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Raj Kumar Roy v. Mritunjoy Das

Calcutta High Court
Jul 26, 1950
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Summary of Opinion by G.N. Das, J. — Appeal in a Suit for Redemption

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerns a usufructuary mortgage executed on 30-8-1918 by Annada Charan Roy Mahapatra (the mortgagor) in favour of Gaya Prosad Das (the mortgagee) for Rs. 2,600 with interest at 1% per month. Of that sum Rs. 1,600 was said to satisfy a previous loan and a claim of Trailokhya Mashani; Rs. 900 was retained for a contingent liability in favour of Kripa Sindhu Paramanik. The mortgaged property comprised two items (set out as schedule Kha in the plaint): (1) three annas share of separate accounts nos. 1 and 2 in mouzas Nij Manakapore and Uttar Arbala (touzi no. 2661, Midnapore Collectorate) and (2) three annas share of a Khudra Niskar known as Rani Patni.

The mortgage was a usufructuary mortgage. The mortgagor died in 1336 B.S. and the mortgagee died in 1340 B.S. Property No. 2 had an earlier mortgage in favour of Hara Prosad Giri; after Hara Prosad's death his son obtained a decree and, in execution, brought property No. 2 to sale on 9-4-1935 (sale confirmed 29-6-1936; sale certificate Ex. L(1)). As regards property No. 1, Gajendra Narayan Maity obtained a money decree against the plaintiff and co-sharers on 18-8-1932 and, in execution (Money Execution Case No. 68 of 1932), the property was sold and purchased by the defendant on 15-3-1933 (sale confirmed 18-4-1933; sale certificate Ex. L).

The plaintiff's pleading advanced multiple claims: he alleged he was a minor at the time of the decree and sale (variously pleaded in the plaint as born in Falgoon 1329 B.S. and elsewhere recorded in the opinion as the plaint stating birth in Falgun 1334 B.S.), that processes in the execution were suppressed from him, that the real auction-purchaser of property No. 1 was the mortgagee Gaya Prosad Das (making the defendant a benamidar/trustee), and that accounting would show the mortgagee had recovered Rs. 6,500 so that, after deducting double the principal (Rs. 3,200), a balance of Rs. 3,300 remained due to the plaintiff. The plaint sought: a declaration that the mortgage had been fully satisfied or, alternatively, a decree for redemption on payment; recovery of possession; a decree for Rs. 3,300; a declaration that the auction-sale (said to be 15-3-1932 in the plaint for Money Execution Case No. 63 of 1932) was void or, alternatively, redemption of that sale; and incidental reliefs.

