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Bejoy Chand Patra v. The State .

Calcutta High Court
Feb 24, 1950
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Harries, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a conviction under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and a sentence of six years' rigorous imprisonment. The charge was that on 13 July 1949 the Appellant attempted to murder his cousin, Kumud Chandra Patra (P.W.1). The trial was before an Assistant Sessions Judge sitting with a jury. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty under section 307, and the learned Assistant Sessions Judge imposed the sentence stated above.

The prosecution case, as narrated in the trial, was that the Appellant and the injured man were cousins and co-sharers in a tank. A dispute existed about the Appellant's claimed sole right of approach to the tank. On the day in question Kumud was washing his hands at the tank edge when the Appellant allegedly came from behind and struck him with a large bhojali, inflicting numerous injuries (the prosecution says as many as 17), after which the Appellant ran away when others arrived. Information was given to the police and prosecution followed.

The defence asserted that Kumud was injured by the Appellant's wife, who acted in defence against an alleged attempt by Kumud to outrage her modesty.

At trial multiple witnesses or persons who had heard cries were examined by police under section 161 Cr.P.C., but the police did not comply with the mandatory provision that requires a separate written record of each witness's statement when statements are reduced into writing. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge sustained an objection and refused to allow certain questions in cross-examination based on the police diary "gist" entries. On appeal, the primary issue concerned the effect of this failure to comply with section 161(3) on the jury's verdict and the admissibility/weight of the witness testimony.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the consequence of the police recording only a condensed "gist" or "boiled" form of witnesses' statements instead of making separate records for each witness as required by section 161(3) Cr.P.C.?
  2. Does the failure to comply with section 161(3) Cr.P.C. render the evidence inadmissible, or does it affect only the weight and the directions the trial judge should give to a jury?
  3. Whether the omission to warn the jury of the effect of improperly recorded statements vitiates the jury's verdict and requires a retrial.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Account

  • The Appellant attacked his cousin Kumud on 13 July 1949 near a tank, striking him from behind with a large bhojali and inflicting severe bleeding injuries — reportedly up to 17 wounds — after which the Appellant fled when onlookers arrived.
  • Multiple persons came to the scene and were examined by police; the police diary contains entries purporting to give the gist of those statements.

Defence's Account

  • The defence asserted that it was the Appellant's wife who injured Kumud while defending herself from an attempted outrage by Kumud.
  • The defence sought to cross-examine on statements that witnesses allegedly made to the police, but the learned Assistant Sessions Judge refused this on the ground that the police had recorded only gists and not separate statements as required by section 161(3) Cr.P.C.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pulukuri Kottaya v. The King-Emperor (Privy Council) Although police are bound to record statements as made, failure to do so does not automatically render the witness's evidence inadmissible; it may, however, cast grave doubt on its credibility. The Court cited this authority for the proposition that failure to comply with section 161 does not per se make evidence inadmissible but is a matter for the court to consider when assessing credibility.
Zahiruddin v. The King-Emperor (Privy Council) Same principle as above: non-compliance with section 161 affects credibility and may raise grave doubts but does not automatically exclude evidence. The Court relied on this case together with Pulukuri Kottaya to support the view that non-compliance may affect weight but not admissibility.
Lakshman Chandra Ghose v. The King (Bench of this Court) Failure to supply copies or where statements are destroyed or recorded in a "boiled" form contrary to section 161(3) does not make the witnesses' evidence inadmissible; where trial is by jury, the judge must direct the jury about the weight to be given and that they may presume under section 114 Evidence Act if evidence was deliberately withheld. The Court held this case to be binding. It applied the principle that the jury should have been warned about the police's failure to record separate statements and that omission rendered the jury charge defective, vitiating the verdict and requiring a retrial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with the statutory text of section 161 Cr.P.C., highlighting subsection (3) which permits the police to reduce statements into writing but mandates a separate record of each person's statement if any statement is so recorded. From this the Court derived two propositions explicitly stated in the opinion:

  1. An investigating officer is not strictly bound to record a witness's statement in writing (subsection (3) uses the word "may"), but if the officer does reduce statements into writing, he must make a separate record of each witness's statement rather than a condensed "gist" or "boiled" summary.
  2. A police diary entry that contains only the gist of several witnesses' statements or a consolidated précis is contrary to the mandatory requirement of section 161(3) and therefore constitutes an improper recording of statements.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the police diary in this case contained condensed "gist" entries rather than separate statements. At trial the learned Assistant Sessions Judge had prevented the defence from cross-examining witnesses by reference to those gist entries. The Court observed that although precedent (Privy Council decisions) establishes that such non-compliance does not automatically render the witnesses' evidence inadmissible, it does raise serious questions about credibility and affects the weight of such evidence.

