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Gobardhan Banerjee Deft. No. 1, Applt v. Sukhamoy And Others Resps.

Calcutta High Court
May 13, 1949
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Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns ancestral properties originally associated with Bidhusekhar Banerjee and his wife Digambari Debi. The family facts relevant to the litigation: Bidhusekhar and Digambari had five sons — Gobardhan, Anath, Ajit, Asit and Anil. Digambari died circa 1912; Bidhusekhar died about nine years later. Anath predeceased Bidhusekhar (died 1917), leaving two sons (Mohitkumar and Monmohan) and a widow Lilabati. Ajit died after Bidhusekhar and left a widow Bijan Bashini (also spelt Biraj Bashini in the opinion) and three sons Eashamoy, Gunamoy and Sukhomoy; Sukhomoy and Bijan Bashini are plaintiffs in the partition suit. Asit is dead and his son Sibanath is defendant 3; Anil is alive and defendant 2.

In 1921 Gobardhan, Ajit, Asit and Anil mortgaged a four-fifths share in the properties to Joy Chand Lal Babu and co-sharers. Joy Chand Lal Babu et al. sued to enforce the mortgage: preliminary decree 6-8-1927, final decree 9-2-1928. In execution of the final decree the decree-holders purchased the mortgaged properties at auction on 10-6-1929; that purchase was confirmed on 7-1-1931. Separately, an unsecured creditor of Ajit and Anil executed a decree and at the court sale on 9-12-1928 Ram Brahmo purchased the right, title and interest of Ajit and Anil; that sale was confirmed on 4-1-1931. The branch descended from Anath (the fifth share) was purchased by Joy Chand Lal Babu et al. from Monmohan by private treaty on 10-8-1932 (text also records 10-8-1932 and dates of compromise and conveyance in 1941).

In 1940 two applications under Section 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act were filed against Joy Chand Lal Babu et al.: one by the mortgagors (Gobardhan, Anil and Sibanath) and one by Ajit's family (Gunamoy, Sukhomoy, Eashamoy and Ajit's widow). The applications were disposed of by consent; the compromise (clause 1(ka)) provided, inter alia, that Joy Chand Lal Babu et al. would give up items 1 & 2 (the two items that are the subject-matter of the present partition suit) and would convey to the mortgagors the share purchased from Monmohan. The compromise date is recorded as 30-8-1941 and conveyance dated 23-12-1941.

On 6-7-1942 Bijan (Biraj) Bashini Debi and Sukhamoy (children/representatives of Ajit) instituted a suit for partition in which defendants included Gobardhan, Anil, Sibanath and others. Lilabati (widow of Anath) and Ram Brahmo were not made parties. Gobardhan alone contested at trial and raised, inter alia, the defense that Lilabati and Ram Brahmo were necessary parties to the partition suit. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled that defense. The present appeal challenges that ruling.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Lilabati (the widow of Anath) was a necessary party to the partition suit.
  2. Whether Ram (Rambrahmo / Ram Brahmo) Brahmo, who purchased at a court sale in execution of a money decree against Ajit & Anil, was a necessary party to the partition suit.
  3. Whether the doctrine of lis pendens (as embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and applied to execution sales by Judicial Committee precedents) defeated Ram Brahmo's title by reason of the prior mortgage suit and sale.
  4. Whether the compromise under the Money-Lenders Act (clause 1(ka)) had the effect of setting aside the auction purchasers' title in items 1 & 2 (thus affecting lis pendens analysis).
  5. Whether failure to institute a suit under Order 21, Rule 103, CPC within the shorter limitation period in Article 11-A of the Limitation Act resulted in extinguishment of Ram Brahmo's title under Section 28 of the Limitation Act.
  6. Whether Ram Brahmo's title was extinguished by adverse possession (limitation), and the proper Article of the Limitation Act to govern any such claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments (Bijan/Biraj Bashini & Sukhomoy)

  • Plaintiffs adduced oral evidence that Mohitkumar (one son of Anath) had died about one year before his father's death in 1917 — implying that Monmohan alone represented Anath's branch for succession.
  • Plaintiffs relied on the compromise under the Money-Lenders Act (clause 1(ka)) and the subsequent conveyance by Joy Chand Lal Babu et al., which returned items 1 & 2 to the mortgagors and conveyed the Monmohan-acquired share to the named family members, in support of their title and partition claim.

Defendant / Objector Arguments (Gobardhan and other defenders)

  • Gobardhan contended that Lilabati (mother/next friend of Monmohan and mother of Mohitkumar) and Ram Brahmo were necessary parties to the partition suit; if they were necessary parties, the suit should be dismissed for non-joinder.
  • At trial the defendants put in documentary evidence (a plaint in a 1917 rent suit) suggesting that Mohitkumar survived Anath, which would alter the share entitlements of Anath's branch and potentially make Lilabati (as next friend) a necessary party.
  • Subordinate Judge gave three reasons for concluding Ram Brahmo was not a necessary party: (a) lis pendens/law of pending suit would have swept away Ram Brahmo's purchase in favor of the mortgage auction purchasers; (b) Ram Brahmo failed to institute a suit under O.21, R.103 within Article 11-A (one year) and thus his right was extinguished; (c) adverse possession — the judgment-debtors (Ajit & Anil) remained in possession, so Rambrahmo never obtained possession and his title was extinguished by limitation.

