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Bilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie & Co. .
Summary of Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, employed by the defendant company for 22 years, was "pensioned off" with effect from 1 April 1947. The plaintiff and others, represented by the Balmer Lawrie & Company's Employees' Union, contended the pensioning was unjust and an industrial dispute arose. By Government order dated 10 October 1947 the dispute was referred to an Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal made an Award directing reinstatement of the plaintiff and payment of arrears of pay and allowances within three months of the Award becoming effective; that Award was declared binding by Government order dated 22 January 1948.
The plaintiff claimed Rs. 4,476-12-0 as arrears of salary, dearness allowance and bonus, calculated from a deemed reinstatement date of 1 June 1947, with credit for pension sums paid. The suit seeking recovery was filed on 6 July 1949. The defendant filed a written statement denying validity of the Order of Reference/Award, asserting absence of an industrial dispute, contending that the plaintiff had been validly pensioned off (or discharged), and arguing that acceptance of pension amounted to waiver of rights under the Award.
Evidence on record included a copy of the Award, a brief of documents, pension receipts, and oral testimony of the plaintiff. Issues were framed and argued before the Court; ultimately the Court made a decree for the plaintiff.
Legal Issues Presented
- Does the plaint disclose any cause of action and is the suit maintainable? (Issues 1(a) and 1(b) as framed)
- Was there any industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act which was the subject matter of the Order of Reference? (Issue 2)
- Is the Order of Reference and/or the Award valid? (Issue 3)
- Is the plaintiff to be deemed to be reinstated or was the plaintiff reinstated as the result of the Award? (Issue 4)
- Is the plaintiff entitled to any arrears of pay and dearness allowance on the basis of being in employment with the company? (Issue 5)
- Has the plaintiff waived his rights to pay and dearness allowance, if any? (Issue 6)
- To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? (Issue 7)
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Niren De and Mr. Ginwalla)
- The dispute referred by the Order of Reference (10 October 1947) was not an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of section 2(k) read with section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act because it was, if at all, a dispute between a single workman and the employer originating in the discharge itself.
- An individual dispute arising solely from dismissal cannot constitute an industrial dispute where no other dispute existed at the time of dismissal.
- The Award did not effect automatic reinstatement — the Tribunal could direct re-employment but could not "recreate" or automatically restore a contract of employment (relying on R. v. National Arbitration Tribunal, Ex parte Horatio Crowther & Co. Ltd.).
- By accepting pension from June 1947 the plaintiff waived his rights under the Award and thus cannot maintain the suit.
- Rights and liabilities created by an Award are statutory creatures for which statutory coercive remedies (section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act and related machinery) are provided; therefore an individual cannot enforce those rights by civil suit and must resort to statutory enforcement under the Act (relying also on Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium Ltd.).
Plaintiff's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. P. Sanyal and the plaintiff's evidence)
- The plaintiff was not dismissed but was pensioned off; therefore the master‑servant relationship was not terminated and he remained a workman at all material times.
- The Union took up and espoused the plaintiff's cause; the dispute was referred by the Union, and the Award directed reinstatement with arrears — the plaintiff contends entitlement to arrears and reinstatement as declared by the Award.
