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Sreemat Swami Satyananda Brahmachari & Ors. v. Phani Lal Mookerjee And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
May 12, 1954
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Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Mookerjee, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Three plaintiffs claimed to be persons interested in the sheba puja of the deity Sri Sri Kalimata of Kali-ghat and alleged that the temple and associated ones formed a public endowment that was being mismanaged and subject to misappropriation. The plaintiffs instituted a suit seeking multiple reliefs (including preparation of an inventory of the deity's properties, rendering of accounts by shebaits, removal of defaulting persons, and the framing of a scheme for proper management of debuttar properties). The plaint stated the suit was brought under sections 92 and 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure and carried an endorsement by the Collector of 24-Parganas dated 24.11.1949, recording consent under section 92, C.P.C.

The defendants (originally 13) were described as members of an Executive Committee of the Shebait Sabha; they challenged maintainability on the ground that the statutory consent required under sections 92 and 93 CPC had not been properly obtained. The maintainability issue — whether the plaintiffs had complied with sections 92 and 93 — was tried as a preliminary issue with the parties' consent. The learned District Judge held against the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit on that preliminary issue. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs had obtained the written consent required under sections 92 and 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure for instituting the present suit.
  2. Whether the Collector's endorsement on the plaint (dated 24.11.1949) was effective given the correspondence between the Collector and the Judicial Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, and in light of a prior general notification (No. 3592-L.R., dated 15th April 1918).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs contended that the letter issued by the Judicial Secretary to the Government of West Bengal expressly stated there was "no objection" to the Collector consenting to the filing of a plaint under section 92, and therefore the Collector's written endorsement on the plaint validated the suit.
  • Implicitly, the plaintiffs relied on the documentary record before the trial court (including the Collector's endorsement) as establishing compliance with sections 92 and 93.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The defendants argued that the Government had not given a specific, case‑by‑case previous sanction required by section 93; instead the Judicial Secretary's letter merely referred the Collector to a prior general notification (No. 3592-L.R., dated 15th April 1918) that authorised Collectors generally to exercise the Advocate-General's powers.
  • Relying on precedent (including Prem Narayan v. Ramcharan and G. Sarkar v. Nripendra Nath Dhar), the defendants asserted that a general notification could not substitute for the prior, specific authorization of the Government in respect of the particular suit; therefore the Collector's endorsement was ineffective and the suit was not maintainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Prem Narayan v. Ramcharan (1931) L.R. 59 I.A. 121 : 36 C.W.N. 257 Interpreted the phrase "the previous consent of the State Government" in section 93 to mean that the local Government must give its previous sanction to each particular suit; a general sanction was insufficient. The Court relied on this decision to hold that the Government's general notification could not be treated as specific authorization for the Collector to consent to the filing of the present particular suit.
Gulzarilal v. The Collector of Etah (L.R. 58 I.A. 460 : 35 C.W.N. 699) Supported the principle that the Government's previous sanction must be given specifically to each suit under section 93; general authorizations are inadequate. Cited as consistent authority reinforcing the requirement for a specific, prior sanction rather than reliance on a general notification.
Lachmandas Goverdhan das v. Narayandas Amrulal (I.L.R. 1948 Nagpur 281) Held that a general sanction was not enough; the previous sanction of Government must be obtained in each case and must be strictly proved; section 114 Evidence Act presumption cannot be invoked to supply the specific sanction. Used to emphasize that proof of specific Government authorization is strictly required and that absence of such proof makes the suit without jurisdiction.
