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Satish Chandra Saha v. The State
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (accused) was tried by an Assistant Sessions Judge at Alipore, with a jury, on a charge under Section 304, Penal Code for causing the death of Chaitanya Saha. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty under Section 304, Part I, and the appellant was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years.
The prosecution case was that on 26 May 1951, between about 8 and 8:30 P.M., the deceased went to the accused's house in Makalgacha village to recover a cow the accused had confined. While walking there he cried out that he was being killed by "Satish Kala." Witnesses Keshab, Bhusan and Baharali Gazi (the latter having joined) saw or heard parts of the incident; Keshab flashed a torch and reported seeing the accused strike the deceased on the shoulder and then walk back to his house. The injured deceased was given first aid, taken to Basirhat hospital, made a statement to a Deputy Magistrate (which became a dying declaration after his death at 7:45 A.M.), and subsequently died. Articles including an axe were seized from the accused's house and earth containing blood was collected from beneath a banyan tree; chemical and serological tests revealed marks of human blood on seized articles. The accused surrendered in July 1951, a charge-sheet followed, and after committal and trial the conviction and sentence were recorded.
The accused's defence, as revealed in cross-examination, was that he had been falsely implicated as the result of a conspiracy among some prosecution witnesses, and that another villager named Satish Chandra Saha might have committed the offence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the statement made by the deceased (as reported by witness Keshab that the deceased said he was going to the accused's house to recover his cow) was admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act as a statement as to a circumstance of the transaction which resulted in his death.
- Whether the learned Judge misdirected the jury by incorrectly stating that P.W.3 (Keshab) had said in the first information report that he saw the accused strike the deceased with an axe, when the first information report did not actually record that the witness saw the striking.
- Whether the learned Judge misdirected the jury by indicating that certain witnesses (P.W.7 Bhusan, P.W.8 Paresh and P.W.11 Hazari) had no omissions or contradictions between their prior statements and their trial evidence, potentially suggesting corroboration by earlier statements and risking contravention of Section 162 CrPC / Section 157 Evidence Act principles.
- In light of the identified misdirections, whether the conviction should stand or the appellant should be granted a retrial.
Arguments of the Parties
Prosecution's Case (as presented at trial)
- The deceased went to the accused's house to recover his cow; upon returning he cried that he was being killed by the accused.
- Witnesses saw or heard the incident; Keshab flashed a torch and reported seeing the accused strike the deceased on the shoulder and then walk back to his house.
- First aid was given, the deceased was taken to hospital, made a statement to a Deputy Magistrate (dying declaration), and later died. Physical evidence (an axe, blood-stained earth) was seized and testing showed human blood.
Appellant's Arguments (as raised by Mr. Roy Choudhury)
- That Keshab's evidence recounting what the deceased said on his way to the accused's house was hearsay and not admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act because it did not refer to circumstances of the transaction resulting in death; reliance placed on Venkatasubha Reddi v. Emperor to show remoteness.
- The learned Judge's summing up contained misdirections: (a) incorrectly stating that P.W.3 had said in the first information report that he saw the accused strike the deceased with an axe; (b) improperly suggesting that there were no omissions or contradictions in the prior statements of P.W.7, P.W.8 and P.W.11, and that P.W.11 had not been confronted with omissions as to his statement to police — thereby risking indirect use of inadmissible prior police statements.
