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Manindra Nath Das v. Ram Kinkar Kundu
Concise Analytical Summary of the Judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns a document described as a "kobala" dated 1-3-1945. The defendants denied execution of that document. The document was presented for registration by the plaintiff on 13-3-1945 but registration was refused by the registration authorities under the Registration Act. The plaintiff filed suit under Section 77 of the Registration Act on 3-1-1946.
At trial the Trial Court concluded that execution of the kobala by the defendants had not been satisfactorily proved and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge reversed that decision, principally relying upon additional evidence — the testimony of a lawyer witness, Babu Kishorilal Das — which was admitted at the appellate stage. The defendants appealed to this Court in a Second Appeal challenging the reception of that additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Subordinate Judge properly received and admitted additional evidence (the testimony of Babu Kishorilal Das) at the appellate stage under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) CPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments
- The defendants denied execution of the kobala and thus contested the documentary evidence on its merits at trial.
- On appeal, the defendants objected to reception of the additional evidence (the lawyer witness) and argued that admitting that evidence at the appellate stage was improper and not justified by O. 41, R. 27(1)(b) of the CPC. Mr. Guha advanced this position before this Court.
Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The respondent (plaintiff) justified the reception of additional evidence at the appellate stage as necessary for the ends of justice. The learned Subordinate Judge stated that such evidence was necessary because it transpired from the scribe's evidence that the lawyer prepared the draft of the kobala.
- Before this Court, Mr. Lala (for the respondent) relied strongly upon the Supreme Court decision in Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy v. Baijnath Bajoria, AIR 1951 SC 1, to support the propriety of admitting additional evidence at the appellate stage.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kessowji v. G.I.P. Rly. Co., 34 Ind App 115 (PC) | Illustrative authority explaining the test of "requirement of the Court" under O. 41, R. 27(1)(b) (i.e., evidence must be required "to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause"). | The Court grouped this case with other Privy Council decisions as part of the established test which, it found, the Subordinate Judge had not borne in mind when admitting additional evidence. |
| Parsotim Thakur v. Lal Mohar Thakur, AIR 1931 PC 143 | Explains the standard for reception of additional evidence on appeal under O. 41, R. 27(1)(b). | Relied upon by this Court as part of a line of authorities clarifying the circumstances in which additional evidence may be taken; the Court held that the Subordinate Judge did not apply that standard here. |
| Chaturbhuj Singh v. Gobind Prasad Singh, 50 Cal WN 2 (PC) | Privy Council authority relevant to the interpretation of Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) concerning additional evidence on appeal. | Included among the authorities demonstrating the applicable test for admitting additional evidence; the Court indicated the Subordinate Judge failed to follow the guidance of such authorities. |
| Mahomed Akbar Khan v. Mt. Motai, AIR 1948 PC 36 | Another Privy Council decision cited on the subject of additional evidence at the appellate stage. | Referenced as part of the established jurisprudence the trial judge should have considered before admitting additional evidence. |
| Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1951 SC 193 | Recent Supreme Court pronouncement concerning additional evidence under O. 41, R. 27(1)(b). | The Court regarded this decision as controlling in the present case and held that the Subordinate Judge's course was inconsistent with the principles explained in Arjan Singh. |
| Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy v. Baijnath Bajoria, AIR 1951 SC 1 | Supreme Court decision on additional evidence where the appeal court had "required" evidence to come to a proper decision; relied upon by respondent. | The Court examined this authority and concluded the facts of that case (where the appeal court had already sufficiently examined the record before asking for additional evidence) were distinguishable from the present facts; it therefore did not assist the respondent in this case. |
| Indrajit Pratab Sahi v. Amar Singh, AIR 1923 PC 128 | Privy Council authority mentioned in connection with interpretation of later cases on additional evidence. | Mentioned as part of the jurisprudential background; the Court noted that how far some earlier decisions apply in particular circumstances is a matter for careful consideration but did not decide that question here. |
| Appeal Court judgment: 53 Cal WN 329 (discussed in Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy) | Described as the appeal-court level judgment that formed the factual matrix for the Supreme Court's decision in AIR 1951 SC 1. | The Court relied on that discussion to show why Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy was distinguishable: in that case the appeal court had already examined the evidence on record before calling for additional evidence. |
| Jagrani Koer v. Kuar Durga Prasad, 41 Ind App 76 (PC) | Privy Council observations concerning admission of additional evidence, to be borne in mind by an appellate court if relevant. | The Court directed that, should the lower appellate court again consider admitting additional evidence, it should give due weight to the observations in this authority when moulding its action. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court focused on the propriety of admitting additional evidence at the appellate stage under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) CPC. The analysis proceeded through the following steps, using only the record and authorities cited in the judgment:
- Identification of the key procedural act: the learned Subordinate Judge admitted and examined, at the appellate stage, a lawyer witness (Babu Kishorilal Das) by order dated 18-7-1949 and overruled defendants' objections by order dated 19-7-1949.
