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Mihirlal Mihilal Dig v. Panchkari Santha And Ors

Calcutta High Court
Dec 15, 1949
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant purchased an occupancy raiyati holding at an auction held in execution of a rent decree on 13 March 1946. On 25 April 1946, Kachimannessa Bibi filed an application claiming to have purchased the interest of the judgment-debtors and sought to set aside the sale under Sec. 174(3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act; that application was dismissed on 13 December 1947. The auction-purchaser (the Petitioner before this Court) filed an application for confirmation of the sale on 5 January 1948 and steps to obtain delivery of possession followed (dates for confirmation and delivery applications appear in the record at various places: the opinion records confirmation as having occurred on 21 February 1948 and an application for delivery of possession on 27 March 1948; an earlier paragraph also records confirmation on 27 March 1948).

On 27 June 1948 two of the 17 judgment-debtors (Panch Kari Santra and Satya Bala Dasi, Opposite Parties Nos. 1 and 2) filed an application under Sec. 174(3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act to set aside the sale, alleging fraud and irregularity in publication and conduct of the sale. The learned Munsif allowed that application. The present Petitioner appealed; the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal, holding that the decree-holder was guilty of fraud (including undervaluation of the holding at Rs. 10 in the sale proclamation and suppression of the proclamation and other notices) and that the auction-purchaser was also guilty of fraud; on that basis the District Judge concluded that the applicants were entitled to the benefit of Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act so that their application, although filed more than six months after the sale, was not barred by limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned District Judge acted irregularly or illegally in holding that the auction-purchaser was guilty of fraud in relation to the sale.
  2. Whether the benefit of Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act (extension of time where a right to sue or apply has been kept from a person by fraud) can be claimed against an auction-purchaser who is not shown to be guilty of the fraud or accessory to it.
  3. Whether the auction-purchaser is a necessary party to an application under Sec. 174(3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act for setting aside a sale, and the consequences of that determination for the question of limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments — as presented in the opinion

  • Mr. Mukherji (for the Petitioner) argued that the learned District Judge misread the evidence: the Judge wrongly thought the auction-purchaser had delayed two years in applying for delivery of possession, whereas the sale was confirmed as late as 21 February 1948 so that any delay was only about one month.
  • Implicit in the petitioner's position is that mere delay in applying for delivery of possession cannot be treated as evidence of fraudulent intent to prevent judgment-debtors from learning of the sale.

Opposite Parties' (Respondents') Arguments — as presented in the opinion

  • Mr. Guha (for the Opposite Parties) advanced two principal points argued to justify finding fraud on the part of the auction-purchaser: (a) the auction-purchaser was present at the time when the sale proclamation was served, together with the decree-holder; and (b) the auction-purchaser gave false evidence in court regarding service of the sale proclamation.
  • Mr. Guha further contended that it is not legally necessary to show fraud on the part of the auction-purchaser for the applicants to obtain the extension of time under Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act; he relied on precedents to that effect (in particular, single-judge decisions in Kedar Hura v. Asutosh Roy and Mahipati Haldar v. Atul Krishna Maitra).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kedar Hura v. Asutosh Roy Held (by B.B. Ghose, J., sitting singly) that the fraud which keeps the judgment-debtor from knowledge of his right to apply to set aside a sale need only be the fraud of the decree-holder; it is not necessary to allege or prove fraud on the part of the auction-purchaser; the auction-purchaser was not a necessary party. The Court considered this single-judge view and expressly disagreed with it, stating an inability to accept that the auction-purchaser is not a necessary party to an application to set aside a sale.
Mahipati Haldar v. Atul Krishna Maitra Mukherjea, J., sitting singly, expressed a similar view that the auction-purchaser was not a necessary party and that the application is directed primarily against the decree-holder. The Court declined to follow this reasoning and rejected the proposition that the auction-purchaser is not a necessary party.
Puma Ch. Mondal v. Anukul Biswas (referred to in the opinion) Referenced in the discussion of prior authority; B.B. Ghose, J., in Kedar Hura refused to rely on this decision because it had been decided under a different Code in which the auction-purchaser had been regarded as a necessary party. The opinion notes the existence of this earlier decision and that it had been treated as authority for the proposition that the auction-purchaser is a necessary party; the present Court aligns with the view that the auction-purchaser is a necessary party.
Majahar Ali v. Mafijaddi Sardar Single-judge decision holding that fraud on the part of the auction-purchaser is necessary to be proved before extension of time under Sec. 18 can be given in an application to set aside a sale. The Court cited this case as part of a line of authority supporting the proposition that fraud by the auction-purchaser (or accessory conduct) must be shown; the Court's reasoning aligns with these decisions.
Saila Bala v. Atul Krishna Another single-judge decision to the same effect: fraud on the auction-purchaser must be proved for Sec. 18 relief. The Court cited this decision among others supporting the requirement that the auction-purchaser be shown to be guilty of fraud or accessory to it.
Jagiswar Das v. Deb Narayan Also cited as a single-judge decision holding fraud on the auction-purchaser must be proved for extension under Sec. 18. Included by the Court as supporting authority for the proposition adopted in this opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two interrelated strands of analysis: first, a factual review of whether the District Judge was justified in holding the auction-purchaser guilty of fraud; second, a statutory interpretation of Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act in the context of Sec. 174(3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act and the question whether an auction-purchaser must be shown to be guilty of fraud (or accessory thereto) before Sec. 18 can be invoked.