- That the accused had been falsely implicated as the result of a conspiracy and that another villager (Satish Chandra Saha) might have been the real assailant (defence theory raised in cross-examination).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Venkatasubha Reddi v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Mad 689 | Authority illustrating that a deceased's statement may be too remote in time or character to be a circumstance of the transaction resulting in death. | The judgment was distinguished: the Court observed that in Venkatasubha Reddi the statement was far too remote; consequently that decision did not preclude admitting Keshab's evidence in the present facts. |
| Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47 (Privy Council) | Definitive interpretation of "circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death" under Section 32(1) — statements about reasons for proceeding to a place where deceased was killed are admissible; the phrase is not restricted to statements made only after the transaction or only when the declarant is near death. | The Court relied on this construction to hold that Keshab's evidence was admissible under Section 32(1) because the deceased's statement that he was proceeding to the accused's house to recover his cow was immediately connected with the quarrel and assault. |
| Gokul Chandra v. The State, AIR 1950 Cal 306 | Application of the Pakala interpretation in Indian courts; supports admitting statements that are circumstances of the transaction. | The Court noted that the construction in Pakala was followed in Gokul Chandra and held, therefore, that Keshab's evidence was rightly admitted. |
| Nandalal Chakravartty v. King Emperor, 49 Cal WN 484 | Illustrates improper use of prior police statements by drawing conclusions about what the accused must have said before police, thereby circumventing Section 162 CrPC. | Sen, J. cited this case to explain the type of impermissible inferential use of police statements. The present case was distinguished: the learned Judge did not draw such inferential conclusions about what had been said to police. |
| Sital Chandra v. Emperor, AIR 1942 Cal 495 | Example of impermissible direction where the judge invited the jury to infer the content of a prior police statement and used that to influence the jury contrary to Section 162 CrPC. | Sen, J. relied on the distinction that in the present case the learned Judge did not invite the jury to infer the content of prior police statements but merely noted facts already before the court (e.g., that a witness had not been contradicted as to prior statements). |
| Bhagwan Singh v. State Of Punjab (I), AIR 1952 SC 214 | Holds that a former statement of a witness may be used either to contradict what is said in cross‑examination or to corroborate what is said in chief (Section 157 Evidence Act) provided proper legal provisions are followed. | Sen, J. cited this authority to explain that statements before the committing court may be used for corroboration or contradiction when legal conditions are complied with, and that merely noting that certain witnesses had not been contradicted as to prior statements was not necessarily misdirection. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court engaged in a staged analysis addressing admissibility, trial directions, and the effect of misdirections on the jury's assessment:
-
Admissibility under Section 32(1) Evidence Act:
- The Court examined Keshab's testimony that the deceased told him he was going to the accused's house to recover his cow. The appellant argued this was hearsay not within Section 32(1).
- The Court applied the Privy Council's interpretation in Pakala Narayan Swami: statements need not be made only after the transaction or when the declarant is near death; they are admissible if they are circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death and have a proximate relation to the occurrence.
- The Court concluded Keshab's evidence was admissible under Section 32(1) because the deceased's statement about recovering the cow was immediately connected with the quarrel and subsequent assault which resulted in death. The decisions in Pakala and Gokul Chandra were followed; Venkatasubha Reddi was distinguished as involving remoteness.
-
Misdirection regarding P.W.3 and the First Information Report:
- The Court agreed with counsel that the learned Judge misdirected the jury by stating that P.W.3 had said in the first information report that he saw the accused give the 'kop' with an axe, when the first information report did not record that the witness or his companions actually saw the striking.
- The appellate Court held the Judge ought to have pointed out the variance between the trial testimony (where Keshab said he saw the accused strike the deceased) and the narrative in the first information report (which did not indicate actual witnessing of the strike). The Judge should have left the discrepancy to the jury to decide the witness's credibility.
- That error was regarded as capable of affecting the jury's assessment of the eyewitnesses' testimony.
-
Directions concerning prior statements and the risk of improper use (Sections 157 Evidence Act and 162 CrPC):
- Counsel argued the Judge improperly suggested corroboration by stating that certain witnesses (P.W.7, P.W.8, P.W.11) had not been shown to have omissions or contradictions between earlier statements and trial evidence. The learned Judge's language might have led the jury to believe prior statements corroborated trial testimony.
- The Court analysed the legal framework: statements before the police are governed by Section 162 CrPC (bar to using statements made to police) while statements before the Committing Magistrate may, under conditions, be used under Section 288 CrPC and Section 157 of the Evidence Act for contradiction or corroboration if properly proved.