- The acceptance of pension did not amount to abandonment or waiver of rights under the Award; letters from the Union and continuing correspondence asserted rights under the Award up to the defendant's refusal to implement it.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay [(1949) F.C.R. 321] | Holds that a dispute about dismissal/non‑employment can fall within the definition of "industrial dispute"; Tribunal may determine whether termination was justifiable and may create or restore employment relations in some circumstances. | The Court relied on observations in this case to support that a dispute espoused by a Union concerning discharge can be an industrial dispute; the Federal Court's view that a Union may take up the cause of discharged workmen was used to validate the Order of Reference and the Tribunal's jurisdiction here. |
| J. Chaudhuri v. M.C. Bannerjee [55 C.W.N 256; (1949) 2 M.L.J. 789; A.I.R. (1951) Mad. 141] | Cited in support of the proposition that an individual dispute may not be an industrial dispute (authority for the soundness of that contention). | The Court accepted the contention (derived from authority including this case) that if the discharge itself gives birth to a dispute and no other dispute existed, the dispute may not qualify as an industrial dispute; but distinguished the present facts because the Union had espoused the cause. |
| Birla Brothers Ltd. v. Modak [I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209] | Order of reference wording including "as represented by the ... Union" was held a valid Order of Reference; dismissal dispute held to be an industrial dispute when union represented employee. | The Court cited this case to support validity of the Order of Reference in the present matter where the Union represented the two employees, reinforcing that the referred dispute was an industrial dispute. |
| Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium Ltd. [(1949) A.C. 398] (House of Lords) | Where a statute creates an obligation and prescribes a specified enforcement mechanism, that statutory remedy may be exclusive, particularly where the statute's primary purpose benefits the public; general right of action may be excluded. | The defendants relied on this case to argue exclusivity of statutory remedy; the Court considered it but distinguished by examining the object of the Industrial Disputes Act and concluded that where an Award creates a personal debt/liability in favour of particular employees, a civil suit to enforce that debt may be maintainable in addition to statutory enforcement. |
| Judhisthir Chandra Adak v. P.R. Mukherjee [54 C.W.N. 222] | Authority that suits to enforce payment of monies or wages due under an Award of an Industrial Tribunal are maintainable by individuals in whose favour the Award is made. | The Court relied on this authority as supporting the proposition that an Award creating a debt may be enforced by action in civil courts. |
| Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat Bank [A.I.R. (1950) S.C. 188] | Observation (per Mahajan, J.) that Awards given by an Industrial Tribunal in respect of money (bonus, higher wages) are enforceable by their own force and by the coercive machinery of the Act, and are not merely declarations that furnish a cause of action for a suit. | The Court cited this case to support the view that Awards can create enforceable monetary obligations and that such obligations may be enforced by civil action as well as by statutory machinery. |
| R. v. National Arbitration Tribunal, Ex parte Horatio Crowther & Co. Ltd. [(1947) 2 All E.R. 693] | Holds that an Industrial Tribunal may alter terms/conditions of a contract but (as interpreted in that case) may not have power to restore/recreate a contract of employment that has been terminated; the English case construed reinstatement as a direction to re-employ rather than automatic reinstatement. | The defendants invoked this case to argue against the concept of "automatic reinstatement"; the Court distinguished Crowther on the facts and construction of the Award before it, and noted that under the Indian statute (as interpreted in Western India Automobile Association) the Tribunal may have wider powers including creating employment relations. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in several linked steps, each drawn from the record and precedent:
- Characterization of the dispute and jurisdiction: The Court acknowledged the defendant's argument that a dismissal-originated dispute between a single workman and employer may not be an "industrial dispute" where no other dispute existed. The Court accepted that principle in the abstract, referencing section 2(k) and section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and authorities supporting that view.
- Distinguishing facts: The Court then examined the Order of Reference and the record and found the Balmer Lawrie & Company's Employees' Union had "taken up or espoused the cause" of the plaintiff and another employee (Santimoy Mitra). The Order of Reference expressly named the Union as representing the two employees. Because the Union had represented them and filed the statement before the Tribunal, the Court concluded the dispute was not between a lone individual and the company but was an industrial dispute within the Act.
- Validity of Award and binding effect: Given that the dispute was an industrial dispute properly referred and that the Award was declared binding by Government order under section 18, the Court held that the Award was valid and could not be impeached by the defendant.
- Effect of the Award — reinstatement and arrears: The Award declared the plaintiff reinstated to his previous service and post "with effect from the date on which the Award would become effective" and explicitly stated as a consequence that the employees "shall also be entitled to arrears of pay and allowance" which the company could pay within three months. The Court interpreted these provisions as effecting automatic reinstatement by force of the Award itself (i.e., nothing was left for the employer to do to effect reinstatement) and as fixing the company's liability to pay arrears.
- Waiver and acceptance of pension: Addressing the defendant's contention that acceptance of pension constituted waiver, the Court reviewed correspondence between Union and company and the evidence. The Court found no letter, act, or witness evidence proving that the plaintiff or Union had abandoned rights under the Award. The filing of the suit, ongoing letters and the defendant's continued payment of pension did not show waiver; absent clear proof, waiver could not be inferred. The Court therefore held there was no waiver.
- Availability of civil remedy to enforce monetary obligations created by Award: The Court examined arguments that statutory remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act (including coercive machinery under section 29) were the exclusive enforcement route. The Court reviewed the object of the Act and authorities, and concluded that where an Award creates a private monetary debt in favor of a particular employee(s), that debt is a civil liability arising from the master‑servant relationship and may be enforced by action in a Civil Court (section 9, Civil Procedure Code), although statutory enforcement was also available. The Court relied on prior decisions (Judhisthir Chandra Adak; Bharat Bank) to support this position.
