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Province Of West Bengal v. Banamali Sen

Calcutta High Court
Sep 20, 1949
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Judgment Summary — Das, J. (with B.K. Guha, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought by the Province of Bengal against an order dated 23rd September 1946 of Mr. J.P. Mookherjee, Subordinate Judge (2nd Additional Court, District 24‑Parganas), which had dismissed an execution case initiated by the Province. The execution arose from a decree for court-fees of Rs. 2,484-12 annas (entered under Order XXXIII rule 11, CPC) passed against plaintiffs who had sued in forma pauperis in Title Suit No. 69 of 1939.

The background involves extensive prior litigation between Bholanath Sen (predecessor-in-interest of the respondents) and Jogendranath Das regarding a mortgage and appeals up to the Privy Council (P.C. Appeal No. 126 of 1917). As security for costs in that Privy Council appeal, Bholanath Sen deposited 3½% Government Promissory (G.P.) Notes of face value Rs. 4,000. Over time, a final mortgage decree was executed and the mortgaged properties were sold; later proceedings under the Benfal Money-Lenders Act led to reopening of the mortgage decree and a reopened decree for Rs. 28,826 was directed by this Court to be paid in ten annual instalments beginning 3rd January 1945.

On 25th August 1942 the Province of Bengal executed the decree for Rs. 2,484-12 against Bholanath Sen and Tulsi Manjuri Dasi and sought attachment of the G.P. Notes deposited as security for costs in the Privy Council appeal. Miscellaneous proceedings were taken: a claim for release of the notes by a third party was dismissed in August 1944; and the judgment-debtor (Bholanath Sen) subsequently filed a petition of objection under section 47 (registered as Misc. Case No. 12 of 1946) praying for release of the G.P. Notes and dismissal of the execution. The Subordinate Judge allowed that petition (23rd September 1946) on grounds including existence of a lien in favour of the mortgagee respondents and that the notes were earmarked for costs. The Province appealed to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the G.P. Notes (3½% Government Promissory Notes of face value Rs. 4,000), deposited as security for costs in the Privy Council appeal, were attachable in execution of the decree for court-fees passed in Title Suit No. 69 of 1939 (i.e., whether such a security deposit is liable to attachment under section 60, CPC).
  2. Whether any lien of the mortgagee respondents in the Privy Council appeal subsisted so as to prevent attachment of the G.P. Notes.
  3. Whether the incorporation of the Privy Council costs into the reopened decree operated to extinguish the security (i.e., whether the reopened decree converted the costs into a charge solely on the mortgaged property, thereby defeating attachment of the deposited notes).
  4. Whether the order of the Subordinate Judge in the earlier claim case (Misc. Case dismissed on 2nd August 1944) was conclusive and binding upon the judgment-debtor for the present proceedings.
  5. Preliminary procedural questions raised by respondents: (a) whether the petition was under Order XXI rule 58 and hence non-appealable; (b) whether the appeal could proceed in absence of co-judgment-debtor Tulsi Manjuri; (c) whether the Province of Bengal, having ceased to exist on the appointed day (15th August 1947), could continue execution or appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Sen, Senior Government Pleader)

  • Even if the mortgagee respondents had a lien, that lien did not bar attachment of the G.P. Notes by the Province.
  • The lien did not subsist because the Privy Council costs were incorporated into the reopened decree, which created a charge only on the mortgaged properties (and thus no longer supported a claim on the deposited notes).
  • The order made in the earlier claim case (Misc. Case) was binding on the judgment-debtor and should not prevent attachment.

Respondents' Preliminary Objections / Arguments (Mr. Siti Kanta Lahiri)