Position / Role of Joy Chand Lal Babu & Co-sharers (mortgagees / auction purchasers)

  • Joy Chand Lal Babu et al. obtained the mortgage sale by execution and purchased the properties in 1929, confirmed 1931.
  • They also acquired the remaining one-fifth share (Anath's branch) from Monmohan by private treaty (10-8-1932) and, under the Money-Lenders Act compromise, agreed to return items 1 & 2 to the mortgagors and to convey Monmohan's share as promised.
  • They initiated possession proceedings against Lilabati and Rambrahmo under Order 21, Rules 97–99 CPC, and obtained orders under R.98 to be put in possession; those orders formed the basis for subsequent arguments about whether Ram Brahmo's rights were extinguished by limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nilakant Banerji v. Suresh Chandra Mullick, 12 I.A. 171 : (12 Cal. 414) P.C. Judicial Committee decision cited for the proposition that the doctrine of lis pendens (Section 52, Transfer of Property Act) applies to execution sales as well as to voluntary transfers. The court relied on this precedent (along with two other Judicial Committee decisions) to state that had the mortgage-auction purchasers' title not been extinguished by the compromise, their auction title would prevail against a transfer made pendente lite (such as Ram Brahmo's purchase at a court sale).
Badha Madhub Haldar v. Monohar Mukerji, 15 I.A. 97 : (15 Cal. 756) P.C. Another Judicial Committee decision used to establish that lis pendens applies to execution sales. Applied together with the other Judicial Committee authorities to explain the legal effect of a transfer made during the pendency of suit and to assess whether Ram Brahmo's purchase could be defeated by the auction purchasers' prior sale.
Moti Lal v. Karrab-ul-Din, 24 I.A. 170 : (25 Cal. 179) P.C. Judicial Committee authority confirming that the general law of lis pendens (Section 52 T.P. Act) governs transfers made pendente lite, including execution sales. The court cited this case with the other two Judicial Committee decisions to support the legal principle that a transfer during pendency of suit yields to title obtained on decree/sale in that suit, and then proceeded to examine whether the compromise had nullified that effect in the present facts.
Kumari v. Ghansham Misra, 35 I.A. 22 : (35 Cal. 202) P.C. Authority discussing the nature of a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 (and by analogy R.103) and considering whether such suits are review-like proceedings and the proper limitation/court-fee characterisation. The court relied on observations in this decision to support the conclusion that a suit under O.21, R.103 is essentially a proceeding to test the summary execution order (i.e., to set aside or review the order) rather than strictly a suit for recovery of possession within Section 28 Limitation Act's ambit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court performed a step-by-step legal analysis on the two primary contested questions (necessity of joinder of Lilabati and necessity of joinder of Ram Brahmo) and on the three separate grounds relied upon by the Subordinate Judge to exclude Ram Brahmo.

1. Lilabati (widow of Anath) — res judicata analysis

- The court noted an earlier partition suit instituted in 1929 by Monmohan (minor) through his next friend Lilabati against Gobardhan, Ajit, Asit and Anil (Ex. 11 plaint; Ex. 9 decree). In that plaint Monmohan claimed the one-fifth share of his father Anath and the plaint stated Anath died 31-7-1917 leaving the plaintiff as his heir.

- The court held that the question whether Anath died leaving only one surviving son (Monmohan) or two sons (Monmohan and Mohitkumar) was a direct and substantial question in issue in the 1929 suit and was decided in favor of Monmohan by the ex parte decree. Accordingly, that issue is concluded between the parties by res judicata, and Lilabati is not a necessary party to the present partition suit. The court therefore upheld the Subordinate Judge's conclusion on this point, but based on res judicata rather than the trial judge's factual finding about Mohitkumar's death.

2. Ram (Rambrahmo / Ram Brahmo) Brahmo — three grounds considered and rejected

(a) Lis pendens / Section 52 T.P. Act and execution-sale doctrine

- The court recognised that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act embodies the doctrine of lis pendens and that the Judicial Committee decisions cited establish that lis pendens applies to execution sales as well as voluntary transfers.

- Applying that principle, the court acknowledged that if the auction purchasers (Joy Chand Lal Babu et al.) had retained their title in items 1 & 2, Ram Brahmo's title (purchased during the pendency of the mortgage suit) would have been subordinate to the auction purchasers' title.

- The court then examined clause 1(ka) of the compromise under the Money-Lenders Act. Clause 1(ka) expressly states that the mortgage decree and the interest obtained by the opposite parties (auction purchasers) in respect of items 1 & 2 are cancelled and set aside, that the sixteen annas interest acquired by the auction purchasers in items 1 & 2 becomes extinct and vests in the petitioners (the mortgagors), and that the opposite parties will not be entitled to any further claim in respect of those items.

- Reading clause 1(ka) and the related clause for items 3–5 together, the court concluded that the auction purchasers' title in items 1 & 2 was extinguished by the compromise and the mortgage decree was satisfied by the auction purchasers retaining items 3, 4 & 5. Consequently, the family members who received conveyance pursuant to the compromise could not be treated as assignees of the auction purchasers for the purpose of invoking lis pendens against Ram Brahmo.

- On this basis the court held the doctrine of lis pendens could not be invoked to defeat Ram Brahmo's title in the partition suit; the first ground advanced by the learned Subordinate Judge failed.