- The Court found the latter part of the Judge's direction (as to P.W.11) offended against Section 162 CrPC in spirit, as it suggested corroboration by prior police statements; this could affect assessment of the three eyewitnesses. However, the Court also noted that prior deposition evidence could be admissible if properly introduced and the accused given the opportunity to meet it.
-
Assessment of overall effect and decision to remit for retrial:
- Although there was a considerable volume of other evidence connecting the accused to the offence, the appellate bench considered the misdirections material enough that they could have affected the jury's verdict.
- Consequently, the majority concluded the conviction and sentence should be set aside and directed a retrial before a learned Sessions Judge sitting with a jury on the same charge. The accused was to remain on the same bail.
- Justice Sen (concurring) agreed that retrial was required because of misdirection on a very important point — the eye‑witnesses — although he disagreed that the Judge's reference to absence of contradiction (in respect of certain witnesses) necessarily formed a misdirection. Sen, J. distinguished the cited authorities where the courts impermissibly inferred the content of prior police statements, observing that the learned Judge in the present case limited himself to stating facts already before the jury.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: The conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside and a retrial is ordered.
The precise orders made by the Court:
- CONVICTION AND SENTENCE SET ASIDE.
- RETRIAL ORDERED — the appellant is to be retried by a learned Sessions Judge sitting with a jury on the same charge.
- The appellant is to continue on the same bail pending the retrial.
Implications: The direct effect is that the earlier conviction and seven‑year sentence are nullified and the matter is remitted for a fresh trial. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal precedent beyond applying established authorities (e.g., Pakala Narayan Swami) on the admissibility of statements under Section 32(1) and reiterating the limitations on using prior police statements under Section 162 CrPC. The Court emphasized caution in leading evidence and in summing up to a jury, but no broader new legal rule was announced beyond the application of extant principles to the facts of this case.
Mitter, J.:— The appellant was tried by a learned Assistant Sessions Judge at Alipore, sitting with a jury, upon a charge under S. 304, Penal Code for causing the death of one Chaitanya Saha. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty under S. 304, Part I, whereupon the appellant was convicted of the offence and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 7 years.
2. The prosecution case against the appellant was as follows: The appellant and the deceased Chaitanya were co-villagers and neighbours. Between 8 and 8-30 P.M on 26-5-1951, in the village called Makalgacha, Chaitanya went to the house of the accused to recover his cow which the accused had kept confined. While proceeding from his own house to that of the accused, along the village road, he was accosted by one Keshab Saha who was then sitting with another person on a ‘Machan’ in front of a shop. Chaitanya stated that he was proceeding to the accused's house to recover and fetch his cow which the accused had kept confined there. Shortly after Chaitanya had passed that way, Keshab and his two companions, named respectively Bhusan and Baharali Gazi, the latter having in the meantime joined Keshab, heard Chaitanya cry out as follows:
“I am being killed by Satish Kala. Save me.”
3. On hearing this, Keshab flashed a torch light in the direction of the cry and saw the accused strike Chaitanya on the shoulder and then walk back to his house. This happened near the southern boundary fencing of the accused's house. Keshab and his two companions rushed to the spot and thereafter helped Chaitanya, who had been seriously injured, to walk a short distance upto a banyan tree. There underneath the tree Chaitanya was made to lie down, and shortly thereafter he was given first aid by a Doctor called Dr. Rahaman. In the meantime, many persons from the village had assembled on hearing the ‘golmal’. Chaitanya's wife and daughter also turned up. Before the arrival of the Doctor, Chaitanya muttered in a feeble but distinct voice that “Sate Kala”, had wounded him. After first aid had been rendered to Chaitanya, he was taken to Basirhat hospital at a distance of about 7 miles from the place of occurrence. The party reached the hospital at about 2-30 A.M At 3-30 A.M Chaitanya made a statement to a Deputy Magistrate. By reason of Chaitanya's death, which took place at 7-45 A.M, the statement became Chaitanya's dying declaration. Keshab and his companion Bhusan had accompanied Chaitanya to the hospital and from there-they left for Hasnabad Police Station about 10 or 12 miles away from the hospital Keshab's departure was long before the death of Chaitnya. The-first information report was lodged at about 7-45 A.M The Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police who recorded the first information report then left for the place of occurrence and on arrival there seized certain articles including an axe from the house of the accsued. In addition, he took charge of a certain quantity of earth from underneath the banyan tree. The earth contained blood.
