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Amyo Pal Choudhury Petitioner, v. The Province Of Bengal Opposite Party, .

Calcutta High Court
Mar 16, 1953
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Judgment delivered by Mookerjee, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Premises described as Plot No. 489, Southern Avenue, South Calcutta were requisitioned under Rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules on 2 October 1944. Possession of the ground floor was taken on 20 October 1944 and possession of the entire premises on 15 November 1944. No agreement as to compensation was reached between the owner (the claimant) and the Government under section 19(1)(a) of the Defence of India Act, and the matter was referred to an Arbitrator to fix fair compensation.

The Land Acquisition Collector had offered Rs. 250 per mensem for the period when only the ground floor was requisitioned (inclusive of rates, taxes and repairs), and Rs. 450 per mensem (inclusive of municipal taxes but exclusive of repairs) when the entire premises were taken. The claimant rejected these offers and sought Rs. 1,000 per mensem for the entire premises.

The Arbitrator issued notices and directed the parties to state their opinions. The claimant repeatedly sought production of records from the Land Acquisition Collector that had been on file in the earlier Land Acquisition proceedings; the Arbitrator requisitioned those records but, despite reminders, the Collector never transmitted them. The hearing proceeded after various delays and administrative lapses. The claimant examined one witness (an engineer who had built the house); the State examined one witness (a Technical Adviser) who asserted an average rent of Rs. 15 per 100 square feet based on the actual rent of a single house (Plot No. 202).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the proper amount of fair compensation to be awarded for the requisitioned premises under section 19(1)(a) of the Defence of India Act?
  2. Whether the Arbitrator and the Land Acquisition Collector complied with their procedural duties (including production of relevant Land Acquisition records and the issuance of summons) in the reference under the Defence of India Act and Rule 75A?
  3. What is the appropriate approach to valuation and allocation of evidential burden before an Arbitrator under the Defence of India Act, particularly in relation to analogous references under Part III of the Land Acquisition Act?

Arguments of the Parties

Claimant's Arguments

  • The claimant asserted that the proper compensation for the entire premises was Rs. 1,000 per mensem and that the Collector's offers (Rs. 250 and Rs. 450) were not fair or proper.
  • The claimant repeatedly requested that the records in the relevant Land Acquisition case be called for and produced to the Arbitrator, stating those records had already been filed before the Land Acquisition Collector and were relevant and necessary for the hearing.
  • The claimant produced a witness (an engineer who built the house) who testified that the first floor was let to an I.C.S. officer at Rs. 325 per mensem; on the basis of that, the witness stated the whole two-storeyed house would bear a fair rental of Rs. 775 per month.

Government's Arguments

  • The Government maintained that the Collector's offers (Rs. 250 per mensem for the ground floor period; Rs. 450 per mensem for the entire premises) were fair; the Government's position before the Arbitrator was that the Collector's offers should be accepted.
  • The State produced a witness (Technical Adviser to the Land and Hiring Department) who stated that the average rent in the locality was Rs. 15 per 100 square feet. He admitted this average was assessed from the actual rent of only one house (Plot No. 202) and did not provide particulars of that house.
  • The Government argued for a standard per-square-foot rate for the locality (as reflected in the witness's evidence), which, according to the Arbitrator's calculations, translated into a figure approximating the Collector's offer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ezra v. Secretary of State (I.L.R. 30 Cal. 36 : 7 C.W.N. 249) When a reference is made under Part III of the Land Acquisition Act the referring claimant occupies the position of a plaintiff and the Government is in the position of a defendant in a civil suit. The Court used this precedent to contrast the position and duties of parties in Part III Land Acquisition references with those in references under the Defence of India Act, emphasising that the Arbitrator's role under section 19 is materially different.
Ananta Ram Banerjee…Claimant v. Secretary Of State… (C.W.N. 1291) It is for the referring claimant to show that the valuation as fixed by the Collector is wrong in a Part III Land Acquisition reference. The Court cited this to explain the usual burden in Land Acquisition references and then to distinguish that burden from the duties under section 19 of the Defence of India Act.
Harish Chandra Neogi v. Secretary of State (11 C.W.N. 875) The mere expression of opinion by the Collector, without reasons or materials, is not accepted as prima facie evidence that his award was correct; if the Collector gives no reason the claimant has a lighter burden. The Court relied on this to explain when a claimant bears a lighter burden and to underscore why reasoned material is necessary; but it again distinguished the Defence of India Act procedure where the Arbitrator must actively fix compensation on materials produced before him.
Assistant Development Officer v. Tayaballi Alibhoy (35 Bom. L.R. 763 : A.I.R. 1983 Bom. 361) If the claimant makes out a prima facie case that the award is inadequate, the Government must support the award by producing evidence. The Court noted this principle in discussing evidential burdens under Land Acquisition Act references and used it as a contrast to explain that, under the Defence of India Act, the Arbitrator has an independent duty to obtain and consider relevant materials.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a sequence of analytical steps anchored to the statutory provisions and the record:

  1. Procedural duties and lapses: The Court recorded multiple procedural defects in the conduct of the reference: the Land Acquisition Collector failed to send the relevant records despite requisitions from the Arbitrator (repeatedly), summonses and notices were not issued in a timely way (a summons prepared on 8 March 1948 was not handed over until 2 April 1948), and the matter suffered delays and periods when it was adjourned sine die. The record contained no explanation for the Collector's failure to transmit records or for the failure to issue summonses before the hearing.
  2. Statutory framework and distinction from Land Acquisition Act: The Court examined the statutory framework in section 19(1) of the Defence of India Act (clauses (d) and (e)) and Rule 75A (sub-rule 5(a)). It emphasised that the Arbitrator's duty under section 19 is materially different from the Special Judge's role in Part III references under the Land Acquisition Act. The Arbitrator under the Defence of India Act must determine fair compensation and may require production of information; Rule 75A(5)(a) permits authorised persons to inspect premises and property for determining requisition matters.
  3. Duty to produce materials independent of onus: The Court held that the duty to produce materials within the special knowledge or control of either party is independent of any question of legal onus. The Arbitrator must fix reasonable compensation on the materials produced before him; there is no rule that the Collector's offer must stand merely because of onus considerations applicable in Land Acquisition Part III references.
  4. Evaluation of evidence presented: The Court reviewed the evidence. The claimant's uncontroverted material included the admitted rent of Rs. 325 per mensem for the first-floor paid by an I.C.S. officer. The State's evidence rested on an assertion of Rs. 15 per 100 square feet, but the State's witness admitted deriving that average from the actual rent of a single house (Plot No. 202) and did not provide particulars to support comparability. The Arbitrator had calculated rates on the basis of selected "living rooms" area and excluded other spaces; further, the Arbitrator accepted some parts of the Collector's approach but added additional allowances.
  5. Improper reliance on extraneous observations: The Court criticised the Arbitrator for introducing observations in his judgment that were not based on record material — notably speculative comments about what other officers might do or what the particular tenant might have done — and for treating such extraneous remarks as grounds for decision despite absence of supporting evidence or cross-examination on those points.
  6. Appropriate basis for valuation: Given the thin and unreliable basis for applying a uniform Rs. 15 per 100 square feet rate (derived from one house without particulars) and the uncontradicted admission of Rs. 325 paid for the first-floor, the Court concluded that the only dependable material in the record was the admitted Rs. 325 monthly rent for the first floor. Using that figure as an index (subject to stated qualifications), the Court determined a fair monthly rent for the entire premises.
  7. Quantification and allocation: The Court fixed the fair monthly rent for the entire premises at Rs. 675 (inclusive of taxes but exclusive of repairs). For the period when only the ground floor was under requisition (20 October 1944 to 15 November 1944), the Court assessed compensation for the ground floor at Rs. 325 per month inclusive of rates and repairs.
  8. Directions for payment and costs: The appeal was allowed; the Court directed that compensation from the date of original occupation to the date of giving up possession be paid by the Government, less any amounts already paid, within one month from the arrival of the records in the lower court. The appellant was awarded the costs of this Court, with the hearing-fee assessed at five gold mohurs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED. The Court fixed compensation as follows:

