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Madan Mohon Jew v. Bejoyabati Dassi

Calcutta High Court
Aug 7, 1953
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Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application to set aside a sale in execution made by the 5th defendant, Mono Durlav Das, who described himself as the Managing Shebâit of the Estate of Sri Sri Madan Mohan Jew under a Will dated 1 August 1914 executed by his father Menick Lal Das (deceased). The property in question was No. 29, Blackburn Lane, Calcutta. The sale took place on 11 March 1953. Although the Municipal valuation of the property was recorded as Rs. 7,760 (per the Exchange Gazette), the property was sold for Rs. 225.

The present application to set aside the sale was filed on 15 May 1953. The limitation for an application to set aside a sale in execution under the Code of Civil Procedure was identified by the Court as 30 days from the date of sale under Article 166 of the Limitation Act, and the Court observed that the application was therefore time-barred.

There was an earlier application by the same petitioner made on 2 April 1953 under Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure (seeking extension of time to deposit the sums required under that Rule). Leave was granted on 16 April 1953 to deposit the required amounts “without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties.” The actual deposit was made on 21 April 1953. The application under Order XXI, Rule 89 was dismissed by the Court on 14 May 1953 (the dismissal being “without prejudice to other rights and contentions of the parties”). The present application under Order XXI, Rule 90 was filed on 15 May 1953.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application filed on 15 May 1953 to set aside the sale (sale dated 11 March 1953) was barred by limitation under Article 166 of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether the period during which the earlier application under Order XXI, Rule 89 was pending (2 April 1953 to 14 May 1953) could be excluded from the computation of limitation under section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.
  3. Whether the dismissal of the earlier application for non-deposit under Order XXI, Rule 89 amounts to a “defect of jurisdiction” or an “other cause of a like nature” within section 14(2) so as to permit exclusion of that time.
  4. How the remedies under Order XXI, Rule 89 (set-aside by deposit) and Order XXI, Rule 90 (set-aside for fraud or material irregularity) interact—whether they are complementary, exclusive, or how election between them should be treated (the Court expressly noted it would not decide the full scope of this point).

