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Prankrishna Kamar And Anr. v. Junior Assessor, Sitarampore Opposite Party.

Calcutta High Court
Sep 3, 1953
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This application concerns procurement under the West Bengal Foodgrains (Intensive Procurement) Order, 1952 (the "order"). The petitioners are producers as defined by the order and own and cultivate paddy lands in the mouzas Srirampore, Shibakalinagore, Madhusudanpore and Kasinagore in the 24-Pergannahs. They were served with notices in Form "A" by the Assessor-Inspector, Kakadwip and the junior assessor, Sitarampur, and filed declarations in Form "B" on or about 18 December 1952.

In those declarations the petitioners stated total holdings of 432 bighas 15 kottas 4 ch. of paddy land, of which 273 bighas 10 kottas 4 chattaks were held and cultivated on their personal account, 99 bighas 5 cottahs for the purposes of a debuttur, and 60 bighas for the purposes of a school. Part of the lands were cultivated in khas and part in bhag. The petitioners' father had executed a deed of trust dedicating certain properties in favour of the deity Sri Visalakshi and Siba Thakur and there existed a charitable trust.

Procurement officers investigated and concluded that the petitioners held and cultivated 120.11 acres on their personal account and 84.71 acres on account of the debuttur and trusts. The petitioners sought exemption for 64 family members but were allowed exemption for 62. Notices in Form "C" dated 5 February 1953 directed the petitioners to deliver specified quantities of aman paddy (784 maunds 13 seers 12 chattaks in respect of holdings other than Kasinagore and 6 maunds 31 seers 4 chattaks for Kasinagore).

The petitioners did not pursue the statutory appellate remedy provided under the order and instead approached this Court. A rule nisi was issued on 24 February 1953 directing the opposite parties to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus should not issue to prevent the directives from being given effect.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the absence in the order of any provision allowing use of the produce (usufruct) for bhog/puja of a Hindu deity or for consumption by beneficiaries of a trust constitutes an infringement of the petitioners' fundamental rights under Article 25(1) of the Constitution (freedom of religion) and Article 26 (rights of religious denominations).
  2. Whether the State's acquisition (or interception) of the entire produce/usufruct of land dedicated to a deity or held in trust is constitutionally permissible when set against Articles 25 and 26, taking into account compensation and limitations such as public order.
  3. Whether the exemption allowed under the order to a shebait or trustee for members of his family (as computed for family consumption) is proper when those family members have no legal entitlement to the usufruct under Hindu law.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Mr. Haldar, appearing for the petitioners, argued that the order omitted any provision for bhog or puja of a Hindu deity and for the consumption of beneficiaries of a trust, and that this omission infringed the petitioners' fundamental rights under Articles 25(1) and 26 of the Constitution.
  • The petitioners also sought exemptions for family members (claimed 64, allowed 62) and challenged the procurement directives issued in Form "C".

Respondents' Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The opinion records that the State intercepts the produce for a consideration; there was no contention before the Court that Article 31 had been infringed. The Court also relied on authorities and reasoning that acquisition (including of usufruct) may be effected by the State subject to compensation and public-order considerations.
  • Implicitly (through case authority and the Court's account), the position advanced against the petitioners' challenge was that Articles 25 and 26 are subject to public order and do not prevent property (including property dedicated to religious purposes) or its usufruct from being acquired by law, provided lawful procedures and compensation are followed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Atulya Kumar De v. The Director, P.S & M. (1) (57 C.W.N. 397) Earlier decision in which the constitutional points raised (regarding procurement under the order) had already been considered; the acquisition under the order was linked to a grave public emergency. The Court referred to that earlier treatment of the constitutional points and relied on its conclusion that acquisition under the order was due to a grave public emergency and linked to public order considerations.
Raja Surya Pal Sinnh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1953 S.C.A. 932) Held that property dedicated to charities or religious institutions is not immune from compulsory acquisition by the State; vesting in the State and payment of compensation does not impair the charity. Used to support the proposition that a charity's property (and by extension its usufruct) can be acquired and that compensation converts the benefit into money without necessarily defeating the charitable purpose.
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1953 S.C.A. 53) Confirmed that the Legislature has the power to acquire trust properties and that such acquisition is within legislative competence. Cited to show that there is no bar on acquiring trust properties and to justify acquisition of usufruct on similar grounds.
Suryapal Singh v. U.P. Government (A.I.R. 1951 All. 674) Full Bench ruled that Articles 25(1) and 26 do not prevent compulsory acquisition of religious or waqf properties by law and that acquisition under Article 31 does not necessarily infringe the freedoms under Article 25. Adopted and endorsed by the Court as an authoritative exposition that acquisition of religious-property by authority of law is not the same as infringement of the religious freedoms guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26.
Khetsidas Giridharilal v. Protapmull Rameswar (49 C.W.N. 595 at 601) Authority identifying that maldistribution of essential commodities in times of emergency may lead to public disorder. Relied upon to justify procurement measures taken under the order as measures aimed at preventing public disorder in a grave public emergency.
Ratilal v. State of Bombay (A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 242) Explained that Article 25 protects individual religious freedom but is subject to public order, morality and health, and that Article 26 concerns rights of religious denominations and does not immunize property from lawful acquisition. Quoted and accepted by the Court to reinforce the conclusion that Articles 25 and 26 are subject to public order and do not prevent lawful acquisition or regulation affecting economic/secular activities connected with religion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded to determine whether the omission in the order (no provision for bhog/puja or for consumption by beneficiaries) rendered the order unconstitutional under Articles 25(1) and 26. The reasoning unfolded in distinct steps:

  1. The Court recognized the factual matrix: the State was intercepting the produce and was providing consideration (i.e., compensation). It noted that no contention was raised under Article 31 in this suit.
  2. The Court examined Article 25(1) (freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion) and posed the central question whether State acquisition of the entire produce of land dedicated to a deity or in trust infringed that Article.
  3. The Court reviewed and relied on existing authorities (Raja Surya Pal Sinnh; State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh; Suryapal Singh v. U.P. Government; Ratilal v. State of Bombay) which rejected the contention that property or income dedicated to religious or charitable purposes is immune from compulsory acquisition. Those precedents were used to establish that acquisition, when matched by compensation, does not necessarily defeat the charitable or religious function because the usufruct effectively becomes money that can sustain the institution.
  4. Applying those principles, the Court held that acquisition of the usufruct (produce) is comparable to acquisition of property itself; adequate compensation preserves the functioning of the religious or charitable trust in monetary form.
  5. The Court addressed specific practical concerns raised: it noted that a Hindu deity is a juristic entity that does not physically partake of bhoga offerings, and on the facts no evidence was shown that interception of the usufruct created any real difficulty for performing required offerings. The Court observed that aman paddy (the crop at issue) was not used for the deity's bhoga and that any special offerings required could be procured from compensation.
  6. The Court emphasized that Articles 25 and 26 are expressly subject to public order, and it accepted that the procurement under the order was motivated by a grave public emergency and by concerns about maldistribution of essential commodities (relying on Khetsidas Giridharilal v. Protapmull Rameswar).
  7. On the separate point concerning exemptions granted to shebaits/trustees for family members, the Court analysed paragraph 3(2)(b)(i) of the order (which required the Director to calculate surplus by taking into account the quantity required by a producer for family consumption). The Court concluded a producer cannot "require" in law what he is not legally entitled to; under Hindu law shebaits and trustees (except for offerings made before the deity) and their families generally have no right to consume the usufruct.
  8. The Court declined to take judicial notice of alleged informal arrangements whereby shebaits or trustees might use granted exemptions to feed the deity or beneficiaries, and suggested that the rules should be amended to make explicit provision for deities and trusts rather than tolerating informal "makeshifts."
  9. On these bases, the Court found no constitutional violation of Articles 25 or 26 by the order and concluded that the petitioners' application must fail.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application was dismissed. The rule nisi was discharged, all interim orders were vacated, and the undertaking was discharged. The petitioners were permitted to appeal; the interim injunction and undertaking were ordered to continue until a week after reopening after the long vacation, and any further stay could only be obtained from the Court of Appeal. There was no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The procurement directives (Form "C") stand; the application to restrain commencement of those directives failed. The specific interim relief enjoyed by the petitioners will lapse under the timetable set by the Court unless extended by the Court of Appeal.
  • Constitutional implication applied by the Court: Acquisition (or interception) of the produce/usufruct of land dedicated to religious purposes or held in trust does not, per the Court's application of existing authorities, amount to an infringement of Articles 25(1) or 26 so long as the acquisition is effected by law in the public interest (subject to public order) and appropriate compensation is provided. The Court treated the procurement under the Order as justified by grave public emergency and public-order considerations.
  • Administrative/legal recommendation: The Court identified an anomaly in the order's treatment of shebaits/trustees (exemption for family consumption where no legal entitlement exists) and suggested that rules be amended to explicitly provide for deities and the performance of trusts rather than tolerating informal arrangements.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided opinion. No external facts or inferences beyond the opinion text have been added.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an application in respect of procurement under the West Bengal Foodgrains (Intensive Procurement) Order, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘order’). The petitioners are ‘producers’, as defined by the order. They own and cultivate paddy lands in mouzas Srirampore, Shibakalinagore, Madhusudanpore and Kasinagore in the 24-Pergannahs. The petitioners were served with notices in Form ‘A’, by the Assessor-Inspector, Kakadwip and the junior assessor, Sitarampur. They filed declarations in Form ‘B’ sometime on 18th December, 1952. In the declarations it was stated that the petitioners held and cultivated 432 bighas 15 kottas 4 ch. of paddy lands, out of which 273 bighas 10 kottas and 4 chattaks were held and cultivated on their personal account, 99 bighas 5 cottahs were held and cultivated for the purposes; of a debuttur and 60 bighas were held and cultivated for the purposes of a School. Part of the lands was cultivated in khas and part in bhag. It appears that the petitioners' father executed a deed, of trust, dedicating certain properties in favour of the deity Sri Visalakshi and Siba Thakur and there is also a charitable trust.