  • Fair monthly rent for the entire premises: Rs. 675 per mensem (inclusive of municipal taxes, exclusive of repairs).
  • Compensation for the period when only the ground floor was requisitioned (20 October 1944 to 15 November 1944): Rs. 325 per mensem (inclusive of rates and repairs).
  • The appellant is entitled to the costs of this Court; the hearing-fee is assessed at five gold mohurs.
  • The Government is directed to pay the compensation from the date of original occupation to the date of giving up possession, less amounts already paid, within one month from the date of arrival of the records in the lower Court.

Implications:

The immediate consequence is the reassessment and award of compensation to the claimant in accordance with the figures and directions above and the award of costs to the appellant. The opinion stresses the distinct procedural responsibilities of Arbitrators and Land Acquisition Collectors under the Defence of India Act and Rule 75A, particularly the Arbitrator's duty to require and consider material within parties' control. The Court did not indicate that it was laying down a new binding legal precedent beyond applying and explaining the statutory scheme and commenting on procedural duties in the present reference.

This summary is confined strictly to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add material beyond the text of the judgment.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Mookerjee, J.:— Premises described as plot No. 489 of Southern Avenue in South Calcutta was requisitioned under Rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules on the 2nd October, 1944. Possession was taken on the 20th October, 1944, of the ground floor and of the entire premises on the 15th November, 1944. As no agreement could be reached between the owner and the Government as under section 19(1)(a) of the Defence of India Act as to the compensation to be paid for such requisition, the question of proper compensation was referred to an Arbitrator. The Land Acquisition Collector had offered compensation at Rs. 250 per mensem for the period when only the ground-floor had been requisitioned, such compensation being inclusive of the charges for payment of rates and taxes and for repairs. As from the date when the entire premises had been taken possession of by the requisitioning authority compensation at Rs. 450 per mensem inclusive of municipal taxes but exclusive of repairs had been offered. This was not accepted by the owner.

2. On receipt of the records the Arbitrator directed notices to be issued on the claimant and the government to state their respective opinions as to the fair amount of compensation. On behalf of the Government the offer as made by the Collector was stated to be a fair one. The claimant stated that, Rs. 1,000 per mensem was the proper compensation for the entire premises, and the amounts offered, whether for the ground-floor only or for the premises in its entirety as made by the Collector were not fair or proper.

3. In the petition filed by the claimant on the 11th November, 1947, giving his estimate of the fair amount of compensation it was mentioned that the documents to be relied upon by the claimant had been already filed before the Land Acquisition Collector when the case was pending before him and those records should be called for as they would be relevant and necessary at the time of the hearing of the matter by the Arbitrator. After the Arbitrator had directed the case to be put up on the 13th May, 1947, for settling a date of hearing a petition was again filed by the claimant on the 5th May, 1947, praying that the records in the relevant Land Acquisition Case be called for from the Land Acquisition Collector. The Arbitrator recorded an order to the effect that as the date of hearing had not yet been fixed this petition might be put up after such a date had been fixed. On successive dates when the matter was put up before the Arbitrator the case was adjourned to another date for settling a date of hearing until the 3rd July, 1947, when it was noted that as there was no chance of the case being taken up in the near future the case be adjourned sine die. On that date the claimant had filed a list of witnesses to be called.

4. A new Arbitrator having in the meantime been appointed the case was brought back to the file on the 20th November, 1947, when the 12th January, 1948, was fixed as the date for hearing. Thereafter, on the 3rd December, 1947, the Arbitrator's attention having been drawn to the earlier prayer made by the claimant for the calling of the records in the relevant Land Acquisition Case, such records were called for and the requisition was sent out to the Land Acquisition Collector on the 8th December, 1947. On the 12th January, 1948, hearing was adjourned on the prayer of the claimant, and the 28th February, 1948, was fixed for hearing. On the 17th February, 1948, the claimant again prayed for the calling of the records pointing out that those had not yet been sent by the Collector. A reminder was sent by the Arbitrator on the 19th February, 1948, but such records were never sent, and there is no paper in the records explaining as to why the Land Acquisition Collector inspite of the requisitions from Arbitrator neglected to send up the relevant records. In the meantime further prayers by the claimant citing witnesses were filed, and in some of those applications summonses were sent out except that the notice on the Agent of the Central Bank of India summoning him to produce certain cheques, although prayed for previously, and made ready on the 8th March, 1948, was not handed over to the peon before the 2nd April, 1948, that is, about two weeks after the disposal of the case by the Arbitrator.