  • The petition filed by the judgment-debtor properly arose under Order XXI rule 58, C.P. Code, and no appeal lay against the order allowing such a petition.
  • The appeal cannot proceed in the absence of Tulsi Manjuri, the co-judgment-debtor, who was not before the Court.
  • The Province of Bengal has ceased to exist since the appointed day (15th August 1947), and therefore the decree under execution could not be executed by it (raising a succession / substitution issue).
  • Reliance on authorities (Ramiah Ayyar v. Gopaliar; Gauranga Behari Basak v. Manindra Nath Das Gupta; and other cases) to argue limits or qualifications on the right of attaching creditors where money had been deposited or earmarked for specific purposes.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahant Shantanand Giri v. Mokant Basudevanand Supports the proposition that a security deposit may be liable to attachment in execution. The Court cited this decision as supporting the conclusion that the security deposit (G.P. Notes) is liable to attachment.
Jagadish Narain Singh v. Mt. Ramsukul Koer Held that money deposited by an insolvent as security for costs of an appeal could be attached by a creditor; the attachment is valid but subject to the result of the appeal. The Court relied on this case to show that an attaching creditor's right to attach a deposit is valid, with the limited effect that the attachment is subject to the appeal's outcome.
Ramiah Ayyar v. Gopaliar Illustrated that money deposited (to meet possible liability) can be charged with dues of a plaintiff, but an attachment by a creditor may still be effective; rights of attaching creditor are subject to prior charge. The Court observed that this authority does not militate against the present view: the attachment may be good but subject to existing charges.
Gauranga Behari Basak v. Manindra Nath Das Gupta Concerned priority among an attaching judgment-creditor, the official receiver and a person in whose favour a Court order had been made to bring money into Court. The Court treated this authority as addressing priority questions among claimants to deposited money and not as defeating the general proposition that a deposit can be attached (i.e., it does not overturn the attachment rule applied here).
Chitrabani Ltd. v. P. Kissan The reported decision did not decide the specific point raised in the present appeal. The Court noted that this case did not decide the point before the Court and therefore did not affect its conclusion on attachability of the security deposit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in three main strands: (A) resolution of respondents' preliminary objections concerning appealability, parties and succession; (B) statutory and property-law analysis on attachability of the security deposit; and (C) application of precedent to the facts.

A. Preliminary objections and succession

  • The Court overruled the first preliminary objection (that the petition fell under Order XXI r. 58 and was not appealable) because the objection to attachment was raised by the judgment-debtor (a party) and fell within section 47 jurisdiction.
  • The second objection (absence of co-judgment-debtor Tulsi Manjuri) was rejected: the G.P. Notes had been deposited by Bholanath Sen alone, relief was claimed against him, and his successors-in-interest were parties to the appeal.
  • The third objection (that the Province of Bengal had ceased to exist on the appointed day) required detailed consideration. The Court analyzed the Indian Independence Act, 1947 (sec. 3) and the Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947 (secs. 3, 7, 12). It found that the decree relating to court-fees payable in Alipore, Bengal, was held for the purpose of the Province of Bengal and thereby vested, as from the appointed date, in His Majesty for the purposes of the two successor provinces. By operation of sec. 12(2) of the Order, the Provinces of East Bengal and West Bengal were automatically substituted for the Province of Bengal in the pending appeal; accordingly both successor provinces were to be deemed appellants. The Court therefore permitted representation by both successor provinces in the appeal.

B. Property law and attachability

  • The Court relied on section 60, Code of Civil Procedure, which enumerates property liable to attachment—"all other saleable property, moveable or immoveable, of the judgment-debtor, over which ... he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his benefit". The Court emphasized that the enumeration is wide.
  • The Court reasoned that a security deposit earmarked for costs does not entirely divest the depositor of disposing power. Despite being earmarked, the depositor retains a contingent disposing power (dependent upon the eventual result of the appeal or exhaustion of costs). The fact that the notes were endorsed in the name of a court officer did not alter the disposability inquiry.
  • The Court observed the practical effect of attachment: it prevents private alienation and subjects the property to claims enforceable under the attachment, but does not necessarily destroy all proprietary or contingent interests of the depositor.