The defendant's defence was that property No. 2 had been sold in execution of a prior mortgage decree, thereby barring the plaintiff's right of redemption in that property. As to property No. 1, the defendant denied suppression of processes, contested the plaintiff's minority, and denied that the true purchaser was Gaya Prosad Das (asserting that the defendant himself was the purchaser). The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit: holding the plaintiff had no right of redemption as regards property No. 2 and that as to property No. 1 the plaintiff was not a minor and the sale was binding. The Subordinate Judge did not decide whether the defendant was a benamidar of his father but held that even if he were, the sale in execution of a decree obtained by a stranger did not raise a trust or give rise to an accounting. The plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff (as mortgagor or successor of the mortgagor) was a minor at the relevant dates and, if so, whether that minority rendered the decree and execution sale inoperative against him with respect to property No. 1.
  2. Whether the plaintiff (being described as the mortgagor) retained such a subsisting interest in the mortgaged premises as to entitle him to redeem under Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  3. Whether a purchase of the equity of redemption by the mortgagee's nominee/son (i.e., an alleged benami purchase) raised a trust or duty of accounting where the sale was in execution of a decree obtained by a stranger.
  4. Whether the sale in execution of a prior mortgage decree (as to property No. 2) barred the plaintiff's right of redemption as a matter of law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff alleged he was a minor at the time of the decree and sale regarding property No. 1, and therefore the sale and decree did not bind him.
  • He alleged suppression of the processes leading to the execution sale and lack of knowledge of the proceedings.
  • He contended that the real auction-purchaser of property No. 1 was Gaya Prosad Das (the mortgagee), making the defendant a benamidar/trustee who must account; alternatively the defendant held subject to the plaintiff's right of redemption.
  • He asserted, relying on his status as mortgagor, that he was entitled to redeem under Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act and that his right to redeem was not barred by time.
  • He sought accounting to show that excess sums had been recovered by the mortgagee (alleged recovery Rs. 6,500) and that Rs. 3,300 was due to him after appropriate deductions.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • As to property No. 2: the defendant contended that that property was sold in execution of a prior mortgage decree and therefore the plaintiff's right to redeem was barred.
  • As to property No. 1: the defendant denied any suppression of processes, disputed the plaintiff's claim of minority, and denied that the true purchaser was Gaya Prosad Das, asserting that the defendant himself was the purchaser; on those bases the defendant contended the plaintiff had no right of redemption.
  • The defendant also maintained that even if he were a benamidar, the sale in execution of a decree obtained by a stranger did not create a trust or give rise to an account in the plaintiff's favour.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Digambar v. Suajan, 33 C.W.N. 100 : A.I.R. 1929 Cal. 233 Where a mortgagee impleads a mortgagor who has entirely parted with his interest and recovers decree for foreclosure or sale, that decree does not vest the equity of redemption in the mortgagee; such a decree is ineffective to pass the right to redeem. The court relied on this principle to emphasize that the right to redeem requires a subsisting interest and that foreclosure/sale obtained without proper parties may not extinguish equity of redemption in certain situations; used to shape the interpretation of "mortgagor" in Section 91.
Perry v. Barker, (1803) 8 Ves. 527; 32 E.R. 459 Possession of an estate in the mortgagee is necessary for the mortgagee to sue on the personal covenant against the mortgagor or holder of the equity of redemption; if mortgagee parts with property and then sues, recovery is limited to the difference between price fetched and sum due. Applied to illustrate reciprocal rights between right to redeem and right to foreclose and to support the proposition that rights to enforce covenants or redeem depend on possession/subsisting interest.
Kinnaird v. Trollope, (1888) 39 Ch. D. 636 Exception: where mortgagor is sued on the personal covenant to pay the mortgage money by the mortgagee, a new right to redeem may arise entitling the mortgagor to reconveyance subject to rights of those interested in the equity of redemption. Cited to acknowledge an exception to the general rule that a mortgagor without interest cannot enforce redemption; the court observed that such an exception exists but found it inapplicable on the facts of the present case.
Ram Das v. Parmanandgir, A.I.R. 1931 All. 238 : 131 I.C. 45 Deals with rights of a person who has acquired by purchase the equity of redemption to enforce his right to redeem. The court noted the case but observed it deals with a purchaser of the equity of redemption and not the point immediately before the court (i.e., whether a mortgagor with no subsisting interest can redeem under s.91).
Ram Kishore v. Jagannath, A.I.R. 1934 Pat. 307 : 151 I.C. 255 Referenced but the court observed it did not shed light on the specific question under consideration (interpretation of "mortgagor" in s.91 where no subsisting interest exists). The court noted the authority but did not rely on it for the central point; it was held not to advance the issue at hand.
Apa v. Salan, 1889 Un. P.J. Bom. 291 Assumed that the right of redemption remains in the mortgagor so long as he has any estate in the mortgaged property. The decision was cited in support of the court's interpretation that "mortgagor" in s.91 must be taken to mean one who has a subsisting interest in the mortgaged premises.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages, addressing discrete factual and legal issues presented on appeal.