5. Reference has been made in detail to the various steps taken by the claimant and the different stages of the proceedings for the purpose of showing the unsatisfactory procedure which is generally followed in disposing of references made for fixing the fair amount of compensation under the Defence of India Act. This is not a solitary instance where laxity prevailed, but in other cases also our attention had been drawn to similar circumstances.

6. This is due in the main to the fact that it is forgotten by the Arbitrators generally that their duty and responsibility when fixing the fair amount of compensation under section 19(1)(a) of the Defence of India Act is materially different from those in the case of a reference under Part III of the Land Acquisition Act. When a reference is made under Part III of that Act the referring claimant occupies the position of a plaintiff and the Government is in the position of a defendant in a civil suit: Ezra v. Secretary of State (1) (I.L.R 30 Cal. 36 : 7 C.W.N 249). It is for the referring claimant to show that the valuation as fixed by the Collector is wrong [Ananta Ram Banerjee…Claimant v. Secretary Of State…. (2) (C.W.N 1291)]. If, however, no evidence had been recorded by the Collector during the enquiry by him, or if no reasons had been given by him to support his conclusion the claimant has a very light burden to discharge. The mere expression of opinion, without reasons or materials, is not accepted as prima facie evidence that his award was either correct or proper [Harish Chandra Neogi v. Secretary of State (3). (11 C.W.N 875)]. Except in those cases where the Collector has not given any reason in support of his decision the party claiming an enhanced compensation must produce evidence to show that the award was inadequate. If the claimant produces no sufficient evidence the Collector's award must stand. If the claimant produces no sufficient evidence the Collector's award must stand If the claimant is able to prove a prima facie case that the award is inadequate the Government must support the award by producing evidence [Assistant Development Officer v. Tayaballi Alibhoy (4) (35 Bom. L.R 763 : A.I.R 1983 Bom. 361).]

7. The provisions under section 19(1) of the Defence of India Act, however, place upon the Arbitrator the duty and responsibility of fixing fair compensation. In these proceedings on compulsory acquisition or requisition, unless the compensation can be fixed by agreement under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Defence of India Act, the Central Government shall appoint an Arbitrator, who must be a person occupying a certain status to fix the compensation.

8. The procedure to be followed by the Arbitrator is determined by clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section 1 of section 19 of the Defence of India Act which are as follows:

“(d) At the commencement of the proceedings before the arbitrator, the Central Government and the person to be compensated shall state what in their respective opinions is a fair amount of compensation.

(e) The arbitrator in making the award shall have regard to—

(i) the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so far as the same can be made applicable; and

(ii) whether the acquisition is of a permanent or temporary character.”

9. Rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules furnishes more detailed provisions about the procedure before the Arbitrator. Sub-rule 5(a) of Rule 75A aforesaid is in the following terms:

“5(a) Without prejudice to any powers otherwise conferred by these Rules, any person authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the Provincial Government may enter any premises and inspect such premises and any property therein or thereon for the purpose of determining whether, and if so, in what manner, an order under this rule should be made in relation to such premises or property, or with a view to securing compliance with any order made under this rule.”

10. It is quite clear from the provisions referred to above that who properties are acquired or requisitioned under the Defence of India Act and/or the Defence of India Rules, it is for the Arbitrator to require any person to furnish him such information in his possession relating to the property as he may require for determining the proper value and compensation. The duty to produce such materials as may be within the special knowledge and under the control of either the claimant or the Government must be discharged by them, irrespective of and independent of any question of onus being on either of the parties. It is fundamentally different from what the, duties are as fixed under the Land Acquisition Act on the Special Judge hearing References under Part. III of the Land Acquisition Act. It is for the Arbitrator to fix the reasonable compensation on the materials produced before him. There is no question of the Collector's offer being accepted on the abstract rule of any onus being placed on the claimant.

