Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

East India Prospecting Syndicate, Calcutta v. Commissioner Of Excess Profits Tax, Calcutta

Calcutta High Court
Apr 8, 1949
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary — Harries, C.J. (with Chatterjee, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a Reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, about whether the East India Prospecting Syndicate (a partnership formed in 1920) was carrying on a "business" within the meaning of s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, so as to make certain receipts liable to excess profits tax.

Material facts (as stated in the opinion):

  • In 1919 Villiers Colliery Company obtained a prospecting licence over land containing coal seams. On 5 August 1920 the East India Prospecting Syndicate was formed as a partnership (originally two limited companies and three individuals; later two limited companies and two individuals).
  • The partnership's objects (Instrument of Partnership) were: (1) to purchase the Villiers Company's prospecting rights; (2) to give effect to the licence terms; and (3) to promote limited companies to acquire at a profit the properties including the licence.
  • The syndicate purchased the prospecting licence for Rs. 10,00,000 (Rs. 4,00,000 cash; remainder discharged by giving Villiers a share in the syndicate).
  • On 22 April 1921 the syndicate obtained a mining lease from the Raja of Talchar for about 5,000 acres for 30 years (with an option to renew), subject to dead rents, royalties (two annas per ton) and surface rents.
  • The syndicate promoted Talchar Coalfield, Limited, and sub-leased the mining property to it by a sub-lease executed 26 September 1924 (effective from 1 December 1921) for Rs. 20,00,000 (Rs. 15,00,000 satisfied by allotment of fully paid shares; Rs. 5,00,000 in cash). The sub-lease required the sub-lessee to pay amounts periodically substantially in excess of the syndicate's obligations to the Raja, so the sub-lease yielded a net profit to the syndicate.
  • For the year ending 31 March 1942 the syndicate's net income from rent and royalty under the sub-lease was computed at Rs. 1,20,877; after standard profit adjustments the excess profits were computed and an assessment to excess profits tax resulted on Rs. 10,889.
  • Procedural history: The Excess Profits Tax Officer assessed the syndicate to excess profits tax (treating the receipts as profits of a business). The syndicate argued the income was income from property. Appellate Assistant Commissioner reversed the Tax Officer. The department appealed to the Tribunal which set aside the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's decision and affirmed the Tax Officer. The Tribunal framed and stated a case for the opinion of this Court on whether the syndicate was carrying on a "business" under s. 2(5).

Counsel: Mr. Atul Gupta for the appellant (syndicate); Dr. Gupta for the department. Attorney for assessees (recorded): G.K. Deb. The final order records costs to the assessees and a refund of Rs. 100 deposit; hearing-fee assessed at five gold mohurs. Chatterjee, J. concurred.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee (the East India Prospecting Syndicate) can be said to be carrying on a "business" within the meaning of s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, so as to bring the income in question (rent and royalties received under the sub-lease) within the charge to excess profits tax.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Atul Gupta)

  • The syndicate was not carrying on a "business" within s. 2(5) because its functions consisted wholly or mainly in the holding of property (the leasehold interest) and collecting rents/royalties.
  • Relying on the proviso to s. 2(5): that proviso deems holding of investments or property to be a business only in the case of companies or incorporated societies — the syndicate is a partnership and therefore not covered by the deeming provision.
  • Consequently, the receipts could not be treated as profits of a business and could not be taxed under s. 4 (charging section) of the Excess Profits Tax Act.

Respondent's / Department's Arguments (Dr. Gupta)