- Examination of the reasons recorded by the Subordinate Judge: he stated the testimony was "necessary for the ends of justice" because the scribe's evidence indicated the lawyer prepared the draft of the kobala, and he wished to respond to repeated adverse comments by the defendants' pleader about the absence of Kishori Babu from the dock.
- Application of the statutory test: O. 41, R. 27(1)(b) permits reception of additional evidence only when the court requires it "to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause." The Court evaluated whether that statutory test had been met on the evidence already on record before the Subordinate Judge took the additional evidence.
- Reliance on precedent: the Court reviewed earlier Privy Council and Supreme Court authorities cited in the record (including Kessowji, Parsotim Thakur, Chaturbhuj Singh, Mahomed Akbar Khan and Arjan Singh) as explaining that the appellate court must first examine the evidence on record and be satisfied that the additional testimony is required for the court to pronounce judgment or for a substantial cause.
- Critical factual-applicative finding: the Court concluded that the Subordinate Judge did not sufficiently or substantially examine the evidence already on record before deciding to admit further testimony. Instead, the Subordinate Judge appears to have been motivated by an impression that the lawyer was an important witness and by a desire to silence adverse comments by the defendants' counsel about the witness's non-examination — considerations that were not proper under the Rule.
- Determination of impropriety: because the statutory test was not applied (i.e., the court's "requirement" was not shown to have arisen after a full or substantial consideration of the existing record), the additional evidence of the lawyer witness must be held to have been improperly admitted and is no legal evidence for purposes of justifying the appellate judgment.
- Remedial prescription: the Court set aside the Subordinate Judge's judgment (which had relied mainly on that additional evidence) and remanded the matter to the lower appellate court for a fresh hearing. The Court clarified that, on remand, the appellate court must first properly consider the legal evidence already on record (excluding the improperly admitted lawyer-witness evidence) and then decide whether the statutory requirement for admitting further evidence arises; if it does, the court may admit such evidence in accordance with law and relevant authorities.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED; the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside, and the case is remanded to the lower appellate court for a fresh hearing in accordance with law.
Immediate implications and consequences:
- The evidence of the lawyer witness, Sri Kishori Lal Das, which was admitted at the appellate stage, is held to have been improperly admitted and is to be treated as no legal evidence for purposes of justifying the now-set-aside appellate judgment.
- On remand, the lower appellate court must first examine the evidence already on record (excluding the improperly admitted evidence) and only if, after that examination, the court finds a genuine "requirement" under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) will it be appropriate to admit additional evidence in accordance with the authorities referred to in this judgment.
- The Court expressly left open the appellate court's power to admit further evidence in conformity with the law and the relevant precedents (including the Supreme Court decisions discussed), thereby not fettering that court's jurisdiction to act lawfully if further evidence is required after proper consideration of the record.
- Costs of this appeal were directed to abide the final result (i.e., no immediate order as to costs beyond that statement).
Broader legal impact:
The judgment applies established principles governing admission of additional evidence on appeal under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) CPC and reinforces that an appellate court must satisfy itself, after a substantial examination of the evidence on record, that such evidence is required to enable it to pronounce judgment or for some other substantial cause. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle but reaffirms and applies earlier Privy Council and Supreme Court authorities to the facts before it.
D.H.Z
JUDGMENT
1. This is the defendants' appeal arising out of a suit under Section 77 of the Registration Act. The disputed document is a kobala, bearing date 1-3-1945. The defendants denied execution of this kobala. On their refusal to register it, it was presented for registration by the plaintiff on 13-3-1945. Registration was refused by the authorities under the Registration Act and, thereafter, on 3-1-1946, the present suit was brought by the plaintiff under S. 77 of that Act. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the execution of the disputed document by the defendants had not been satisfactorily proved and, in that view of the matter, he dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal, that decision has been reversed by the learned Subordinate Judge whose judgment is based mainly upon the additional evidence of a lawyer witness Babu Kishorilal Das, who was examined by the court and whose evidence was admitted at the appellate stage. The defendants have now come up to this Court in Second Appeal.
2. The only point which has been urged by Mr. Guha in support of this appeal is that the reception of the additional evidence by the learned Subordinate Judge at the appellate stage was improper and not justified by the terms of the relevant provision of the Code, namely, O. 41, R. 27(1)(b). In my opinion, Mr. Guha's submission is not without force in the circumstances of the present case.