4. Subsequently, a seizure list in respect of the-articles seized on that occasion was prepared indicating the different places from which they were recovered. These articles were in due course sent to the Chemical Examiner and the Imperial Serologist. These were found to have upon them marks of human blood. It was until July 1951 that the accused surrendered in Court. After the investigation a charge-sheet was submitted and thereafter a preliminary enquiry was held and, as I have stated before, after being committed to the Court of Sessions, the appellant was tried and convicted of an offence under S. 304, Penal Code.
5. The defence of the accused, as it appeared from the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, was that he had been falsely implicated as a result of a conspiracy among some of the prosecution witnesses. It was also suggested on his behalf that another person of the name of Satish Chandra Saha, also a co-villager, might have committed the offence.
6. Mr. Roy Choudhury appearing on behalf of the appellant has impugned the learned Judge's summing up in many respects. The first point urged by Mr. Roy Choudhury was that a piece of evidence, vital in the circumstances of this case, was wrongly admitted in evidence. This concerned witness Keshab Chandra Sana's version of what Chaitanya had told him on his way to the house of the accused. The actual evidence of Keshab on the point was as follows:
“I asked Chaitanya where he was going. Chaitanya said that accused Satish had confined a. cow of his and that he was going to release the cow.”
7. This evidence, Mr. Roy Choudhury argued, was hearsay and did not come within Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. Mr. Roy Choudhury's argument was that the statement could not be said to refer to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the deceased's death. In support of this, he cited the decision reported in — ‘Venkatasubha Reddi v. Emperor’, AIR 1931 Mad 689 (A). We must at once point out that in the facts of that case the statement of the deceased was far too remote, both in point of time and as to its character to be regarded as a circumstance of the transaction which resulted in his death.
8. We have no doubt that Keshav's evidence is clearly admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. The transaction which resulted in the death of the deceased was the assault committed in the course of a quarrel over the recovery of the deceased's cow which the accused had detained and for the recovery of which the deceased visited the accused's house, that he was going there to recover his cow which the accused had detained was immediately connected with the quarrel which resulted in the accused's inflicting the injury concerned. The statement concerned was made almost immediately preceding the quarrel over the recovery of the cow and was therefore a statement as to a circumstance of the transaction.
9. The meaning of the phrase “circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death” was considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of — ‘Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor’, AIR 1939 PC 47 (B). In that case the point for decision was whether a statement made by the deceased to his wife that he was proceeding to Berhampore, where ultimately he was murdered, was admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. Their Lordships held that the statement concerned was a statement as to one of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the man's death. In delivering the judgment of the Board Lord Atkin dealing with the evidence or the statement concerned observed as follows:
“The first question with which their Lordships propose to deal is whether the statement of the widow that on 20th March the deceased had told her that he was going to Berhampore as the accused's wife had written and told him to go and receive payment of his dues was admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872. That section provides:
“Statements written or verbal of relevant facts made by a person who is dead…. are themselves relevant facts in the following cases (1) when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question.
Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not at the time when they were made under expectation of death and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.”
10. A variety of questions had been mooted in the Indian Courts as to the effect of this section. It has been suggested that the statement must be made after the transaction has taken place, that the person making it must be at any rate near death, that the “circumstances” can only include the acts done when and where the death was caused. Their Lordships are of opinion that the natural meaning of the words used does not convey any of these limitations. The statement may be made before the cause of death had arisen or before the deceased has any reason to anticipate being killed. The circumstances must be circumstances of the transaction; general expressions indicating fear or suspicion whether of a particular individual or otherwise and not directly related to the occasion of the death will not be admissible.
