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Bibhuti Bhusan Roy v. Narendra Narayan Ghosh

Calcutta High Court
Jan 19, 1950
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Factual and Procedural Background

These two appeals arise from Title Suit Nos. 95 and 88 of 1942 concerning disputes over ownership and possession of certain land. The Plaintiffs sought declarations of title and possession, as well as injunctions against Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 from proceeding with a mutation case and from withdrawing deposited money under the Bengal Tenancy Act. The background involves a property originally owned in moiety share by Nripendra Bala, who died leaving a Will bequeathing the property to her daughter Saraswati and appointing her son Durga Charan as executor. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 obtained a decree in Suit No. 328 of 1927 against Nripendra Bala (later substituted by Durga Charan as heir), leading to a sale of the disputed property in 1939. Separately, Plaintiffs obtained a decree in Money Suit No. 37 of 1936 against Nripendra Bala, with Durga Charan and Saraswati impleaded as executor and legatee respectively, and subsequently purchased the property in 1939. The central dispute is which of these two sales is valid.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale executed under the decree obtained by Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 was valid, given the substitution of Durga Charan as heir rather than executor during the suit.
  2. Whether the executor Durga Charan, who obtained probate after the sale, was competent to represent the estate at the time of the sale in execution of the decree.
  3. Whether the Plaintiffs' claim to the disputed property, based on their purchase following a separate decree, prevails over the Defendants' purchase.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The substitution of Durga Charan as heir was invalid because there was no valid order for substitution of the legal representative of Nripendra Bala.
  • The sale in execution of the Defendants' decree was invalid, especially since one Defendant learned of the Will shortly before the sale.
  • Relying on Khiraj Mal v. Daim, the Court lacked jurisdiction to sell property of persons not properly represented, and a purchaser with notice of all facts cannot rely on judicial sale protections.
  • Invoked Khaivala Venkata Subamme v. Katreddi Ramyya to argue that under Hindu law, an executor’s powers vest from the testator’s death even without probate, validating alienations made before probate if probate is later granted.

Respondent's Arguments

  • On the date of the sale (June 15, 1939), Durga Charan had no title to represent the estate as he had not yet obtained probate, which was granted only on September 13, 1939.
  • Relying on Lakhya Dasya v. Umakanta Chakravarty, an executor who has not completed probate and has not intermeddled with the estate cannot represent it; decrees against such an executor do not bind the estate.
  • Supported by Mohamidu Mohideen Hadijar v. Ptichev, a creditor cannot sue the executor unless the executor has administered or proved the Will.
  • Argued that the person substituted and brought on record by Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 was competent to represent the estate at the time of the suit and sale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khiraj Mal v. Daim The Court has no jurisdiction to sell property of persons not parties or not properly represented; purchasers with notice of facts cannot rely on judicial sale protections. Appellant relied on this to challenge validity of sale due to improper representation and notice of Will.
General Manager of Raj Durbungh under the Court of Wards v. Maharaja Kumar Ramapat Singh A rent decree against a guardian without impleading the infant son bound the estate because the guardian fully represented it. Referenced to support that a legal representative who sufficiently represents the estate binds the estate even if actual representative differs.
Sanna Govappa v. Rodda Sanna Govappa If a plaintiff sues a person appearing as proper legal representative in good faith without fraud, the decree binds the estate. Courts below relied on this to uphold validity of decree against the estate.
Chaturbhujadoss Kushal Doss v. Raja-manicka Mudali Same principle as above regarding good faith suit against a person appearing as legal representative binding the estate. Courts below relied on this to reject Plaintiffs’ challenge to representation.
Lakhya Dasya v. Umakanta Chakravarty An executor without probate and who does not intermeddle cannot represent the estate; decrees against such executor do not bind the estate. Respondent relied on this to argue executor Durga Charan was not competent at sale date.
Mohamidu Mohideen Hadijar v. Ptichev A creditor cannot sue an executor unless the executor has administered or proved the Will. Supported argument that executor must have proved Will to represent estate in suit.
Khaivala Venkata Subamme v. Katreddi Ramyya Under Hindu Wills Act, estate vests in executor from testator’s death even without probate; alienations before probate are validated if probate is later granted. Appellant cited this to argue executor’s powers existed before probate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed whether the Defendants’ sale was valid, focusing on the representation of the estate of the deceased Nripendra Bala. It noted that Durga Charan was substituted as heir, not executor, during the suit, and that probate was granted only after the sale. The Court acknowledged precedents establishing that a decree binds the estate if the person sued sufficiently represents it in good faith without fraud. However, the Court emphasized authorities holding that an executor cannot represent the estate in a suit or execution until probate is actually obtained and the executor has intermeddled with the estate. Applying these principles, the Court found that Durga Charan was not competent to represent the estate at the time of sale because probate was granted after the sale date. Consequently, the person brought on record by Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 was competent to represent the estate, validating the decree and sale. The Court upheld the decisions of the lower Courts dismissing the Plaintiffs’ suits.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED WITH COSTS

The Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ second appeals, affirming the validity of the sale executed in favor of Defendants Nos. 1 to 4. The decision confirms that an executor must have obtained probate to represent the estate in suits or execution proceedings, and that substitution as heir without probate does not confer such competence. The ruling resolves the dispute in favor of Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and does not establish any new precedent beyond the application of existing principles concerning probate and representation of estates.

Show all summary ...

Lahiri, J.:— These two appeals are at the instance of the Plaintiff: Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 1356 of 1944 arises out of Title Suit No. 95 of 1942 in which the Plaintiffs ask for a declaration of their title to the disputed land and for confirmation of their possession and they also ask for an injunction restraining Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 from proceeding with a certain mutation case instituted under the Land Registration Act, and Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 1357 of 1944 arises out of Title Suit No. 88 of 1942 in which the Plaintiffs pray for a declaration that Defendants Nos. 5 and 6 are tenants under them in respect of Kha Schedule land of the plaint and ask for an injunction restraining Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 from withdrawing the money which had been deposited by Defendants Nos. 5 and 6 under the provisions of sec. 149 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

2. The facts which are material for the purpose of these two appeals are these: One Nripendra Bala had a moiety share in Touzi No. 192 of the 24-Parganas Collectorate. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 instituted a suit, vis., Suit No. 328 of 1927, against Nripendra Bala and obtained a decree on August 2, 1938. Before the decree, however, Nripendra Bala died leaving a Will by which she bequeathed the disputed property to her daughter Saraswati and appointed her son Durga Charan as the executor. During the pendency of the suit, Nripendra Bala's pleader was requested to supply the names of the heirs of Nripendra Bala and the pleader supplied the name of Durga Charan as the heir. Thereafter Durga Charan was substituted in the place of Nripendra Bala, not as an executor to Nripendra Bala's Will, but in his personal capacity; as heir. Durga Charan accepted the written statement filed by his mother on April 29, 1938, and eventually the suit was decreed, as already stated, on; August 2, 1938.; In execution of this decree, the disputed property was sold on June 15, 1939, and the sale was confirmed on July 17, 1939. It further appears that on August 26, 1938, there was an order for probate being granted in favour of Durga Charan of Nripendra Bala's Will. On September 13, 1939, the probate was actually issued by the Probate Court to Durga Charan on payment of the deficit probate duty. It also appears that the Plaintiffs of the present suits brought a money suit against Nripendra Bala which was registered as Money Suit No. 37 of 1936. In this suit, on Nripendra Bala's death, her son Durga Charan was impleaded as executor, and the legatee Saraswati was also impleaded as a legatee under the Will. In execution of the decree obtained by the Plaintiffs in Suit No. 37 of 1936, the Plaintiffs purchased the same property on October 9, 1939.

3. The question which has arisen in these two suits is, which of these two sales will prevail? If the sale at which the Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 purchased be a valid sale, the Plaintiff's claim in the two suits is liable to be dismissed. Both the Courts below have taken that view and have dismissed the Plaintiffs' suits; and against the decision of the Courts below the Plaintiffs have preferred the present second appeals.

4. On behalf of the Appellants, Mr. Bose has argued that having regard to the fact that in the Defendants' suit there was no valid order for substitution of the legal representative of Nripendra Bala, and having regard to the further fact that shortly be- fore the sale in execution of the decree obtained by Defendants Nos. 1 to 4, one of the said Defendants had come to know about the Will left by Nripendra Bala, the sale at which the Defendants purchased must be held to be invalid; at any rate, it did not pass title of the legatee Saraswati to Defendants Nos. 1 to 4. In support of this contention, Mr. Bose has relied upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Khiraj Mal v. Daim(1), where it was observed at page 33 that the Court had no jurisdiction to sell the property of persons who were not parties to the proceeding nor properly represented on the record, and Mr. Bose has relied upon another passage at page 36 where their Lordships held that a person who had notice of all the facts cannot rely upon the principle that the Courts of law should be inclined in favour of the title of persons who buy under a judicial sale.

