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Fakir Chandra Chiki v. S. Chakravarti And Ors.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner began employment with the East Indian Railway in February 1917 (as an apprentice mechanic), was appointed mechanic in 1922, officiated as a foreman in 1949, reverted to his substantive post of T.T.C. on 10 October 1949 and was confirmed as an assistant foreman on 15 May 1951. When the East Indian Railway was taken over by the Government of India the petitioner executed a service agreement acknowledging he would be bound by the general rules and regulations of Government Service.
In early April 1951 the petitioner reported sick and remained on the sick list until 25 June 1951. He suffered from left ventricular failure with myocardial deficiency. He was recommended leave and was on leave until 25 October 1951. A workshop medical officer examined him on 18 November 1951 and opined that the petitioner was not likely to be physically fit to resume work by 1 June 1953 (the date of his superannuation). The workshop medical officer declared the petitioner medically unfit and reported to the Chief Medical Officer, Calcutta.
After receipt of the certificate, the petitioner's pay for 20 days in November 1952 was remitted to him; there was no intimation to him that he had been discharged, and no formal order by any authority discharging him was found in the disclosed papers. The petitioner received a letter dated 15 February 1952 from the Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer stating that he had been declared medically unfit for further Railway service from the afternoon of 20 November 1951 and that leave salary up to that date had already been received.
The petitioner made repeated applications asserting he could not be summarily discharged without an opportunity to be heard, and claimed he became fit to resume duties in or about December 1952. The workshop medical officer later directed further examination and the petitioner produced cardiological evidence; the workshop medical officer was satisfied and recommended the petitioner, but the Chief Medical Officer rejected the appeal as not in accordance with the rules.
Procedurally, a rule (writ process) was issued on 28 May 1953 calling on the respondents to show cause why appropriate writs should not be issued preventing them from giving effect to the order declaring the petitioner medically unfit or terminating his services. By the time of judgment the petitioner had passed the age of superannuation; the court observed that the practical relief would be avoidance of a premature discharge and possible arrears of pay up to superannuation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a termination of service on the ground of physical incapacity amounts to a "removal" or "dismissal" within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution (and therefore requires the safeguards of that Article).
- Whether provisions in the Indian Railway Establishment Code (specifically Rule 149(3) and Rule 1702) which treat termination for physical incapacity as not amounting to removal or dismissal, and which do not require notice, are ultra vires Article 311.
- Whether the Supreme Court decision in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India (holding that termination under a contract in accordance with its terms may not attract section 240 of the Government of India Act / Article 311) affects the applicability of Article 311 to a railway employee whose service is governed by the Railway Establishment Code and who was declared medically unfit.
- Whether the petitioner was entitled to the procedural protection of being informed of an intention to dismiss him for physical incapacity and given an opportunity to show cause before any dismissal took effect.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner contended he was effectively discharged (or that the respondents treated him as discharged) on or about 20 November 1951 due to medical unfitness without any formal order by the proper authority and without being given an opportunity to be heard.
- He asserted that he subsequently became fit (in or about December 1952), underwent further medical examination and produced supporting cardiological evidence; the workshop medical officer was satisfied and recommended him, but the Chief Medical Officer turned him down on a procedural ground (appeal not in accordance with rules).
- The petitioner sought relief preventing respondents from giving effect to the alleged discharge and contended that the safeguards of Article 311 applied and had not been observed.
Respondents' Arguments (as recorded)
- Counsel for the respondents (Mr. Roy) argued that the earlier appellate decision (Union of India v. Someswar Banerjee) is no longer good law in view of the Supreme Court decision in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India (which held that termination under contract in accordance with its terms does not attract section 240 / Article 311).