1. On the factual point, the District Judge relied on two principal matters in concluding the auction-purchaser was guilty of fraud: (a) that the auction-purchaser had benefited from an under-valuation in the sale proclamation which caused paucity of bidders, and (b) that the auction-purchaser delayed two years in applying for delivery of possession. The Court found the District Judge's assessment to be based on a misreading or non-reading of the record: the confirmed timeline in the record shows that although the sale occurred on 13 March 1946, an intervening application (filed by Kachimannessa) was not disposed of until 13 December 1947; the auction-purchaser filed for confirmation on 5 January 1948, the sale was confirmed on 21 February 1948 (the opinion contains another reference to confirmation on 27 March 1948 but also records the application for delivery being made on 27 March 1948), and the auction-purchaser applied for delivery on 27 March 1948. Thus the supposed two-year delay did not exist; at most there was a short delay after confirmation. The Court held that mere delay in applying for delivery of possession, without more, cannot in itself be treated as proof of fraudulent intent to prevent judgment-debtors from knowing of the sale.

2. The Court also considered the other factual points relied on by the Opposite Parties (presence of the auction-purchaser at the time of service of the sale proclamation together with the decree-holder, and alleged false evidence by the auction-purchaser as to service). The Court stated that even assuming those facts to be true, they would not remotely justify inferring that the auction-purchaser intended to, or did, prevent the judgment-debtors from knowing the date of the sale. On the available record the Court concluded there was no evidence that the auction-purchaser was guilty of fraud in connection with the sale.

3. On the statutory point, the Court analysed the text of Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act, which provides that where a person having a right to institute a suit or make an application has been kept from the knowledge of such right by means of fraud, the time limited for instituting the suit or making the application shall be computed from when the fraud first became known to the person injured; the provision specifically refers to extension of time "against the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto" and "against any person claiming through him otherwise than in good faith and for a valuable consideration."

4. Applying that language, the Court reasoned that Sec. 18 provides a special rule of computation only against (a) the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto, or (b) a person claiming through him other than in good faith and for valuable consideration. The Court found it difficult to see how a person who is neither guilty nor accessory nor claiming through the guilty person could attract Sec. 18. Consequently, if the auction-purchaser is not a necessary party to the application to set aside a sale, limitation would not arise in relation to him; but if he is a necessary party, then the application must be made in time against him too unless Sec. 18 applies.

5. The Court examined the question whether the auction-purchaser is a necessary party. Sec. 174(3) does not specify parties; Sec. 174A requires that no order setting aside a sale be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected. The Court concluded that an application to set aside a sale cannot be considered unless the person against whom the relief is primarily sought has been made a party and received notice. Since the relief sought (setting aside the sale) would primarily affect the auction-purchaser, he is the most necessary party; the decree-holder is also a necessary party.

6. From this statutory reading and party-analysis, the Court deduced that the extension under Sec. 18 cannot be applied in the applicant's favor as against the auction-purchaser unless the auction-purchaser is guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto, because Sec. 18 only authorises a special rule of computation against a person in those categories.