11. But statements made by the deceased that he was proceeding to the spot where he was in fact killed, or as to his reasons for so proceeding, or that he was going to meet a particular person, or that he had been invited by such person to meet him would each of them be circumstances of the transaction, and would be so whether the person was unknown, or was not the person accused. Such a statement might indeed be exculpatory of the person accused. “Circumstances of the transaction” is a phrase no doubt that conveys some limitations. It is not as broad as the analogous use in “circumstantial evidence” which includes evidence of all relevant facts. It is on the other hand narrower than ‘res gestae’. Circumstances must have some proximate relation to the actual occurrence: though as for instance in a case of prolonged poisoning they may be related to dates at a considerable distance from the date of the actual fatal dose. It will be observed that “the circumstances” are of the transaction which resulted in the death of the declarant. It is not necessary that there should be a known transaction other than that the death of the declarant has ultimately been caused, for the condition of the admissibility, of the evidence is that “the cause of (the declarant's) death comes into question”. In the present case the cause of the deceased's death comes into question. The transaction is one in which the deceased was murdered on 21st March or 22nd March, and his body was found in a trunk proved to be bought on behalf of the accused. The statement made by the deceased on 20th or 21st March that he was setting out to the place where the accused lived, and to meet a person, the wife of the accused, who lived in the accused's house, appears clearly to be a statement as to some of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. The statement was rightly admitted.”
12. The construction thus placed upon the phrase “the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death” was followed in the recent case of — ‘Gokul Chandra v. The State’, AIR 1950 Cal 306 (C). We hold, therefore, that, Keshab's evidence was rightly admitted by learned Judge.
13. It was next contended by Mr. Roy Choudhury that the learned Judge misdirected the jury in stating that P.W 3 Keshab had stated in the first information report that he had in fact seen the accused strike the deceased with an axe. The direction concerned was expressed as follows:
“P.W 3 has said in the first information report that he saw the accused give the ‘kop’ with an axe. You have heard that the positive evidence of P.W 3 is that he saw in the light of the torch that the deceased was given a ‘kop’ with the axe.”
14. We agree that this, as a statement of fact, was entirely incorrect, for P.W 3 did not only not say that he saw the accused strike the deceased but from the narrative as given by him in the first information report it would be quite clear that neither he nor any of his companions saw the accused actually hit the deceased. Before the Sessions Court this witness stated that he had seen the accused strike the deceased. That being the position, the learned Judge should have point ed out that the witness's evidence at the trial was at variance with what he had stated in the first information report, then leaving it to the jury to decide whether they would accept his testimony or not.
15. It would also have been the learned Judge's duty to point out to the jury that according to the narrative in the first information report neither of the two companions of Keshab could have seen the actual striking. In this connection the learned Judge should also have pointed out to the jury that Bhusan had accompanied Keshab to the thana and that it was in the presence of Bhusan that Keshab gave his story. There is no doubt that this error on the part of the learned Judge was bound to affect the jury's assessment of the evidence, not only of Keshab but also of his companions, with what result it is not for us to predicate.
16. Mr. Roy Choudhury next contended that the learned Judge was also in error when he pointed out to the jury that with regard to the evidence of P.W 7 Bhusan, P.W 8 Paresh and P.W 11 Hazari, not a single omission or contradiction had been brought out between the evidence they had given in the Court of the Committing Magistrate and that given in the Court of Sessions. It was also contended that the learned Judge was equally in error when he pointed out to the jury that no contradiction had been brought out by the defence between the statement which Hazari had made to the police and his evidence in Court. The actual direction was in these terms:
“I would mention that so far as the evidence of P.W 7, Bhusan, P.W 8, Paresh and P.W 11, Hazari, in the lower Court is concerned, not a single omission or contradiction has been brought out. P.W 11, Hazari, has not been confronted by the defence with any omission or contradiction so far as his statements before the police are concerned.”
