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Bhupen Dey And Ors. ... v. The Chief Secretary,...
Factual and Procedural Background
This set of judgments (delivered by Harries, C.J., with concurring opinions) concerns seven petitions made under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by persons detained in various jails in the province. The petitioners sought release on the ground that their detention was illegal. The factual allegations in the petitions vary by case but include: arrest and detention under sections of the West Bengal Security Act (including sec. 30 and orders under sec. 16) in May–June 1949; claims that the West Bengal Security Act was no longer in force (relying on this Court’s decision in Badal Bose v. The Government/Province of West Bengal); and in at least one petition an allegation that the grounds of detention served were vague or that detention was mala fide or wrongful.
The Provincial Government (through the Advocate-General) responded by producing fresh orders of detention made under section 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930 (Bengal Act VI of 1930) dated June 26, 1949 (served about July 2, 1949). The Advocate-General also relied on section 4 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Supplementary) Act, 1932, which provides that the powers conferred by section 491 CrPC shall not be exercised in respect of persons arrested, committed to, or detained under the local Act or the local Act as supplemented by the 1932 Act. The High Court called on the Chief Secretary and jail superintendents to show cause why the detained persons should not be released; the Advocate-General appeared and defended the detentions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the detentions were unlawful because the West Bengal Security Act (under which initial detentions/orders had been made) was no longer in force, as asserted by the petitioners relying on the decision in Badal Bose.
- Whether, having been re-detained under section 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, the High Court retains jurisdiction under section 491 CrPC to entertain these applications in light of section 4 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Supplementary) Act, 1932.
- Whether the High Court may interfere under section 491 CrPC where orders of detention under the 1930 Act are alleged to be mala fide or made in bad faith (i.e., whether mala fides removes the protection conferred by section 4 of the 1932 Act).
- The proper interpretation of section 2(1) of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930—specifically whether an order under that section is valid when the Provincial Government merely honestly believes membership and the character of the association, or whether the Court must be satisfied that the association is in fact of the character contemplated by the section.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Many petitioners contended that they were originally detained under the West Bengal Security Act and that, by reason of this Court’s decision in Badal Bose v. The Government/Province of West Bengal, that Act had expired (the Court had held the Act expired on March 12, 1948) and the detentions under it were unlawful.
- Some petitioners (or their representatives) alleged mala fides in detention in at least one case—claiming wrongful, mala fide arrest and detention (e.g., detention for political reasons or without grounds).
- In one petition it was asserted that the grounds of detention served were vague and uncertain and thereby rendered the detention improper or unlawful.
Advocate-General / Provincial Government's Arguments
- The Advocate-General produced fresh orders dated June 26, 1949, made under section 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, and maintained that the detained persons (with limited exceptions already released) were lawfully detained under those orders.
- Relying on section 4 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Supplementary) Act, 1932, the Advocate-General contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction under section 491 CrPC to entertain these applications in respect of persons detained under the local Act (or the Act as supplemented by the 1932 Act).
Argument of Mr. Gupta (counsel for some detained persons)
- Mr. Gupta argued that the orders on their face were not a sufficient answer because section 2(1) of the 1930 Act requires first that the Provincial Government honestly believe a person is a member of an association and further that such association in fact have objects and methods including the commission of offences in the First Schedule. He contended that the Court must be satisfied that the association was in fact one contemplated by the section (i.e., the Court should look beyond the government's honest belief to the factual character of the association).