Somchand Bhikhabhai v. Chhaganlal Khopchand (I.L.R. 35 Bom. 243) Demonstrated the strictness of the rule: consent endorsed by an officer who was not formally appointed as Collector (although discharging duties) was not treated as permission by the Collector. The Court cited this case to show how narrowly authorities construed the formal requirements for valid consent endorsements by Government officers.
Capt. G. Sarkar v. Nripendra Nath Dhar (52 C.W.N. 831) Held that a general notification (Notification No. 3592 L.R., dated 15th April 1918) could not satisfy the specific prior sanction requirement of section 93; consent recorded by the Collector was ineffective if the local Government had not previously given consent to that particular suit. The Court treated this recent decision as directly apposite: the same notification (No. 3592 L.R., 15.4.1918) was relied on in the present correspondence, and Capt. G. Sarkar was applied to conclude that the Government's letter here did not amount to specific sanction for this particular case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court began by stating the statutory requirements of sections 92 and 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 92 permits the Advocate‑General or two or more persons (with the Advocate‑General's consent) to institute suits in respect of public trusts; subsection (2) bars suits except in conformity with sub‑section (1) unless specially allowed by relevant laws. Section 93 permits, outside the Presidency town, the powers of the Advocate‑General under section 92 to be exercised by the Collector with the previous consent of the State Government.
  2. Precedential constraint: The Court reviewed binding and persuasive authorities (including Prem Narayan and G. Sarkar) establishing the settled rule that the "previous consent of the State Government" must be a prior, specific sanction for the particular suit; a general notification or general sanction is inadequate. The Court emphasized that such sanction must be strictly proved and that courts have previously disallowed suits where specific authorization was missing.
  3. Factual application: The Court examined the documentary record. The Collector had forwarded the draft plaint (dated 2nd August, 1949 as appears from the plaint) with a recommendation that Government sanction institution of the particular suit. The Judicial Secretary's reply (No. 5977‑J, dated 11th November, 1949) referred to Notification No. 3592‑L.R. (15th April, 1918), stated that Collectors had been authorised by that notification to exercise the Advocate‑General's powers, and said "there is, therefore, no objection to such consent being given in respect of the above trust property," while also stating that it was "not intended that such a suit should be instituted by yourself or through another Government servant."
  4. Interpretation of the Government letter: Applying the above precedents and the ordinary meaning of the correspondence, the Court concluded that the Judicial Secretary's letter did not constitute a specific prior authorization by the Government for the Collector to give consent in respect of this particular suit. The letter merely referred the Collector to the earlier general notification and expressly disclaimed any intention to have the suit instituted by the Collector or through another Government servant.
  5. Effect of the Collector's endorsement: Because the Government had not specifically authorized the Collector in this particular instance, the Court held that the Collector's endorsement on the plaint was of no legal consequence and did not satisfy the requirements of section 93. The consequence followed that the suit lacked jurisdiction and was not maintainable under sections 92 and 93 CPC.
  6. Evidence and record: The appellants sought further production of the Government file to show specific Government approval; the Court refused to admit additional evidence at this late stage, noting that the relevant records from the Collector and from the Secretary, Judicial Department, had been placed before the trial Court and that there was no definite suggestion that relevant materials were missing. The Court disallowed a "roving enquiry" into Government files.
  7. Conclusion from analysis: Given the statutory requirements, controlling authorities, the terms of the Judicial Secretary's letter, and the absence of a specific Government sanction on the record, the Court concluded that the trial court was correct to dismiss the suit on the preliminary issue of maintainability.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct consequences on the parties:

  • The trial court's dismissal of the suit on the preliminary issue (for failure to produce the specific prior consent required under sections 92 and 93 CPC) was upheld.
  • The Collector's endorsement on the plaint was held to be ineffective because the Government had not given the specific prior authorization required by section 93 in respect of this particular suit.
  • Each party was directed to bear its own costs in both the trial court and this Court (the Court observed it was no fault of the plaintiffs that the suit had to be dismissed, and therefore ordered that parties bear their respective costs).
  • The Court ordered that a copy of the judgment be sent to the Legal Remembrancer for communication to the authorities concerned.

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing precedents requiring strict proof of specific Government sanction under section 93; the Court did not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond the application of those precedents to the facts before it.

Disposition: This appeal is dismissed. Renupada Mukherjee, J. agreed.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Mookerjee, J.:— The only question raised in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs had obtained the consent required under sections 92 and 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure for filing the present suit. The learned District Judge has held against the plaintiffs. Hence this appeal to this Court.

2. The three plaintiffs claimed to be persons interested in the sheba puja of the deity Sri Sri Kalimata of Kali-ghat.

3. It is alleged that this temple along with other associate ones are part of a public endowment. They are not being properly managed. Certain definite allegations are also made about mismanagement and misappropriation. In the body of the plaint it is averred that this suit is brought under the provisions of section 92 read with section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the written consent of the Collector, 24-Parganas, as required therein had been obtained. On the original plaint the Collector, 24-Parganas, made the following endorsement:—

“Under Government Order No. 5977-J, dated 11.11.49 I hereby give consent in writing to the institution of this suit under section 92, C.P.C, by the applicants (1) Sreemat Swami Satyananda Brahmachari, (2) Ganapa ti Sarkar and (3) Parimal Chandra Sen, against Phanilal Mukherjee and other shebaits and paladars of the deity Sri Sri Iswari Kalimata Thakurani of Kalighat in the District of 24-Parganas for relief as sought for in the present suit.

S.N Maitra,

Collector, 24-Parganas,

24.11.1949”

4. The defendants were originally 13 in number who were described as members of the Executive Committee of the Shebait Sabha constituted by some, of the influential shebaits and paladars who were made parties for themselves and for the benefit of all shebaits and paladars in general under the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Various reliefs were claimed including preparation of inventory of the properties of the deity, the shebaits to be directed to render accounts, for removing such persons as are found to have defaulted in the work of the sheba puja, committed any breach of trust or are found unfit and to settle a Scheme for the proper management and control of the debuttar properties. It is not necessary for our present purpose to refer in detail either to the allegations as made in the plaint or to the various objections raised in the written statement.

5. Of the many issues one was—

“Is the suit maintainable and is it filed in compliance with the terms of section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure? Have the plaintiffs properly complied with the terms of sections 92 and 93 of the Code in instituting the present suit?”

6. As this issue concerned the maintainability of the suit it was taken up for hearing as a preliminary issue: with the consent of the parties.

7. It appears from the records that the connected papers relating to the alleged approval under section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, were called for from the office of the Collector of the District as also from the office of the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Judicial Department. Only such of the papers as were considered relevant by the parties were marked as Exhibits and the rest were returned to the respective offices. It will have to be considered later on whether all the relevant papers have been brought into the record. As stated already the learned District Judge found this issue against the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit on this preliminary issue.

8. When there are allegations of breach of any; express or constructive trust created for public purposes and for certain other reasons section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that

“the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the Trust and having obtained the consent of the Advocate-General, may institute a suit”—to obtain a decree for any one or more of the reliefs referred to in that section.

9. Sub-section 2 of section 92 of the Code bars the institution of a suit except in conformity with the provisions contained in sub-section 1 of the section referred to above, unless such a suit is specially allowed under the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, or in any corresponding law in force in a part B State.

10. It is clear from that provision contained in sub-section J of section 92 of the Code that if the Advocate-General himself files a suit he can do it immediately for any one or more of the reliefs contained in sub-section 1 if that be in respect of a public trust.

11. Two or more persons interested in the said trust may be permitted to maintain a suit only after having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate-General.

12. Under section 93 of the Code the powers conferred under section 92 on the Advocate-General

“may, outside the Presidency town, be with the previous consent of the State Government exercised also by the Collector or by such officer as the State Government appoint in this behalf.”

13. The expression “the previous consent of the State Government” appearing in section 93 of the Code has been interpreted by the Judicial Committee in Prem Narayan v. Ramcharan (1). [(1931) L.R 59 I.A 121 : 36 C.W.N 257] that the local Government must have given its previous sanction to each particular suit. Such previous sanction in each particular case was considered to be vital to the right of the plaintiffs to sue and even when such objection had not been raised in the Courts in India the attention of the Board being drawn to that defect at the final stage such objection was allowed. [See also Gulzarilal v. The Collector of Etah (2) (L.R 58 I.A 460 : 35 C.W.N 699)].