(b) Extinguishment by limitation for failure to institute suit under O.21, R.103 within Article 11-A

- The court considered the Subordinate Judge's view that Ram Brahmo had failed to institute a suit under O.21, R.103 within the one-year period of Article 11-A of the Limitation Act, thereby extinguishing his right.

- The court analysed whether a suit under O.21, R.103 is a "suit for possession" within the meaning of Section 28 of the Limitation Act (Section 28 states that at the determination of the period limited for instituting a suit for possession, the person's right to such property shall be extinguished).

- The court examined the relevant rules in Order 21 (R.58, R.63, R.97–R.103) and the Judicial Committee's observations in Kumari v. Ghansham Misra. It noted that O.21, R.103 contemplates a suit to establish the right the party claims to the present possession, and that R.103 is to be read with the investigative character of R.98 and R.99 (which require investigation on the merits before such orders are made).

- The court concluded that a suit under R.103 is essentially a proceeding to test or set aside the execution order (a review/controversy about the execution order) and is not, by its nature, a suit for recovery of possession within the meaning of Section 28 of the Limitation Act. Therefore Section 28 could not be invoked to hold that Ram Brahmo's title was extinguished merely because he did not bring a suit under R.103 within Article 11-A's one-year period. The second ground therefore failed.

(c) Adverse possession / limitation (Article 138)

- The Subordinate Judge had found that Ram Brahmo was never in possession after his purchase and that Ajit & Anil (the judgment-debtors) remained in possession; on that basis he held Ram Brahmo's title extinguished by adverse possession.

- The appellate court noted that, where the judgment-debtors were in possession at the time of the court-sale, the proper Article to consider is Article 138 of the Limitation Act and limitation would run against the purchaser from the date the sale at which he purchased became absolute (sale confirmation date).

- The sale certificate showed Ram Brahmo's sale was confirmed on 1-1-1931 (the Subordinate Judge had overlooked this date). The partition suit was instituted on 6-7-1942, which is within 12 years from 1-1-1931. Therefore limitation by adverse possession (extinguishment under Section 28) had not run out as of the suit date. The third ground therefore failed.

Conclusion of the Court's Analysis

After rejecting each of the three grounds relied upon by the learned Subordinate Judge for holding that Ram Brahmo was not a necessary party, the appellate court concluded that Ram Brahmo alone was a necessary party to the partition suit. The court allowed the appeal on that basis.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's central rulings are as follows:

  • APPEAL ALLOWED.
  • Ram (Rambrahmo / Ram Brahmo) was a necessary party to the partition suit; the failure to join him was a fatal non-joinder requiring correction by allowing the appeal.
  • Lilabati (widow of Anath) is not a necessary party because the question whether Anath left one surviving son (Monmohan) or two sons (Monmohan and Mohitkumar) was directly and substantially in issue and decided in favour of Monmohan in the earlier 1929 suit (res judicata).
  • The learned Subordinate Judge's three independent reasons for rejecting the necessity of joinder of Ram Brahmo (lis pendens, extinguishment by failure to sue under O.21 R.103 within Article 11-A, and adverse possession) were each examined and rejected by the appellate court for the reasons summarised above.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the partition suit as framed could not proceed to final adjudication binding on Ram Brahmo in his absence; he was a necessary party and must be joined for a decree affecting his rights.
  • The court awarded costs to defendant 1 (Gobardhan) — specifically the costs of the appeal and the lower court as detailed in the Schedule to the decree, and a consolidated sum of Rs. 340 for hearing-fee and the fee for drawing up grounds of appeal in this Court. The court recorded that as the appeal has been allowed, no order is necessary in the Rule.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general principle of law; it applies established doctrines (res judicata, lis pendens principles, interpretation of Order 21 rules and Section 28 Limitation Act) to the specific facts and earlier compromise recorded in clause 1(ka). The opinion therefore primarily determines the parties' rights in this case rather than announcing a broader precedent beyond application of cited authorities.

End of summary.

Show all summary ...