- Mr. Roy further argued that the aggrieved employee in the appellate decision had brought a suit and therefore there was an adequate alternative remedy (suggesting that suit proceedings would be an appropriate remedy rather than writ relief).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Someswar Banerjee (appeal court decision) (referred to as 58 C.W.N 107) | Held that termination of employment on ground of physical incapacity is a dismissal; a Railway rule dispensing with charge-sheet/notice in such cases contravened section 240(3) of the Government of India Act and was ultra vires. | The court relied on the reasoning in this decision to conclude that Rule 149(3) and Rule 1702 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code are ultra vires Article 311 insofar as they purport to allow termination for physical incapacity without notice or opportunity to be heard. |
| Satish Chandra Anand v. The Union of India [(1953) S.C.A 293] | Holds that where service is terminated according to terms of a contract (for example a contract providing for termination on notice), section 240 of the Government of India Act (corresponding to Article 311) may have no application; termination in terms of a contract is not necessarily a "dismissal" or "removal" attracting those provisions. | The court distinguished this Supreme Court decision: it accepted that Anand stands for the proposition that contractually-terminated services in accordance with their terms do not attract Article 311, but held that Anand does not affect the earlier appellate decision where the rules purported to dispense with Article 311 safeguards. The court found no term in the petitioner's service contract permitting termination without notice; therefore Article 311 protections remained applicable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in logical steps, applying statutory rules, precedent and constitutional principles to the facts disclosed in the record:
- The court first examined the factual record and observed that although a medical certificate had been issued and the petitioner had been informed (by letter) that he had been declared medically unfit from 20 November 1951, there was no formal order by the proper authority discharging him from service on the papers disclosed.
- The relevant Railway rules were identified: Rule 149(3) (termination of non-pensionable railway servants for mental or physical incapacity without notice) and Rule 1702 (which lists penalties and contains a Note stating that discharge for inefficiency due to failure to conform to requisite physical fitness does not amount to removal or dismissal within the meaning of the Rule).
- The court addressed the contention (recorded in the opinion) that discharge for physical unfitness is not a "dismissal" or "removal" so as to attract Article 311. It rejected that contention on principle, noting that terminating a man's employment is the act of dismissal whatever the cause; dismissal for physical incapacity is still dismissal.
- Relying on the appellate decision in Union of India v. Someswar Banerjee, the court held that rules which purport to avoid the safeguards required by the Government of India Act / Constitution (here Article 311) insofar as they do not require notice or an opportunity to be heard in cases of physical incapacity, are ultra vires. The Someswar Banerjee reasoning that a provision dispensing with procedural safeguards contravened section 240(3) (and by analogy the constitutional provision) was applied.
- The court then considered the Supreme Court decision in Satish Chandra Anand, which holds that termination in strict accordance with the terms of a contract of service (for example on giving the contractually required notice) does not attract section 240 / Article 311. The court distinguished Anand: Anand permits contractually-terminable services to end without invoking Article 311, but does not validate contractual provisions which purport to permit dismissal or removal without affording the constitutional safeguards. Here, there was no contractual term authorising summary termination without notice for physical unfitness.
- The court emphasized a constitutional principle: an individual cannot be validly employed on a term which contracts out of the Constitution; a contract cannot exempt an employer (including the Government) from obligations under the Constitution. Therefore, any rule or contractual provision that seeks to allow dismissal for physical incapacity without opportunity to be heard is void to the extent it conflicts with Article 311.
- Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the petitioner had not been told clearly that he was going to be dismissed for physical incapacity nor given an opportunity to show cause. That procedure required by Article 311 was not followed on the facts.
- The court considered but rejected the respondents' contention that the employee's alternative remedy — a suit as taken in the earlier case — was an adequate alternative to writ relief, finding such a remedy less efficacious and potentially inaccessible or oppressive for a humble employee (slow, expensive, and potentially requiring the Union of India to be made a party in another forum).
- Given that the petitioner had already reached superannuation by the time of decision, the court recognised continued service was not possible; the practical relief sought was to avoid a premature discharge and secure any arrears up to the date of superannuation should entitlement exist.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The court made the rule absolute and issued a writ in the nature of a mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the alleged discharge of the petitioner on or about 20 November 1951. The order explicitly did not affect any termination of service resulting from the petitioner having reached the age of superannuation. There was no order as to costs.