The Court further relied on the domestic binding authority of Lakshman Chandra Ghose v. The King which required that where statements have been improperly recorded, in a trial by jury the judge must give appropriate directions warning the jury of the danger of accepting such evidence and that it would be open to them to disbelieve the witnesses on the assumption that properly recorded statements might have contradicted their court evidence. Where statements were deliberately destroyed or improperly recorded, the trial judge must also direct the jury that they may draw the presumption under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that the withheld evidence would have been adverse to the prosecution.

The Court concluded that because the trial judge made no reference in his charge to the manner in which the statements had been recorded nor warned the jury about the effects of the non-compliance with section 161(3), the charge was defective. The failure to warn the jury could have affected the verdict; consequently the conviction could not stand.

The Court then provided guidance for a retrial:

  • If from the condensed/gist entries it is possible to deduce what each witness said to the police, then those particulars can be put to the witnesses in cross-examination under section 162 Cr.P.C., and no adverse inference arises from the failure to keep separate records.
  • If the actual statements cannot be deduced from the gist, the trial judge must treat the matter as a contravention of section 161(3) and direct the jury in accordance with Lakshman Chandra Ghose's case, including possible reference to section 114 Evidence Act where appropriate.
  • Where a previous statement in writing is to be used to contradict a witness, the witness must be given the opportunity to deal with that statement before it is proved, in accordance with section 145 Evidence Act (which the Court cited to explain the proper procedure for contradiction by prior written statements).
  • The accused must be furnished with a copy of the gist of the statements whether or not those statements can be used in cross-examination; the right to access the statements is not denied merely because they may be unusable for contradiction.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed; the jury's verdict, the conviction under section 307 IPC, and the sentence of six years' rigorous imprisonment are set aside. The Appellant is to be retried by a Judge of the rank of Sessions Judge (other than the original trial judge) sitting with a jury.

Direct consequences and procedural directions:

  • The verdict and conviction are quashed and a retrial is ordered.
  • On retrial, the presiding Judge must determine whether the condensed police diary entries are sufficiently detailed to be used to confront witnesses in cross-examination (under section 162 Cr.P.C.). If they are so usable, no adverse inference arises from the police's failure to make separate records. If not, the Judge must give the jury the special directions required by Lakshman Chandra Ghose's case and this judgment, including informing the jury of the danger in accepting witnesses whose statements were improperly recorded and the possibility of an adverse inference under section 114 Evidence Act where appropriate.
  • The accused must be supplied with a copy of the police "gist" of statements irrespective of whether those statements can be used in cross-examination.
  • The Appellant will continue on the same bail until the commencement of the retrial; continuation on bail during the retrial is left to the discretion of the presiding Judge.

The opinion applies and follows existing authorities (Privy Council decisions and the domestic Bench decision in Lakshman Chandra Ghose). It does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying these precedents to the facts and directing the procedure to be followed on retrial.

Show all summary ...

Harries, C.J:— This is an appeal from a conviction under sec. 307 of the Indian Penal Code and a sentence of six years' rigorous imprisonment.

2. The charge against the Appellant was that he on July 13, 1949, had attempted to murder his cousin, Kumud Chandra Patra, P.W 1. The trial took place before a learned Assistant Sessions Judge sitting with a jury. The jury unanimously returned a verdict of guilty under sec. 307 of the Indian Penal Code and agreeing with that verdict the learned Assistant Sessions Judge sentenced the Appellant as I have indicated. The facts of the case were comparatively simple. The Appellant and the injured man, Kumud, were cousins and apparently were co-sharers in a tank near the village. Alongside this tank ran a roadway or a pathway and it is said on behalf of the prosecution that the Appellant claimed the sole right in his approach to the tank. His right was disputed by the injured man and this; it is alleged, led to a quarrel between them some time before the occurrence. On the day of the occurrence, namely, July 13, 1949, the injured man Kumud was standing at the edge of the water of the tank washing his hands when it is alleged that the Appellant came from behind and struck Kumud with a big Bhojali causing a severe bleeding injury. Kumud turned round, but the Appellant showered further blows on him, Kumud being injured, amongst other places, on his hands as he was endeavouring to ward off the blows. The prosecution states that as many as 17 injuries were caused and Kumud was felled to the ground.