- Distinguishing English authority (Horatio Crowther): The Court considered Horatio Crowther & Co. (English authority) which had construed reinstatement as a direction to re‑employ rather than as automatic reinstatement. The Court observed that the Indian statutory scheme (as interpreted by the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association) conferred broader powers on an Industrial Tribunal, including power to create the employment relation; and that the present Award contained additional language expressly providing for arrears and a payment time‑limit. On that basis the Court distinguished Horatio Crowther and found automatic reinstatement by force of the Award applied in this case.
- Conclusion on entitlement and relief: Synthesizing the above, the Court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to the declared arrears and that the Award created a sum recoverable by suit. The Court ordered decree for the undisputed claimed amount with interest and costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The suit is allowed. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 4,476-12-0 with interest on the decree at 6% and costs on Scale No. 2 (certified for two counsel).
Implications (as stated or reflected in the opinion):
- The Court held that where a Union has espoused the cause of dismissed/pensioned employees and an Order of Reference has been validly made, the Tribunal had jurisdiction and the Award is valid and binding once declared so by the Government.
- The Court held that the particular Award in this case effected reinstatement by its own force and created a fixed monetary liability (arrears) in favour of the employee; such a monetary obligation may be enforced by a civil suit as well as by the statutory enforcement mechanisms under the Industrial Disputes Act.
- The Court found no waiver by acceptance of pension absent clear proof; acceptance of pension payments did not, on the facts, amount to abandonment of the claim under the Award.
- The opinion distinguishes English authority (Horatio Crowther) on factual and statutory grounds and relies on Indian authorities (including Federal Court and High Court decisions) to justify that an Award can create enforceable rights which an individual may enforce in a Civil Court.
- The decision directly results in a decree for the plaintiff; the opinion does not state that it establishes any novel precedent beyond its application of existing authorities and statutory interpretation to the facts before the Court.
Solicitors recorded in the opinion: J.R. Holdar for the Petitioner; Messrs. Sanderson & Morgans for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:
1. This is a suit for recovery of Rs. 4,476-12-0 for arrears of salary, clearness allowance and certain bonus payable to plaintiff under an Award of a Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. The case of the plaintiff as laid in the plaint is that he had been in the employment of the defendant company for 22 years. On the 1st April, 1947, he was unjustly pensioned off for Trade Union activities. Thereupon an industrial dispute arose between the defendant company and the plaintiff and other employees represented by the Balmer Lawrie & Company's Employees' Union and the Government of West Bengal by an order No. 648-Lab., dated the 10th October, 1947, referred the said dispute to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The Tribunal made an Award directing that the plaintiff be reinstated in his employment and it further directed the defendant company to pay to the plaintiff the arrears of pay and allowances consequent to such reinstatement within three months of the date on which the Award would be effective. By an order, dated the 22nd January, 1948, the Government declared the Award to be binding. It is alleged that by virtue of the said Award the plaintiff came to be reinstated to his service and post and shall be deemed to be reinstated from 1st June, 1947, and became entitled to his arrears of pay and allowances from that date and as the plaintiff is still in and Shall be deemed to be in the employment of the defendant company he is entitled to the sum of Rs. 4,476-12 for his pay and allowances from June, 1947, after giving credit for the sums paid to the plaintiff as pension dining the period. The particulars of the claim are set out fin paragraph 5 of the plaint. As the defendant company failed and neglected to implement the Award and to pay the dues of the plaintiff this suit was filed on the 6th July, 1949.
3. The defendant company filed a written statement, on the 17th August, 1949. It is stated in this written statement that on 1st April, 1947, the defendant duly terminated the employment of the plaintiff with two months' pay in lieu of notice and a payment of Rs. 31 per month as pension and certain reasons for the discharge of the plaintiff are set out therein. It is denied that the dispute which was referred by the Government was an Industrial dispute at all and it is submitted that the order of reference was invalid and consequently the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the Award. It is further denied that the Award entitled the plaintiff to claim reinstatement and pay and allowances as alleged. It is further stated that by accepting and enjoying the pension the plaintiff had waived his right to be reinstated and to receive the pay and allowances, and so the suit should be dismissed.
4. The following issues were raised:
1. (a) Does the plaint disclose any cause of action?
(b) Is the suit maintainable?