- He urged that, given the liberty of the subject involved, the Court should construe the section in a manner favourable to personal freedom.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Badal Bose v. The Government/Province of West Bengal | Held that the West Bengal Security Act expired on March 12, 1948, and its existence beyond that date had not validly been extended; detentions under that Act were unlawful. | The Court relied on this decision as the reason the Provincial Government cancelled earlier orders made under the West Bengal Security Act and proceeded to make fresh orders under section 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930. The Court also noted that in Badal Bose it had expressed no opinion on whether detention was otherwise justified under other laws. |
| S. Dilbagh Singh v. Emperor | Supports the proposition that abuse or misuse of power is no exercise of power; a mala fide order is not an order made under the statute and therefore is not protected by statutory ouster provisions. | The Court relied on this authority to state that if any order were malâ fide the High Court could interfere under section 491 CrPC because a malâ fide order would not be an order made under the 1930 Act and thus would not be covered by section 4 of the 1932 Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps (limited to what is stated in the opinion):
- Identification of orders and statutory basis: The Court observed that after the decision in Badal Bose invalidated detentions under the West Bengal Security Act, the Provincial Government cancelled those orders and made fresh detention orders dated June 26, 1949, under section 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930. Those orders were served on or about July 2, 1949.
- Statutory ouster relied on by Government: The Advocate-General relied upon section 4 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Supplementary) Act, 1932, which provides that the powers conferred by section 491 CrPC shall not be exercised in respect of persons arrested, committed to, or detained under the local Act or the local Act as supplemented by the 1932 Act. The Advocate-General’s contention was that the High Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain these petitions.
- Exception for mala fide orders: The Court accepted the legal principle (citing S. Dilbagh Singh v. Emperor) that an abuse or misuse of power is no exercise of power; accordingly, if an order were malâ fide (made in bad faith), it would not be an order under the 1930 Act and the Court could interfere under section 491 CrPC. Thus the ouster in section 4 of the 1932 Act does not protect genuinely malâ fide acts of the local government.
- Requirement to plead mala fides with particulars: The Court held that mere unsupported assertions of mala fides in a petition would not suffice. It would be necessary for a detained person who alleges mala fides to set out grounds upon which it could be said that the order was malâ fide. Apart from a bare statement in one case, the Court found no pleaded or established suggestion of mala fides. The bonâ fides of the Provincial Government were not impugned in the material before the Court.
- Interpretation of section 2(1) of the 1930 Act and Mr. Gupta’s argument: The Court considered Mr. Gupta’s submission that a court should require that the association be in fact the kind of association contemplated by the Act (not merely that the Government honestly believe so). The Court rejected that construction: it found the wording of section 2(1) clear and unambiguous, and concluded that an order under section 2(1) is justified where the Provincial Government is honestly of the opinion that a person is a member of an association which the Government believes has the objects and methods described in the section, or where the Government honestly believes the person has done or is doing acts to assist such an association. The Court held that it was not open to the Court to go into whether the association was in fact of that character; the statute required only the honest opinion of the Provincial Government.
- Application to the present petitions: Because the orders before the Court recited that they were made in the opinion of the Provincial Government that reasonable grounds existed (wording following section 2), and because nothing suggested the Provincial Government's opinion was dishonest or malâ fide, the Court concluded it could not challenge the orders. Once the orders were treated as orders made under the 1930 Act, section 4 of the 1932 Act prevented the High Court from entertaining the section 491 applications.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petitions were dismissed and the Rules were discharged. The Court found no ground for holding that the orders of detention were illegal.
Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):
- The detained persons for whom fresh orders under section 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, were produced remain lawfully detained under those orders, insofar as nothing in the material before the Court shows those orders to be malâ fide.
- The Court concluded that where an order is properly made under section 2(1) of the 1930 Act (i.e., in the honest opinion of the Provincial Government that the conditions in the section are met), the High Court's jurisdiction under section 491 CrPC is ousted by section 4 of the 1932 Act unless mala fides is properly pleaded and established.
- The Court interpreted section 2(1) of the 1930 Act to require only the honest opinion of the Provincial Government that the person is a member of an association of the kind described or has done acts to assist such an association; the Court will not, on judicial review under section 491 unless mala fides is alleged and established, inquire into whether the association is in fact of that character.
Note: The Court stated that if acts of the Local Government were shown to be dishonest or malâ fide, the High Court's powers under section 491 CrPC would remain. The opinion therefore preserves judicial review where mala fides is shown, but dismisses these petitions for want of such a showing.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Harries, C.J:— These are seven petitions made under sec. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code in which prayers are made for the release of certain persons detained in various jails in this province on the ground that their detention is illegal.