1. Bidhusekhar Banerjee had a wife of the name of Digambari Debi. Five sons were born to them, viz., Gobardhan (deft, 1), Anath, Ajit, Asifc & Anil. Digambari died sometime in 1912 but Bidhusekhar died about nine years thereafter. At the time of Digambari's death all the five sons were living but at the time of Bidhusekhar's death Anath was dead but the other four sons survived him. We are stating those facts because one of the points raised in this case is whether the properties in suit belonged Bidhusekhar or to his wife Digambari. In the view that we are taking it is not necessary to decide this point. Anath died in the year 1917 Heaving him surviving a widow, viz., Lilabati. It is admitted that Anath had two sons, Mohitkumar & Monmohan but it is a point in controversy in this case as to whether Mohitkumar predeceased Iris father or survived him. Ajit is dead; he died after Bidhusekhar. His family consists of at the present time, his widow, Bijan Bashini & three sons Eashamoy Gunamoy & Sukhomoy. Sukhomoy & his mother Bijan Bashini are the pltfs. in suit. The other two sons of Ajit, viz., Eashamoy & Gunamoy have sold whatever interest they had in the properties in suit to another person of the name of Dasarathi Mukherjee who is deft. 4 in the suit. Asit is now dead & his son Sibanath is deft. 3 in the suit. Anil who is alive is deft. 2 in the suit. In 1921 Gobardhan, Ajit, Asit & Anil mortgaged the four-fifths share in the properties in suit to Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers. Whether the properties belonged to Bidhusekhar or to his wife Digambari would not affect this share as in any event they would have four-fifths share. The share of the descendants of Anath would not also be affected; that branch would have the remaining fifth share whether the properties belonged to Digambari or to her husband Bidhusekhar. Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers instituted a suit to enforce his mtge. on 24-5-1927. A preliminary decree for sale was passed in that mtge. suit on 6-8-1927, & the final decree for sale was passed on 9-2-1928. In execution of the final decree for sale, the decree-holders themselves viz., Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers, purchased the properties mortgaged, which are the properties in suit, on 10-6-1929. That sale was confirmed on 7-1-1931. In the meantime an unsecured creditor of Ajit & Anil had obtained a decree for money against them. That decree was put into execution by that creditor & at the Ct's sale held on 9-12-1928, one Ram Brahmo purchased the right, title & interest of Ajit & Anil. The sale at which Ram Brahmo purchased was confirmed on 4-1-1931. From the dates that we have mentioned above relating to the mtge. suifi which had been instituted by Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers it will appear that Earn Brahmo purchased the right, title & interest of Ajit & Anil during the pendency of the mtge. suit. To be more exact, the sale at which Earn Brahmo purchased was held & confirmed between the preliminary & final decrees of the mtge. suit. The share belonging to the branch of Anath was not mortgaged to Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers. They, however, purchased that, share, which was the remaining one-fifth share in the properties from Monmohan, the son of Anath, who had admittedly survived Anath, by private treaty on 10-8-1982. As a result of the mtge. sale & of this purchase by private treaty, Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers became the 16 annas owners of the properties in suit. But other complications ensued thereafter. In 1940 two applns. were made against Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers under Section 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. One appln. was made by the mtgor. Gobardhan, Anil & Sibanath & the other appln. was made by the three sons of Ajit, viz., Gunamoy, Sukhomoy, Eashamay & by Ajit's widow Biraj Bashini. Those applns. were heard together. They were not, however, disposed of on adjudication, because the’ mtgees decree-holders-auction-purchasers, Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers & the mtgors. put in a consent petn. & a consent order was passed. We shall have to notice in some detail one of the terms of the compromise petn. namely, the term which is embodied in para, 1(ka) of the joint petn. of compromise on the basis of which the consent order was passed on the applns. under Section 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. We, would, however, only state what in substance is the effect of that compromise. Five items of property which had been included in the mtge. had been purchased by the mtgees-decree-holders themselves Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers in execution of the final decree. The mtgees-auction purchasers gave up items 1 & 2 but they retained the other three items viz., items 3, 4 & 5 & the mtge. decree was taken to be satisfied, items 1 & 2 are dealt with in ol. 1(ka) of the petn. of compromise & these are the two items which are the subject matter of the suit out of which this appeal arises. By that compromise Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers also agreed to convey to the mfcgors, Gobardhan, Gunamoy, Sukhamoy, Basamoy, Bijan Bashini, Shib Nath & Anil, the share which they had purchased by a private treaty from Monmohan on 10-8-1932. In pursuance of that agreement Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers later on executed the promised conveyance. The date of compromise is 30-8-1911, & the date of conveyance is 23-12-1941. On 6-7-1942, Bijan Bashini Debi, the widow of Ajit, & Sukhamoy, one of the three sons of Ajit instituted this suit for partition. In the suit the defts. were the persons whom we have named above. Lilabati, the widow of Anath, & Earn Brahmo were not, however, made parties to the suit. Gobardhan (deft. 1) alone appeared in this case & contested the same. We are not concerned in this appeal with all the defences that he took in his written statement. We are concerned with only one defence taken, viz., whether the suit could go on in the absence of Lilabati, the widow of Anath & of Earn Brahmo, that is to say, whether Lilabati & Earn Brahmo are necessary parties in this suit for partition. If they are necessary parties, this suit will have to be dismissed; if they are not, this suit would go on but the only effect would be that the decree in the suit would not be binding on Lilabati or Earn Brahmo, because they are not parties to the suit. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled the defenoe. He came to the conclusion that Mohitkumar, the eldest son of Anath had predeceased his father. Apparently he aocepted the evidence which had been led by the pltfs. that Mohitkumar had died about a year before his father's death, which admittedly occurred in 1917. A piece of documentary evidence was put in by the deft, to show that Mohitkumar survived his father. The document is a plaint of a rent suit in respect of the property situated in the dist of Midnapore. In the cause title the pltfs. were Gobardhan, Ajit, Asit, Anil & Mohit Kumar & Monmohan represented by the next friend mother Lilabati. This suit was filed in 1917 & the cause title proceeds in this way ‘On the death of Anathnath Banerjee his minor sons Mohit Kumar & Monmohan Banerjee represented by their mother Lilabati Devi.” The learned Subordinate Judge explained away this document by saying that the Gomastha who was in charge of the case must have committed a mistake. If we were to proceed on the evidence which has been adduced in this case both oral & documentary it would have been a matter for serious consideration, whether in the absence of any evidence that the Gomosfcha who was in charge of that suit had committed a mistake the statement in that plaint could be brushed aside: It would have been also a material question as to whether the properties in suit belonged to Digambari Debi or to Bidhusekhar. If it had belonged to Bibhusekhar the question whether Mohit Kumar died shortly before or after the death of his father Anath would not have been material at all for, in that case succession would not open till Bidhusekhar's death which occurred in 1921. At that time Anath was dead but the grandsons of Bidhusekhar who were the sons of Anath & who were alive at his death would take a share of his property in their independent right & admfttedly at the death of Bidhusekhar Monmohan was the only surviving son of Anath. If however, the property belonged to Digambari, the question whether Anath was survived by one son viz., Monmohan or by both his sons Mohit & Monmohan would have been a very pertinent question as in that case succession would open while Anath was alive. However, we are relieved of deciding on the evidence the point which we have just indicated for the purpose of considering whether Lilabati was a necessary party to this suit for partition, as we are of opinion that the question is concluded by res judicata as between the defts. in this suit including Gobardhan & the pltfs. The question of res judicata arises in the following manner; In the year 1929 when Monmohan was a minor; his mother Lilabati as his next friend instituted a suit for partition which included the properties in suit now against Gobardhan, Ajit, Asit & Anil Banerjee, the other four sons of Bidhusekhar. The plaint of the suit has been marked Ex. 11 in this case. In para, 1 of the plaint, the plfcf. of that suit stated that Bidhusekhar the paternal grand-father of the pltf., died leaving four sons viz., the four defts. to the suit & another son Anath, the father of the pltf., that Anath died on the 15th of Sravan 1324 B.S— 31-7-1917, during the life time of his father leaving the pltf. as his heir. The learned Judge simply notices in his judgment this plaint & uses his para, of the plaint in support of his finding that Mohit, the other son of Anath had predeceased the latter. The learned Judge, however, did not notice the fact that the suit so instituted terminated in a decree. The decree is an ex parte decree & is Ex. 9 in the case. On the basis of the said statement, the pltf. Monmohan claimed the share of his father, viz., one-fifth. If Mohit had survived Anath then Monmohan could only claim one-tenth share in the property, viz., a moiety share of what would have belonged to his father, Anath & the other moiety share would have devolved upon Mohit & Lilabati would have got his share on the death of Mohit as heir of her son. That being the position, we hold that the question as to whether Anath died leaving him surviving only one son Monmohan or two sons Monmohan & Mohitkumar was a direct & substantial question in issue in the case & must be taken to have been decided in favour of the pltf. in that suit viz., Monmohan. On this ground & this ground alone we hold that the defence of Gobardhan that Lilabati is a necessary party to the suit that we have before us cannot be given effect to.