14. The effect of these decisions was considered in Lachmandas Goverdhan das v. Narayandas Amrulal (3) (I.L.R 1948 Nagpur 281) and it was observed that a general sanction was not enough and the previous sanction of the Government must be obtained in each case. A sanction of this type has to be strictly proved because in the absence of a proper sanction the suit is without jurisdiction. It is not open in such a case to raise the presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act that all due formalities of law must have been complied with.

15. The strictness with which these provisions have been interpreted will appear from Somchand Bhikhabhai v. Chhaganlal Khopchand (4) (I.L.R 35 Bom. 243) that after the Government approval had been obtained the consent as actually endorsed by the Assistant Collector who on the particular day the certificate was given was attending to the duties of the Collector who was too ill to attend office on that day was not considered to be a permission by the Collector. The reason was that the officer signing, though working for the Collector, had not been formally appointed as such though he might be discharging the functions of the Collector under the provisions of section 11 of Land Revenue Code, Bombay Act V of 1879.

16. Reference may also be made to the; recent decision of this Court, Capt. G. Sarkar v. Nripendra Nath Dhar (5) (52 C.W.N 831). In that case the consent of the Collector of Hooghly was endorsed on the plaint in the following manner:

“Consent to the filing of this suit under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is given by me in writing to the plaintiff by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the provisions of section 93.”

17. It transpired in that case that the local Government had not, previous to the consent recorded by the Collector of Hooghly, given consent to the institution of that particular suit. General Notification was produced by the plaintiffs, namely, Notification No. 3592 L.R, dated the 15th April, 1918, published in the “Calcutta Gazette” of 1918 at page 650 of Part I. This notification will have to be referred to subsequently as in course of the correspondence in the suit now before us reference was made by the Judicial Secretary to this particular notification. The Division Bench of this Court held that in view of the clear decision in Prem Narayan's case (1) (L.R 59 I.A 121), such a general notification could not be deemed to have satisfied the conditions imposed by section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The requirements of that section not having been complied with the suit was dismissed.

18. On behalf of the defendants respondents it was contended before us that in the present case also the Government did not purport to have authorised the Collector to give his consent to this particular case but simply referred the Collector to the self-same general notification, dated the 15th April, 1918, which was produced in the earlier case, G. Sarkar v. Nripendra Nath Dhar (5), reported in 52 C.W.N 831. The present suit therefore was not maintainable.

19. On the other hand the contention of the plaintiffs appellants is that in the letter issued by the Judicial Secretary to the Government of West Bengal it was clearly stated that there was no objection to the Collector consenting to the filing of a plaint under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

20. It will, therefore, be necessary to refer to the correspondence between the Collector and the Judicial Secretary to the Government of West Ben-. gal for finding out whether the Government had specifically authorised the Collector of 24-Parganas in this particular case as required under section 93 of the Code.

21. It appears from the papers produced in this case that there had been a previous suit in respect of this endowment which ultimately came up on appeal to this Court in F.A No. 36 of 1940. No copies of either the pleadings or of the judgments of the trial Court or of this Court in this earlier suit have been produced in this case. Reference however is made in paragraph 14 of the plaint to this litigation and an extract from the concluding portion of the High Court judgment is quoted.

22. It is the admitted case of both the parties that the High Court had then held that the endowment was a public one and the properties described in Schedule D of that plaint (particulars of which are not available to us) were the properties of the deity. The other reliefs claimed in that suit, which had not been instituted in terms of section 92 read with section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, could not be considered in that suit. The concluding observation quoted in the plaint and accepted by the parties before us as being a correct quotation runs as follows:—

“In conclusion we may say that the affairs of the temple, though somewhat improved after the formation of the Shebait Sabha are still in a deplorable state and it is highly desirable that either all the shebaits should agree and frame a proper scheme for management in the interest of the deity or if that is not possible a scheme should be put through in a properly framed suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The importance from the public point of view seems to us to be of great urgency.”