  1. Minority: The question whether the plaintiff was a minor at the relevant dates was a question of fact. The court reviewed the record and found no reason to dissent from the Subordinate Judge's factual conclusion that the plaintiff was not a minor at those dates. Consequently, the court treated the plaintiff as a major for purposes of determining the validity and effect of the execution sale of property No. 1.
  2. Trust / Benami and accounting: The court accepted the view (also accepted below) that no case of trust arises when the equity of redemption is sold in execution of a decree obtained by a stranger. The appellant did not press a contrary view on this point on appeal. The Subordinate Judge's finding that even if the defendant were benamidar no trust arose (because the sale was in execution of a decree obtained by a stranger) was left intact by the court.
  3. Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act — interpretation of "mortgagor": The principal legal controversy raised on appeal was whether the plaintiff, described as the mortgagor (or successor of the mortgagor), could still claim the right to redeem under Section 91 despite having allegedly lost or parted with his equity of redemption.
    • The court analyzed the basic concept of a mortgage transaction, stressing that the rights to redeem and to foreclose/sell are co-extensive and reciprocal.
    • The court noted procedural law (Order 34, Rule 1 CPC) which requires the mortgagee to implead all persons interested in the equity of redemption when seeking foreclosure or sale, and cited Digambar v. Suajan to show consequences where a decree is obtained without properly joined parties.
    • Drawing on authorities (including Perry v. Barker and Kinnaird v. Trollope) the court identified the essential element: a mortgagor must have a subsisting interest in the mortgaged premises to be able to exercise active rights of redemption. The court acknowledged the narrow exception where a mortgagor who has parted with interest may obtain a new right to redeem if sued on a personal covenant, but observed that this exception did not apply on the facts before it.
    • The court therefore concluded that the ordinary meaning of "mortgagor" in Section 91 must be read to require a mortgagor who has a subsisting interest in the mortgaged premises.
  4. Application to facts: Applying the foregoing interpretation to the facts of the case, the court held that the plaintiff did not possess a subsisting right in respect of the mortgaged property at the date of the suit. Accordingly, the plaintiff could not invoke Section 91 to redeem.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences recorded by the court:

  • The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
  • The hearing fee was assessed at ten gold mohurs.

The opinion contains no extended discussion of broader legal or doctrinal implications beyond the court's holding that the term "mortgagor" in Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act must be read to mean a mortgagor who has a subsisting interest in the mortgaged premises. The decision was applied to the particular facts: the plaintiff lacked a subsisting interest at the date of the suit and therefore could not redeem. No new expansive precedent beyond that interpretation was articulated in the opinion.

G.M.J

Disposition: Appeal dismissed.

Show all summary ...

G.N Das, J.:— This appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff in a suit for redemption. The facts are that on 30-8-1918 the plaintiff's father Annada Charan Roy Mahapatra borrowed money on a mortgage from the defendant's father Gaya Prosad Das. The sum borrowed was Rs. 2,600 and carried interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month. Out of this sum, a sum of Rs. 1,600 was paid in satisfaction of the previous loan of the mortgagee and of one Trailokhya Mashani. The balance of Rs. 900 was retained by the mortgagee for payment of a contingent liability in favour of one Kripa Sindhu Paramanik. The property mortgaged consisted of two items of property, (1) three annas share of separate accounts nos. 1 and 2 in mouzas Nij Manakapore and Uttar Arbala appertaining to touzi no. 2661 of the Midnapore Collectorate and (2) three annas share of a Khudra Niskar known as Rani Patni. These properties are set out sch. Kha of the plaint. The terms of the mortgage bond which was for a period from 13th Bhadra 1325 B.S corresponding to 30-8-1918 to the end of the Amli year 1350 were that the mortgagee would get into possession of the mortgaged property and out of the usufruct pay himself a sum of Rs. 250 towards principal and interest and pay revenue and casses to the tune of Rs. 190 and a sum of Rs. 30 to the mortgagor.

2. It is not disputed that the mortgage so created was a usufructuary mortgage. The mortgagor, Annada Charan Mahapatra died in the year 1336 B.S The mortgagee died in 1340 B.S It also appears that on property no. 2 there was a previous mortgage in favour of one Hara Prosad Giri. On Hara Prosad's death, his son and suooessor Prem Chandra Giri obtained a decree on the mortgage and in execution of that decree brought to sale property No. 2 on 9-4-1935. The sale was confirmed on 29-6-1936. The sale certificate is Ex. L(1). As regards property No. 1 one Gajendra Narayan Maity obtained a money decree against the plaintiff and his co-sharers on 18-8-1932 and in execution of that decree (Money Ex. case No. 68 of 1932) this property was sold and purchased by defendant ion 15-3-1933. The sale was confirmed on 18-4-1933. The sale certificate is Ex. L.