C. Precedent application and specific contentions

  • The Court held that the security deposit was liable to attachment and cited Mahant Shantanand Giri and Jagadish Narain Singh as supporting authorities: Jagadish Narain Singh specifically held that deposits for costs could be attached, with the qualification that the attachment remains subject to the result of the appeal.
  • The authorities relied upon by respondents (including Ramiah Ayyar and Gauranga Behari Basak) were addressed: these cases established that deposits may be charged with particular dues or raise priority issues, but they did not negate the principle that an attaching creditor can validly attach deposited funds—the attaching creditor’s rights remain subject to pre-existing charges.
  • The Court declined to decide the appellant's second contention (that the incorporation of Privy Council costs into the reopened decree extinguished the security for costs) because the materials before the Court did not permit a determination of how far the judgment-debtor had fulfilled the terms of the reopened decree. The Court did, however, note that merely passing the reopened decree did not by itself extinguish the security for costs of the Privy Council.
  • The Court treated the third contention (that the earlier claim-case order was binding) as insubstantial because the claim had been filed by one of the decree-holders and the order made was not final.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal succeeds. The Court set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge dated 23rd September 1946, and directed that the execution case proceed. (The Court ordered that the parties will bear their own costs.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The attachment of the G.P. Notes by the Province (now represented by the successor Provinces of East Bengal and West Bengal) is permissible; the execution in respect of the decree for court-fees will continue in the execution court. The Subordinate Judge's order releasing the G.P. Notes is set aside.
  • On the succession question, by operation of the relevant post-Independence provisions cited in the opinion, the Province of Bengal's rights in the decree vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the successor provinces and the Provinces of East Bengal and West Bengal were automatically substituted for the Province of Bengal in the pending appeal.
  • On broader legal effect: The Court concluded that a security deposit made for costs is within the ambit of property liable to attachment under section 60 CPC and that such a deposit does not necessarily extinguish the depositor’s contingent disposing power. The opinion applied and relied on existing authorities to support that position, but the judgment itself does not purport to state that a new general principle of law is being laid down beyond applying those authorities to the facts. The Court declined to decide the question whether the reopened decree had, in the particular facts, extinguished the security.

Direct quotation and analysis in this summary are confined to matters expressly contained within the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Das, J.:— This is an appeal by the Province of Bengal against an order dated 23rd September, 1946, passed by Mr. J.P Mookherjee, learned Subordinate Judge, 2nd Additional Court, District 24-Parganas dismissing an execution case started by Appellant.

2. The facts are as follows.—

3. Bholanath Sen, predecessor-in-interest of the Respondents and Tulsimanjuri Dasi filed a suit in forma pauperis, being Title Suit No. 69 of 1939 against Rajlakshmi Dasi and Nabani Gopal Banerji. On 31st June, 1941, the suit was dismissed and under the provisions of Or 33 r. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a decree for payment of Rs. 2484-12 ans, being the Court-fees which would have been payable to the Government, had the Plaintiffs not been permitted to sue as paupers, was passed against the Plaintiffs in favour of the Government. In 1900 the said Bholanath Sen had borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,000 from Jogendranath Das on a mortgage. In 1911, Jogendra sued to enforce the mortgage. The Court, however passed a money decree in favour of Jogendra. Jogendra preferred an appeal to this Court. On 5th June, 1917, this Court allowed the appeal and passed a preliminary mortgage-decree. Bholanath Sen preferred an appeal to His Majesty in Council, which was numbered P.C Appeal No. 126 of 1917. Bholanath Sen deposited 3-½ per cent. G.P Notes of the face value of Rs. 4.000 as security for cost of the said Jogendranath Das in the said P.C Appeal. The P.C Appeal was dismissed with costs. On 23rd November, 1918, a final mortgage decree for Rs. 43,000 odd was passed in favour of Jogendra. The decree was executed and the mortgaged properties were sold on 6th October, 1936, and purchased by the decree-holder Jogendra for Rs. 79,000, the dues of the mortgagee being about 85,000 on that date. The sale was confirmed on 29th May, 1939. The decree-holder auction-purchaser took possession through Court on 20th February, 1940. The Benfal Money-Lenders Act having come into force, the judgment-debtor Bholanath Sen instituted proceedings under the said Act for reopening of the said mortgage-decree and for incidental reliefs. On 26th February, 1944, the learned Subordinate Judge directed the decree to be reopened and a new preliminary decree for Rs. 43,000 was passed, but no instalments were granted. Both Jogendra and Bholanath appealed to this Court. The appeals were disposed of on the 26th April, 1944, and this Court directed a preliminary decree to be passed for Rs. 28,826 which was made payable in 10 annual instalments commencing with 3rd January, 1945.