3. The additional evidence in question was received and admitted by the learned Subordinate Judge in the course of the hearing of the appeal by his order No. 30, dated 18-7-1949, and the reasons, given by him for admission of that evidence, appear in that order in the following terms:
“It appears to me that the evidence of Sri Kishorilal Das, pleader, is necessary for the ends of justice as it transpires from the evidence of the scribe (P.W 5) that Kishori Babu prepared the draft of the kobala in question. I thus order examination of Sri Kishorilal Das, to be examined as a witness before me under O. 41, R. 27, Civil P.O”.
4. The defendants objected to the reception of this additional evidence but their objection was overruled by the learned Subordinate Judge by his order No. 31, dated 19-7-1949, with ‘inter alia’ the following observations:
“The necessity for examining Sri Kishorilal Das arose from the evidence, adduced in the suit, and further, the learned Pleader for the respondent repeatedly harped on the absence of Kishori Babu from the dock. My order dated 18-7-1949 thus stands.”.
5. In the final judgment delivered by the learned Subordinate Judge, he made the following observations on this aspect of the matter:
“Babu Kishori Lal Das was not examined in the lower court. But at the time of hearing of the appeal when the learned pleader for the respondent repeatedly referred to the absence of Kishori Babu from the dock, I thought it advisable for the ends of justice to examine Babu Kishori Lal Das, Pleader, before me. The defendants thereafter made opposition to his examination but, none the less, I examined Kishori Babu who was allowed to be cross-examined by both sides.”.
6. It seems to me that, in the circumstances-of this case, as they appear from the present record, the evidence of Kishori Babu was improperly admitted at the appellate stage and I am not convinced that, in the context of those circumstances, the reasons given by the learned Subordinate Judge for taking that additional evidence were proper or sufficient reasons within the meaning of the relevant O. 41, R. 27(1)(b) of the CPC.
7. The test of requirement of the Court for pronouncing judgment or ‘for any other substantial cause’ as laid down in that Rule and explained repeatedly in the several decisions of the Judicial Committee in — ‘Kessowji v. G.I.P Rly. Co.’, 34 Ind App 115 (PC) (A); — ‘Parsotim Thakur v. Lal Mohar Thakur’, AIR 1931 PC 143 (B); — ‘Chaturbhuj Singh v. Gobind Prasad Singh’, 50 Cal WN 2 (PC) (C); — ‘Mahomed Akbar Khan v. Mt. Motai’, AIR 1948 PC 36 (D) and also by the Supreme Court in their latest pronouncement in the case of — ‘Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh’, AIR 1951 SC 193 (E), does not appear to have been borne in mind by the learned Subordinate Judge when admitting this additional evidence. The learned Subordinate Judge apparently thought, on the arguments before him, that Sri Kishori Lal Das was an important witness and he at once decided to examine him for ‘ends of justice’ and, what appeared no less important to him, to silence the defendants' lawyer's repeated adverse comments on “the absence of Kishori Babu from the dock.”
8. I am not satisfied that the learned Judge examined fully or even substantially the evidence on the record before embarking upon the somewhat perilous course of taking additional evidence at the Appellate stage & it seems almost clear that he did not consider the question of additional evidence from the point of view of the Court's requirement “to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause”, for which requirement no valid occasion can legitimately arise before a full or, at least, substantial and sufficient examination of the evidence, already on record.
9. The learned Subordinate Judge appears to have been unduly and prematurely swayed by the elliptical and elusive phrase ‘ends of justice’ and, in no mean measure also, by the defendants' lawyer's adverse comments on the non-examination of Kishori Babu by the plaintiff which had little relevance under O. 41, R. 27, of the Code. The learned Judge's approach, therefore, to the question before him cannot be justified in law and, on the present materials, the evidence of Sri Kishori Lal Das must be held to have been improperly admitted.
10. In the above circumstances, it is not possible for me to uphold the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, based mainly upon the additional evidence, so improperly admitted, namely, the evidence of the lawyer witness Sri Kishori Lal Bas, taken at the Appellate stage, and that judgment must, therefore, be set aside.
11. Mr. Lala, appearing for the respondent, relied strongly upon the other Supreme Court decision on this question of additional evidence, namely, the case of — ‘Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy v. Baijnath Bajoria’, AIR 1951 SC 1 (P). But, in my view, the present case falls clearly within the later pronouncement of the Supreme Court in — ‘AIR 1951 SC 193 (E)’ and its earlier decision cited by Mr. Lala, is distinguishable.