2. Miscellaneous Case No. 102 of 1949 concerns one Bhupen De who is confined in the Darjeeling Jail. According to his petition he was arrested under sec. 30 of the West Bengal Security Act on May 11, 1949, and an order under sec. 16 of that Act was subsequently made on June 3, 1949. This order was an order for detention for a period of nine months. The petitioner claims that the Act under which he was detained is no longer in force by reason of the fact that it was not extended in accordance with law. He therefore claims that his detention is unlawful and that he should be released.
3. Miscellaneous Case No. 103 of 1949 is by a detained person Pangamali Chhetri who is confined in the jail at Darjeeling. In his petition he states that he was arrested on May 21, 1949, and by an order of June 18, 1949, he was ordered to be detained in jail for a period of nine months. These orders were made under the West Bengal Security Act which, the detained man contends, is no longer in force. He, therefore, submits that his detention is unlawful and prays that he should be released. Miscellaneous Case No. 105 of 1949 is a petition presented by one Lalita Ghose on behalf of a detained person Deb Kumar Bose. In the petition it is said that Deb Kumar Bose was arrested about three months ago under the West Bengal Security Act and was ordered to be detained in jail by an order made under sec. 16 of that Act. It is said in the petition that the detained person has been served with a copy of the grounds upon which the order was made, but these grounds, it is said, are vague and uncertain and the failure to serve the detained person with proper grounds has rendered the detention either improper or unlawful. Further it is said that the West Bengal Security Act under which the order for detention was made is no longer effective and accordingly the detention is unlawful and the petitioner is entitled to be released.
4. Miscellaneous Case No. 106 of 1949 is presented by one Santilata Das on behalf of a detained person Sitanath Das. We are informed that Sitanath Das has already been released, so we need not concern ourselves further with this petition and the rule is discharged.
5. Miscellaneous Case No. 107 of 1949 is presented by Subodh Chandra Basu on behalf of a detained person Sukumar Bose alias Basu. In the petition it is said that the detained person is a student of the Jadavpur Engineering College and that he was detained for no reason at all. It is suggested that he had interested himself in the South Calcutta bye-election and that he had been approached by supporters of the Congress candidate to work in favour of that candidate. Apparently the detained person supported Mr. Sarat Chanda Bose who opposed the Congress candidate, and as a result it is said that he was arrested and detained. He claims that an order for detention under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, made in his case is made without any grounds whatsoever and that the Provincial Government could not possibly believe that this man was dangerous.
6. Miscellaneous Case No. 108 of 1949 is a petition by one Satyajit Das Gupta on behalf of ten persons who are detained in the Dum Dum Central Jail. Of these ten persons we are informed that Sachindra Nath Mukherjee has already been released; so we are not concerned with the petition so far as he is concerned. In the petition it is said that these persons were all arrested on various dates under sec. 30 of the West Bengal Security Act and were later ordered to be detained in the Dum Dum Jail by orders under sec. 16 of the Act. They claim that the West Bengal Security Act is no longer in force and, therefoe, their detention has become illegal and they pray for their release.
7. Miscellaneous Case No. 109 of 1949 is a petition presented by Amarendra Nath Sarkar on behalf of a detained person Kamala Kanta Sarkar. It is stated in the petition that the detained person is a Stenographer to the Sales Manager of the Tata Iron and Steel Company at their Calcutta Office. It is said that the Petitioner was arrested on May 23, 1949, without any reason whatsoever and that the detention is malâ fide and wrongful.
8. The Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal and the Superintendents of the Jails concerned were called upon by this Court to show cause why these detained persons should not be released and they have appeared to show cause through the Advocate-General. He has produced in each case an order for detention made under sec. 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930 (Bengal Act VI of 1930) and he claims that all the detained persons with the exception of Sitanath Das and Sachindra Nath Mukherjee are lawfully detained under these orders.