2. The procurement officers investigated the facts and came to the conclusion that the petitioners held and cultivated 120 .11 acres on their personal account, and 84.71 acres on account of the Debuttur and trusts. The petitioners claimed exemption for 64 members of their family but were allowed exemption for 62 members. Notices in form ‘C’ were served on the petitioners, dated the 5th February, 1953, directing them to deliver 784 maunds 13 srs. 12 chattaks of aman paddy in respect of their holdings other than Kasinagore and 6 mds. 31 seers 4 chattaks in respect of the latter. The petitioners have not preferred any appeals before the appellate tribunal provided for by the order, but have come up straight to this Court. A rule was issued on the 24th February, 1953, directing the opposite parties to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus should not issue, directing them not to give effect to the said directives. The constitutional points raised have already been dealt with by me in Atulya Kumar De v. The Director, P.S & M. (1) (57 C.W.N 397). Mr. Haldar however raises a new point which requires consideration. In this case, a considerable portion of the land was held as shebait and trustee. He points out that under paragraph 2(4) of the order, a ‘producer’ includes a person cultivating more than 10 acres of land, as a shebait or trustee.

3. Although the order gives exemption to the members of the family off the shebait or trustee, there is no provision for any exemption to be given in respect of the bhog puja of the deity, or for the consumption of the beneficiaries. Mr. Haldar argues that this is an infringement of the fundamental rights conferred upon the petitioners by the Constitution of India, by Articles 25(1) & 26 of the Constitution.

4. I think that the absence of any provision for the bhog or Puja of a Hindu Deity, while intercepting the produce of lands belonging to the deity was an unfortunate omission. I am however only concerned with finding out whether the omission makes the order unconstitutional.

5. Article 25(1) of the Constitution runs as follows:—

“Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions off this part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion”.

6. The question is whether the acquisition by the State of the entire Produce of a land dedicated to a deity or in trust, infringes the right conferred by this article. There is no question that the State is doing so for a consideration. No point is raised before me that there has been any infringement of Article 31 of the Constitution. In Raja Surya Pal Sinnh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2) [(1953) S.C.A 932], Mahajan, J. (page 953), states as follows:—

“Dr. Asthana……argued the case of religious institutions, he contended that the properties held by these institutions had already been dedicated for public purposes, that the income of these properties was being used for holding melas, feeding Sadhus and other charitable purposes and that any reduction in that income would adversely affect those institutions and the properties that were already dedicated for public purposes could not be acquired under compulsory powers of acquisition. The argument is fallacious. A charity created by a private individual is not immune from the sovereign power to compulsorily acquire that property for public purposes. It is incorrect to say that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from the properties has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them.”

7. Das, J., states (page 963):—

“Dr. Asthana appearing for certain religious institutions…………….. contended that their property already dedicated to a public purpose cannot be acquired for another public purpose. I see no substance in this contention. The property belonging to the religious institution will only change its form, namely, from immovable property into money”.

8. Mahajan, J., further said in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (3) [(1953) S.C.A 53], (page 99):—

“Mr. Chakravarty …. urged that as regards trust properties the Bihar Legislature had no power to acquire them without payment of full compensation as certain educational and charitable institutions would thereby be seriously affected. He was, however, unable to point out how the Bihar Legislature had no power to acquire trust properties”.

9. If the State can acquire property dedicated for religious purposes and/or trusts, it can equally acquire the usufruct. Since adequate compensation; must be paid, the religious or charitable trust will function as if the usufruct has been changed into money. Since that is the way all trusts normally function, I can see no prejudice in it.