2. We will now deal with the question as to whether Earn Brahmo is a necessary party to the suit out of which this appeal arises. We have already pointed out that he purchased the right, title & interest of Ajit & Anil during the pendency of the mtge. suit instituted by Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers. Anil & Ajit were two of the mtgors. & they were parties to the suit. If the proceeding under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act had not resulted in the compromise or if as a result of that compromise the mtgee-decree-holders purchasers had conveyed to the defts. in that suit what they had purchased at the court-sale held in execution of their mtge. decree, Earn Brahmo would have been concluded by the rule of lis pendens. If, however, the mtge. sale in respect of the properties in suit which were items (1) & (2) in the sale certificate given to the mtgee-decree-holders purchasers, Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers, was set aside as a result of that compromise & the mtge. decree was fully satisfied, the doctrine of lis pendens would not in our opinion apply. The doctrine of lis pendens although it is contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, a statute which deals with “voluntary transfers” would apply to execution sales also. This has been settled by three decisions of the Judicial Committee viz., Nilakant Banerji v. Suresh Chandra Mullick, 12 I.A 171 : (12 Cal. 414 P.C) Badha Madhub Haldar v. Monohar Mukerji, 15 I.A 97 : (15 Cal. 756 P.C) and Moti Lal v. Karrab-ul-Din, 24 I.A 170 : (25 Cal. 179 P.C). Though Earn Brahmo is not a purchaser by private treaty but is a purchaser at a Ct. sale, the validity of[his purchase must therefore in effect be judged by the terms of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act which embodies the general law of lis pendens. The material portion of the Section runs thus:

“… the property cannot, therefore, be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein.”

3. That is to say, a transfer pendente lite is not absolutely prohibited, i.e, a transfer pendente lite is not void or illegal, only the title acquired by such a transfer would be inferior to the title acquired under the decree or order which is eventually passed in the suit during the pendency of which the transfer is made by a party—to that suit. Applying the language of this part of the section which we have quoted above to the facts of this case, Ram Brahmo's title would have been swept away by the title which the auction pur-chasers had got by the sale in execution of the mtge. decree passed in the suit instituted by Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers to enforce the mtge. executed amongst others by Ajit & Anil— persons whose right, title & interest Earn Brahmo had purchased at a court sale during the pendency of that suib. That is to say, the title of Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers qua purchasers at the mtge. sale would have prevailed over the title acquired by Earn Brahmo. Earn Brahmo could not have set up his title against Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers qua auction purchasers any person claiming title through Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers by purchase, inheritance etc. That being the position in law it is necessary to see whether the other parties to the compromise, namely, Gobardhan, the heirs of Ajit, namely, Gunamoy, Sukhomoy & Easamoy & Bijan Bashini; Sibnath, the heir of Asitnath & Anil can be regarded as assignees of Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers, qua auction purchasers. This question would depend mainly upon cl. 1(ka) of the terms of compromise arrived at between the last mentioned persons & Joy Chand Lal Babu & his co-sharers in the Money-lenders Act proceedings. Clause 1(ka) runs as follows:

“Out of the mortgaged properties property of item 1 is the ancestral residential house of the petnrs. & the property of item 2 is the patit homestead land adjoining the property of item 1. The mtge. decree obtained by the opposite parties in respect of items 1 & 2 of the mortgaged properties & the interest they had acquired on the basis of the execution of the mtge. decree are cancelled & set aside, & the sixteen annas interest acquired by the opposite parties in the said items 1 & 2 of properties by virtue of purchase at auction & under deed of voluntary sale comes to be extinct & the same vests in the petnrs. in the present case & also in Misc. Case No. 48 of 1941 of this Ct. & the sixteen annas interest in items 1 & 2 of the mortgaged properties comes to revive in favour of the petnrs. in the aforesaid two suits & they become owners & possessors of the aforesaid items 1 & 2 of properties. The opposite parties will not be entitled to lay any further claim or demand in respect of the same in future.”