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The applicant contended that the application should receive the benefit of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act so that the time during which the earlier Rule 89 application was prosecuted (from 2 April to 14 May 1953) should be excluded in computing the period of limitation for the present Rule 90 application.
  • Counsel for the applicant argued that because the deposit required by Order XXI, Rule 89 had not been put in at the time, the Court could not entertain the earlier application — implying that the earlier proceedings were prosecuted in a Court “unable to entertain” them within the meaning of section 14(2).
  • The applicant relied on precedents (notably Janki Prasad v. Ram Kripal and other authorities interpreted broadly) to support a liberal construction of the words “defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature” in section 14(2).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent (Mr. Lahiri) pointed to the Full Bench decision in Bishambhur Haldar v. Bonomali Haldar (26 Cal 414), and to Shan Lal v. Daulat Ram (AIR 1943 EP 68), to argue that where an earlier application was dismissed on the ground of limitation (or where the dismissal was effectively on the merits of compliance with procedural requirements), such dismissal is not to be characterised as due to “defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature” under section 14(2), and therefore the time cannot be excluded.
  • In short, the respondent urged that dismissal for non-deposit or dismissal because of limitation is a decision on merits and not a result of defect of jurisdiction such as would attract section 14(2).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Janki Prasad v. Ram Kripal, AIR 1951 Pat 486 Interpreted section 14(2) broadly: protection for litigants prosecuting remedies in good faith where a Court is unable to entertain the proceeding; words “other cause of a like nature” construed ejusdem generis with defect of jurisdiction and to be liberally construed. The Court noted this authority was relied on by the applicant, but distinguished it as relating to section 5 (condoning delay) and not to the present case of non-compliance with Order XXI, Rule 89; the Court therefore found it not directly applicable.
Mathura Singh v. Bhawani Singh, 22 All 248 Referenced in Janki Prasad as part of observations on protecting litigants prosecuting remedies in good faith. Quoted in Janki Prasad and considered in the line of authorities about liberal construction; the present Court relied on the distinction between those authorities and the facts here.
Jai Kishen v. Peoples Bank of Northern India, AIR 1944 Lah 136 Authority on ejusdem generis construction of “other cause of a like nature” with defect of jurisdiction. Referred to via the Janki Prasad judgment as part of interpretive guidance; the Court acknowledged the interpretive points but did not apply them to extend s.14(2) to the present facts.
Lal Bihari Lall v. Bani Madhav, AIR 1949 Pat 293 (Full Bench) Full Bench decision cited for liberal construction of section 14(2) and reference to Judicial Committee decisions. Noted as part of the jurisprudential background on s.14(2); again the Court distinguished that body of authority from the present case of dismissal for non-deposit under O.21, R.89.
Ramdutt Ramkissendas v. E.D. Sassoon & Co., AIR 1929 PC 103 Judicial Committee decision referenced in the chain of authorities considered relevant to s.14(2). Referred to as part of the authorities emphasising liberal construction; not applied to alter the result in the present factual matrix.
Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC 156 Another Judicial Committee decision referenced in the same context. Part of the background authorities; not decisive in favour of the applicant on the facts before the Court.
Bishambhur Haldar v. Bonomali Haldar, 26 Cal 414 (Full Bench) Full Bench held that if an appeal was clearly out of time and failed for that reason, it failed for a reason other than “defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature” for s.14 purposes. Relied upon by the respondent; the Court accepted the principle that a dismissal for limitation is not a defect of jurisdiction so as to attract section 14(2).
Shan Lal v. Daulat Ram, AIR 1943 EP 68 Holds that when a Court dismisses a suit or application on the ground that it was barred by limitation, it is a decision on the merits and not because the Court was unable to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction or similar cause. Relied upon by the respondent and given weight by this Court to support the conclusion that time spent in proceedings dismissed as barred by limitation cannot be excluded under section 14.
Sarvi Begam v. Ram Chunder Sarup, AIR 1925 All 778 Involved concurrent applications under R.89 and R.90; held Court ought to have put applicant to election and that dismissal of the R.89 application without election was not necessarily a bar to the R.90 application. Relied upon by the applicant to argue that a prior R.89 dismissal did not necessarily bar later R.90 proceedings; the Court regarded that judgment (including an obiter by Sulaiman, J.) with respect but did not treat it as controlling here.
Gour Chandra v. Pradyumna Kumar, AIR 1945 Cal 6 Held that an application under O.XXI, R.89 need not be dismissed in limine if applicant did not withdraw R.90; R.89 could be stayed until disposal of R.90 if the requirements of sub-rule (2) were observed. Noted by the Court as a local authority addressing the interplay between R.89 and R.90; used to show divergent approaches but not to alter the Court's conclusion on limitation and s.14(2) in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded step by step:

  1. The Court first identified the statutory limitation applicable: an application to set aside a sale in execution must be made within 30 days from the date of sale under Article 166 of the Limitation Act. Because the sale occurred on 11 March 1953 and the present application was filed on 15 May 1953, the Court characterised the present application as plainly time-barred.
  2. The applicant sought to exclude the period during which an earlier application (filed 2 April 1953 under Order XXI, Rule 89) was pending, by invoking section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, which excludes time during which a plaintiff has been prosecuting another civil proceeding, where that proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or a like cause, is unable to entertain it.
  3. The Court examined whether the earlier Rule 89 application fell within the ambit of section 14(2). It analysed the facts: the earlier application was a proper application to the proper Court; it was not incapable of being entertained by reason of defect of jurisdiction; its dismissal was due to the applicant's failure to deposit the required sums under Rule 89. The Court characterised that failure as the applicant’s fault, not as any defect of jurisdiction or similar inability of the Court to entertain the proceeding.
  4. The Court further observed procedural chronology: leave to deposit was given on 16 April 1953 but the deposit was not made until 21 April 1953, leaving unexplained days between 16 and 21 April during which the applicant could have made the present application. The Court treated this unexplained interregnum as a further ground to refuse exclusion of time, although it proceeded to assume the absence of that interim break for the purposes of argument and then rejected the applicant's case on the law.
  5. The Court considered authorities relied upon by both sides. It noted the applicant's reliance on Janki Prasad and related authorities which favour a liberal construction of section 14(2). The Court, however, distinguished Janki Prasad as relating to section 5 (condonation of delay) and not to a case of non-compliance with procedural deposit requirements under Order XXI, Rule 89.
  6. The Court gave particular weight to the Full Bench decision in Bishambhur Haldar and to Shan Lal v. Daulat Ram, which support the proposition that dismissal of an application as barred by limitation (or dismissal founded on failure to comply with procedural requirements) is not equivalent to a defect of jurisdiction or an inability of the Court to entertain the proceedings within section 14(2). On that parity of reasoning, the Court concluded that the dismissal of an application under O.21, R.89 for failure to make required deposits was a decision on the merits of the rule and not for a defect of jurisdiction or other like cause.
  7. The Court then addressed, more broadly, the relation between R.89 and R.90. It explained the distinct statutory purposes of the two Rules: Rule 89 allows setting aside a sale upon deposit (even where the sale may otherwise be valid), whereas Rule 90 permits setting aside a sale only on grounds of material irregularity or fraud (and requires demonstration of substantial injury). The Court considered sub-rule (2) of R.89 (which restricts prosecution of R.89 where R.90 is pending unless R.90 is withdrawn) and discussed the policy reasons for the provision. The Court reviewed decisions on the overlap and interaction of R.89 and R.90 (including Sarvi Begam and Gour Chandra) but expressly declined to decide the full scope of their competition or exclusivity in all circumstances.
  8. On the combined factual and legal analysis the Court concluded section 14(2) could not be invoked to exclude the earlier period in the present case and that the present application was barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Application dismissed.

Implications and consequences:

  • The Court dismissed the applicant's attempt to set aside the sale under Order XXI, Rule 90 on the ground that the application was time-barred and that the period occupied by the earlier Rule 89 application could not be excluded under section 14(2) of the Limitation Act in the circumstances of this case.
  • The Court held that dismissal of the earlier application for non-deposit under Order XXI, Rule 89 was a decision based on the merits of compliance with the procedural rule and not a dismissal attributable to a defect of jurisdiction or an inability of the Court to entertain it within the meaning of section 14(2); accordingly, that time could not be excluded from computation of limitation for the present application.
  • The Court noted its sympathy for the applicant in view of the low sale price relative to municipal valuation but nonetheless found limitation dispositive and dismissed the application. The Court recorded that, having regard to observations made, it was proper not to make any order as to costs.
  • The Court expressly declined to decide certain broader questions about the precise legal interaction and potential exclusivity between Order XXI, Rule 89 and Rule 90 in all circumstances; therefore no authoritative or new settled rule on that point was laid down by this judgment beyond the reasoning applied to the present facts.

Order of the Court: Application dismissed; no order as to costs.

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JUDGMENT

1. This is an application to set aside a sale in execution the application is made by the 5th defendant Mono Durlav Das who describes himself as the Managing Shebait of the Estate of Sri Sri Madan Mohan Jew under a Will dated 1st August, 1914 executed by his father Menick Lal Das deceased. It relates to the sale of property No. 29, Blackburn Lane, Calcutta. The sale was held on the 11th March, 1953. Although the Municipal valuation of the property was Rs. 7,760/- as shown in the Exchange Gazette, it was sold for the sum of Rs. 225/- only. My sympathies, therefore, are naturally with the applicant. The main difficulty, however, on his way is the bar of limitation. I have already said that the sale was held on the 11th March, 1953. This application was made on the 15th May, 1953. The limitation for an application to set aside a sale in execution under the Code of Civil Procedure is 30 days from the date of sale under Article 166 of the Limitation Act. This application, therefore, is obviously time-barred.

2. Learned Counsel for the applicant, however, argues that the applicant should receive the benefit of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. The section begins with a marginal note “Exclusion of time of proceeding ‘bona fide’ in Court without jurisdiction.” In sub-section (2) of Section 14 it is provided:

“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of Appeal, against the defendant, snail be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.”

3. Counsel for the applicant proposes to take advantage of this section on the basis of the following facts which must here be recounted at this stage.

