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Kathleen Dias v. H.M Coria And Sons
Summary of Opinion (Banerjee, J.; Harries, C.J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
Donald A. Dias, employed by the respondent as a foreman, received injuries on 27 November 1948 and died the same day. On 8 December 1948 the widow and other relations received Rs. 3,000 from the respondent and executed a receipt stating that they never had any claim by way of compensation or otherwise against the respondent for the accidental death and acknowledging the Rs. 3,000 as an ex gratia payment. Thereafter the widow lodged a claim before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. The Commissioner found that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment (a finding not challenged by cross-objection or cross-appeal), assessed the correct compensation at Rs. 3,500, but deducted the Rs. 3,000 already paid and entered a decree for Rs. 475 and Rs. 22-4 costs. The present appeal challenges the Commissioner’s deduction of the Rs. 3,000. The Commissioner’s impugned order was made on 10 January 1950.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sum of Rs. 3,000 paid by the respondent to the widow (described in the receipt as an ex gratia payment) could be deducted from the amount of Rs. 3,500 which the Commissioner considered to be the compensation payable.
- Whether a payment made directly by an employer (or a receipt given by the workman's dependants) can be treated as payment of compensation under section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
- Whether a receipt or contract given by the workman's dependants could bar the statutory claim in view of section 17 (prohibition on contracting out) and the requirement of registration under section 28 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded from the text of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the facts recorded by the Commissioner:
- The court examined section 8 of the Act, which provides that no payment of compensation in respect of a workman whose injury has resulted in death shall be made otherwise than by deposit with the Commissioner, and that any payment made directly by an employer shall not be deemed a payment of compensation. The proviso permits advances of up to Rs. 100 by an employer in respect of a deceased workman, which the Commissioner may deduct if within the limit and repaid to the employer.
- Applying section 8, the court held that a payment made directly by the employer (even if described as compensation) is not a payment of compensation for the purposes of the Act and therefore cannot be set off against the statutory compensation payable by the Commissioner.
- Here, the Rs. 3,000 had been paid as an ex gratia payment. The court concluded that this increased the force of the statutory bar to deduction: because the payment was not compensation and was made directly, it could not be deducted from the Rs. 3,500 that the Commissioner considered payable.
- The court also considered whether the receipt could be treated as a valid contract precluding the statutory claim. It applied section 17 of the Act, observing that a workman cannot contract himself out of his statutory rights; section 17 protects workmen from agreements by which they abandon entitlements under the Act. The court noted, additionally, that if the receipt were treated as a contract it would have required registration under section 28, which had not been done.
- Finally, the court rejected the Commissioner’s appeal to "equity." It held that where the statutory provisions are clear and definite, equitable considerations cannot override those provisions; accordingly, the Commissioner was not entitled to deduct the Rs. 3,000 on equitable grounds.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED — The deduction of Rs. 3,000 from the compensation was disallowed.
Direct effect: The court allowed the appeal and directed that there will be a decree in favour of the appellant for the sum of Rs. 3,475 with costs here and below. The hearing-fee of the appeal was assessed at three gold mohurs. The court's ruling rests on statutory interpretation of sections 8 and 17 (and the requirement of registration under section 28) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and rejects an equitable set-off where the statute is definitive.
The opinion does not purport to create or state any broader precedent beyond the application of the quoted statutory provisions to the facts of this case.
Banerjee, J.:— This is an appeal from an order made on 10th January, 1950, by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and arises in the following circumstances. One Donald A. Dias was a workman employed by the respondent as a foreman. On 27th November, 1948, he received injuries and died on the same day from the injuries. On 8th December, 1948, the widow and other relations of the deceased received Rs. 3,000 from the respondent and gave a receipt. In that receipt they stated that they never had any claim by way of compensation or otherwise against the respondent for the accidental death of the deceased or for any arrear of salary or other remuneration payable to him and acknowledged having received from the respondent a cheque for Rs. 3,000 as an ex gratia payment. Thereafter the widow made the claim before the Commissioner. The Commissioner made a decree for Rs. 475 in favour of the widow. The Commissioner has found that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. There is no cross-objection or cross-appeal challenging this finding. The Commissioner thought that the rights amount to award was Rs. 3,500. But he took into consideration the sum of Rs. 3,000 paid by the respondent, and deducting that amount from the amount which he thought was the right compensation payable, he made a decree for Rs. 475 and Rs. 22-4 costs.
2. The question before us is as to whether this sum can be deducted from the sum of Rs. 3,500.
3. Section 8, Workmen's Compensation Act, is as follows:
“(1) No payment of compensation in respect of a workman whose injury” has resulted in death, and no payment of a lump sum as compensation to a workman or a person under a legal disability, shall be made otherwise than by deposit with the Commissioner, and no such payment made directly by an employer shall be deemed to be a payment of compensation.
Provided that, in the case of a deceased workman, an employer may make to any dependant advances on account of compensation not exceeding an aggregate of one hundred rupees, and so much of such aggregate as does not exceed the compensation payable to that dependant shall be deducted by the Commissioner from such compensation and repaid to the employer.”
4. It is quite clear from this section that even if the sum of Rs. 3,000 had been paid to the appellant by way of compensation, that amount could not be deducted from the actual amount of compensation payable, because the section says that such payment shall not be deemed to be a payment of compensation.
5. In this case the amount was paid to the appellant not as compensation but as an ex gratia, payment. Therefore, the observation I have made applies with greater force. This amount cannot be deducted from the sum of Rs. 3,500.
6. If the receipt is taken as a contract between the widow and the employer, the answer would be that under section 17 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a workman cannot contract himself out. The section protects the ignorant workman who may be induced by the employer to agree to a lesser compensation or to abandon something to which he is entitled under the Act. If the employer pays of his own accord to the workman he does so with the risk that he will not be entitled to get a set off for the sum so paid. Further as a contract it should have been registered under section 28. That has not been done. In our opinion the respondent is not entitled to get a set off for the sum of Rs. 3,000 paid to the widow as aforesaid.
7. The learned Commissioner thought that there was some sort of equity in favour of the respondent. We do not see how any question of equity arises when the sections of the Act are definite and clear.
8. We are of the opinion that the learned Commissioner was wrong in deducting the sum of Rs. 3,000 from the sum of Rs. 3,500. We therefore allow this appeal. There will be a decree in favour of the appellant for the sum of Rs. 3,475 with costs here and below. The hearing-fee of this appeal is assessed at three gold mohurs.
Harries, C.J:— I agree.
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