7. The Court reviewed prior authority: it identified single-judge decisions (Kedar Hura; Mahipati Haldar) reaching the opposite conclusion (that auction-purchaser need not be shown to be guilty and is not a necessary party), but the Court rejected that reasoning as inconsistent with the words of Sec. 18. The Court also noted several single-judge decisions (Majahar Ali; Saila Bala; Jagiswar Das) supporting the position adopted by this Court that fraud on part of the auction-purchaser must be proved before Sec. 18 relief can be granted; the present Court aligned with these authorities.

8. Applying these propositions to the facts before it, because there was no evidence that the auction-purchaser was guilty of fraud or accessory thereto, the applicants (Opposite Parties Nos. 1 and 2) could not obtain the benefit of Sec. 18 in respect of the auction-purchaser; consequently their application filed in June 1948 was barred by limitation as against the auction-purchaser and therefore failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's final disposition is that the application made by Opposite Parties Nos. 1 and 2 is barred by limitation and must fail; accordingly the orders passed by the lower Courts are set aside and the application under Sec. 174(2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act is ordered to be dismissed. The Court further ordered no order as to costs.

Core Ruling: Before any extension of time can be given under Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act in an application for setting aside a sale under Sec. 174(3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it must be proved that the auction-purchaser was either guilty of the fraud or accessory to the fraud that prevented the judgment-debtor from knowing of the sale.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The auction-purchaser is not held to have committed fraud on the record before the Court; the application by Opposite Parties Nos. 1 and 2 is dismissed as barred by limitation, and prior orders allowing the application are set aside.
  • Legal consequence emphasised by the Court: Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act, by its terms, permits computation of time from when the fraud became known only as against the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto (or certain persons claiming through such a person). Therefore an applicant seeking relief under Sec. 18 in a proceeding to set aside a sale must show that the auction-purchaser falls within one of those categories; otherwise Sec. 18 cannot be invoked to save a late application as against the auction-purchaser.
  • Costs: The Court made no order as to costs.

Note: The summary is strictly based on the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that record. Where the opinion records multiple dates for confirmation in different passages, both references are reported as they appear in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

Das Gupta, J.:— The Appellant before us purchased at auction an occupancy raiyati holding in execution of a rent decree. The sale was held on the 13th March, 1946. On the 25th April, 1946, an application was filed by one Kachimannessa Bibi claiming to have purchased the interest of the judgment-debtors, for setting aside the sale under the provisions of Sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. This application was dismissed by the Court on the 13th December, 1947. On the 5th January, 1948, the auction-purchaser, the Petitioner before us, filed an application for confirmation of the sale. The sale was ultimately confirmed on the 27th March, 1948. On the 27th June, 1948, an application was filed by two of the 17 judgment-debtors who are Panch Kari Santra and Satya Bala Dasi, Opposite Parties Nos. 1 and 2, under Sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act for setting aside the sale on the ground of fraud and irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale. The learned Munsif allowed the application and the learned District Judge has dismissed the appeal that was filed by the present Petitioner against that decision. The learned District Judge has come to the conclusion that the decree-holder was guilty of fraud inasmuch as he mentioned the value of the holding at Rs. 10 only in the sale proclamation and further that he fraudulently suppressed the sale proclamation and other notices. He also came to the conclusion that the auction-purchaser was also guilty of fraud and that consequently the applicants under Sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act were entitled to the benefit of Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act, and so the application though filed long after six months after the date of the sale, was not barred by limitation.

2. The first question agitated before us is whether the learned District Judge acted irregularly and illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in coming to the conclusion that the auction-purchaser was also guilty of fraud. The learned District Judge appears to have based his decision in this matter on two facts, first that the auction-purchaser has benefited by the fraud on the part of the decree-holder inasmuch as there was paucity of the bidders because of the gross under-valuation in the sale proclamation and the auction-purchaser was thus able to have the land for an inadequate price. The other ground on which the learned District Judge relied was that the auction-purchaser did not apply for delivery of possession for two years after the date of the sale. It has been pointed out to us by Mr. Mukherji on behalf of the Petitioner that the learned District Judge misread the evidence, inasmuch as he omitted to notice that the sale was confirmed as late as the 21st February, 1948, so that the delay of the auction-purchaser was not two years but only one month. I am myself unable to agree that the mere fact that the auction-purchaser makes delay in applying for delivery of possession can be any ground for thinking that he is acting fraudulently with a view to prevent the judgment-debtors from knowing about the sale. But even if such delay can justify any conclusion as regards fraud, it is abundantly clear that there was no such delay as the learned District Judge seems to have wrongly thought. From the facts pointed out above it appears that though the sale was actually held on the 13th March, 1946, the application under Sec. 174 (3) filed by Kachimannessa was not disposed of till the 13th December, 1947. It was only after that application was disposed of that the auction-purchaser could take steps for getting the sale confirmed. That he did, as we have seen, on the 5th January, 1948, and the sale was confirmed on the 21st February, 1948, and he put his application for delivery of possession on the 27th March, 1948. There was, therefore, as already stated above, no appreciable delay on his part.