4. Meanwhile on 25th August, 1942, the Province of Bengal executed the decree for Rs. 2484-12 ans, passed in Title Suit No. 69 of 1939, against Bholanath Sen and Tulsi Manjuri Dasi and prayed for realisation of the same by the attachment of 3-½ per cent. G.P Notes for Rs. 4,000 deposited by Bholanath Sen as security for costs of the Respondent Jogendranath Das in P.C Appeal 126 of 1917. This was registered as Title Execution Case No. 59 of 1942. On 15th March, 1944, Ajit Nath Das, one of the Respondents in P.C Appeal 126 of 1927, filed an application under Or. 21, rr. 52 and 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure for releasing the said G.P Notes from attachment by the Province of Bengal. This gave rise to Miscellaneous Case 11 of 1944. The Miscellaneous Case was dismissed on 2nd August, 1944, on the ground that as the first instalment had not fallen due, the claimant had no lien on the said 3-½ per cent. G.P Notes and the latter could not be released from attachment. No Suit has been filed by the claimant under Or. 21 r. 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. On 6th March, 1946, the judgment-debtor Bholanath Sen filed a petition of objection under sec. 47 and prayed that the G.P Notes be released from attachment and the execution Case be dismissed. This was registered as Msc. Case No. 12 of 1946. The learned Subordinate Judge by his order dated 23rd September, 1946, allowed the Misc. Case on the following grounds:

(1) The mortgagee Respondents in the said P.C Appeal have a lien on the said G.P Notes.

(2) The said G.P Notes were earmarked for a certain purpose vis., the payment of the cost of the said P.C Appeal and cannot be utilised for any other purpose unless the said costs are paid.

(3) The order in the claim case was made on the footing that the 1st instalment had not then become due and is not conclusive.

6. On 2nd January, 1947, the decree-holder Province of Bengal preferred this appeal against the said order.

7. Mr. Sen, the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the Appellant pressed the following points:

(1) Even assuming that the lien of the Respondents in the said P.C Appeal subsisted, there was no bar to an attachment of the said G.P Notes.

(2) The lien in fact, does not subsist, because the P.C costs are now incorporated in the reopened decree which created a charge only on the mortgaged properties.

(3) The order passed in the claim case is binding on the judgment-debtor.

8. Mr. Siti Kanta Lahiri for the Respondents raised three preliminary objections.

(1) The petition filed by the Respondent judgment-debtor really came under Or. 21 r. 58, C.P Code and no appeal lay against the order allowing the same.

(2) The appeal can not proceed in the absence of Tulsimanjuri, the co-judgment-debtor.

(3) The decree under execution can not be now executed by the Province of Bengal which has ceased to exist since the appointed day (15th August, 1947).

9. The first objection must be overruled as the objection to attachment is at the instance of the judgment-debtor and not of a 3rd party. The case comes within sec. 47, vide Mulla's Civil Procedure Code, 11th Ed. p. 188.

10. The second objection is also without any substance. The G.P Notes sought to be attached were deposited by Bholanath Sen alone. The relief is claimed against him and on his death, his successors-in-interest who are parties to the appeal as Respondents.

11. The third objection requires careful consideration.

12. Sec. 3 (I) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the appointed day:

(a) the Province of Bengal, as constituted under the Government of India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist, and

(b) there shall be constituted in lieu thereof—two new Provinces, to be known respectively as East Bengal and West Bengal.

13. Sec. 3 of the Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947, provides that the initial disrtibution of rights, property and liabilities would be governed by the provisions of the order subject to any agreement between the two Dominions of India and Pakistan, or the provinces concerned, and to any award of the arbitral Tribunal.

14. Secs. 4, 5, 6 relate to the distribution of land, goods, coins, banknotes and currency notes.

15. Sec. 7 deals with distribution of Property other than land, goods, coins, banknotes and currency notes.

16. The effect of sec. 7 (2) is to vest in His Majesty for the joint purposes of the two. Dominions of East Bengal and West Bengal all such property which was held for the purpose of the Province of Bengal. It is admitted on both sides that the decree which related to Court-fees payable in respect of a suit in Alipore, Bengal, was held for the purpose of the Province of Bengal; as such, the decree automatically vested, as from the appointed date, in His Majesty for the Provinces of East and West Bengal.