10. In Suryapal Singh v. U.P Government (4) [A.I.R 1951 All. 674], a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court stated as follows: (Page 690)—

“Arguments have been advanced by learned counsel on behalf of certain Waqfs and Hindu religious institutions, based on articles 25(1) & 26, cl. (c) of the Constitution. Article 25(1) provides that

“subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion”.

11. It is said that a mutwalli's right to profess his religion is infringed if the Waqf property is compulsorily acquired, but the acquisition of that property under Article 31 (to which the right conferred by Article 25 is expressly subject) has nothing to do with such rights and in no way interferes with this exercise.

12. Article 26, cl. (c) provides that

“Subject to public order morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property” and; the argument is that as such institutions have been thereby guaranteed the right to own property any acquisition of their property is a contravention of the provisions of the Article. Article 19(1)(f) is distinguished from Article 26, clause (c) on the ground that the ownership of property is guaranteed under the latter but not under the former. This argument we think to be wholly fallacious. Article 26, cl. (c) confers on every religious denomination the right to own and acquire property but it does no more than this and we can see no ground for holding that it prevents, or was intended to prevent, property belonging to a religious body being acquired by authority of law”.

13. I agree with this enunciation of the law.

14. The acquisition of the usufruct does not in any way take away the right of the citizen to freely profess or practise his religion. A Hindu deity is a juristic entity and does not physically partake of the bhoga offerings. There is nothing to show before me that there was any real difficulty created by intercepting the usufruct. Aman paddy is not used in the bhoga of the deity. The special kind of offerings that are required by the deity can be acquired from the compensation paid. This also applies to the trust. There is nothing to show that the provisions of the trust cannot be carried out without utilising the actual usufruct. Both articles 25 and 26 are subject to “public order”. As I have endeavoured to show in Atulya De's case (1) (supra), the acquisition of rice and paddy under the order is due to a grave public emergency. As was held in “In the matter of Khetsidas Giridharilal v. Protapmull Rameswar (5) (49 C.W.N 595 at 601), maldistribution of essential commodities in such times may easily result in public disorder.

15. In Ratilal v. State of Bombay, (6) [A.I.R 1953 Bom. 242 at 244], Chagla, C.J, states as follows:—

“Article 25 protects religious freedom as far as individuals are concerned…………… But here again the right is not an unrestricted right. It is a right subject to public order, morality, and health, and further it permits the State to make any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or secular activity although it may be associated with religious practice, and there is a further right given to the State and that is that the State can legislate for social welfare and reform even though in doing so it may interfere with the profession, practice and propagation of religion by an individual. When we turn to Article 26 it does not deal with the rights of an individual or of a citizen. It deals with the rights of a religious denomination or a section of a religious denomination…………”.

16. I agree with this enunciation of the law. The result is that I hold that the rights of the petitioners under either article 25 or 26 of the Constitution, has not been infringed by the order.

17. There is only one other aspect of the matter that requires consideration. Although a shebait or a trustee does not get exemption for the deity or a beneficiary he gets an exemption for the members of his own family, which is entirely wrong. So far as a Hindu endowment is concerned, the shebait is entitled to the offerings made before the deity. Apart from this, neither he nor his family are entitled to utilise the usufruct.

18. In this particular case, the shebait has got exemption for 62 members at the rate of 10 mds. for each member. None of these members have any right to consume any part of the usufruct, so far as the debutter is concerned. The difficulty is created by paragraph 3(2)(b)(i) of the order, whereby the Director is enjoined to calculate the available surplus by taking into account “the quantity of foodgrains required by a producer, for his family consumption according to the prescribed scale”. But the answer is that a producer can never “require” anything which he is not entitled to in law. Under the Hindu law, he or his family members are not entitled to be fed (unless there is a special provision to that effect in; the deed of trust or endowment) out of the usufruct, hence he can never in the eye of law “require” the same. I am informed that shebaits and trustees make good the absence of any provision for the feeding of the deity or beneficiary in the order, by utilising what they receive on this heading. I cannot however take notice; of any such makeshifts. It would be better if the rules were amended and some provision made for deities and the performance of trusts, rather than countenance an illegality and then depend upon the goodness of human nature to do the right thing.

19. For the reasons aforesaid, this application must fail and be dismissed. The rule is discharged, all interim orders vacated, undertaking discharged. In as much as the petitioners wish to appeal against this order, the interim injunction and undertaking will continue until a week after the reopening after the long vacation. Any further stay must be obtained from the Court of appeal.

20. There will be no order as to costs.

P.S