11. In the case now before us, in spite of the fact that the claimant had been from the very beginning, when the Arbitrator was placed in seisin of the case, drawing the attention of the latter that the relevant materials were with the Land Acquisition Collector, it is inexplicable from the records in the present case why the Land Acquisition Collector failed in his duty to send the records in spite of such requisition by the Arbitrator more than once. This was overlooked by the Arbitrator also when the matter was put up for final hearing. It is time that the attention of the Arbitrator, the Land Acquisition Collector and the parties before the Arbitrator should be pointedly drawn to the; nature of the proceedings before the Arbitrator and to the duty which each is to discharge under the law.

12. There are no materials on the record to explain the circumstances under which the summons directed to be issued by the Arbitrator had not been issued from his Court till after the case was heard out and disposed of.

13. So far as the claimant is concerned, he examined one witness, an Engineer, who had built the house in question, and the State examined one witness who attempted to prove that the average rent per 100 square feet in the locality was Rs. 15.

14. The requisition had taken effect so far back as 1944. In the best interests of the parties concerned the amount of compensation should be fixed without any further delay on such evidence as had been adduced in this case, particularly when the evidence adduced by the claimant as to the monthly rent for the first floor of the premises in question remains unrebutted. Only the average to be calculated on the same for the entire premises was attempted to be questioned] during the cross-examination.

15. The premises in question is a south-facing one abutting on the Southern Avenue and on the southern side of the latter are the Lakes and open grounds. On the west of the premises is another Municipal Road, Abdul Rasul Road. The major portion of the structures consists of a two-storeyed house with a garage, a mezzanine floor and certain other sheds. The building was a newly constructed one, the ground-floor being in the occupation of the then owner, and the first floor was admittedly let out to an I.C.S Officer, who paid Rs. 325 per mensem for the same. The testimony of the witness examined on behalf of the claimant taken along with the plan, Exhibit 1, in the case shows what the total area in the different floors was as also the areas covered by portions other than the main building. That the I.C.S Officer paid Rs. 325 per month was not questioned by the Government. When the witness stated that on the basis of the rent so paid the two-storeyed house would bear a fair rental of Rs. 775 per month, the only questions put to the witness were (1) that the rent for the ground floor was sometimes less than that for the first floor and (2) if an entire house is let out to one party, the rent would be comparatively less that what two different tenants would pay for the two floors separately.

16. The witness examined on behalf of the State described himself as the Technical Adviser to the Land and Hiring Department, and stated that he was concerned with the assessment of compensation in respect of the houses requisitioned on the Southern Avenue. The substance of his deposition is that the Collector had allowed Rs. 15 per 100 square feet in respect of eight houses in the locality facing the Lakes. He admitted that he had assessed the rental values of all these houses from the actual rent of only one house, viz, Plot No. 202 Southern Avenue. He did not give any particulars of either the accommodation or the conveniences and the facilities of even the particular house which only he had examined to assess the average rate of Rs. 15 per 100 square feet.

17. The learned Arbitrator points out that the Collector having offered a rent which works out according to the former at Rs. 18 per 100 square feet in place of Rs. 15 stated by the witness to have been allowed in the case of seven other houses, such compensation must be considered to be a proper compensation for the main building. Additional rent was allowed by the Arbitrator for certain portions of the house which had not been taken into consideration, according to the Arbitrator, by the Collector. The total area on which the square foot rate was applied by the Arbitrator was by excluding all spaces other than what he considered to be the “living rooms”.