2. Was there any industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act which was the subject matter of the Order of Reference?
3. Is the Older of Reference and/or the Award valid?
4. Is the plaintiff to be deemed to be reinstated or was the plaintiff reinstated as the result of the Award?
5. Is the plaintiff entitled to any arrears of pay and dearness allowance on the basis of being in employment with the company?
6. Has the plaintiff waived his rights to pay and clearness allowance, if any?
7. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?
5. A copy of the Award, an admitted brief of documents, and certain receipts for pent ion have been out in evidence by consent of parties. The plaintiff has also given evidence in the box. He states that he and a few other employees formed the Balmer Lawrie & Company's Employees' Union in July or August, 1946, and he was the Vice-President of the Union. In or about October, 1946, the employees submitted a Charter of demands to the defendant company. After the Charter of demands was submitted he incurred the displeasure of the Accountant and on 31st March, 1947, he was served with a letter intimating that he was pensioned off with effect from 1st April, 1947. The company paid him salaries for April and May, 1947, and since June, 1947, he is and has been receiving his pension, but he has not given up his right to be reinstated. The plaintiff states that it is because of his activities on behalf of the Union that he ceased to be in the good books of the Authorities and was ultimately pensioned off. He states that he had been discharging his duties smoothly for 22 years and there was no reason for his suddenly being found inefficient. Although the defendant company did not accept the Charter of demands which was submitted originally but after the discharge of the plaintiff they accepted a revised charter of demands. The plaintiff admits that the only dispute referred to the tribunal was about the discharge and reinstatement of the plaintiff and one Shanti Mitra. The plaintiff further states that he did rot write any letter himself stating that he kept his rights under the Award open, but the Union had written several letters asking for reinstatement and salary and allowances. He does not know whether the Union had written any letter stating definitely that plaintiff's rights under the Award had been kept open.
6. Mr. Niren De, the learned counsel for the defendant company, has contended that the dispute purported to be referred by the Order of Reference, dated 10th October, 1947, was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Mr. De argues that the alleged dispute was the dispute, if at all, between a single workman and the defendant company and as the plaintiff was a discharged employee and the origin of the dispute is the discharge itself there could not be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section. 2(k) of the Act read with section 2(s) thereof. The said sections are as follows:—
Section 2 (k)— “Industrial dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person.
Section 2(5)— “Workman” means any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air service of the Crown”.
7. In the case of Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (1) [(1949) Federal Court Reports, 321] Mahajan, J., made certain observations which lend some support to the proposition that a dispute between a dismissed employee and the employer relating to the dismissal itself is an industrial dispute. At page 330 the following observation appears with regard to the third illustration given:—
“An employer may dismiss a man or decline to employ him. This matter raises a dispute as to non-employment.”
8. Then again at page 336 the learned Judge made the following observations:—
“Having regard to the general words in connection with the employment or non-employment in the definition of industrial dispute, it seems clear that if there arises non-employment by reason of the termination of employment by the employer, it will be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine whether the termination was justifiable.”
9. But the facts of the case show that the dismissal took place during other disputes which were subsisting and which had been referred to the Tribunal and consequently the dismissed employees were “Workmen” within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act.
10. It appears to me that there is considerable force in the argument of Mr. De that if the discharge itself originates or gives birth to the dispute then the dispute does not arise till the moment when discharge takes effect or till sometime later than the discharge and in such a case there cannot be an industrial dispute between the employer and the dismissed employee provided there was no other dispute existing at the time. I accept this argument of Mr. De as sound. With regard to the other contention of Mr. De that an individual dispute cannot be an industrial dispute, I think that it is equally sound. J. Chaudhuri v. M.C Bannerjee (2) [55 C.W.N 256; (3) [(1949) 2 M.L.J 789]; (4) [A.I.R (1951) Mad. 141]
11. The order of reference in the present case however shows that the Union had taken up or espoused the cause of the plaintiff and Santimoy Mitra in regard to the dispute as to their discharge, and the Union represented these two employees in their dispute. The relevant portion of the order of reference is that:
“Whereas an industrial dispute has arisen between Messrs. Balmer Lawrie & Co., Ltd., of 103, Netaji Subhas Road and Messrs. Bilash Chandra Mitra and Santimoy Mitra, two of their employees as represented by the Balmer Lawrie & Company's Employees' Union……… etc………….”