4. The first part of cl. 1(kha) states that the title acquired by the mtgee. auction purchasers, Joychand Lall Babu & his co-sharers in items 3, 4 & 5 (properties which are not in suit) shall remain in force & intact. That clause then winds up with the following words:

“The entire claim of the opposite parties under the decree in Mtge. Suit No. 29 of 1927—together with costs is deemed to be satisfied out of the properties in the aforesaid items 3, 4 & 5,”

5. Reading these clauses together, the effect is that the title acquired by the mtgees. by their purchase at the auction sale in items 1 & 2 was extinguished. Those items of property are taken out of the mtge. security & the court-sale in respect thereto was set aside, with the result that the mtgors. retained the title which they originally bad & the mtge. decree was fully satisfied by the mtgees. retaining as owners the other three items included in the mtge., namely, items 3, 4 & 5. In this view of the matter, Gobardhan & the other persons we have mentioned above cannot, in our opinion, be considered as assignees of the mtgee. decree-holders purchasers. The doctrine of lis pendens cannot therefore be invoked by the pltfs. in the partition suit, which we have before us, for the purposes of defeating the title which Rambrahmo had acquired by reason of his purchase at the court-sale held in execution of a money decree that had been passed against Ajit & Anil. The first ground on which the learned Subordinate Judge based his decision cannot, therefore, be supported.

6. The second ground on which he overruled the plea taken by deft 1 to the effect that Ram Brahmo was a necessary party to the suit has now to be considered.

7. The relevant facts bearing on this point are as follows: The mtgees., Joychand Lall Babu & his co-sharers, purchased the mortgaged properties, which are the subject-matter of this suit, on 10-6-1929 & that sale was confirmed on 7-1-1931. Thereafter they as auction purchasers went to take delivery of possession of the properties. They were obstructed by Lilabati & Rambrahmo. As we have already held on a different ground that Lilabati is not a necessary party to the suit that we have before us it is not necessary in considering this point to make a further reference to Lilabati. On Rambrahmo obstructing the delivery of possession the auction purchasers, Joy Chand Lall Babu & his cosharers, started a proceeding against him under the provisions of O. 21, R. 97 of the CPC. Those proceedings were numbered as Misc. Case No. 34 of 1937 of the Ct. of the Subordinate Judge of Burdwan. The learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the Misc. case by his order dated 30-8-1937. It is not necessary for our purposes to examine the reasons which he gave in support of that order. The order was an order in favour of the auction purchasers made under the provisions of O. 21, R. 98 of the Code, that is to say, the effect of the order was that the auction purchasers Joy Chand Lal Babu & others were directed to be put in possession of the pro-perties purchased by them. Rambrahmo, however, did not institute a suit under the provisions of O. 21, R. 103 of the Code. Limitation governing a suit coming under O. 21, R. 103 is prescribed in. Article 11-A, Limitation Act. The period of limitation is one year & time starts from the date of the order, which in the case before us was an order under O. 21, R. 98 of the Code. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that as Rambrahmo did not institute a suit within the period provided for in Article 11-A, Limitation Act, his right to the property which he had purchased at the court-sale in execution of a money decree against Ajit & Anil was extinguished as soon as the period of one year from the date of the order expired. The learned Judge, however, in coming to this conclusion referred only to the provisions of O. 21, R. 103 & did not consider Section 28 of the Limitation Act. The terms of O. 21, R. 103 by themselves would not lead to the conclusion that the title of the person affected by the order passed under O. 21, R. 98 or under O. 21, R. 99 is extinguished, if he does not bring his suit within one year as provided for in the aforesaid Article 11-A, Limitation Act. For the purpose Section 28 of the Limitation Act, in our opinion, is the section which has to be considered. The title to the property of the rightful owner would be extinguished only if Section 28 of the Limitation Act, can be invoked.

8. Section 28 of the Limitation Act, is in these terms:

“At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property his right to such property shall be extinguished.”

