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Lunatic Karali Prosad Roy v. Probodh Chandra Mitra

Calcutta High Court
Jun 9, 1950
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Bench Opinion Summary — Banerjee, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This summary is compiled exclusively from the provided opinion text.

The decree in the underlying suit was recorded as made on June 20, 1935. An appeal from that decree was dismissed on January 30, 1934. An application for execution of the decree was initially made on August 14, 1934; a sale proclamation was published on July 21, 1935, but the proceeding was dismissed for default on December 4, 1935.

On June 23, 1937, one Surjya Narayan Roy, claiming to be an assignee of the decree, filed an execution case which was registered; that registration order was later cancelled (on August 20, 1937) and the petition was treated as an application leading to Execution Case No. 139 of 1939, filed on September 1, 1939. That application was dismissed for want of prosecution on June 4, 1941. Notices under Order 21 rule 22 and subsequently under Order 21 rule 66 C.P.C. had been issued in that prosecution, but the application was nevertheless dismissed for non-prosecution on June 4, 1941.

Execution Case No. 21 of 1943 (the matter giving rise to this second appeal) was started on June 3, 1943. In that execution, after notices under Or. 21 r. 22 and Or. 21 r. 66 C.P.C., attached properties were sold. The central procedural controversy is whether this last execution case (No. 21 of 1943) was time-barred.

The Subordinate Judge originally held the 1943 application to be time-barred. On appeal the District Judge remanded the matter; the Subordinate Judge then revised his view and held that it was not time-barred. The District Judge, on subsequent consideration, held that it was out of time. The present second appeal challenges the District Judge's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the execution proceedings in Execution Case No. 21 of 1943 are time-barred (i.e., whether the last execution application was barred by limitation).
  2. Whether prior steps in the 1937 / 1939 proceedings (including issue of notice under Or. 21 r. 22 and publication under Or. 21 r. 66 C.P.C.) constituted an effective step in aid of execution such that the judgment-debtor is precluded from raising limitation by reason of res judicata.
  3. Whether the court's issuance of a notice under Order 21 rule 22 (followed by an order for sale) amounts to an implied finding that the application was not time-barred and thus prevents the judgment-debtor from later pleading limitation.
  4. Whether entries in the suit register or order sheet constitute proof of service of notices under Or. 21 r. 22.
  5. Whether the court is bound under Section 3 of the Limitation Act to notice limitation even if the point is not taken by the parties, and whether that obligation applies to execution proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The sole point urged before the Court by counsel for the appellant was that the judgment-debtor could not take the plea of limitation because, in the application started on September 1, 1939, the court had ordered issue of a notice under Or. 21 r. 22 C.P.C., followed by an order for publication of the sale proclamation under Or. 21 r. 66. Counsel contended that when the court, after issuing notice under Or. 21 r. 22, directed sale, that amounted to an implied finding that the application was not barred by time; therefore the judgment-debtor should be precluded from raising limitation.

Judgment-Debtor's Position / Evidence

  • The only evidence produced by the judgment-debtor before the courts below in proof of service of the notice was a certified copy of the suit register showing entries that notices were issued. No other proof of service was produced.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Syed Mohiuddin v. Prithichand Lal Choudhury(2) The principle that a mere entry in the order sheet (or register) is no proof that a notice had been served. The court relied on this authority to treat entries in the suit register as insufficient to prove service of the Or. 21 r. 22 notice and therefore concluded that service could not be held to have occurred on the evidence produced.
Chatterput Singh v. Daya Chand Marwari(1) The principle that if the judgment-debtor does not appear to contest a notice under Or. 21 r. 22, he is not precluded from raising an objection later when his property is attached. The court invoked this authority to hold that even if the Or. 21 r. 22 notice had been served and not contested, the judgment-debtor would still be entitled to raise objection to sale and take the point of limitation; thus res judicata would not bar the limitation plea.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the procedural history and focused on whether prior proceedings could be treated as effective steps in execution such that the 1943 application would not be time-barred. The analysis proceeded along the following lines:

  1. Chronology and dependency: The Court observed that if the application of June 23, 1937 (and the subsequent application filed on September 1, 1939) cannot be regarded as effective steps in aid of execution, then the 1939 application was out of time and any order in it would be ineffective; consequently the 1943 application would be time-barred.
  2. Scope of the appellant's contention: The appellant's single contention was that issuance of notice under Or. 21 r. 22 followed by an order for sale amounted to an implied judicial finding that the earlier application was not barred by limitation, and that the judgment-debtor was therefore precluded from later raising limitation.
  3. Service of notice as critical fact: The Court framed the critical factual question as whether the notice under Or. 21 r. 22 had been served on the judgment-debtor. If it was not served, the judgment-debtor had no opportunity to raise limitation earlier and res judicata could not apply.
  4. Insufficiency of register entries: The only evidence of service produced was a certified copy of the suit register showing entries that notices were issued. Relying on Syed Mohiuddin v. Prithichand Lal Choudhury(2), the Court held that such entries do not by themselves prove service. On that basis the Court found that service had not been proved.
  5. Mandatory consequences of Or. 21 r. 22 and r. 23: The Court explained the statutory scheme — courts issue notice under Or. 21 r. 22 where the decree is more than one year old or execution is sought against legal representatives; if the person served does not appear or does not satisfy the court why decree should not be executed, the court shall order execution (Or. 21 r. 23). In the present case, because no appearance was proved, the court was bound to direct execution and sale once the notice was issued (or at least once no appearance occurred).
  6. Res judicata not attracted: Because service was not proved and the judgment-debtor did not have an opportunity to raise limitation on appearance to Or. 21 r. 22 notice, the Court reasoned that res judicata could not preclude the debtor from later taking the point. Even assuming service, relying on Chatterput Singh v. Daya Chand Marwari(1), the Court held that non-appearance to an Or. 21 r. 22 notice does not preclude the debtor from later objecting at attachment/sale stage and raising limitation.
  7. Limitation Act, s. 3 — court's duty to notice limitation: The Court further reasoned that under Section 3 of the Limitation Act the court must itself notice limitation whether or not the point is taken by parties, and that this principle applies to execution proceedings. Therefore, the court was obliged to dismiss an application not in time even if the respondent had not specifically pleaded limitation. Having failed to take that point in the earlier proceedings, the court could not now treat the debtor as barred by res judicata or any analogous principle.
  8. Conclusion from reasoning: For these reasons the Court concluded that the plea of res judicata was no bar to the judgment-debtor taking the point of limitation and that, on the facts and law, the application under consideration was time-barred and therefore liable to be dismissed.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences stated in the opinion:

  • The Court held that the District Judge was right in holding the application to be time-barred.
  • The application (execution application) is barred by time.
  • The appeal is dismissed with costs: one set, two gold mohurs.

The opinion does not set out any broader or novel precedent beyond applying cited authorities and statutory provisions; no further implications beyond the direct effect on these proceedings are discussed in the provided text.

Bench: Banerjee, J.; Harries, C.J. concurred.

Show all summary ...

Banerjee, J.:— This second appeal arises out of an execution proceeding instituted in the following circumstances. The decree in the suit was made on June 20, 1935. An appeal from it was dismissed on January 30, 1934. An application for execution of the decree was made on August 14, 1934. In due course sale proclamation was published on July 21, 1935. But no further step having been taken, it was dismissed for default on December 4, 1935.