23. The plaintiffs alleged in the plaint that no scheme as suggested by this Court in the above judgment had been framed nor was it possible on the part of all the shebaits to agree and frame such a scheme nor such a scheme, if at all framed, be binding upon the deity or the public. The judgment in the other suit was delivered on the 22nd December, 1948.

24. On the 4th July, 1949, the Advocate for the widow of one Harendra Lal Haider, who was stated to have been the original plaintiff, responsible for the filing of the earlier suit, moved the Advocate-General of Bengal to immediately file a suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for having a scheme framed and for recovery of debuttar properties which had been illegally transferred or misappropriated.

25. On this letter the then Advocate-General-of West Bengal made an endorsement on the 11th July, 1949, forwarding the same to the Collector, 24-Parganas, for consideration.

26. From Ex. 1, a letter addressed by the Collector, 24-Parganas, to the Commissioner of the Presidency Division on the 30th August, 1949, it appears that a memorandum, dated 1st August, 1949, had been received by the former from the Commissioner, Presidency Division. It has not been brought to our notice as to what that memorandum contained. It, however, appears from the body of the plaint filed in the present case that the draft plaint had been made ready by the 2nd August, 1949, as appears from the verification clause at the end of the plaint. This was presumably placed before the Collector, 24-Parganas, and was considered by the latter along with the opinion of the Government Pleader.

27. On the 30th August, 1949, the Collector, 24-Parganas, forwarded the copy of the draft plaint along with a copy of the opinion obtained from the Government Pleader as also a copy of Government letter, dated 6th June, 1935, and with his own observations. He stated that in view of the previous litigation and the opinion expressed by the High Court in F.A 36 of 1942, it was unnecessary to hold independent enquiries afresh. He accordingly recommended:—

“that necessary sanction for the institution of the suit may be accorded by Government”.

28. It is quite clear from the concluding paragraph of this letter addressed by the Collector (Ex. 1) that he had asked for the sanction of the Government to the institution of this particular suit of which the draft plaint was sent with his letter.

29. The letter addressed by the Collector to the Commissioner, Presidency Division, was ultimately replied by the Judicial Secretary to the Government of West Bengal. It is on the interpretation of this letter that the parties have agreed to differ. It is, therefore, essential that the letter should be quoted in its entirety.

“Government of West Bengal,

Judicial Department.

Sree S.K Sen, I.C.S,

Secretary to the Government of West Bengal.

The Collector, 24-Parganas.

No. 5977-J, dated Calcutta, the 11th November, 1949.

Subject: Kalighat Debuttar Property.

I am directed to refer to your memorandum No. C. 700-5-49, dated the August, 1949, to the address of the Commissioner, Presidency Division and to say that in Notification No. 3592-L.R., dated the 15th April, 1918, (copy enclosed for ready reference), all the Collectors and Deputy Commissioners in the Presidency Division (excluding the town of Calcutta) have been authorised to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General to give consent in writing to institution of suits under sections 91 and 92 of the Civil Procedure Code by two or more persons having interest in a trust. There is, therefore, no objection to such consent being given in respect of the above trust property It is, however, not intended that such a suit should be instituted by yourself or through another Government servant

Yours faithfully,

S.K Sen,

Secretary to the Government of West Bengal.”

“(Annexure).

Notification No. 3592 L.R dated the 15th April, 1918 (published in “Calcutta Gazette” of 1918 Pt. I, p. 650).

In exercise of the powers conferred by section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1948), the Governor in Council is pleased hereby to sanction the exercise of the powers conferred by sections 91 and 92 of that Code upon the Advocate-General by all the Collectors and Deputy Commissioners, in Presidency Division (excluding the town of Calcutta), Burdwan Division and the District of Darjeeling within the limits of their respective districts”.

