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Union Of India v. Someswar Banerjee .
Opinion Summary — Harries, C.J. (Appeal from Bose, J., dated 13-6-1950)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff was a permanent Bridge Inspector employed under the Bengal and Assam Railway (a Railway owned by the Union of India). After sustaining a serious back injury, he was absent from work for a considerable time. Medical officers acting for the Railway examined him, issued a certificate declaring him unfit, and the Railway terminated his services effective from the date of that certificate. The plaintiff unsuccessfully sought re-employment and then brought suit seeking a declaration that he remained in the employment of the Railway; the plaint originally claimed wrongful dismissal and damages. The plaint was subsequently amended to seek a declaration simpliciter in the form provided by the Privy Council in High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall (AIR 1948 PC 121).
At first instance, Bose, J. held that the dismissal was contrary to the provisions of Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, because the plaintiff had not been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action of dismissal; Bose, J. granted a declaration in the form used in I.M. Lall. The Railway appealed against that decree. This opinion is the appellate judgment of Harries, C.J., dismissing the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff's termination on the ground of physical unfitness amounted to a "dismissal" within the meaning of Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, thereby attracting the statutory requirement to give a reasonable opportunity to show cause before dismissal.
- Whether the plaintiff was in fact given a reasonable opportunity to show cause prior to the dismissal (i.e., whether the letter of 12-12-1943 sufficed as such opportunity).
- Whether Rules of service made under Section 241 (specifically Rrs. 1708 and 1709 of the State Railway Establishment Code) exempted the Railway from the requirement in Section 240(3) to give such an opportunity and, if so, whether those Rules were intra vires or ultra vires the Government of India Act (and, as discussed, the Constitution).
- What is the appropriate form of relief where dismissal is found to be contrary to Section 240(3) (i.e., whether the declaration in the form of I.M. Lall is appropriate).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Railway) — principal arguments (as recorded)
- Mr. Sannyal (for the Railway) argued that the plaintiff had been given an opportunity to show cause by reason of a letter dated 12-12-1943 from the plaintiff which, it was said, brought certain matters to the notice of the Railway authorities and therefore sufficed as an opportunity to explain.
- Mr. Sannyal further contended that, under the applicable service Rules (Rrs. 1708 and 1709 of Volume I of the State Railway Establishment Code), no notice or explanation was necessary where inefficiency was due to failure to conform to the requisite standard of physical fitness — the specific rule relied on stated that it would not be necessary to serve a charge sheet or obtain explanation in such cases.
- He therefore submitted that the statutory notice requirement in Section 240(3) was unnecessary in the present circumstances because the Rule purported to dispense with it.
Respondent (Plaintiff) — principal contentions (as recorded)
- The plaintiff's case, as brought in the suit, was that he had been wrongfully dismissed and that he remained in employment; he sought a declaration to that effect and had amended the plaint to seek a declaration in the form applied by the Privy Council in I.M. Lall.
- It was asserted (and accepted by the courts below and on appeal) that the plaintiff had not been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause prior to the termination of his employment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall, AIR 1948 PC 121 | The appropriate form of declaration to be granted where dismissal is found to have been effected contrary to the statutory protections (i.e., the form of declaration to be granted in such cases). | The court ordered the declaration in the form laid down by the Privy Council in I.M. Lall and affirmed Bose, J.'s grant of that form of declaration to the plaintiff. |
| North-West Frontier Province v. Surai Narain Anand, AIR 1949 PC 112 | Established that Rules made under Section 241 must comply with the provisions of Section 240; a Rule inconsistent with Section 240 would be ineffective. | The court relied on this Privy Council authority to hold that the Railway Rule (R. 1709(b)) which dispensed with serving a charge-sheet or obtaining explanation in the case of physical incapacity was in conflict with Section 240(3) and therefore could not be relied upon; the Rule was held to be ultra vires. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeds in a logical sequence tied closely to the statutory language and the documentary record:
- Qualification as Government Servant and Applicability of Section 240(3): The plaintiff was a Railway servant and, therefore, a servant in connection with the affairs of the Government of India; Section 240(3) applied to him. The case did not fall within the proviso exceptions (conviction for criminal conduct or situations where it was not reasonably practicable to give such opportunity), so the statutory protection applied.
- Characterisation of the Correspondence as Dismissal: Although the word "dismissal" did not appear in the 15-12-1943 letter, when read together with the subsequent 20-12-1943 correspondence (which referred to forwarding the salary bill and that "final settlement Memo will follow") the court concluded the 15-12-1943 communication was effectively a dismissal, taking effect from 17-11-1943, linked to a medical certificate of 16-11-1943.
- Opportunity to Show Cause: The court examined whether the plaintiff had in fact been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause. The first intimation that the Railway proposed dismissal was the 15-12-1943 letter of dismissal; prior to that no notice was given that dismissal was being contemplated. The plaintiff's 12-12-1943 letter merely questioned the medical certification and raised points but was not a request for reasons in response to a prior show-cause notice nor did it amount to being asked to show cause against a proposed dismissal. Thus the court held the plaintiff had not been afforded the statutory opportunity to be heard.