3. The plaintiff's case is that he was born in Falgoon 1329 B.S that is, February or March 1918. As regards property No. 1 he suggests that he was a minor at the date of the passing of the decree and at the time of the sale. He further alleges that the processes in the aforesaid suit and execution case were suppressed and he had no knowledge about the pendency of the proceedings leading up to a sale of his interest in this property. He also alleges that the real auction-purchaser was not the defendant but the latter's father Gaya Prosad Das the mortgagee. He further suggests that by this purchase the defendant became a trustee for him. The plaintiff also alleges that if accounts are taken it would appear that the mortgagee has recovered a sum of Rs. 6,500 out of the profits and deducting therefrom a sum of Rs. 3,200 being double the principal sum advanced on the mortgage there will be a balance of Rs. 3,300 in his favour. The plaintiff therefore prays for a declaration that the aforesaid mortgage has been fully satisfied, and in the alternative he prays that if the entire dues under the mortgage were not fully satisfied for a decree for redemption on payment of the sum due. He also prays for recovery of possession of the mortgaged premises. He also prays for a decree for Rs. 3300 which was overpaid to the mort gages according to the allegations in the plaint. He also prays for a declaration that the auction-sale held on 15-3-1932 in Money Execution Case No. 63 of 1932 was void, and in the alternative he prays for redemption of this property. He prays for incidental reliefs.

4. To this suit the defence raised by the defendant was that as property No. 2 was sold in execution of a prior mortgage decree the plaintiff's right to redeem the said property is barred. As regards property no. 1 the defence is that there was no suppression of the prooesses as alleged in the plaint, that the plaintiff was not a minor and that the real purchaser at the sale was not Gaya Prasad Das but the defendant himself. As such the plaintiff can have no right of redemption as regards plot No. 1 also.

5. The learned Subordinate Judge was of the opinion that as regards property No. 2 there was no dispute at the time of the trial that the plaintiff had no right of redemption. As regards property No. 1 the learned Subordinate Judge was of the opinion that no redemption can he had because the plaintiff was not a minor. As such the Bale was binding on him. The learned Subordinate Judge also seemed inclined to the view that the sale processes were duly served. The learned Subordinate Judge did not come to any finding as to whether the defendant was a benamidar of his father Gaya Prasad Das. But the learned Subordinate Judge was of the opinion that even assuming that the defendant was a benamidar for the mortgagee the purchase at the execration sale on 15-3-1932 being in execution of a decree obtained by a stranger no trust was raised and no question of accounting therefore arose. The suit was accordingly dismissed. Against this decree the plaintiff has preferred this appeal.

6. Mr. Mukherji, appearing for the appellant, has not disputed the view taken by the Court below that the plaintiff has no right of redemption as regards property No. 2. He has confined his arguments to property No. 1.

7. In the first place he contends that the plaintiff was a minor at the relevant date and as such the decree and the sale at the instance of Gajendra Narayan Maity did not bind him and did not affect his title so far as property No. 1 is concerned. This argument rests on a question of fact, viz., whether the plaintiff was a minor at the relevant dates. The plaintiff's case in the plaint is that he was born in Falgun 1334 B.S The case of the defendant, on the other hand, is that the plaintiff was born in the year 1911, that is, 1318 B.S [After considering evidence his Lordship concluded]: In this state of the record we see no reason to dissent from the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff was not a minor at the relevant dates. The first contention raised on behalf of the appellant must therefore be overruled and we must proceed on the basis that the plaintiff was a major at the relevant dates.

8. Mr. Mukherji did not dispute the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge that no case of trust arises in view of the fact that the decree in execution of which the equity of redemption of the plaintiff was sold, was obtained by a stranger. Mr. Mukherji strongly pressed the contention, which does not seem to have been argued in the Court below, that the plaintiff is the mortgagor and as such he is entitled to redeem under the express terms of Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act. He points out that the right to redeem, in the facts of the present case, is not barred by time. It is therefore necessary for us to consider the effect of Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act. The material portion of Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as follows:

“Besides the mortgagor, any of the following persons may redeem, or institute a suit for redemption of, the mortgaged property, namely, cls. (a), (b) and (c) which are not relevant for the present purposes.”

9. There is no dispute that the mortgage with which we are concerned is a usufructuary mortgage, nor is there any dispute that there is no subsisting personal liability of the mortgagor at the date of the suit.