9. All the detained persons had been arrested and detained under the West Bengal Security Act, 1948. This Act was considered by this Court in the recent unreported (since reported) case of Badal Bose v. The Government of West Bengal(1) when it was held that the Act expired on March 12, 1948, and that its existence beyond that date had not validly been extended. The detention of these pesons under that Act was, therefore, unlawful and consequently the orders of detention made under that Act were cancelled and fresh orders for detention in each case were made under sec. 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, and it is upon these latter orders the Provincial Government now rely to justify the detention of all the persons who have moved this Court in these applications. sec. 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, is in these terms:—
(1) “Where, in the opinion of the Provincial Government, there are reasonable grounds for believing that any person—
(i) is a member of an association of which the objects and methods include the commission of any offence included in the First Schedule or the doing of any act with a view to interfere by violence or threat of violence, with the administration of justice; or
(ii) has been or is being instigated or controlled by a member of any such association with a view to the commission or doing of any such offence or act; or
(iii) has done or is doing any act to assist the operations of any such association;
the Provincial Government, may, by order in writing, give all or any of the following directions namely that such person—
(f) shall be committed to custody in jail; and may at any time add to, amend, vary or ??? any order made under this section”.
10. In the present cases orders under this section were made on June 26, 1949, and were served on the various detained persons on or about July 2, 1949. The learned Advocate-General has produced the orders made in each case and the orders follow the terms of the section. In each order it is said that in the opinion of the Provincial Government there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person ordered to be detained is a member of an association of which the objects and methods include the commission of offences included in the First Schedule to the act, and that in the opinion of the Provincial Government there are also reasonable grounds for believing also that he has done or is doing an act to assist the operations of such association.
11. Further, the learned Advocate-General relies upon sec. 4 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Supplementary) Act, 1932. This was an Act passed by the Central Government to supplement the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930 to which I have already made reference. Sec. 4 is in these terms:
“The powers conferred by sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall not be exercised in respect of any person arrested, committed to or detained in custody under the local Act or the local Act as supplemented by this Act.
12. The learned Advocate-General has contended that this Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to hear these applications because the jurisdiction of this Court has been taken away by sec. 4 of the Act of 1932.
13. It seems quite clear that if these orders were orders made under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, then we could not entertain any of these applications as our right to consider the propriety of these orders is definitely taken away by sec. 4 of the Act of 1932. However, if we came to the conclusion that any of these orders were malâ fide or made in bad faith we could, I think, interfere under sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been repeatedly held that abuse or misuse of power is no exercise of power and if we were satisfied that any of these orders were malâ fide we would be bound to hold that they were not orders made under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930 at all and that being so, the jurisdiction of this Court would not be affected by sec. 4 of the Act of 1932. See S. Dilbagh Singh v. Emperor(2). That section only takes away our right to interfere where an order is made under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act. A malâ fide order would not be made under the Act and we could interfere.
14. However, there is no real suggestion that any of these orders are malâ fide. I do not think that it would be sufficient for a detained person to state merely in his petition that an order was malâ fide. It would, I think, be necessary for him to set out grounds upon which it could be said that the order was malâ fide. Apart from a mere statement in one case that the order is malâ fide, the bonâ fides of the Provincial Government are not impugned.
15. In the petitions it is contended that the continued detention of the detained persons is illegal by reason of the decision of this Court in the case of Badal Bose v. Province of West Bengal. The Provincial Government, realising that such was the case, cancelled the orders for detention made under the West Bengal Security Act which were clearly invalid and made in every case a fresh order under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act.