17. By sec. 12 (2) of the Order, therefore, the Provinces of East and West Bengal would he automatically substituted for the Province of Bengal in this appeal which was pending on the appointed day and the appeal shall continue as such.

18. The above result is, by reason of sec. 3 of the Order, subject to any agreement between the two Dominions or Provinces or any award of the Arbitral Tribunal.

19. No such agreement has been placed before us and we are not aware of the terms of such an agreement, if any

20. As the interest in the decree has been automatically transferred to the Provinces of East Bengal and West Bengal, both the Provinces are to be deemed to be Appellants. The learned Senior Government Pleader, for the Province of West Bengal represents one of the Appellants viz., the Province of West Bengal. We gave time to the Province of East Bengal to appear. Mr. Asir has appeared for the Province of East Bengal and represents the latter. Mr. Asir has accepted the position taken by the Province of West Bengal.

21. We shall now proceed to deal with the contentions raised on behalf of the Appellants.

22. The security deposit was made for the purpose of enabling the Respondents to England to realise the cost which may be awarded to the latter in case the appeal fails. Even if the appeal fails, the costs decreed may or may not exhaust. In the latter case, the surplus is available for the Appellant (depositor).

23. If the appeal succeeds, the whole of the deposit remains at the disposal of the depositor.

24. Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the properties liable to attachment, namely lands…. all other saleable property, moveable or immoveable, of the judgment-debtor, over which or the profits of which, he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his benefit, whether the same be held in the name of the judgment debtor or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf.

25. The enumeration is subject to certain provisos which are not applicable in the present case.

26. The effect of the security deposit as stated already, is not to take away entirely the disposing power of the depositor. Inspite of the fact that the deposit is earmarked for a specific purpose, the depositor still retains a disposing power which he may exercise for his benefit. The extent of the power is dependent on certain contingencies. The fact that the G.P Notes deposited was endorsed in the name of an officer of the Court did not affect the question. The word ‘property’ is used in a wide sense and does not mean only proprietorship but includes any right or power in respect of the same. The effect of the attachment is merely to prevent private alienation and to subject the attached property to claims enforceable under the attachment.

27. In my opinion, the security deposit is liable to attachment in execution of a decree.

28. This view is supported by the decision in Mahant Shantanand Giri v. Mokant Basudevanand(1).

29. The view is also supported by the decision in Jagadish Narain Singh v. Mt. Ramsukul Koer(2). In that case, money was deposited by an insolvent as security for costs of an appeal to His Majesty in Council. The deposit was attached by a creditor. It was held that the attachment was valid, the only effect is that it is subject to the result of the appeal.

30. Mr. Lahiri relied on the case of Ramiah Ayyar v. Gopaliar(3). In that case a debtor in order to prevent his arrest by the creditor, deposited the claim of the Plaintiff. The money so deposited was attached by another person who had obtained a decree against the depositor. The latter was adjudicated an insolvent. In was held that the money deposited was charged with the dues of the Plaintiff, but the attachment effected was good, the rights of the attaching creditor and the official receiver were however subject to the said charge. Mr. Lahiri also relied on the case of Gauranga Behari Basak v. Manindra Nath Das Gupta(4). This case turned on the question of priority between a mere attaching judgment-creditor, the official receiver and a person in whose favour an order had been made by a Court to bring the money into Court.

31. The cases cited by Mr. Lahiri do not therefore militate against the view taken by me.

32. The decision in Chitrabani Ltd. v. P. Kissan(5), did not decide the point before.

33. The first contention raised on behalf of the Appellant therefore suceeds.

34. It is not necessary to express an opinion on the second contention as we are not in a position to ascertain, on the materials before us, how far the judgment-debtor has fulfilled the terms of the reopened decree.

35. We may observe, however, that the mere passing of the reopened decree had not the effect of extinguishing the security for costs of the Privy Council.

36. The third contention is not one of substance, the claim was filed by one of the decree-holders and the order made was not a final one.

37. The result, therefore, is that this appeal succeeds, the decision of the Court below is set aside and the execution case will proceed.

38. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.

B.K Guha, J.:— I agree.

N.D.R