12. Thus the case was not of a dispute between a single individual and the company but disputes of two employees represented by the Union, and taken up by the Union, had been referred to the Tribunal. The statement filed before the Tribunal was by the Union. (See brief of documents.)
13. In the case of Birla Brothers Ltd. v. Modak (5) [I.L.R (1948) 2 Cal. 209], per Harries, C.J, and Clough, J., an order of reference in which the wordings were “and their employee as represented by the Birla Brother's Union” was held to be a valid order of reference and the dispute as to dismissal was held to be an industrial dispute. [Per Harries, C.J, & Clough, J.]
14. In the case of Western India Automobile Association (1) [(1949) F.C.R 321] the Federal Court observed at pages 346–347:—
“It was contended that reinstatement of the discharged workman was not an industrial dispute because if the Union represented the discharged employees, they wore not workmen within the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act. This argument is unsound. We see no difficulty in the respondents (Union) taking up the cause of the discharged workmen and the dispute being still an industrial dispute between, the employer and the workmen. The non-employment ‘of any person’ can amount to an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen falling under the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act.”
15. Mr. P. Sanyal, the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs, contended that his client was not dismissed or discharged but was merely pensioned off and so the relationship of master and servant had not been terminated or wiped out at any time and so according to the learned advocate, the plaintiff remained a workman at all material times.
16. The order pensioning off the plaintiff which was served on him on 1st April, 1947, shows that the company did not dismiss the plaintiff but instead forced him to retire on a pension. The Union however treated it as a discharge (See Statement of Union filed before Tribunal.) In my view when an employee retires ??? is forced to retire on a pension he cannot be said to be still in employment. He ceases to be an employee or a workman but he receives the pension in consideration of his past services. (See Oxford Concise Dictionary, page 847.)
17. However, inasmuch as the Union had taken up the cause of the plaintiff it must be held that the dispute referred to the Tribunal was an industrial dispute and the order of Reference was consequently a valid order and the Award was also a valid Award and became binding on the parties upon the order, dated, 22nd January, 1948, being made under section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Award Therefore cannot be impeached by the defendant company.
18. The next question relates to the scope and effect of the Award. It is contended by Mr. De that as the company did not at any time reinstate the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot claim any salary or allowance. It appears to me that the contention of Mr. De cannot be accepted. The Award declares that the plaintiff is reinstated to his previous service and post with effect from the date on which the Award would become effective and as consequence of reinstatement the plaintiff would get arrears of pay and allowances. Further, a time-limit was fired within which the amount had to be paid. It is thus clear that nothing was left to be done by the defendant company. The plaintiff was restored to his service by the Award itself and he was declared entitled to arrears of pay and allowances. There was automatic reinstatement by virtue of the Award. The award fixed the liability of the company to pay the arrears of salary and allowances. In other words a sort of decree for a sum to be calculated arithmetically had been passed against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff.
19. The further point raised by Mr. De is that by accepting the pension since June, 1947, the plaintiff had waived his rights or claim under the Award and so the plaintiff has no right to maintain the suit. The correspondence between the Union and the defendant company beginning from 4th February, 1848, and ending with the letter of the defendant company, dated the 5th May, 1949, show that all the time the rights of the plaintiff and Santimoy under the Award were asserted but as the defendant company refused to implement the Award and declined to pay the salary and allowance the suit was filed on the 6th July, 1949. There is nothing to show that the plaintiff had given a go-by to the Award and accepted the pension in lieu of his claim under the Award. The defendant company has not been able to produce any letter of the plaintiff or the Union to show that the claim under the Award was given up at any time. No witness has been called by the defendant company to prove that the plaintiff had by anything that he said or did, induced the defendant company to believe that the plaintiff had given up his claim under the Award. A suggestion was made in cross-examination in Questions 32 and 33 about waiver but the answers do not throw any light on the point. Unless waiver is clearly established or can be inferred from facts proved, the plaintiff's rights cannot be taken away by mere implication. It is further clear that the defendant company was not at any time misled into thinking that the plaintiff by accepting the pension had elected to forego his rights under the Award; even after the filing of the suit the defendant company has gone on paying the pension and the plaintiff has accepted it month by month. The filing of the suit was a definite indication that the rights under the Award had not been given up but this did not lead the company to stop the payment of pension. I hold that there was no waiver of the plaintiff's rights or claim under the Award and the suit is maintainable.