17. This direction, in my view, would in the first instance suggest that the previous evidence of the witnesses concerned was the same as their evidence in the Court of Session, and that therefore the latter evidence was corroborated by the former. In my view, in the absence of a further direction that what a witness stated before the Committing Magistrate was not evidence in the Sessions trial, the Jury might be led to believe of the existence of such evidence. However, the evidence given before the Committing Magistrate could be admissible under Section 288 of the Cr PC if the conditions laid down in the section were complied with. The accused could then have an opportunity to meet the situation. Such evidence could also be used under Section 157 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of corroborating the witnesses' evidence at the trial. But in either case the Judge would be required to follow the relative provisions of law laid down for the reception of such evidence. If it was intended to use the previous deposition as corroborative evidence the same should have been proved as required under Section 157 of the Evidence Act. The accused would then have an opportunity to meet the prosecution case on the point.
18. The latter part of the direction, in my view, clearly offends against the provisions of Section 162 of the Cr PC, which controls the general provisions of Section 157 of the Evidence Act. In my view, the direction concerned involved the suggestion that the evidence of witness Hazari was corroborated by what had been stated to the police in the course of the investigation. The effect of this, in my view, was to affect the jury's assessment of the evidence of the 3 witnesses concerned. There were only three what should be called eye-witnesses, Bhusan, Keshab and Bahar Ali Gazi. There was a considerable volume of other evidence to connect the accused with the offence. We therefore thought that in spite of the misdirections to which I have already referred, we might go into the evidence in the case and decide whether or not it was sufficient to sustain the conviction. There are however certain features in that evidence which have led us to decide that the appellant should be retried upon the same charge. That being our decision, it is not desirable that we go into the evidence in any further detail. We must, however, observe that utmost caution ought to be exercised in leading evidence, irrespective of the result which such caution might entail.
19. In the result, the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant are set aside and I order that he be retried by a learned Sessions Judge sitting with a jury upon the same charge.
20. The appellant will continue on the same bail.
Sen, J.:—
21. (12) I agree that the case must go back for retrial because on a very important point, viz., with reference to the three eye-witnesses, the learned Judge undoubtedly made some mis-direction. He-clearly made a mistake when he said that P.W 3 Keshab had stated in the first information report that he saw the accused give the ‘kop’ with an axe. The first information report carefully perused shows that the informant Keshab did not really see the giving of the ‘kop’ himself and it would make highly doubtful whether any other witness had seen the ‘kop’ with the axe. This aspect of the case was not placed by the learned Judge who only discussed the non-mention of the flashing of the torch light in the first information report. He should clearly have gone much further and stated that from the first information report it would appear that Keshab and his companions could not have seen the actual assault at all.
22. As to the learned Judge having mentioned that as regards the evidence of certain witnesses no contradiction had been brought out I am unable to agree that this constituted a misdirection. In so far as the statement before the police is concerned, the learned Judge stated that P.W 11, Hazari had not been confronted by the defence with any omission or contradiction so far as his statement before the police was concerned. This did not, in my opinion, amount to an indirect use of the statement made before the police which is clearly inadmissible under Section 162 of the Cr PC, but this was merely a statement of the facts that had appeared at the trial, viz., that certain witnesses had been contradicted with reference to their statements before the police and this particular witness had not been so contradicted. The facts were already before the Court and the jury and there could be no mis-direction in merely putting the same in the words. In this connection Mr. Roy Choudhury has referred to two cases but both of them are clearly distinguishable.
23. In the case of — ‘Nandalal Chakravartty v. King Emperor’, 49 Cal WN 484 (D), the Court was concerned with a statement that an accused was supposed to have made before the police. The Court directed the jury as follows:
“Though the statement the accused made when first challenged is not admissible in evidence, and we do not know what it was, we know that it caused the Inspector to begin searching him. It could not therefore have contained any admission that he had actually received any notes, and so could not have been that he had accepted the notes for the purpose of giving change. This explanation he put forward sometime later in the elaborate statement which the Magistrate recorded.”