18. From the evidence as adduced by the claimant, the nature of the building and the amenities available, as also the fact that Rs. 325 per month was being paid by the officer for the first-floor remain uncontroverted. The assessment of compensation by ignoring the amount of rent paid by the officer cannot be justified. The Arbitrator also has accepted the claimant's case that the officer paid Rs. 325 per month as rent. But according to the Arbitrator that rent works out at Rs. 29 per 100 square feet of “living looms”, and he was not prepared to accept this as a reliable basis for fixing the compensation for the premises. He also proceeded to refer to what in his view, other officers of his class purported to do and what the particular tenant officer might have done also. It was highly improper for the Arbitrator to introduce in his judgment observations which were not based on any material on the record. Such extraneous matters ought not to have found a place in the judgment far less been utilised as one of the grounds for decision by the Arbitrator. Even the Government had not raised any such question during the cross-examination of the witness examined for the claimant nor was it even suggested by the Government witness.

19. The position taken up by the Government, therefore is substantially this: Rs. 15 per 100 square feet is the average rate for houses in the locality in question, and should be applied to the present case. Fixing a standard rate of rent per 100 square feet for residential houses in Calcutta is not at all an easy task; even if it can be so fixed in any particular locality, sufficient materials must be made available to the Court before a particular rate can be accepted as the prevailing rate for residential houses in that locality. In business quarters, no doubt, particular rates in particular localities can be much more easily fixed, as the amenities and facilities necessary for such, business quarters may be of particular standards in particular localities. In the case, however, of residential quarters such a method is a very risky one as there are so many uncertain quantities which influence and regulate the rate of rent of a particular premises, as distinguished from the rent payable, it may be even for the contiguous house. What is the nature of the structures? What are the amenities available? For what particular class of persons is the premises meant for letting out? Whether there are open lands, lawns, etc.? The arrangements made for attached bathrooms to each living room? The arrangements for servants' quarters? Whether the premises are within easy reach from the tramways or bus routes, etc.? Whether the premises stand at the junction of two roads or with one frontage only? There may be various other considerations in particular cases and particular localities. Even when there are comparable considerations no average is possible to be worked out from one or two cases only.

20. The rent of a particular premises would depend on considerations mentioned above and others as well. In the present case the so-called expert had determined the rate of rent per 100 square feet from the actual rent of one house only. The particulars of that house even have not been stated before the Arbitrator. Although that witness stated that Rs. 15 per 100 square feet had been worked out and applied in the case of all houses, no question was put to him by the Government to elucidate whether this rate of Rs. 15 per 100 square feet is to be calculated on the “living room” area only as done by the Arbitrator, without any material in the record, on for the entire floor area.

21. Apart from the initial difficulties attending the fixation of an average rate of rent for residential houses in the locality, the records in the present case do not contain any materials on which such a rate can be fixed unless the ipse dixit of the expert who fixed the rent with reference to one house only be accepted. This will be most improper. The only relevant material, therefore, on which the Court can proceed to fix the fair rent and compensation in the present case is by taking the admitted rent Rs. 325 per month for the first-floor without considering any extraneous matter.

22. If the rent for the first-floor be taken as the index for arriving at the rent of the entire premises, subject to certain qualifications and limitations, in our view the fair monthly rent for the entire premises should be Rs. 675 inclusive of taxes, but exclusive of repairs.

23. The rent which was being paid by the officer tenant is not shown to be inclusive or exclusive of the occupier's share of rates. In the absence of such evidence it would be only fair to take it that the usual share of the occupier's share of taxes on the rental was paid by the tenant in addition to the rent as under the normal provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act.

24. The Arbitrator has overlooked that for some period, viz., from the 20th October, 1944, to the 15th November, 1944, only the ground-floor had been taken possession of and the compensation for that period will not be the compensation for the entire premises. We assess the compensation for that period for the ground floor at Rs. 325 per month inclusive of rates and repairs.

25. This appeal is accordingly allowed and the compensation is to be fixed according to the directions given above. The appellant will be entitled to the costs of this Court, the hearing-fee being assessed at five gold mohurs.

26. We further direct that the compensation from the date of the original occupation to the date of giving up possession be paid by the Government less such amount as might have been paid in the meantime within one month from the date of the arrival of the records in the lower Court.

P.N Mookerjee, J.:— I agree.

P.S