5. With regard to this point, it is to be observed that in an earlier case the Privy Council had also to consider the question whether the title to an estate would pass to an auction-purchaser even if the real person was not impleaded in the suit. In the case of General Manager of Raj Durbungh under the Court of Wards v. Maharaja Kumar Ramapat Singh(2), it was held that rent decree obtained by the zemindar against a widow of the deceased tenant as guardian of her infant son and without impleading that son was binding upon the estate and that the estate of the deceased when sold in execution of the decree thus obtained passed the interest of the widow as well as of the son, because the widow fully represented the estate.

6. The Courts below have negatived the point made by the Plaintiffs in the present suits by relying upon two decisions of the Madras High Court, The first decision relied upon is Sanna Govappa v. Rodda Sanna Govappa(3) and the second decision relied upon by the Courts below is the decision of the same High Court in Chaturbhujadoss Kushal Doss v. Raja-manicka Mudali(4). In both these decisions, all the earlier authorities on the subject have been carefully reviewed, and it has been held that if a Plaintiff in good faith sues a person who appears to him to be the proper legal representative of the deceased debtor, and there is no fraud or collusion in the proceeding, then a decree so obtained is binding on the deceased's estate whoever may be the actual legal representative; the essential question to be considered in such cases is, whether the estate of the deceased person was sufficiently represented by the legal representative who had been brought on the record.

7. But Mr. Bose has raised a further point that though the decree obtained by the Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 might have been a good decree, the sale in execution was bad in law, because shortly before the sale, one of those Defendants had come to know about the Will. With regard to this point Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the Respondent has argued that on the date of the sales, i.e, on June 15, 1939, Durga Charan the son of Nripendra Bala, who was appointed the sole executor under her Will had no title to represent the estate, because on that date, he had not obtained the probate of the Will executed by Nripendra Bala and in support of this proposition Mr. Mukherjee has relied upon the decision of this Court in Lakhya Dasya v. Umakanta Chakravarty(5) in which it has been held that an executor who had obtained an order for the grant to him of probate, but took no further steps to complete the grant and who in no way, intermeddled with the estate cannot properly represent the estate in a suit brought against it; the decree purporting to have been passed against such an executor does not bind the estate. Mr. Mukherjee has also relied upon the decision in Mohamidu Mohideen Hadijar v. Ptichev(6) in which Lord Macnaghten observed as follows at page 442:

“A creditor of a deceased debtor cannot sue a person named as executor in the Will of the deceased unless he has either administered, that is, intermeddled with the estate, or proved the Will.”

8. Upon these authorities, Mr. Mukherjee argues that the executor in the present case having obtained the grant as late as September 13, 1939, could not have been impleaded as a party to the suit or execution proceeding before the sale which took place on June 15, 1939.

9. Mr. Bose has placed before us the decision of the Judicial Committee in Khaivala Venkata Subamme v. Katreddi Ramyya(7), where it has been held that in the case of a Hindu Will to which the Hindu Wills Act, 1879, does not apply the estate of the testator vests in the executor, if he accepts office, from the date of the testator's death, and he has the powers of an executor under the Probate and Administration Act 1881, even though probate has not been obtained.

10. With regard to this case, it is to be noticed that it deals with the powers of the executor to dispose of the property of the deceased testator under sec. 90 of the Probate and Administration Act, which corresponds to sec. 307 of the Indian Succession Act, and this decision is an authority for the proposition that an alienation made by an executor before the grant of probate is validated if the probate is subsequently granted.

11. Upon the authorities, it seems to us that in the case of suits, it has been held that an executor cannot represent the estate in a suit or proceeding till probate has been actually obtained by him. In this view of the matter, as in the present case, the executor Durga Charan did not obtain the grant of probate on the date of sale in favour of Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and he was not competent to represent the estate of the deceased Nripendra Bala, and we accordingly hold that the person who was actually brought on the record by Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 in their suit was actually competent to represent the estate. The view taken by the Courts below is accordingly upheld, and these appeals are dismissed with, costs.

Mookerjee, J.:— I agree.

A.K.D.G