Core Ruling: The petitioner's challenge succeeded; the respondents were prohibited by mandamus from giving effect to the alleged discharge for physical incapacity dated on or about 20 November 1951.
Implications
- The court held that provisions of the Indian Railway Establishment Code (specifically Rule 149(3) and Rule 1702) which purport to permit termination for physical incapacity without notice or to treat such termination as not amounting to removal or dismissal are ultra vires Article 311 to the extent they negate the constitutional safeguards required when dismissing a civil servant.
- Employees covered by similar service rules cannot be legitimately deprived of the constitutional protection of being told of the proposed dismissal for physical incapacity and afforded an opportunity to show cause against it; contractual terms or service rules cannot validly contract out of Article 311.
- Because the petitioner had already reached the age of superannuation, the immediate practical effect was to prevent a premature dismissal; the petitioner might be entitled to arrears of pay up to the date his service ended by reason of attaining superannuation, but the court did not order reinstatement (and the petitioner did not seek to continue in service).
Solicitors recorded in the opinion: S.M. Dutt for the Petitioner; Sandersons and Morgan for the Respondents.
1. The facts of this case are as follows:
The petitioner joined the East Indian Railway in February, 1917, as an apprentice mechanic. In 1922 he was appointed as a mechanic. In 1949 he officiated as a foreman. On and from 10th October, 1949, he reverted to his substantive post of T.T.C (Technically Trained Chargeman). On 15th May, 1951, he was confirmed in the post of an assistant foreman. When the East Indian Railway was taken over by the Government of India, the petitioner executed a service agreement by which he agreed as follows:
“I acknowledge that I am and will be bound by all general rules and regulations of Government Service.”
2. In the beginning of April, 1951, the petitioner reported sick, and continued to be on the Sick-list until 25th June, 1951. It appears that he was suffering from left ventricular failure of the heart with myocardial deficiency. He was recommended leave for two months from 25th June, 1951, by the workshop, medical officer, Lillooah, and remained on leave until 25th October, 1951. On the 18th November, 1951, he was again examined by the then Workshop, medical officer, Lillooah. In the opinion of the said medical officer the petitioner was not likely to be physically fit enough to resume work by the 1st June, 1953, on which date he would reach the age of superannuation. It is said in the affidavit in opposition (affirmed by Sitansu Sekhar Chakravarti) as follows:
“Accordingly the said Workshop, Medical Officer, Lillooah, duly declared the petitioner to be medically unfit and sent a report, recording the said fact to the Chief Medical Officer, Calcutta.”
3. Upon the receipt of the certificate, the petitioner's pay for 20 days in November, 1952, was remitted to him. There was neither any intimation given to him, nor any formal notice that he had been discharged from service for physical unfitness. In fact, although all relevant papers have been disclosed, I have been unable to find any order by the proper authority ordering his discharge, I shall come back to this aspect of the case presently. On the 10th December, 1951, the petitioner wrote to the Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer, Lillooah, complaining about receipt of only 20 days' pay with the note on a money order coupon “Your settlement salary”.
4. On the 15th February, 1952, the Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer wrote to the petitioner stating as follows:
I would state that you have been declared medically unfit for further Railway Service from the afternoon of 20.11.51 and that the leave salary due upto 20.11.51 has already been received by you on 8.12.51”
5. Even this letter does not contain the order of discharge.
6. The petitioner then made various applications to the authorities stating that he could not be discharged summarily without being granted an opportunity to be heard in respect thereof. It is further the petitioner's case that in or about December, 1952, he became fit for resuming his duties. It appears that the workshop, medical officer directed the petitioner on 14th Feb-January, 1953, to appear before him for further examination with a report from a cardiologist and an Electric Cardiogram; which he did. According to the petitioner, the workshop, medical officer, was satisfied and recommended his case but the Chief Medical Officer turned it down on the ground that the appeal was not in accordance with the rules.