- Validity of Service Rules: The Railway relied on service Rules (Rrs. 1708 and 1709) that purported to make unnecessary any charge-sheet or explanation where inefficiency was due to failure to meet physical fitness standards. The court analysed the relationship between these Rules and the statutory protection in Section 240(3).
- Supremacy of Section 240(3) Over Conflicting Rules: Relying on the Privy Council decision in North-West Frontier Province v. Surai Narain Anand, the court held that Rules framed under Section 241 must conform to Section 240. A Rule that is inconsistent with Section 240(3) cannot override the statutory requirement. The court concluded that R. 1709(b) was in conflict with Section 240(3) and therefore ultra vires; it further observed that such a Rule would also be ultra vires the (then) provisions of the Constitution, although the Constitution did not apply to the specific facts of this case.
- Meaning of "Dismissal": The court expressly rejected the submission that termination for physical unfitness is not a "dismissal." It held that dismissal includes termination of employment whether for misconduct, dishonesty, or physical incapacity — the decisive feature is termination of employment, not the reason. Therefore, dismissal on grounds of physical unfitness falls within Section 240(3).
- Relief and Form of Declaration: Because the dismissal contravened Section 240(3), the plaintiff was entitled to the declaratory relief granted by Bose, J. The court adopted the form of declaration prescribed in I.M. Lall and affirmed that form as appropriate in the circumstances.
- Disposition: For these reasons, the court found no merit in the appeal, dismissed it with costs, and certified the case for two counsel.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEAL DISMISSED. The appellate court affirmed Bose, J.'s decree that the plaintiff's dismissal was contrary to Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration in the form given by the Privy Council in I.M. Lall.
Immediate consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):
- The Railway Rule relied upon (R. 1709(b) of the State Railway Establishment Code) which dispensed with serving a charge-sheet or obtaining explanation where inefficiency arose from physical incapacity was held to be in conflict with Section 240(3) and therefore ultra vires the Government of India Act; the court observed that such a Rule would also be ultra vires the then provisions of the Constitution (though the Constitution did not apply to this case).
- The plaintiff is entitled to the declaratory relief granted by the lower court in the form adopted from I.M. Lall. The dismissal by the Railway was held to be unlawful for want of the statutory opportunity to show cause.
- The appeal was dismissed with costs; the court certified the case for two counsel.
Broader legal significance: The opinion applies and follows established Privy Council authority on the supremacy of statutory protections (Section 240(3)) over conflicting service Rules made under Section 241 and confirms that termination for physical incapacity constitutes "dismissal" for purposes of Section 240(3). The court did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying those authorities and their logical consequences to the facts before it.
Harries, C.J:— This is an appeal from an order and decree of Bose, J., dated 13-6-1950.
2. The plaintiff who had been employed as a permanent Bridge Inspector under the Bengal and Assam Railway brought the suit for a declaration that he was still in the employment of the Railway, which of course was a Railway owned by the Union of India.
3. The plaintiff had sustained a serious injury to his back and was away from employment for a considerable time. Eventually, he was examined by medical officers on behalf of the Railway and he was declared to be unfit and his services were terminated from the date of the certificate declaring him unfit. The plaintiff apparently attempted to get the Railway authorities to change their view but they made it clear that they could not re-employ the plaintiff. He, therefore, brought a suit and the relief claimed originally was a declaration that he had been wrongfully dismissd and there was a further prayer for damages. Later an application was made to amend the plaint and a declaration simpliciter was asked for in the form granted by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of — ‘High Commissioner for India v. I.M Lall’, AIR 1948 PC 121 (A).
4. The case eventually came before Bose, J. who held that the plaintiff had been dismissed contrary to the provisions of Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was in force at the time. He held that the dismissal was wrongful in that the plaintiff had not been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed, namely, dismissing him. As he had been wrongfully dismissed, the learned Judge gave-him the declaration as given to the plaintiff in the-case of I.M Lall. It is from that decree that the present appeal has been preferred.
5. Sub-section (3) of Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is in these terms:
“No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed. or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him: Provided that this sub-section shall not apply,
(a) where a person is dismissed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where an authority empowered to dismiss a person or reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to give to that person an opportunity of showing cause.”
6. The plaintiff, as I have said, was a Railway servant and therefore, a servant of the Government of India and that is conceded. Sub-section (3) of S. 240 clearly applied to this case and admittedly the case does not fall within cls. (a) and (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (3). The plaintiff was, in the view of the learned Judge and in my view, a person entitled to the benefit of sub-s. (3) of S. 240, and the learned Judge has held that he was not given the benefit of that sub-section.
7. That the plaintiff was dismissed on the ground of physical unfitness, I think, is clear. On 15-12-1943, the Engineer-in-Chief of Bridges informed the plaintiff with regret that he had been declared unfit and permanently incapacitated for further Railway service in Class A3 as a Bridge Inspector with effect from 17-11-1943. Reference is made to a medical certificate of 16-11-1943. This letter was followed by another letter of 20-12-1943, from the same superior officer to another department of that Railway in which that department had been informed that the plaintiff had been declared unfit and permanently incapacitated and that his salary bill upto November 16 was forwarded and that early payment of the salary should be arranged. The letter concludes with this phrase: “His final settlement Memo will follow”.
