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Nalinakshya Bysack v. Shyam Sundar Haldar

Calcutta High Court
Apr 9, 1951
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Factual and Procedural Background

This rule was obtained by a landlord against an order of a Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, which had granted relief to the opposite party tenant against ejectment under section 18(1) of the West Bengal Premises; Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950. The central procedural context is a civil revision challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 18(1) of the West Bengal Premises; Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 applies to orders passed under section 43 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act in proceedings under section 41 of that Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Contended that omission of the word "order" in section 18(1) of the 1950 Act indicates a legislative change from the 1948 Act (which referred to "decrees and orders").
  • Urged that because proceedings under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act are not suits and technically no "decrees" are passed under ordinary definitions, the omission should exclude such orders from section 18(1).

Amicus Curiae (Atul Chandra Gupta)

  • Argued that section 18(5) showed the Legislature intended proceedings under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act to come within section 18(1), and that there was no apparent change in legislative intention between enactments.

Other Counsel

  • Mr. Hirendra Chandra Ghose presented exhaustive learned argument on the subject; the opinion records consideration of that argument but does not detail its content.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Atulya Dhan v. Sudhangsu Bhusan (1) (55 C.W.N 343) Interpreted section 18(1) to include orders under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act; addressed drafting omission and extended meaning of "decree" for that section. The court accepted and followed this Divisional Bench decision as correctly decided and held no Full Bench reference was necessary.
Stoomvaart Maatschappy Nederland v. Peninsular Oriental Steam Navigation Company (2) [(1882) 7 A.C 795, 816] Principle (Lord Blackburn) that omission of words in legislation may be for brevity or redundancy and not necessarily indicate change of intention. Used to support the view that omission of the word "order" in section 18(1) may be for brevity or redundancy rather than an intended change.
Amulya Ratan Bhattacharya… v. Meghmala Dutt…* (3) (53 C.W.N 474) Held that the words "suit" or "decree" did not apply to proceedings or orders under section 16 of the 1948 Act (distinguishing context where section expressly referred to Small Causes definitions). The court noted this decision had been considered previously but gave it less weight here because section 16 (1948) expressly referenced Small Causes definitions, unlike the provision in question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the drafting of section 18(1) of the 1950 Act and the omission of the word "order" (present in the 1948 Act). It acknowledged that omission can indicate a legislative change but may also result from brevity or redundancy (citing Stoomvaart Maatschappy Nederland). The court agreed with the analysis of Mr. Justice Das in Atulya Dhan v. Sudhangsu Bhusan that:

  • Proceedings under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act are not technically suits and do not produce "decrees" as defined in the Civil Procedure Code or in the Small Causes Court Rules.
  • To render the 1950 Act workable and sensible despite imperfect drafting, the term "decree" in section 18(1) should be given an extended meaning limited to the context of that section, so as to include orders under section 41 of the Small Causes Courts Act (i.e., enforceable judgments between the parties without importing the full Civil Procedure Code distinction between decrees and orders).
  • Section 18(5) and the absence of any clear legislative intent to change the scope between enactments supported reading section 18(1) to include such orders.

After considering opposing arguments (including those recorded but not detailed), the court found no reason to depart from the Atulya Dhan decision and applied its reasoning to discharge the rule.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Rule is discharged.

Implications:

  • The court accepted the Divisional Bench decision in Atulya Dhan v. Sudhangsu Bhusan and held that section 18(1) of the 1950 Act should be read to include orders under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act for the purposes of that section.
  • No reference to a Full Bench was considered necessary.
  • Each party was ordered to pay his own costs.
  • The opinion applied and endorsed existing Divisional Bench authority rather than establishing a new, separate precedent in derogation of that authority.

Show all summary ...

Chunder, J.:— This rule was obtained by a landlord against an order of a Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, granting relief to the opposite party tenant against ejectment under sec. 18(1) of the West Bengal Premises;Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950.