7. This rule was issued on the 28th May, 1953, upon the respondents to show cause why appropriate writ or writs should not be issued preventing them from giving effect to the order declaring the petitioner as medically unfit or terminating his services.
8. Before I proceed further, it will be observed that by now the petitioner has passed his age of superannuation, so that there is no question of his being continued in service at present. If the petitioner is successful herein, the only result will possibly be that his premature discharge will be avoided and he might become entitled to arrears of pay until his service came to an end by his attaining the age of superannuation. The following are the relevant rules in the Indian Railway Establishment Code:
148(3) Other (non-pensionable) railway servants:—
The service of other (non-pensionable) railway servants shall be liable to termination on notice on either side for the period shown be low. Such notice is not however required in cases of…………………………….. termination of services due to mental or physical incapacity.”
“Rule 1702—Penalties—the following penalties may for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon railway servants.
(8) Removal from the service;
(9) Dismissal from the service.
Note (1). The discharge—
(d) of a person for inefficiency due to failure to conform to the requisite standard of physical fitness…… does not amount to removal or dismissal within the meaning of this rule.”
9. It is argued that discharge due to physical unfitness is neither removal nor dismissal so as to attract the provisions of article 311 of the Constitution. In the first place, I do not see how the petitioner was discharged at all. Neither the rules lay it down, nor the service agreement provides, that a report by the medical officer declaring the employee to be medically unfit, will operate as a notice of discharge or a summary dismissal. In the decision which I shall presently cite, the discharge of an employee for physical incapacity has been held to operate as a dismissal from service. If so, the proper officer should pass the order so that article 311(1) should be satisfied. No such order has been placed before me.
10. In Union Of India… v. Someswar Banerjee…., (1) (58 C.W.N 107), the plaintiff had been employed as a permanent Bridge Inspector under the Bengal and Assam Railway. He had sustained an injury to his back and was away from employment for a considerable time. Eventually he was examined by a medical officer on behalf of the Railway and was declared unfit. The Engineer-in-Chief informed the plaintiff that he had been declared unfit and permanently incapacitated. The same authority directed that his salary upto the date when he was so declared should be paid. The plaintiff brought a suit for a declaration that he was still employed in the Railway. Boss. J., decreed the suit and granted the declaration. The appeal court upheld the decree. Harries, C.J, pointed out that the word ‘dismissal’ had not been used. However he took the letter of the Chief Engineer to be a letter of dismissal. It was contended that Rule 1709(b) of the State Railway Establishment Code laid down that where the inefficiency was due to physical incapacity, it was not necessary to serve the employee with a charge sheet or obtain his explanation. The learned Chief Justice held that this rule clearly contravened section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and so was ultra vires. He said:
“It was faintly suggested that removing a man because he is physically unfit is not dismissing him. Dismissing a man is putting an end to his employment. He may be dismissed rightly or wrongly but the act of dismissal is the act of terminating his employment. It matters not whether his employment is terminated because of dishonesty, corruption or bad health. In all three cases he has been dismissed, though in the first two cases his instant dismissal might well be morally justified, whereas in the last case it may be very harsh and unjust. In all the cases, however, the service has been terminated and he has been dismissed. It seems to me that dismissal on the ground of in efficiency due to physical incapacity clearly comes within the provisions of section 240(3) of the Government of India Act and that being so, the rule of Railway, namely, Rule 1709(b) is ultra vires the provision of the Government of India Act and I think, clearly ultra vires the present provisions of the Constitution……………”
11. Upon the same reasoning, Rule 149(3) and Rule 1702 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, in so far as they purport to lay down a rule that in case of termination of service for failure to conform to the requisite standard of physical fitness, no notice is necessary or that such termination does not amount to a removal or dismissal from service, are ultra vires the provisions of article 311 of the Constitution. Mr. Roy appearing on behalf of the respondent argues that the above-mentioned decision is no longer good law regard being had to the Supreme Court decision of Satish Chandra Anand v. The Union of India (2) [(1953) S.C.A 293]. The facts in that case were as follows: In October, 1945, the petitioner was employed by the Government of India on a five-year contract in the Directorate General of Resettlement and Employment of the Ministry of Labour. Before termination of the service contract it was agreed between the petitioner and the Government that upon termination of the contract, he would be allowed to continue temporarily and will be governed by the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949. Those rules required a notice of one month to be given to terminate employment. Such notice had been given. It was held that where a service is terminated according to the terms of a contract, section 240 of the Government of India Act had no application. In other words such a dismissal was neither a removal from service nor a dismissal, as contemplated by section 240, which corresponds to Article 311 of the Constitution.