24. Here the Court practically drew the conclusion as to what the accused must have stated before the police when first challenged, viz., that he did not then take the defence which he subsequently took in Court. This was a clear use of the statement before the police by the accused, and their Lordships naturally held that it was not open to the Court to circumvent the provisions of Section 162 of the Cr PC, by a process of deduction in this way.
25. In the case of — ‘Sital Chandra v. Emperor’, AIR 1942 Cal 495 (E), one witness called for the prosecution gave a version altogether contradicting the prosecution case. In this connection the learned Sessions Judge directed the jury as follows:
“He (witness) has deposed entirely against the prosecution and it is necessary for us to see how far his deposition is true …. The investigating officer has told us that not merely did he examine Bhaskar Pal (witness), but he actually took down the statement under the provision of Section 161 of the Cr PC. This statement would not go in as evidence. Had Bhaskar Pal then made a statement before the investigating officer which was so entirely contrary to the prosecution case as the one he has made before you, do you think it likely that the prosecution would have put him in the witness box?”
26. This was clearly telling the jury that before the police the particular witness had made a statement supporting the prosecution case and this, of course, was clearly against the provisions of Section 162 of the Cr PC. In the present case the learned Judge has not asked the jury to draw any conclusion as to what statement the witness might have made before the police. He has merely pointed out a fact which was already before the jury, viz., that a particular witness Hazari has not been confronted by the defence with any omission or contradiction so far as his statement before the police is concerned. The learned Judge placed before the jury the contradictions elicited in respect of other witnesses and, in my opinion, he was quite entitled to place a fact that in respect of a particular witness no such contradiction existed.
27. The same remarks apply to the observation of the learned Judge as regards three witnesses P.W 7, Bhusan, P.W 8, Paresh and P.W 11, Hazari that in respect of their evidence no different statements which they might have made before the Committing Court had been brought out. Certain witnesses had been contradicted by the defence lawyer with reference to their statements made before the Committing Magistrate. The learned Judge placed these contradictions before the jury. The learned Judge was therefore entitled, in my opinion, to remind the jury of the fact already before them viz., that certain other witnesses had not been so contradicted with reference to their statement before the Committing Court. In respect of a statement made before the Committing Court there is no such bar to the using of such statement as there is in Section 162 of the Cr PC, in respect of a statement before the Police.
28. On the other hand, the statements before the Committing Court, may, under certain conditions being satisfied, be put in under Section 288 of the Cr PC, both for the purpose of contradiction and for the purpose of corroboration. That the statement may be used for the purpose of corroboration was laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of — ‘Bhagwan Singh v. State Of Punjab (I) ’, AIR 1952 SC 214 (P). The Supreme Court stated that the prosecution was entitled to use a former statement of a witness either to contradict what was said in cross-examination or to corroborate what was said in chief, Section 157 being as much a provision of the Indian Evidence Act as S. 145.
29. But apart from the question that the evidence before the Committing Court could be legally proved and was not a bar, we are only concerned with the mention of the mere fact that certain witnesses had not been contradicted by showing that they had stated differently before the Committing Court. This was not, in my opinion, an attempt to use the statement in the Committing Court without taking the trouble to prove the same under Section 157 of the Evidence Act and Section 288 of the Cr PC. If the learned Judge had gone on to state further that the jury might presume that before the committing court or before the police the witnesses had made some consistent statement that would no doubt amount to misdirection. The learned Judge carefully stopped short of making such statement and contented himself by merely stating fact which was also before the court and the Jury. As I have already mentioned, on one very important item, namely in dealing with eye-witnesses, the learned Judge clearly went wrong. There is sufficient other evidence in the case which justifies a retrial and I agree that the case should go back for a retrial.
B/K.S.B
30. Retrial ordered.
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