16. I do not think that it can be contended that the fresh orders under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act are malâ fide merely because they were made with the intention of justifying detention which had been declared by this Court to be unlawful. Orders under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act were undoubtedly made to nullify the effect of the decision of this Court in the case of Badal Bose v. Province of West Bengal but even so the orders are not necessarily malâ fide. In the case of Badal Bose v. Province of West Bengal this Court expressed no opinion on the necessity for such detention. All that the Court held was that the orders were invalid as they were made under an Act which was not in force when the orders were made. Had this Court held that the orders were improperly made even if the Act was in force, different considerations would arise and in such a case it might well have been argued that the orders under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act were malâ fide as they had been made to prevent the release of persons who had been detained for no good reason. In Badal Bose's case, however, this Court expressed no opinion on the question whether there existed in fact any grounds which would justify detention under any other law.
17. Mr. Gupta who appeared on behalf of some of the detained persons contended that these orders were not on the face of them, a good answer to the petitions. They were not, he argued, orders made under the Act at all as there was nothing to show that the association to which, it was alleged, the detained persons belonged was in fact such an association as was contemplated by the Act. His argument was that sec. 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, required, firstly, that the Provincial Government should be honestly of opinion that the detained persons were members of an association and further that such association had in fact objects and methods including the commission of offences set out in the First Schedule of the Act. Mr. Gupta's argument was that before an order could be justified it was not sufficient for the Court to be satisfied that the Provincial Government honestly believed that a detained person was a member of an association such as that described in sec. 2(1) (i) of the Act. The Court would have further to be satisfied that the association of which the detained person was honestly believed to be a member, was one which was in fact such an association as is contemplated in sec. 2.
18. Mr. Gupta urged that as the liberty of the subject is involved we should give as favourable a construction as possible to this section to ensure the freedom of the subject. It is true that where an Act involves the freedom of a subject the Court is loath to give a construction taking away such freedom. However, where the words of an Act are clear then a grammatical construction must be given if it involves the taking away of personal freedom or liberty.
19. In the present case it appears to me that the words of sec. 2(1) are in no way ambiguous and admit of only one meaning. Where the Provincial Government honestly believes that a person is a member of an association which the Government believes has certain objects and certain methods, then an order for detention can be made. Again, if the Provincial Government honestly thinks that a man has done or is doing any act to assist the operations of any such association, an order for detention can be made. There is nothing in the wording of this section to suggest that a Court is entitled to go into the question whether the association is in fact such an association as is contemplated in this section. I think the words are clear and an order for detention is justified if in the opinion of the Provincial Government the person sought to be detained is a member of an association which in the honest opinion of the Government employs certain methods to obtain certain objects. The order would also be justified if in the opinion of the Provincial Government there are reasons for believing that the person sought to be detained has done an act or is likely to do an act to assist the operations of an association which the Provincial Government has reasonable grounds to believe is an association contemplated by this Act.
20. To give the Act the construction sought for by Mr. Gupta would involve reading into sub-sec. (1) words which are not there. All that is necessary to my mind to justify an order under sec. 2(1) of the Act is an honest opinion of the Provincial Government that a person is a member of an association which is believed to employ certain methods and objects or has done or is doing an act likely to assist such association or has been or is being instigated or controlled by a member of such association with a view to the commission or doing of certain acts. No other construction of these words appears to me to be possible and, therefore, we are bound to hold, that if the Provincial Government were honestly of opinion that there were grounds under the act for detaining these men and there is nothing to suggest to the contrary, then such an order cannot be challenged. Once it is conceded that these orders are orders made under this Act, then it appears to me that it is not open to this Court to consider the propriety or otherwise of the orders of detention by reason of sec. 4 of the Central Act of 1932.
21. For these reasons I can see no ground for holding that the orders of detention are illegal and that being so, the petitions fail and are dismissed. The Rules are discharged.
Sen, J.:— I entirely agree that these Rules should be discharged. I also wish to add that I agree with what has fallen from my Lord the Chief Justice with regard to the interpretation of sec. 4 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Supplementary) Act, 1932. It seems to me that our powers under sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would still remain if it could be shown that the acts of the Local Government complained against were dishonest or malâ fide. If these acts be not honest they cannot be said to be acts under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1930.
Banerjee, J.:— I agree.
Lahiri, J.:— I agree.
J.P Mitter, J.:— I agree.
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