20. It was further contended by Mr. De and Mr. Ginwalla on behalf of the defendant company, that inasmuch as the rights of the plaintiff under the Award of the Tribunal and the liability incurred by the defendant company under the Award are the creatures of Statute and the Statute also prescribes the remedy for their enforcement, the remedy provided by the Industrial Disputes Act alone can be availed of and the plaintiff cannot proceed by action to enforce the rights or the liability created by the Award. Mr. Ginwalla referred to Halsbury, Vol. I, page 11, paragraph 11 and also relied on the decision of the House of Lords in (1949) Appeal Cases 398 (Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium Ltd.)
21. Mr. Ginwalla has also drawn my attention to various sections of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, such as sections 15(2), 18(a) & (b), 22, 23, 29 and 34 and also to sec. 20(1) of the new Act XLVIII of 1950 and argues that the object of the Act was to secure benefit to the public as a whole and to keep the wheels of industry going and so the only method provided for enforcing obedience to the provisions of the Act is the coercive machinery provided in section 29 of the Act. A private individual has too right of enforcing the provisions of the Act but it is the Government alone who can do so by invoking in aid the provisions of section 29 of the Act.
22. It is further pointed out by Mr. Ginwalla that the Federal Court also has held in Western Automobile Association case (1) (supra) that the remedy for enforcing obedience was under sec. 29 of the Act. It is argued that if it was Open to file a suit, the Federal Court would have said so. It may be pointed out however in answer to this contention that the question before the Federal Court was the question of reinstatement and as no suit lies for enforcing reinstatement, this aspect of the question whether an action lies for enforcing any right under an Award of an Industrial Tribunal did not engage the attention of the learned Judges of the Federal Court nor any such question was raised. So it was observed by the Federal Court that the remedy was under section 29 of the Act.
23. In the case of Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium Ltd. (6) [(1949) A.C 398] a bookmaker had instituted an action asking for declaration of his right to use a convenient space on the dog-racing track in a Stadium occupied by a company known as Wandsworth Stadium Ltd., and for certain other declarations and also for injunction. The plaintiff had founded his claim on section 11 of the Betting and Lotteries Act (24 and 25 Geo. 5 Ch. 58) and also claimed damages for breach of statutory duty. The section 11 itself provided that if any person contravened the provisions of the section he would be guilty of an offence. Lord Simonds quoted the general rule that “Where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, the performance cannot be enforced in any other manner.” It was pointed out however that this general rule is subject to exceptions and the Court is to consider the scope and purpose of the Statute in question and in particular for whose benefit it is intended. Lord Simonds after an analysis of the provisions of the Betting Act concluded that the primary intention of the Act was to regulate the conduct of race tracks and in particular conduct of betting operations thereon and agreed with the principle of interpretation suggested by Somervell, L.J, that where an Act regulates the way in which a place of amusement is to be managed the interests of the public who resort to it may be expected to be the primary consideration of the Legislature. As the Betting Act had the public benefit for its primary object, it was held that the statutory remedy by way of penalty was the only remedy available and the general right of action was excluded.
24. The Industrial Disputes Act has for its object “the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes” and bringing about industrial peace. “An industrial tribunal can create new rights and obligations between the employer and the employees which it considers essential for keeping industrial peace, though they may not be within the terms of any existing Agreement”. The primary object is to maintain a harmonious relation between the employers and employees of industrial establishments it is no doubt true that by this process the public is also benefited as the wheels of industry are kept going and production of goods in the country is not hampered, but the more immediate object is to remove discontentment from the minds oil the employees and to bring a sense of security in the minds of the employers. To achieve this end provision for industrial Awards is made and there is provision which makes breach of the terms of an Award an offeree, punishable by fine. But this remedy by way of penalty does not, in my opinion, deprive the individual rights of action in cases where the Award confers any personal right or benefit to particular employee or employees for the purpose of bringing about industrial peace among the whole body of employees who are espousing the cause of the particular employee or employees.