3. In my judgment the omission to look into the record in the case is a gross irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction and the learned Judge's decision based upon a faulty reading or rather a non-reading of the record that the auction-purchaser was guilty of fraud cannot be allowed to stand.

4. Mr. Guha has, however, taken us through the evidence and has tried to convince us that quite apart from this question of delay in applying for delivery of possession there was other evidence which would justify such a conclusion. Of the two items of evidence pointed out one was that the auction-purchaser was present at the time when the sale proclamation was served when the decree-holder was also present; the other was that in Court he has given false evidence as regards the service of the sale proclamation.

5. Assuming that both these facts are true, namely, that the auction-purchaser was present at the time of the service of the sale proclamation where the decree-holder was also present and also that the auction-purchaser has given false evidence in the present proceedings I am unable to see how these can even remotely justify a conclusion that he was guilty of any fraud by which he intended to or managed to prevent the judgment-debtors from knowing of the sale.

6. My unhesitating conclusion is that there is no evidence on the record to show that the auction-purchaser was guilty of any fraud in connection with the sale or that by any fraudulent conduct on his part the judgment-debtors were prevented from knowing the date of the sale.

7. If, therefore, it is necessary, before the applicant under Sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act can get the benefit of Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act in the present application that the auction-purchaser must be shown to have been guilty of fraud or to have been accessory to the fraud, it must be held that the applicants could not get the benefit of Sec. 18, and the application filed on June, 1948, was barred by limitation

8. It has, however, been contended by Mr. Guha for the Opposite Party that it is not really necessary in law that the auction-purchaser should be shown to be guilty of any fraud in order that the extension of time under Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act can be given.

9. The relevant portion of Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act runs as follows:—

“Where any person having a right to institute a suit or make an application has, by means of fraud, been kept from the knowledge of such right…. the time limited for instituting a suit or making an application.

“(a) against the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto, or

“(b) against any person claiming through him otherwise than in good faith and for a valuable consideration, shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the person injuriously affected thereby….”

10. Here, the application was made against the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser. As against the decree-holder on the finding with which we find no reason to interfere that he was guilty of fraud and by that fraud, namely, the suppression of processes he had kept the applicants from the knowledge of the sale, it must be held that the application is within time if we accept that the judgment-debtors first came to know of the fraud at the time when the auction-purchaser went to take delivery of possession.

11. What however is the position of the application as against the auction-purchaser? In order that the applicants may succeed, the application must be made in time as against him also, unless he be considered to be an unnecessary party. It is not within the period of six months allowed by Sec. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Obviously, the applicant can succeed only if they can get the benefit of Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act.

12. The words of the section as already mentioned above give a special rule of computation against two kinds of persons — a person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto or a person claiming through such other person guilty of fraud otherwise than in good faith and for valuable consideration — when such fraud has kept the Plaintiff or the applicant from knowledge of this right to sue. It is difficult to see from the words of the section how the application against a person who is neither guilty of the fraud nor accessory thereto, nor is a person claiming through such other person can attract the provisions of Sec. 18.

13. If the auction-purchaser is not a necessary party to an application for setting aside the sale under Sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, no question of limitation would arise at all and the application would not fail, because such unnecessary party comes on the record beyond the period of limitation.

14. The question, therefore, is whether the auction purchaser is a necessary party to an application for setting aside a sale.