4. There was a previous application to set aside this sale on the 2nd of April, 1953. That application was under Order 21, Rule 89 of the CPC. The frame of that previous petition did not suggest any irregularity or fraud although some such case was intended to be made in the affidavit-in-reply in those proceedings. In substance that petition itself was an application under Order 21, Rule 89. In fact, in that application of the 2nd April, 1953, the same petitioner asked for extension of time to deposit the money required under Rule 89.

5. He obtained my leave on the 16th April, 1953 to deposit the amount of claim and costs of the decree-holder Ganga Prosad Gupta at whose instance the property had been sold; but such leave was expressly granted “without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties.” The actual deposit was not made until the 21st April, 1953. That application for setting aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 89 was dismissed by me on the 14th May, 1953. That order was without prejudice to other rights and contentions of the parties. The present application was made the following day, that is, the 15th May 1953.

6. Now this present application is one under Order 21, Rule 90 of the CPC, and made by the same petitioner.

7. What is, therefore, said by the learned Counsel for the applicant is that the whole period from the 2nd of April 1953 till the 14th May 1953 during which the application under Order 21, Rule 89 to set aside the sale was pending, should be excluded, in determining the limitation for this present application. If that is done, then it is claimed that he is within time. I am not disposed to accept that argument that even then he is within time because between the 16th and 21st April there are five or six days in which he could have made this application but did not do so, and nothing is shown before me why that delay was made. This application should therefore fail on that ground alone.

8. But I will assume for the purposes of argument everything in favour of the applicant and disregard the interim break between the 16th April and the 21st April 1953 and now deal with the argument if the whole period from 2nd April 1953 to 14th May 1953 can be excluded under section 14(2) of the Limitation Act in the facts and circumstances of this case.

9. Now I am not satisfied that this period from the 2nd April 1953 till the 14th May 1953 can be excluded under section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. In order to exclude that time this Court has to be satisfied that the former application under Order 21, Rule 89 was prosecuted “with due diligence” in a Court which, “from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature” was unable to entertain it. Now the application under Order 21, Rule 89 was a proper application and was made to the proper Court. There was no “defect of jurisdiction” or “other cause of a like nature” within the meaning of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.

10. It was argued before me by the learned Counsel for the applicant that because the deposit was not put in as required by Order 21, Rule 89, therefore the Court could not entertain the application and had to dismiss it. Failure to deposit as required by O. 21, R. 89 is the fault of the applicant and the dismissal of the application on that ground is not in my view due to any defect of this Court's jurisdiction or “other cause of like nature”. It is not a point of “defect of jurisdiction” or “other cause of a like nature”.

11. In contending otherwise, the learned Counsel for the applicant has drawn my attention to the case of — ‘Janki Prasad v. Ram Kripal’, reported in AIR 1951 Pat 486 (A). B.P Sinha, J. delivering judgment in that case observes at p. 487 of that report:

“The broad principle underlying the provisions of section 14 of the Act (Limitation Act) is, naturally, the protection against the bar of limitation of a litigant honestly pursuing his remedies, or supposed remedies, to get his case tried on merits, and failing to get his relief on account of the inability of the Court to give him a hearing on merits — see in this connection the observations of their Lordships of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of — ‘Mathura Singh v. Bhawani Singh’, 22 All 248 at p. 253 (B). * * * These words (‘“or other cause of a like nature”), of course, have got to be construed ‘ejusdem generis’ with defect of jurisdiction, that is to say, the defect must be of such a character as to make it impossible for the Court to entertain the suit or application, and to decide it on its merits — see in this connection the observations of their Lordships of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of — ‘Jai Kishen v. Peoples Bank of Northern India’, AIR 1944 Lah 136 (C). It has also been repeatedly held that the words of this section, and particularly the words “or other cause of a like nature”, should be liberally construed: vide — ‘22 All 248 (B)’ and the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of — ‘Lal Bihari Lall v. Bani Madhav’, AIR 1949 Pat 293 (FB) (D) where the decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the cases of — ‘Ramdutt Ramkissendas v. E.D Sassoon & Co.’, AIR 1929 PC 103 (E) and — ‘Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram’, AIR 1917 PC 156 (F), have been referred. In my opinion, these words are wide enough to cover a case like the present.”