2. On June 23, 1937 one Surjya Narayan Roy claiming to be an assignee of the decree filed an execution case. It was registered. On August 20, 1937 the order registering the application was cancelled and the petition was treated as an application which gave rise to execution Case No. 139 of 1939. This application was filed on September 1, 1939 and was dismissed for want of prosecution on June 4, 1941. In this execution case notice under Or. 21 r. 22 C.P.C had been issued, followed by a notice under Or. 21 r. 66. This application again was dismissed for non-prosecution on June 4, 1941. Execution case No. 21 of 1943 from which this appeal arises was started on June 3, 1943. In this execution case, after notices under Or. 21 r. 22 and Or. 21 r. 66 C.P.C, the properties attached were sold. The question is whether this last execution case is out of time. It is quite clear that if the application made on June 23, 1937 is not regarded as a step in aid of execution, the application which was filed on September 1, 1939, was out of time. Therefore any order made in that application would be ineffective. Consequently, the present application would be time-barred. Originally the learned Subordinate Judge in this last mentioned execution case held that it was out of time. But on appeal the District Judge remanded the matter and the learned Subordinate Judge has revised his previous opinion and held that it is not time-barred. From that there was an appeal to the District Judge who has held that it is out of time. From the order of the District Judge the present appeal has been filed.

3. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has taken before us one point and one point only in support of the appeal, namely, that it is not open to the judgment-debtor to take the plea of limitation by reason of the fact that in the application which was started on September 1, 1939 there was an order for the issue of a notice under Or. 21 r. 22 C.P.C followed by an order for publication of the sale proclamation under Or. 21 r. 66. According to Counsel, when the court after issue of notice under Or. 21 r. 22 directed sale of the properties, it came to an implied finding that the application was not barred by time; otherwise, it could not order the sale.

4. The question before us is whether the notice under Or. 21 r. 22 was served on the judgment-debtor. If the notice was not served, the judgment-debtor had no opportunity to raise the question of limitation and therefore no question of res judicata arises. The only evidence the judgment-debtor produced before the courts below in proof of service of the notice was a certified copy of the suit register. There was no other evidence on this point. In the register there are entries showing that the notices were issued. But that does not mean that the notices were served. Such entries by themselves cannot prove service. It has been laid down in a Bench decision of this Court in Syed Mohiuddin v. Prithichand Lal Choudhury(2), where it was observed that the mere entry in the order sheet is no proof that the notice had been served. In this case we are unable to hold that there was service.

5. The court issues notice under Or. 21 r. 22 where the decree is more than one year old or when the decree is sought to be executed against the legal representative of the judgment-debtor. If the person to whom notice is issued under Or. 21 r. 22 does not appear or does not show cause to the satisfaction of the court why the decree should not be executed, the court shall order the decree to be executed (Or. 21. r. 23 C.P.C). In this case after the issue of notice under Or. 21 r. 22 when there was no appearance by the defendant, the court was bound to order the decree to be executed in such manner as the decree could be executed.

6. In this case the judgment-debtor had not been served and did not appear to the notice under Or. 21 r. 22 and he did not raise nor had the opportunity to raise the issue of limitation. The court issued notice under Or. 21 r. 66 and directed sale of the properties as it was incumbent on it to do so. We do not see how any question of res judicata arises.

7. Furthermore, in the case of Chatterput Singh v. Daya Chand Marwari(1), it has been held that if the judgment-debtor does not appear to contest a notice under Or. 21 r. 22 he is not precluded from raising an objection when his property is attached. Assuming in this case that the notice under Or. 21 r. 22 was served, which we do not hold is the fact, the judgment-debtor can raise objection to the sale and take the point of limitation.

8. There is another point of view from which we can come to the conclusion that the question of limitation is not res judicata. It is this: under S. 3 of the Limitation Act whether or not the point of limitation is taken by the defendant or the respondent in a suit or an application, the court is bound to notice it in disposing of the matter before it. It has been held that the principles of this section apply to execution proceedings. In this case, therefore, the court was bound to take the point of limitation itself and dismiss the application in it was not in time. Having failed to do so, it cannot be said that the judgment debtor is bit by res judicata or any principle analogous thereto.

9. We therefore hold that the plea of res judicata is no bar to the judgment-debtor taking the point of limitation to the application under consideration. As the application was not in time, the court was bound to dismiss it.

10. On these considerations we hold that the District Judge was right.

11. The application is barred by time.

12. The appeal therefore is dismissed with costs, one set two gold mohurs.

Harries, C.J:— I agree.

N.D.R