15. Sec. 174 (3) does not in words state as to who should be made a party. In Sec. 174A there is a provision that no order setting aside a sale shall be made unless notice of the application had been given to all persons affected thereby. Whatever view may be taken as regards the stage where such notice is to be given, there can be no doubt, in my opinion, that an application for setting aside the sale cannot be considered at all unless the person against whom the relief is primarily claimed has been made a party and received notice. The relief asked for is that a sale be set aside. The one person who will suffer if the relief is granted, is the auction-purchaser. If anybody, therefore, is a necessary party the auction-purchaser, in my opinion, is the most necessary party, the decree-holder being the other party who, in my opinion, should also be brought on the record.

16. The necessary conclusion which, in my opinion cannot be escaped, unless we are to add certain things to Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act or to ignore some of the words actually used therein, is that the extension of time under Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act cannot be made in an application for setting aside a sale as against the auction-purchaser unless he is guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto. It need hardly be mentioned that the auction-purchaser is not a person claiming through the decree-holder.

17. Reliance was placed by Mr. Guha on two decisions of this Court, one in the case of Kedar Hura v. Asutosh Roy(1) and the other in Mahipati Haldar v. Atul Krishna Maitra(2). In the case of Kedar Hura, B.B Ghose, J., sitting singly was of the opinion that the fraud by which the judgment-debtor is kept from the knowledge of his right to apply for setting aside the sale must be the fraud only of the decree-holder and it is not necessary either to allege or to prove fraud on the part of the auction-purchaser. A similar conclusion was reached by Mukherjea, J., sitting singly, in the case of Mahipati Haldar quoted above. I find that in both these cases the learned Judges expressed their opinion that the auction-purchaser was not a necessary party in an application for setting aside the sale. In fact B.B Ghose, J., refused to rely on the previous decision in the case of Puma Ch. Mondal v. Anukul Biswas(3), in the view that under the of d Code in which the decision in Purna Chandra's case was given, the auction-purchaser was a necessary party in an application for setting aside the sale. Mukherjea, J., also appears to be of the same opinion and says that the application for setting aside the sale is directed primarily against the decree-holder at whose instance or for whose benefit the sale was held. If I could see my way to agree with these eminent Judges in this view that the auction-purchaser is not a necessary party, I would have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the question of limitation does not arise at all, as regards the auction-purchaser. As stated, however, I am unable to agree that the auction-purchaser is not a secessary party and in my view he is the most necessary party in a case where the sale at which he purchased is sought to be set aside.

18. The other reason given by Mukherjea, J., is that if fraud on the part of the auction-purchaser is held to be necessary to be proved for an extension of time under Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act, the judgment-debtor would have no remedy where by the fraud of the decree-holder the judgment-debtor is totally kept out of the knowledge of the sale and the property has been sold for a nominal price, but the auction-purchaser is not party to the fraud or accessory thereto.

19. With great respect I think that this is not a reason why a different interpretation should be put on Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act. If the section is properly interpreted, it does not provide the judgment-debtor with any remedy in the cases as mentioned by Mukherjea, J. The question of giving the remedy is in the hands of the Legislature. Of course if there was any ambiguity in the language used, it would have been reasonable and possible to put the interpretation which would give the judgment-debtor a remedy. I am unable to detect any such ambiguity.

20. I am, therefore, unable to accept the reasoning which found favour with the two learned Judges in the cases of Kedar Hura v. Asutosh Roy and Mahipati Haldar mentioned above.

21. It may be mentioned here that in a number of other cases Judges sitting singly have in this Court decided that fraud on the part of the auction-purchaser is necessary to be proved in an application for setting aside a sale before extension of time under Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act can be given. Mention may be made of the decision in the cases of Majahar Ali v. Mafijaddi Sardar(4), Saila Bala v. Atul Krishna(5) and Jagiswar Das v. Deb Narayan(6).

22. My conclusion is that before any extension of time can be given under Sec. 18 of the Limitation Act in an application for setting aside a sale under Sec. 174 (3) of, the Bengal Tenancy Act, it must be proved that the auction-purchaser was either guilty of the fraud or accessory to the fraud that prevented the judgment-debtor from knowing of the sale.

23. The result is that the application made by the present Opposite Parties Nos. 1 and 2 must be held to be barred by limitation and must, therefore, fail.

24. Accordingly, I would set aside the order passed by the learned Courts below and order that the application under Sec. 174 (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act be dismissed.

25. There will be no order as to costs.

Das, J.:— I agree in the order proposed by my learned brother.

N.D.R