10. It is true that the word ‘mortgagor’ has been used without any qualifying epithet and prima facie supports the contention raised by Mr. Mukherji that as the plaintiff was the mortgagor or the successor of the mortgagor he is entitled to redeem. We have therefore to consider the question whether the word ‘mortgagor’ is used in a wide sense and includes one who has no estate in the property mortgaged.

11. In order to get at the true meaning of the word mortgagor we have to consider the basic concept of a mortgage transaction, viz. that the right to redeem and the right to foreclose are co-extensive and reciprocal rights.

12. In a case where the mortgagor has entirely parted with the equity of redemption in order that the mortgagee may cut off the equity of redemption by a suit either for foreclosure of for sale must implead all persons interested in the equity of redemption. Order 34, R. 1 of the CPC requires the mortgagee to implead all persons interested in the equity of redemption. In the case of Digambar v. Suajan, 33 C.W.N 100 : (A.I.R (16) 1929 Cal. 233) it was held by this Court that if a mortgagee impleads the mortgagor who has entirely parted with his interest in the mortgaged premises and recovers a decree for foreclosure or for sale the effect of that decree is not to vest in the mortgagee the equity of redemption. The decree for foreclosure or for sale in such cases is ineffective to pass to the mortgagee or the purchaser at the mortgage-sale the right to redeem. In the early case of Perry v. Barktr, (1803) 8 ves. 527; 32 E.R 459 it was held that the possession of an estate in the mortgagee was necessary in order that the mortgagee may sue of the personal covenant against the mortgagor or holder of the equity of redemption. Where the mortgagee after a decree for sale or foreclosure parts with the mortgaged property and thereafter sues on the personal covenant the mortgagee is only entitled to recover the difference between the price fetched at the mortgage sale and the sum due on the mortgage.

13. Similar principle must be applied to the case of a mortgagor. The mortgagor must therefore be possessed of subsisting interest in the mortgaged premises or any part thereof. This rule is however subject to an exception where the mortgagor is sued upon the personal covenant to pay the mortgage money by the mortgagee. In such a case a new right to redeem the mortgaged property springs up into existence and entities the mortgagor to get a reconveyance of the mortgaged property to himself subject of course to the rights of persons interested in the equity of redemption, Kinnaird v. Trollope, (1888) 39 Ch. D. 636 : (57 L.J Ch. 905). But as Sir Rashbehary Ghose points out in his Tagore Law Leotures, Edn. 5 p. 253 a mortgagor who has thus entirely parted with his interest in the mortgaged property cannot actively enforce his right to redeem when sued upon the personal covenant.

14. Mr. Mukherji appearing for the appellant drew our attention to the case of Ram Das v. Parmanandgir, A.I.R (18) 1931 All. 238 : (131 I.C 45). That case however deals with the light of a person who has acquired by purchase the equity of redemption, to enforce his right to redeem. The case of Ram Kishore v. Jagannath, A.I.R (21) 1934 Pat. 307 : (151 I.C 255), to which our attention was also drawn by Mr. Mukherji does not throw any light upon the point which is now under consideration before us.

15. In my opinion, the word ‘mortgagor’ in Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act, must mean a mortgagor who has subsisting interest in the mortgaged premises.

16. Section 60 of the Proviso of the Transfer of Property Act, does not present any difficulty. In a case like the present the right to redeem may be taken to have been extinguished by the act of the mortgagor in allowing the equity of redemption to be sold in execution of the money decree. Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act, merely defines the right of a mortga-gor in case of a usufructuary mortgage. The view taken by me receives support from the decision in the case of Apa v. Salan 1889 Un. P.J Bom. 291 where Sargent and Gandy JJ., assumed that the right of redemption remains in the mortgagor so long as he has any estate in the mortgaged property.

17. The result of the above discussion leads to the conclusion that the word ‘mortgagor’ in Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act, must mean a mortgagor who has a subsisting interest in the mortgaged premises. In the present case, the plaintiff had no subsisting right at the date of the suit. The third contention raised on behalf of the appellant also fails. The result therefore is that this appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs, hearing fee being assessed at ten gold mohurs.

G.M.J

18. Appeal dismissed.