12. In the decision, cited by Mr. Lala (AIR 1951 SC 1 (F)), their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the question of additional evidence and holding that “the matter” before them was “fully covered by O. 41, R. 27 of the CPC” observed at p. 4 of the Report as follows:
“The judgment of the Appeal Court clearly indicates that it was the appeal Court that ‘required’ the evidence ‘in order to clear up the matter and’ ‘for the purpose of enabling it to come to a proper decision on this point’.”.
13. Reading the above passage in the light of the earlier observations, made by their Lordships in the course of statement of facts at page 2 of the Report, and the judgment of this Court — (‘Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy v. Baijnath Bajoria’, 53 Cal WN 329 (G)) which was under appeal before them, it seems proper to hold that their Lordships of the Supreme Court were satisfied that the “Appeal Court” was unable to come to a conclusion on the evidence, already on record, — which obviously implied that it had already sufficiently examined that evidence when it decided to give the plaintiff “an opportunity to examine the Maharaja as a witness” in the case, “so that all relevant facts might be brought out and placed before the Court for the purpose of enabling it to come to a proper decision” on the point, and admit the said additional evidence.
14. The stage was thus properly set for reception of additional evidence and the theory of the Court's requirement as envisaged in Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code had obvious application. That this was the correct position receives confirmation from the discussion in the appeal Court's judgment 53 Cal WN 329, at pp. 334-5 (G) of the Report. I do not, therefore, read this decision of the Supreme Court as laying down anything contrary to the other decisions, cited above, or as being of much assistance to Mr. Lala's client in the present case. On the findings, already made by me, the instant case, now before me, is clearly different and AIR 1951 SC 1 (P) cannot the Respondent.
15. I am not unmindful that, in AIR 1951 SC 193 (S) and the Privy Council cases, cited above, the question arose on the application by a party to tender additional evidence but, in my view, that fact does not, in any way, affect or detract from the authority of those decisions — or the generality and comprehensive character of their Lordships' pronouncement and their very elaborate observations on the subject, — in matters of additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code. Whether and how far those decisions will apply — and AIR 1931 PC 143 (B), so far as it seeks to explain away — ‘Indrajit Pratab Sahi v. Amar Singh’, AIR 1923 PC 128 (H), may have to be particularly and carefully considered on this aspect of the matter — where additional evidence is sought to be introduced on the ground that the particular party had no opportunity to adduce such evidence earlier or how those decisions are to be interpreted in relation to such cases is not a question which arises for consideration on the present occasion, as there is no allegation here, up till now, that the plaintiff-respondent suffered from any such lack of opportunity.
16. That being so, the ‘requirement’ of the Court, under O. 41, R. 27(1)(b) of the Code must have to be judged on the ‘evidence on record’ before reception of the impugned ‘additional evidence’ and must be found to arise upon and only after the court's appreciation of that ‘evidence on record’. That presupposes examination of that evidence, which test was not followed in the present case. I am, accordingly, unable to accept the submission of Mr. Lala that the evidence of the lawyer witness Sri Kishori Lal Das was properly admitted at the appellate stage.
17. It thus follows that there has been no proper hearing before the Lower Appellate Court and its present decision cannot stand. It seems to me further that, in the circumstances of this case, it is only proper that the matter should go back to that court for a fresh hearing of the plaintiff's appeal before it in accordance with law. I direct accordingly.
18. I must make it clear, however, that, if the appellate court, on examining the evidence, already on the record, excluding of course, the evidence of Sri Kishori Lal Bas (which, as I have already held, was improperly admitted and which, therefore, is no legal evidence and must altogether be left out of consideration requires further evidence to be adduced in the light of the decisions, to which reference has been made above, including the decision in AIR 1951 SC 1 (P), as explained in this judgment, it will be open to it to take such additional evidence at the appellate stage in accordance with law and nothing herein will in any way fetter its power in that respect.
19. I must point out also that, if the appellate court chooses to admit additional evidence, it will bear in mind the observations of the Judicial Committee in that connection at page 82 of 41 Ind App 76 (PC), — ‘Jagrani Koer v. Kuar Durga Prasad (I)’, and, to the extent those observations-will be found relevant in the present case, it will give them due weight and consideration and mould its action accordingly.
20. The appellate court will first consider properly the legal evidence, already on record, and then the question of its requirement, if any, under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code will arise. I am particularly emphasising this, lest there be repetition of the unfortunate error which was committed by the Lower Appellate Court on the present occasion and which has necessitated this remand.
21. In the above view of the matter, I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge and send the case back to the lower appellate court to be dealt with in accordance with law in the light of the observations I have made above. Costs of this appeal will abide the final result.
D.H.Z
22. Case remanded.
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