3. The shouts of the injured man brought a number of persons to the scene and on seeing these persons the Appellant, it is said, ran away. In due course information was given to the police and this case was instituted against the Appellant.

4. The defence was that the injured man had been injured by the Appellant's wife who had to defend herself against an attempt by Kumud Patra to outrage her modesty or worse.

5. There were a number of eye-witnesses or people who heard cries and rushed to the scene. These persons appear to have been examined by the police under sec. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the police had not complied with the mandatory provisions of that section.

6. Sec. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is in these terms:

“(1) Any police officer making an investigation under this Chapter or any police officer not below such rank as the Provincial Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, acting on the requisition of such officer, may examine orally any person supposed 1o be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.

(2) Such person shall be bound to answer all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer, other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture.

(3) The police officer may reduce into writing any statement made to him in the course of an examination under this section, and if he does so, he shall make a separate record of the statement, of each such person whose statement he records.”

7. A investigating officer is not bound to record the statements of a witness. That seems clear from sub-sec. (3) which says that the police officer may reduce into writing any statement made to him. However, the sub-section provides that if he does reduce statements into writing he must make a separate record of the statement of each of the persons whose statements he records. In other words, if a police officer examines a number of witnesses he cannot record a condensed version of the examination of all of them or a precis of what the witnesses are supposed to have said. He must record what each witness says. He cannot, for example, record that witnesses A, B and C said so and so. Neither can he lawfully do what police officers frequently do, that is, record the statement of A and then add that witnesses B and C corroborate what A says. If he purports to reduce the statements into writing he must record the statement of each of the witnesses whom he examines.

8. In this case, as I have said, although a number of witnesses were examined their exact statements were not recorded. Whilst the investigating officer was being cross-examined, an attempt was made to prove from him certain statements which the witnesses must have made in their examination under sec. 161. The prosecution objected because the statements had not been separately recorded and were in a condensed or what has been referred to in this Court us a boiled form. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge upheld this objection in an order dated November 16, 1949 and observed as follows:—

“I have gone through the police diary; no statements appear to have been recorded by the S.I (P.W 12) under sec. 161, Cr. P.C What he did was only to note the gist of the statements of the persons examined by him. So the learned pleader for the defence cannot be allowed to cross-examine the said witness with reference to the so-called statements of the prosecution witnesses named above in the police diary under sec. 162, Cr. P.C The prayer is refused.”

9. There appears to be no doubt that a number of witnesses were examined and the police purported in the diary to give the gist of the statements of the witnesses examined. Sec. 161 (3) of the Code makes it clear that if a police officer reduces into: writing any statement made to him in the course of the examination he shall make a separate record of the statement of each person whose statement he records. He cannot give the gist of what a witness or witnesses have said. If he has recorded the gist then he has improperly recorded the statement which he should have recorded in full in the case of each witness under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 161. It appears to me in this case that the learned Judge has come to the conclusion that a precis or gist of statements were recorded and that is contrary to sec. 161 (2).

10. It has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that though the police are bound to record the statement as made, nevertheless if such is not done the evidence of the witness does not become inadmissible. The cases of their Lordships of the Privy Council are Pulukuri Kottaya v. The King-Emperor(1) and Zahiruddin v. The King-Emperor(2). Their Lordships, however, in both these cases pointed out that the failure to comply with the provisions of sec. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure might throw very grave doubt upon the evidence of the witnesses and it was a matter which the Court was entitled to consider when dealing with the credibility of the witnesses.

11. This point as to the admissibility of evidence of witnesses whose statements have been improperly recorded by the police was considered by a Bench of this Court in the case of Lakshman Chandra Ghose v. The King(3). The Bench held that failure to supply copies of statements of witnesses re-corded under sec. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure either because the statements were lost, destroyed, or were recorded in a boiled form in contravention of sub-sec. (3) of that section does not make the evidence of those witnesses inadmissible. The Bench, however, held that in such circumstances if the trial is by a jury, the Judge should give proper directions to the jury as regards the weight to be given to such evidence which the accused had no opportunity to test by cross-examination in some particulars. If such statements were deliberately destroyed or were recorded in a boiled form in contravention of law, that would be tantamount to withholding of evidence by the prosecution and a presumption might be raised under sec. 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872, that the evidence, if produced, would have gone against the prosecution.