2. The question which arises in this case is whether sec. 18(I) of the Act of 1950 applies to orders passed under sec. 43 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act in a proceeding under sec. 41 of the said Act. This point was considered at length by a Divisional Bench of this Court in Atulya Dhan v. Sudhangsu Bhusan (1) (55 C.W.N 343) by Mr. Justice G.N Das and Mr. Justice Lahiri in which the judgment was delivered by Mr. Justice Das and agreed to by Mr. Justice Lahiri. The question has been examined at great length there and almost everything that was urged before us is covered by that judgment. Mr. Justice Das has very rightly pointed out that the Act is very badly drafted and there is some force in the contention of the petitioner in a case of this nature that because of the omission of the word ‘order’ in sec. 18(I) of the Act a change was intended. Obviously under the Act of 1948 it was clearly mentioned that relief was to be given against ‘decrees and orders’. The words ‘or order’ have been omitted in the Act of 1950. Mr. Justice Das also was well aware of the fact as shown in that judgment that proceedings under sec. 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act are not suits and technically no decrees are passed in them either under the definition of a decree in the Civil Procedure Code or the definition of decree as given in Rule 6 of the Small Causes Court Rules framed by the High Court under authority given to it by the Act.

3. We are quite aware that an omission of a word in a legislation may show a change in the intention of the legislature, but such an emission may also be, as has been said by Lord Blackburn in Stoomvaart Maatschappy Nederland v. Peninsular Oriental Steam Navigation Company (2) [(1882) 7 A.C 795, 816] for the salve of brevity at the cost of some obscurity or words are often omitted because they are considered redundant. Mr. Justice Das has also rightly pointed out that the word ‘decree’ has not been defined in the Rent Control Act of 1950 or in the Bengal or Indian General Clauses Act. The meaning of the word has to be ascertained as far as sec. 18(1) is concerned from sec. 18 itself It was urged before us, though it does not seem to have been urged at that length before Mr. Justice Das, that a Divisional Bench of this Court in the case of Amulya Ratan Bhattacharya… v. Meghmala Dutt….* (3) (53 C.W.N 474) decided by the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice S.B Sinha held that the word ‘suit’ or ‘decree’ does not apply to proceedings or orders under section 16 of the Act of 1948. It may be pointed out that Mr. Justice Das had considered this case and did not rightly give much weight to that decision in the present controversy. The reason is very simple. Section 16 of the Act of 1948 definitely drew by pointed reference to the definition of suits and decrees as applicable to proceedings before the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. There is no such reference in anything in this section to the Court of Small Causes. It was further pointed out by Mr. Atul Chandra Gupta, who was heard amicus curiae in this Court as playing a very prominent part in the enactment of this section that section 18 (5) showed that perhaps the Legislature from very beginning intended that proceedings under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act would come within the provisions of sec. 18(1) unless we are to say that between the enactment of section 18(1) and the enactment of the amended section 18(5) there was a complete change in the intention of the Legislature which is not apparent anywhere in the Amendment Act. The Legislature had in our opinion omitted the word ‘Order’ in section 18(1) either for the sake of brevity or because it had considered it to be redundant and not because a change from the Act in 1948 was intended in this Act. We see nothing will be gained by reiterating the important considerations pointed out by Mr. Justice Das as to why the word ‘Decree’ in this section and for the purpose of this section alone, namely, 18(1) be given an extended meaning so as to have the meaning of an enforceable judgment between the parties but not connoting any such finality as distinguishes a decree from an order in the ‘Code of Civil Procedure.’

4. We are in full agreement with the main reasons given by Mr. Justice Das and we agree that to make some sense out of a badly drafted Act and to make it workable decree must be taken to include orders under sec. 41 of the S.C.C Act. We are therefore of opinion, having paid the fullest consideration to the very exhaustive and learned argument of Mr. Hirendra Chandra Ghose on the subject, that we should accept the decision of the Divisional Bench in Civil Revision, Atulya Dhan v. Sudhangsu Bhusan (1) (55 C.W.N 343) and hold that it was correctly decided and no reference to a Full Bench is necessary.

5. Under the circumstances as no other point of any importance arises, the Rule is discharged. Each party will pay his own costs.

[Civil Revision Case 1164 of 1950.]

6. The point which arises in this Rule is covered by our decision in Civil Revision Case No. 1038 of 1950 and we find no good ground for making a reference to a Full Bench. We accept the decision of the Divisional Bench in Atulya Dhan v. Sudhangsu Bhusan (1) (55 C.W.N 343) and in view of it the Rule must be discharged. Each party will pay his own costs.

Sen, J.:— I agree.

A.K.D.G