25. In the present case the plaintiff is not merely claiming the arrears of salary and allowance due up to the date of the Award but also salary and allowance which accrued due after the Award on the strength of the declaration as to reinstatement made by the Award. In other words the plaintiff's claim extends to or comprises further reliefs which flow from the Award. The Award has created a debt in favour of the plaintiff and I fail to see why payment of such debt cannot be enforced by suit. The debt has accrued from the relationship of the master and servant. It is a civil liability and for enforcement of such liability recourse can be had to an action in a Civil Court (section 9 of Civil Procedure Code) though no doubt the remedy of proceedings for enforcement of the provisions of the section 29 of the Act is also available for punishing the person so liable. Mr. Justice Banerjee of this Court and Mr. Justice Mahajan of the Supreme Court have held that sails to enforce payment of monies or wages due under the Award of an Industrial Tribunal are maintainable at the instance of individuals in whose favour the Award is made. See Judhisthir Chandra Adak v. P.R Mukherjee (7) (54 C.W.N 222 at 224), and Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat Bank (8) [A.I.R (1950) S.C 188, paragraphs 37 at page 202], where Mahajan, J, observes as follows:—
“The Award given by an Industrial Tribunal in respect of either of bonus or higher wages, etc., is enforceable by its own force and by the coercive machinery of the Act, and it is not merely a declaration of a character that furnishes a cause of action to the employee to bring a suit on its foot to recover the wages.”
26. Mr. De placed reliance on the case of R. v. National Arbitration Tribunal, Ex parte Horatio Crowther & Co., Ltd. (9) [(1947) 2 All E.R 693], and submitted that this case has decided that an Industrial Tribunal has no doubt power to add to or alter the terms or conditions of the contract of service, but it has no power to restore or recreate a contract of employment which has been terminated, by directing reinstatement, and so there cannot be any question of automatic reinstatement nor can any claim for salary on the basis of a subsisting contract of service arise in the case before me. But it has to be remembered that the Federal Court in the case of Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (1) [(1949) Federal Court Report 321] has held that under the provisions of the Indian Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, the Tribunal has been vested with power even to make a new contract of employment. Mahajan, J., at pages 336–337 observed as follows:—
“The strongest argument urged on behalf of the appellants was that to in vest the Tribunal with jurisdiction to order re-employment amounts to giving it authority to make a contract between two persons when one of them is unwilling to enter into a contract of employment at all…………… This argument overlooks the fact that when a dispute arises about the employment of a person at the instance of a trade union or a trade union objects to the employment of a certain person the definition of Indus trial Dispute would cover both those cases. In each of those cases although the employer may be unwilling to do so there will be jurisdiction in the Tribunal to direct the employment or non-employment of the person by the employer. This is the same thing as making a contract of employment when the employer is unwilling to enter into such a contract which a particular person………… It can equally direct in the case of dismissal that an employer or employee shall have the relation of employment with the other party although one of them is unwilling to have such relation.” (p. 337).
27. The learned Judge has explained the scope and effect of Horatio Crowther's case (9) (supra) at pages 337–343 of the report.
28. If such is the wide power of the Tribunal—if the tribunal can create the relationship of employer and employee even if the employer is unwilling to do so, I fail to see why clause 14 of the Award cannot be construed to have reinstated the plaintiff to his service by the force of the Award itself. Of course it is open to the defendant Company to terminate this relationship created by the Award by giving proper notice of termination, if sufficient or justifiable reasons exist for such termination. But that has not been done in this case so far.
29. Mr. De also argued that in Horatio Crowther's case (9) (supra), the Court construed the Award for reinstatement as implying a direction upon the employer to re-employ the dismissed workmen and not that such dismissed employees had been automatically reinstated, and the words “be reinstated” in the present award should also bear the same construction. The learned Judges who decided Crowther's case (9) (supra) could never conceive that there could be such a thing as an automatic reinstatement under the English Law because according to them the Industrial Tribunal had no power to recreate the relationship of master and servant which had been terminated at the instance of an employer or an employee. So according to them the reasonable and perhaps the only possible construction to be put upon the Award was that it directed the employer to recreate the relation of master and servant which had been terminated by the employer. In the case before me if clause 14 of the Award had ended with the first sentence then it might have been possible to put the same construction as was put in Horatio Crowther's case (9) (supra). But here the Award proceeds to state further that:
“As a consequence to reinstatement they shall also be entitled to arrears of pay and allowance less any sum, if any, already paid. These may be paid by the company within three months of the date on which the Award becomes effective.”
30. These succeeding sentences distinguish the present case from Horatio Crowther's case (9) (supra). This argument of Mr. De therefore cannot be accepted
31. In my view this suit should succeed.
32. As there is no dispute as to the amount claimed there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 4,476-12,-0 with interest on decree at 6 per cent and costs on scale No. 2. Certified for two counsel.
Solicitors: J.R Holdar for the Petitioner; Messrs. Sanderson & Morgans for the Respondent.
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