9. The section speaks of a suit for possession which means, in our judgment, a suit for recovery of possession. For the purpose of attracting the operation of S. 28 it is necessary that the proceeding, must be (1) a suit & (2) a suit for possession. It has been held in a number of cases that, where under some law the procedure for recovery of possession by a party is not through a suit but through an appln. if the period limited for making the appln. for possession is barred, Section 28 of the Limitation Act, would not come into the picture. In such a case the remedy would be barred but the right would not be extinguished, with the result that if a person who had not made an appln. for possession within the time limited by the proper Article of the Limitation Act, somehow or other gets possession & is thereafter dispossessed by a third person, his suit against the third person would not be defeated on the ground that he had no title at the date of the institution of that suit for possession. If, however, his title had been extinguished under Section 28 of the Limitation Act, the position would have been different, for, even if he had regained possession somehow or other, his suit would have been defeated by the deft, on the plea that though he, the deft., may have been a trespasser, the pltf. could not recover as he himself had no title. We have made these observations for the purpose of indicating how strictly Section 28 of the Limitation Act has been construed. We may say that the strict construction put upon Section 28 of the Limitation Act is in accordance with the cardinal rule of interpretation of Statutes, namely, that a Statute which takes away a right from a person or which imposes a burden upon him has to be strictly construed. The fundamental question that has to be considered in dealing with the second ground on which the learned Subordinate Judge has proceeded is whether a suit as contemplated by O. 21, R. 103 of the Code can be regarded to be a suit for possession. A civil proceeding instituted under the provisions of that rule is a suit, for that word is used in the rule itself, but the question is—is the suit contemplated in that rule a suit for possession? So far as we are aware, there are no decided cases on the point, & therefore the question has to be considered by considering the provisions not only of that rule but also of Rs. 97,98 & 99 of O. 21, as also of other rules in that Order, which so far as the point in the present case if concerned is pari materia with the provisions of O. 21, R. 103. Order 21, Rr. 58 & 63 would, therefore, have to be considered also.

10. Order 21, R. 58 deals with objections to the attachment of property. The objections can be decided one way or the other, that is to say, either in favour of the decree-holder who has attached the property or in favour of the person objecting to the attachment, either on investigation on the merits or without any investigation, for, the proviso allows the executing Ct. to reject the objections summarily in some cases. Order 21, R. 63 states that where a claim or objection is preferred the party against whom the order is made may institute a suit to establish his right to the property in suit but subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive. The language of O. 21, R. 103 is that any party not being a judgment-debtor against whom an order is made under R. 98, 99 or 101 may institrate a suit to establish the right he claims to the present possession of the property but subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive. The concluding sentence of O. 21, R. 63 & of O. 21, R. 103 is the same (“but subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive”.) There are, however, other material differences between the two rules. Inasmuch as no specific rule is mentioned in O. 21, R. 63 it has been held that Article 11-A, Limitation Act, would apply even where an objection to the attachment is rejected without investigation on the merits. It is not however possible to take the same view in respect of R. 103, for, it specifically mentions that the suit is to be brought in terms of the section by a person against whom an order is made under R. 98, 99 or 101. In order that the shorter period of limitation as provided for in Article 11-A, Limitation Act may apply, there must be investigation on the merits, for an order under R. 98, 99 or 101 can only be passed after investigation on the merits. There is another distinction in the wording of the two sections & the reason is obvious. Whereas O. 21, R. 63, speaks of a suit to establish the right which he claims to the present possession of the property. These words “claims to the present possession of the property” & the concluding sentence, namely, “but subject to the result of such suit etc.,” in our opinion furnish a clue to the nature of the suit contemplated by R. 103. In Kumari v. Ghansham Misra, 35 I.A 22 : (35 Cal. 202 P.C) in considering the question as to whether the suit that had been instituted had to be stamped with ad valorem court-fees or a fixed court-fee under Article 17(1), Limitation Act, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee made-certain observations which throw some light on the point. In that case an objection to an attachment had been made. The objection was overruled. The claimant thereafter instituted a suit for a declaration of his title to the property attached & prayed for an injunction to restrain the decree-holder from proceeding on with the-execution. He valued the two prayers, namely, for declaration & injunction, separately & paid two stamps of Rs. 10 as court-fees. The deft, to that suit raised the question as to the sufficiency of the court-fees & contended that ad valorem court-fees which would have amounted to a sum of about Rs. 1250 were payable. The H.C gave-effect to the contention of the deft, but the Judicial Committee of the P.C held that the pltf. had over paid court-fees by the sum of Rs. 10. He was required under the law to pay court-fees of Rs. 10 only under Article 17(1), Limitation Act. So far as the subject, matter of the decision is concerned, it is entirely different but in arriving at that conclusion their Lordships of the P.C said that a suit under O. 21, R. 63 or the corresponding provision of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882, was in substance a review of the summary order passed under O. 21, R. 58. We are referring to the rules of the Code of 1908, for, the corresponding sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, which were in force at the time of the P.C decision are exactly the same. Apparently, the P.C made those observations on the strength of the words “subject to the result of such suit, the order passed, shall be conclusive.” The phraseology of the last sentence of R. 103 is-exactly the same as the phraseology of the last sentence of O. 21, R. 63. These observations of the P.C would support the conclusion that a suit, whether it be a suit under O. 21, R. 63 or a suit under O. 21, R. 103, would in essence be a suit to set aside and order of the Ct. passed under O. 21, R. 58 or R. 98 or 99 as the case may be, in execution proceedings.