12. Now that decision relates to an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in making an application for review of a judgment of that Court. No question of condoning delay arises here. Here is a case of non-compliance and disregard of O. 21, R. 89 leading to the dismissal of the application.

13. As against these decisions, Mr. Lahiri appearing for the respondent draws my attention to the Full Bench decision of this Court in — ‘Bishambhur Haldar v. Bonomali Haldar’, reported in 26 Cal 414 (G). That was a Reference to the Full Bench by Sir Guru Das Banerjee, J. and Pratt, J. in the letter of Reference set out at p. 417 it is said:

“Nor do we think that the mere fact of the Commissioner having rejected the appeal on the ground of limitation is sufficient to disentitle the plaintiff to the deduction of the time during which that appeal was pending, if, in the opinion of the Court which has to determine the question whether this suit is barred by limitation, that appeal was not really out of time, but failed “from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature” within the meaning of section 14 of the Limitation Act. But in this case the appeal to the Commissioner was clearly out of time as well under section 2 of Bengal Act VII of 1868 as under section 16 of the Bengal Act VII of 1880, the only provisions of the law under which such an appeal could lie; and though under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the appeal could be admitted for sufficient cause though out of time, it was for the Court to which the appeal was made to say whether there was any sufficient cause for admitting it. As no such sufficient cause was shown before the Commissioner, the appeal to him must be taken to have been barred by limitation, and it, therefore, failed for a reason other than “defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature” within the meaning of section 14 of the Limitation Act.”

14. These observations found favour in the judgment of the Full Bench delivered by Maclean, C.J on the Reference. The other case relied on by Mr. Lahiri is also on this point. He refers me to the case of — ‘Shan Lal v. Daulat Ram’, reported in AIR 1943 EP 68 (H).

15. In that case it was distinctly held that when a Court dismissed a suit or an application on the ground that it was barred by limitation, it decided it on merits. In any case, it could not be said that it was unable to entertain it either from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature”.

“Where, therefore, the previous proceedings, the time spent during which the plaintiff wishes to be excluded, were started on an application for execution and it was held that the execution application was barred by time, the case does not fall under the purview of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and the time spent therein cannot be excluded.”

16. Reliance in that case was placed on the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court to which I have drawn attention already.

17. The net result seems to me that if an application is dismissed on the ground of limitation, it cannot be said to come under the words “defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature” within the meaning of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. On a parity of reasoning I am satisfied that when an application under O. 21, R. 89 is dismissed on the ground that the required deposits have not been made in time, such dismissal is on merits of the provisions of O. 21, R. 89 and not due to “defect of jurisdiction” in the Court or “other cause of a like nature” within the meaning of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. Therefore, I cannot accede to the applicant's contention that his previous application under O. 21, R. 89 being dismissed because of the applicants failure to deposit the required money within time, the period taken in prosecuting that application should be excluded under section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.

18. There is another point for consideration in this application (?) is concerned. Under O. 21, R. 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure a sale is set aside on deposit. The deposit has to be a sum equal to five per cent, of the purchase money for payment to the purchaser and a deposit for payment to the decree-holder the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered. Now by making these two deposits, a person either owning such property or holding an interest therein by virtue of any title acquired before such sale, is given the right to have the sale set aside. This has nothing to do with the sale being impeached on the ground of fraud or material irregularity. It may have been a perfectly valid sale, even then the law allows it to be set aside under O. 21, R. 89 on making those deposits.

19. In Rule 90 the application to set aside the sale is made on very different grounds. Those grounds are of material irregularity or of fraud. Rule 90 permits an application to be made to set aside a sale on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale provided of course that no sale is set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud unless the Court is satisfied that the applicant had sustained substantial injury by reason thereof.

20. This leads to a consideration of the question, how far these two different applications under R. 89 and R. 90 are complementary or exclusive. Sub-rule (2) of O. 21, R. 89 provides:

“Where a person applies under rule 90 to set aside the sale of his immoveable property, he shall not unless he withdraws his application, be entitled to make or prosecute an application under this rule.”