30. On behalf of the defendants stress is laid on the fact that the letter opens with a reference to the general Notification, dated 15th April, 1915, of which a copy was enclosed with the letter. It may be noted that this is the same notification to which reference had been made in G. Sarkar v. Nripendra Nath Dhar (5) (52 C.W.N 831). According to the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal that notification authorised the Collector to exercise the power under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Secretary accordingly stated that

“There is, therefore, no objection to such consent being given in respect of the above trust property.”???

31. It is contended that this is no specific sanction to the filing of the particular suit but the Government simply draws the attention of the Collector to the notification of 1918, which had already authorised him to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General under section 92 of the Code and no objection can, therefore be raised by the Government to consent being given by the Collector. It is not that the Government officers applied their mind to the facts of this particular case, as to whether the plaint as drafted could be filed and the Collector authorised to give his consent to the filing of that plaint. It is urged that that the Government had not applied its mind to the facts arising in that particular case was also clear from the last sentence in the letter issued by the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal.

32. If the Collector is being empowered to give his consent on the basis of the draft plaint it could be only consenting to a suit to be filed by the three particular plaintiffs as in the draft plaint. There was no suggestion and there was no occasion even for supposing that the Collector himself was thinking of instituting the suit himself or of permitting the institution of the suit through another Government servant.

33. It is apparent that the Government had overlooked the effect of the decision by the Judicial Committee in Premnarayan v. Ramcharan (1) (L.R 59 I.A 121) and the very clear observation of this Court in G. Sarkar v. Nripendra Nath Dhar (5) (52 C.W.N 831) made only a few months before.

34. Whether this was an intentional One or by oversight the fact remains as: it is clear on the letter written by the Judicial Secretary (Ex. A) that the Government was not authorising the Collector in this particular case permitting the latter to give his consent to the filing of the suit by the three plaintiffs.

35. The endorsement, therefore, by the Collector on the face of the plaint is of no consequence as it must be held that he had not been authorised by the Government to give his consent to the filing of this particular plaint but Government had simply reminded the Collector of the general notification of 1918.

36. We must, therefore, hold that on the face of Ex. A the Collector had: not been authorised in this particular case to give his consent to the filing of this suit.

37. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that immediately after the filing of the plaint in the present suit another plaint had been filed by some of the other shebaits of the deity purporting to be under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure after getting the consent of the Advocate-General of West Bengal (Suit No. 85 of 1949 Administration). Copies of the pleadings of the other suit have not been made available in the present suit but it was conceded by both the parties that the scope of this latter suit is a limited one as it purports to place before the Court a scheme prepared with the help of some of the legal advisers of the shebaits and the Advocate-General but does not contain any one of the various other reliefs relating to misappropriation, mal-ad-ministration or the other allegations made against the shebaits in general or against some amongst them.

38. At one stage of the argument it had been suggested on behalf of the appellant that if reference were made to the steps taken by the Government after the receipt of the Collector's letter dated 30th August, 1949, forwarding the draft plaint with the recommendation that the filing of the suit be approved it might be made clear as to whether Government had actually approved of the filing of the present plaint or not.

39. It was contended that for finding out the actual fact the file in the office of the Secretary, Government of West Bengal, may be called for again. We do not think that we can allow additional evidence to be led at this stage as on a plain leading of the letter, Ex. A, there is no lacuna. Further, the records from the office of the Collector, 24-Parganas, and from the Office of the Secretary, Judicial Department of the Government of West Bengal, had been brought before the learned District Judge in the trial Court. We must proceed on the basis that all such items as were considered relevant for the decision of this preliminary issue had been brought into the record of the present case by the parties and as there is no definite suggestion that there are any relevant materials in the file of the Government of West Bengal no such roving enquiry can be allowed at this late stage. Although the circumstances are rather unfortunate the very strict provisions of the Code leave no option and we must hold that the suit has properly been dismissed by the trial court. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.

40. In the circumstances of the present case, however, as it is no fault of the plaintiffs for which the suit has to be dismissed, it is only proper that the parties will bear their respective costs in both the courts.

41. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Legal Remembrancer for communication to the authorities concerned.

Renupada Mukherjee, J.:— I agree.

P.S