11. Further, an analysis of the provisions of O. 21, R. 103 & of O. 21, Rr. 98 and 99 would, in our opinion, lead to the conclusion that a suit contemplated by O. 21, R. 103 is not by its nature a suit for possession of the property in respect of which the order had been made by the executing Ct. under O. 21, R. 98 or R. 99 as the case may be. We will first take the case of an order passed under O. 21, R. 99. This order (as well as an order which is contemplated by R. 98, are to be in proceedings started under O. 21, R. 97, that is to say, (1) proceedings started by the decree-holder who has obtained a decree for possession & who is obstructed when he goes to take delivery of possession of the property, or (2) by an auction-purchaser of a property at a court-sale in execution of a money-decree or a decree which is to be realised by recourse to sale of property. Those proceedings started by the decree-holder has to proceed in the presence of the party who has so obstructed. In substance the order under R. 99 would be an order of dismissal of the appln. made by the decree-holder under O. 21, R. 97, that is to say, the effect of the order is that he cannot take possession through the writ for possession which had been issued by the executing Ct. at his instance. The suit which is contemplated by R. 103 is a suit in which he has to pray that he has the right to present possession, that is to say, that he had the right to take possession at the relevant time, namely, when the writ for possession was issued at his instance by the executing Ct. On the language of R. 103 he has not to make any other prayer. If he fails in the suit, the matter ends here. The writ which was issued at his instance remains a dead writ. If he succeeds, that is to say, he establishes his claim to the present possession of the property as against the deft, who had resisted the execution of the writ for possession, he would take possession of the property by the execution of that very writ on the basis of which possession could not be delivered before by the executing Ct. by reason of the obstruction at that time by the deft. So to say, during the interval between the order passed under O. 21, R. 99 & the decree which is passed in favour of the decree-holder or the auction-purchaser, as the case may be, in the suit under O. 21, R. 103 the writ was in a state of suspended animation. The result of the suit one way or the other would give it full life, if we may use a figurative expression or put an end to its life.

12. We will now examine the case where the decree holder or the auction purchaser, as the case may be, gets an order in his favour, that is to say, an order under O. 21, R. 98. The execution of the writ for possession is obstructed & the Ct. by its order under that rule says that the obstruction by the person concerned was unlawful & the Ct. is empowered to put the person so obstructing even to prison if after the order passed under that rule he persists in obstructing the decree-holder or the auction purchaser, as the case may be. There would be same appreciable interval of time between the date of the order passed under O. 21, R. 98 & the date when the successful decree-holder or the auction-purchaser, as the case may be, actually takes possession of the property & it is possible to contemplate a case that within that interval the person who had obstructed the decree-holder or the auction-purchaser, as the case may be & against whom the order was made under O. 21, R. 98 may institute a suit under O. 21, R. 103. In such a case, obviously he would not have to make a prayer for recovery of possession. It would still be a suit under O. 21, R. 103 without a prayer for possession. It would in our opinion make no difference whatsoever so far as the character of the suit contemplated under R. 103 is concerned even if the suit is instituted after the successful decree-holder or the auction purchaser, as the case may be, had actually taken possession of the property after the order had been passed under R. 98. If the pltf. in that suit succeeds, that is to say, establishes his claim to the present possession of the property the order I on the strength of which the decree holder or the auction purchaser had taken possession disappears, & it would be the duty of the executing Ct. which had passed the order under R. 98 to restore status quo ante & put the other party in possession. Such being the position, it is not in our opinion at all necessary for the pltf. instituting a suit under the provisions of R. 103 to make any prayer; for recovery of possession. We are accordingly of opinion that a suit contemplated under R. 103 is not a suit for recovery of possession within the meaning of Section 28 of the Limitation Act. We cannot, therefore, agree with the second reason given by the learned Subordinate Judge in support of his judgment.

13. The third & the last reason which the learned Subordinate Judge gives is this. He finds that Rambrahmo was not in possession at any time after his purchase & the judgment debtors; mentioned in the decree in execution of which he purchased, namely, Ajit & Anil were in possession, all along, that is to say, from before the purchase of Rambrahmo & thereafter up to the date of this partition suit. He says that in these circumstances Rauibrahmo's title has been extinguished by adverse possession. Apparently, the learned Subordinate Judge has overlooked two things His finding is that the judgment-debtors, Ajit & Anil were in possession at the time when Rambrahmo made the purchase in execution of the decree at the court-sale. On this finding, the proper Article of the Limitation Act would be Article 138. He overlooked that Article. According to that Article-limitation against Rambrahmo would run from the date when the court sale at which he had purchased became absolute, because at the date of his sale the judgment-debtors under the decree in execution of which he had purchased were in possession. The sale certificate of Rambrahmo has been put in & that shows that the sale was confirmed on 1-1-1931. This date the learned Sub’ ordinate Judge has overlooked. Under Article 138 limitation against Rambrahmo would run from that date & if he did not institute a suit within 12 years of that date his title would have been extinguished by reason of the provisions of Section 28 of the Limitation Act, but this suit for partition was instituted on 6-7-1942, that is to say, within 12 years of the date when Rambrahmo's sale was confirmed. Whether Rambrahmo's title had been extinguished or not by reason of Section 28 of the Limitation Act, has to be determined in reference to the date when the suit was instituted. In fact, when these facts were pointed out to the learned Advocate for the resps. he did not make any attempt to support this part of the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. The result is that we disagree with all the reasons given by the learned Subordinate Judge in support of his conclusion that Rambrahmo is not a necessary party. We allow the appeal on the ground that Rambrahmo only was a necessary party to the suit. Deft, 1 would get the costs of this appeal as also the costs of the lower Ct. as mentioned in the Schedule to the decree from the prttf. the hearing-fee & the fee for drawing up the grounds of appeal in this Ct. being assessed at a consolidated sum of Rs. 340. As the appeal has been allowed, no order is necessary in the Rule.

R.G.D

14. Appeal allowed.