act. But it is not the violation of that excellent piece of legislation that is complained of, but what is complained of is the violation of the rules of natural justice in using documents and statements of witnesses which the petitioner had never had an opportunity of either seeing or challenging. In my opinion, the departmental proceedings here have violated the rules of natural justice and are in violation of Rule 55 of the C.S (C.C.A) Rules and cannot be supported. I say nothing about the merits of the case. The function of this Court is to see that the safeguards imposed by Article 311 and the Statutory rules are properly maintained.
6. This Rule must, therefore, be made absolute and a writ in the nature of Mandamus must issue directing the respondent to forbear from giving effect to the order of dismissal dated the 16th of August, 1950, or, the order in appeal confirming the same dated the 13th/15th April, 1953. The respondents are directed to give the petitioner another opportunity of showing cause against the charges that have been framed against him and the punishment which is sought to be imposed. There will also be a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing these findings. If the authorities wish to abandon the charges they will be at liberty to do so.
7. I make no order as to costs.
A.K.D.G
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