21. So far, therefore, as can be obtained from these provisions it if the clear intention of the Code that, when there are two applications — one under R. 89 and the other under R. 90 — pending in the Court, the applicant is not allowed to move or prosecute and application under R. 89 unless he withdraws his application under R. 90. The reason behind such a provision is not far to seek.

22. If the sale is set aside on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale, then it will not be proper to pay the purchaser a solatium and the decree-holder the amount stated in the proclamation of sale vitiated by such material irregularity or fraud. The principle is that if the sale is bad and set aside for fraud or material irregularity no money should be payable under such sale. Hence before a sale-is set aside by calling for deposits under O. 21, R. 89 the application to set aside the sale for material irregularity or fraud under O. 21, R. 90 is required to be withdrawn. At the same time the very fact that a provision is made in O. 21, R. 89 Sub-rule 2 appears to indicate a possible legal situation when two applications one under R. 39 and another under R. 90 are pending concurrently.

23. Two decisions on this branch of the case have been shown to me. On behalf of the applicant the well-known decision of — ‘Sarvi Begam v. Ram Chunder Sarup’, AIR 1925 All 778 (I), has been relied upon. There the judgment) debtor made two applications to set aside a sale, one under R. 89 and the other under R. 90. The former was dismissed on the merits after hearing. The latter was dismissed on the ground that the judgment-debtor by pressing her application under R. 89 must be presumed to have withdrawn her application under R. 90.

24. The learned Judges delivering judgment in that case held that the Court ought to have put the judgment-debtor to her election as to whether she would withdraw the application under R. 90, and if she had refused to do so, it should have dismissed the application under R. 89. But the dismissal of the application under R. 89 without putting her on election was no bar to the hearing of the application under R. 90. In fact, at ‘page 779’ of the report the following observation is made:

“In our opinion the converse proposition that an application under order XXI, rule 89, having been heard and disposed of, an application under order XXI, rule 90, is not maintainable, does not necessarily follow from sub-clause (2) of rule 89.”

25. Although it was an ‘obiter dictum’ coming as it does from Sulaiman, J., I have the highest respect for that observation. In this Court there is a decision of S.R Das, J. in — ‘Gour Chandra v. Pradyumna Kumar’, AIR 1945 Cal 6 (J).

26. The learned Judge there comes to the conclusion that an application under O. XXI, R. 89 need not be dismissed ‘in limine’ if the applicant does-not withdraw his application under R. 90, and held that the requirements of sub-sec. (2) of R. 89 were sufficiently compiled with if the application under R. 89 was not allowed to be actually made or prosecuted, i.e, actually moved or proceeded with and was stayed till the disposal of the application under R. 90. In that application the grounds of both R. 89 and R. 90 were combined.

27. It does not appear to me that any one of these cases dealt with the point as to why an applicant should bear the penalty of paying a solatium to the purchaser whose sale has been set aside and pay fully the claim of the decree-holder while having the other remedy of being able to set aside the sale in case of material irregularity and fraud. The point is that it is difficult to see why where there has been a case-of fraud or material irregularity the applicant should rather deposit moneys under R. 89 than apply to set aside under R. 90 without paying the moneys.

28. One can certainly understand such a situation in a case where at the time of making an application under R. 89, the fraud or material irregularity was not known to the applicant. But where both the grounds under Rules 89 and 90 are known and available, and the applicant choses the ground under R. 89 and elects to put in the deposits required under that Rule, then his failure to take the ground of attack of the sale under R. 90 might be argued to bar its subsequent revival because of the doctrine of ‘res judicata’ and principles analogous thereto. The judgments referred to above do not deal with these considerations. It is unnecessary, however, for me to decide this particular point of competition between R. 89 and 14, 90 of O. 21 of the Code, and how far they are independent or exclusive and if so in what circumstances. I therefore do not decide it.

29. I am satisfied in this case that the application is barred by limitation and the provisions of Article 14(2) of the Limitation Act cannot be attracted. Inspite of my natural sympathies with the applicant because of the price at which the property was sold in this case I think that the point of limitation is clear. The application, therefore, must be dismissed. Having regard to what I have observed before, I think it will be proper not to make any order as to costs.

B/R.G.D

30. Application dismissed.