12. I do not think that this decision of the Supreme Court affects the decision of the appeal court mentioned above. All that Ananda's case (supra) decides is that termination of service under a contract and in terms thereof does not attract the provision of Article 311. But it also points out that if any penalty is imposed like dismissal or removal from service, the provisions are attracted. If the contract of service of the petitioner here contained a provision that his services could be terminated without notice and his services were terminated without notice, Article 311 would not be attracted. But what are the facts here? It is not stated that there is any term in the service contract whereby the service can be terminated without notice. The service-contract attracts the entire Railway Establishment Code. Removing a man because he has become inefficient through physical unfitness is dismissal. Therefore the matter can be looked at from two points of view. Firstly, if a man merely binds himself to be governed by the general rules and regulations of Government service, he must be taken to be bound by those terms that are legal. In so far as that law offends against the Constitution, it is void. Hence, those provisions in the rules which lay down that dismissal or removal from service for physical incapacity will not call for any notice, that is to say, no charge-sheet, enquiry etc., are clearly void and the petitioner cannot be said to be bound thereby. Secondly, even suppose all the provisions in the Code are taken to be terms of a service-contract it is hot permissible to contract out of the provisions of the Constitution. In other words, the Government cannot be permitted to employ a citizen (nor a citizen can agree to be employed) upon condition that the provisions of the Constitution will not apply, since this is the result of a contract of service which says that a civil servant can be dismissed or removed from service summarily, without the observance of the safeguards contained in Article 311.
13. In Ananda's case (2) (supra) the contract (and the rules incorporated in the Contract) laid down that a service can be terminated upon a month's notice. There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents this. Even if a contract says that a service can be terminated without any notice, that does not militate against the provisions of Article 311. But a provision in a contract that the employee can be dismissed or removed from service, (in the present case, for inefficiency due to physical incapacity) without giving him any opportunity to be heard, clearly militates against article 311 and is to that extent bad.
14. It is not argued that if a hearing was necessary, any such hearing was given, on the facts of this case. To comply with the provisions of Article 311, the petitioner would have to be clearly told that he was going to be dismissed for physical incapacity and should have been given an opportunity to show cause against it. That procedure has not been adopted.
15. Mr. Roy has argued that in the Appeal Court decision cited above, the aggrieved employee brought a suit and therefore there was an adequate alternative remedy.
16. I do not think that it is an equally efficacious remedy. Notice would have to be served on government and the proceedings would be long drawn and expensive. Besides, the Union of India would have to be made a party and it might be urged that a suit should be filed in the Punjab. That would be denying justice to a humble employee like the petitioner who is now without employment. The only thing that remains to be considered is as to what relief should be given to the petitioner. As the age of superannuation has already been passed, there is no question of the petitioner continuing in service, nor does Mr. Chaudhuri ask for such a relief.
17. The proper order would be to make the rule absolute and issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the alleged discharge of the petitioner upon grounds of physical incapacity on or about 20th November, 1951. This order however does not affect any termination of service as a result of the petitioner having reached the age of superannuation.
18. There will be no order as to costs.
Solicitors: S.M Dutt for the Petitioner; Sandersons and Morgan for the Respondents.
P.S
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