8. Though the word ‘dismissal’ is not used, it is quite clear, I think, that the letter of 15-12-1943, was a letter of dismissal and this becomes quite clear if that letter is read in the light of the latter letter of December 20, to which I have made reference. The man has been paid off finally upto 16-11-1946, bcause he had been found to be physically unfit for further service and it was quite clearly a dismissal on the ground of unfitness.
9. The plaintiff did endeavour to contest this order of dismissal and a letter from the Deputy General Manager of the Bengal and Assam Rail way, dated 16-8-1944, makes it quite clear that the Railway had regarded the man as having been dismissed, because in that letter they referred to the question of re-employing the plaintiff and re-employment can never arise if he had not been dismissed. Therefore, I think, it is clear that the plaintiff was dismissed on the ground of physical unfitness and that dismissal took effect as and from November 17.
10. In the first place, Mr. Sannyal contends that the plaintiff was given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be dismissed and Mr. Sannyal relies upon a letter written by the (Plaintiff to the Railway, dated 12-12-1943. In that letter, the plaintiff states that he has received information that the C.M.O has forwarded a certificate of unfitness without certifying whether the plaintiff was suitable for any other work. The plaintiff then brings to the notice of the Railway authorities certain matters. It is to be observed that upto this stage no notice had been given to the plaintiff that the Railway authorities proposed to dismiss him. The first intimation the plaintiff had of that was in the letter of 15-12-.1943, to which I have already made reference. He was never asked in terms or impliedly what he had to say against the proposal to dismiss him. It was never suggested to him that he was going to be dismissed until the notice of dismissal came. The letter of 15-12-1943, which is a letter of dismissal, was like a bolt from the blue and the plaintiff quite clearly was never given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be dismissed.
11. Mr. Sannyal then contended that by reason of the Rules of service obtaining in this Rail way the notice required by sub-s. (3) of Section 240 of the Government of India Act was not necessary. He relied upon Rr. 1708 and 1709 in Volume I of the State Railway Establishment Code. The Rule which the learned Counsel relied on in particular was in these terms:
“Where inefficiency is due to failure to conform to the requisite standard of physical fitness, it shall not be necessary to serve the Railway servant with a charge sheet, or to obtain his explanation.”
12. Mr. Sannyal has contended that the in-efficiency of the plaintiff was due to his physical condition. His case, therefore, came within this Rule and Mr. Sannyal has urged that by reason of the Rule notice calling upon the plaintiff to show cause was unnecessary.
13. Section 241 of the Government of India Act provided by sub-s. (2)(a) that the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Government of India were to be in accordance with Rules made by the Governor-General. This Rule which I have referred to is such a Rule. Therefore, it is urged that it is binding on the plaintiff.
14. Bose, J. has held that no Rule framed under S. 241 can have effect if it is contrary to the provisions of S. 240. The Rule relied upon by Mr. Sannyal is in conflict with sub-s. (3) of S. 240. It has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of — ‘North-West Frontier Province v. Sura.i Narain Anand’, AIR 1949 PC 112 (B), that Rules under S. 241 must comply with the provisions of S. 240. The Government of India could not possibly avoid the provision in the Government of India Act by making a Rule contrary to the particular provision in that Act. It is to be observed that subs. (3) of S. 240 now finds place in the Constitution of India. A statute contrary to the provision of sub-s. (3) of Section 240 of the Government of India Act would have been ultra vires the provisions of the Government of India Act and would now be ultra vires the Constitution. A fortiori a Rule framed by Government would be ultra vires. It seems to me that the view of Bose, J. is unassailable. Reliance cannot be placed upon the Rule in question, because it clearly offends against the provision of Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act.
15. It was faintly suggested that removing a man because he is physically unfit is not dismissing him. Dismissing a man is putting an end to his employment. He may be dismissed rightly or wrongly, but the act of dismissal is the act of terminating his employment. It matters not whether his employment is terminated because of dishonesty, corruption or bad health. In all three cases he has been dismissed, though in the first two cases his instant dismissal might be morally justified, whereas in the last case it may be very harsh and unjust. In all the cases, however, the service has been terminated and he has been dismissed. It seems to me that dismissal on the ground of inefficiency due to physical incapacity clearly comes within the provisions of Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act and that being so, the Rule of the Railway, namely, R. 1709(b) is ultra vires the provision of the Government of India Act and I think clearly ultra vires the present provisions of the Constitution, though the Constitution has no application to this particular case. For these reasons, the view of Bose, J. was undoubtedly right and the dismissal of the plaintiff was contrary to law. He was, therefore, entitled to a declaration and as to the form of the declaration there can be now no dispute. The form of the declaration in cases of this kind was laid down by their Lordships of the Priivy Council in the case of — ‘I.M Lall, (A)’ and a declaration in that form was one given to the plaintiff by the learned Judge.
16. For these reasons I see no force in this appeal which fails and is dismissed with costs.
17. Certified for two counsel.
Banerjee, J.:— I agree.
A/VR. B.
18. Appeal dismissed.
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