12. The statements of witnesses were undoubtedly recorded in this case in a condensed or, if I may use the words of the Bench which decided Lakshmmi Chandra Ghose's case, in a boiled form contrary to the express provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 161. This Bench held that where such was the case the jury should be directed that the police had not observed the law and that the jury might, if they thought proper, presume under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that if these statements had been recorded the witnesses might well have been flatly contradicted.

13. We are bound by the case of Lakshman Chandra Ghose v. The King and, therefore, we are bound to hold that in this case where no reference whatsoever is made to the manner in which these statements were recorded in the charge to the jury, the charge is defective. The jury should have been warned as to the danger of accepting these witnesses in the circumstances as witnesses of truth and should have been told that it was open to them, if they thought proper, to disbelieve these witnesses on the assumption that their statements, if properly recorded, would have contradicted their evidence in Court. It appears to me that in the present case the failure to warn the jury of the effect of the non-compliance with sub-sec. (3) of sec. 161 vitiates the verdict. The verdict may well have been otherwise if the jury had been warned and properly directed concerning their duty in approaching the evidence for the prosecution. That being so, the verdict cannot stand and must be set aside.

14. It appears to me that this is a case in which there should be a re-trial. There is a good deal of evidence, but that is hotly denied and the defence have put forward a very different version. It is a case preeminently fitted for decision by a jury and that being so, I think a new trial should be ordered.

15. I should like to mention that when the new trial is held the learned Judge presiding must carefully consider whether or not cross-examination to contradict the witnesses is possible from the condensed or boiled statements recorded by the police. If it is possible from those condensed statements to make out what a witness said to the police then such can be put to the witness to contradict him or her under sec. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, if the actual statements of the witnesses cannot be deduced from the gist which was recorded then the learned Judge must treat the case as one in which statements of witnesses were recorded but in contravention of sec. 161 (3) of the Code, and consequently must direct the jury as provided for in the case of Lakshman Chandra Ghose v. The King and in accordance with the observations which I have made in this judgment.

16. If, however, the witnesses can be cross-examined and confronted with what must have been their statements to the police in order to contradict the witnesses then, of course, the jury can draw no adverse inference from a failure properly to record the statements. The learned Judge should consider the statements as recorded and come to the conclusion whether or not they can be intelligently put to the witnesses. If they can be put then it cannot properly be held that the statements were improperly recorded in violation of sec. 161 (3). For the purposes of this judgment I must assume that they were improperly recorded by reason of the order which the learned Judge passed forbidding any questions on these statements.

17. Before concluding I should like to point out that if it is possible to deduce from the gist recorded what witnesses said, then what each witness said must be put to the witness if it is intended to contradict the witness by use of such statement. It is not sufficient to obtain proof of the statements from the investigating officer and then ask the jury to hold that the witnesses have contradicted themselves. A previous statement in writing cannot be used to contradict a witness unless that witness has had an opportunity of dealing with the statement and explaining it away if possible. This is clear from sec. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides:

“A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.”

18. I merely point out the proper procedure to be followed because in the hearing the first attempt to use these statements if they could be used at all appears to have been made in the cross-examination of the investigating officer.

19. In the result, therefore, this appeal is allowed and the verdict of the jury and the conviction and sentence are set aside and the Appellant will be retried by a Judge of the rank of Sessions Judge, other than the Judge who presided over the original trial, sitting with a jury.

20. In this trial the statements of witnesses, if they can be deduced from the gist, must be allowed to be put to the witnesses to contradict them. But if the statements of witnesses cannot be deduced from the gist then in his charge to the jury the learned Judge will deal with the failure properly to record these statements as directed in Lakshman Chandra Ghose's case and in this judgment. The accused should be furnished with a copy of this gist of the statements whether such can or cannot be used in cross-examination. The fact that the statements cannot be used is no ground for denying the right of the accused to these statements.

21. The Appellant will continue on the same bail until the commencement of the re-trial. Whether he will continue on bail during that trial will be a matter for the learned Judge presiding.

Bachawat, J.:— I agree.