  • The Tribunal was correct to treat the syndicate as carrying on a business, relying on authorities (particularly English cases) that hold similar receipts can be profits of a business where the corporate object or memorandum indicates acquisition and turning to account of concessions.
  • Alternatively, the department relied on sub-rule (4) of rule 4 of Schedule I of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, which provides that where a business consists wholly or partly in letting out property, the income from the property shall be included in the profits of the business; thus the departmental position was that the income from the sub-lease should be included as business profits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Korean Syndicate, Ltd. Held (Court of Appeal) that a company which acquired concessions and entered into an agreement with lessees to turn them to account was carrying on a business under the English Finance Act; receipts under the arrangement were held to be business profits. The Tribunal relied on this English authority. Harries, C.J. distinguished it: the English Act's definition of "business" was much wider and the agreement in the Korean case was treated by the majority as not being a mere ordinary lease; the English case therefore did not compel the same result under the Indian Act, which has a narrower definition and an express proviso in s. 2(5).
South Behar Railway Co., Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue English authority treating receipts of a company functioning wholly as a holder of securities as business receipts under the English statute. The Court observed that such English authorities would have to be decided differently under the Indian Act but for the proviso to s. 2(5) of the Indian Excess Profits Tax Act; the proviso specifically deems certain corporate holdings to be business for the Indian Act, a distinguishable feature.
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Budderpore Oil Co., Ltd. English case where a company formed to develop oil-bearing properties later became a lessor and was treated under English law as carrying on a business. Harries, C.J. considered it distinguishable for India because of the different (narrower) definition of "business" in the Indian Act and the effect of the proviso to s. 2(5).
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Shaw, Wallace & Co. (Board) Observation that Indian Acts are not in pari materia with English Acts and that English case-law may have limited application to Indian statute construction. Cited to support the position that English precedents are of limited value because the statutory language and scheme in India differ; Harries, C.J. relied on this reasoning to justify distinguishing English authorities.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras v. Bosotto Brothers, Ltd. (Madras) Madras High Court held a limited company that leased rice mills was carrying on a business of letting and so entitled to depreciation allowances; similar holding in another Madras case re: hotel letting. The Court noted these Madras decisions but declined to follow them; Harries, C.J. considered the rents in those cases to be income from property (s. 6(iii) / s. 9) rather than profits of a business and disagreed with the Madras Court's emphasis on company objects/memorandum as decisive.
In re Commercial Properties Ltd. (Special Bench, Calcutta) Held that a company whose sole object was acquiring and letting house property derived income that was to be regarded as income from property (s. 9), not profits of business under s. 10. Harries, C.J. followed and accepted this Special Bench decision as binding and persuasive: where a company's sole activities are owning and letting property, the receipts are income from property, not business profits. The Court applied the reasoning analogously to the partnership.
Kamakshya Narain Singh v. Income-tax Commissioner (Ramgarh case; Privy Council) Royalties in mining were held to fall under "other sources" (s. 6(v)) rather than being profits or gains of a business; royalties treated as arising from covenant of lessees. The Court relied on Lord Wright's observation that royalties cannot be regarded as profits of a business and used this authority to support the conclusion that the syndicate's royalties were not business profits but income from other sources.
In re Kaladan Suratee Bazar Co., Ltd. (Chief Court of Lower Burma) Held that a company owning house property and distributing rents to shareholders was not carrying on a "business" as defined for excess profits duty purposes; business must follow the meaning in the Income-tax Act. The Court treated this as a direct authority favoring the assessee's position and consistent with the conclusion that mere holding and letting of property does not constitute a business under the relevant Indian statutory scheme.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Sangster (English; Rowlatt, J.) Rowlatt, J. held an inventor receiving royalties was not carrying on a business; royalties were treated as owner income rather than business profits under English law. Harries, C.J. cited it as supportive of the view that receipts from royalties are not necessarily business profits; in the Indian context such royalties would be treated as income from other sources and not subject to excess profits tax.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from statutory interpretation of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 and the Indian Income-tax Act:

  1. Statutory starting point — s. 4 (charging section): The excess profits tax is chargeable only "in respect of any business to which this Act applies" and therefore can be levied only on profits of a business as defined by the Act.
  2. Definition critical — s. 2(5): The Court closely examined the definition of "business" in s. 2(5), including the proviso which deems the holding of investments or property to be a business only in the case of companies or societies incorporated by statute. The Court observed the proviso is a deeming provision: it makes what would not generally be business into business for the limited purpose of the Excess Profits Tax Act but only for companies or incorporated societies.
  3. Expressio unius exclusio alterius: The Court applied this principle to the proviso: because the proviso expressly makes limited companies and incorporated societies subject to the deeming rule, other entities (such as partnerships or individuals) are excluded from being deemed to carry on a business merely by holding investments/property.
  4. Factual application: The Court accepted (and the department conceded for 1941–1943) that the syndicate did not carry on mining operations and its functions consisted wholly in holding the leasehold interest and collecting rent/royalty under the sub-lease. Thus the syndicate's activities amounted to holding property and collecting income therefrom.
  5. On the department's alternative reliance on sub-rule (4) of rule 4 of Schedule I (which includes income from letting in profits of a business): The Court rejected that reliance because the sub-rule only applies where a business "consists wholly or partly in the letting out of property" — i.e., the letting must itself amount to a business. Since the syndicate's holding/letting did not amount to a business under s. 2(5), the sub-rule could not convert the receipts into business profits. The Court insisted that rules must be construed to harmonize with the substantive provisions of the Act and not to create conflict with the statutory definition.
  6. Interaction with the Income-tax Act: The Court considered the structure of the Indian Income-tax Act (s. 6 and related provisions) which distinguishes distinctly between income from property, interest on securities, profits and gains of business, and other sources. The Court emphasized this statutory separation and concluded that receipts arising from rent and royalties under a lease/sub-lease are appropriately classifiable as income from property or from other sources rather than as business profits in the context of Indian law.
  7. Assessment of precedents: The Court reviewed the English and Indian decisions relied upon by the Tribunal. It distinguished the English authorities (including the Korean Syndicate) on the basis that the English Acts and their judicial development define "business" more broadly and are not in pari materia with Indian statutes. The Court followed the Calcutta Special Bench in In re Commercial Properties Ltd. and the Privy Council's treatment of royalties in Kamakshya Narain Singh as supporting the conclusion that royalties and similar receipts are not profits of business under Indian law. The Court also noted decisions (e.g., Madras High Court cases) but declined to follow them insofar as they treated company lease receipts as business profits; Harries, C.J. considered those decisions incorrect in principle when read against the statutory scheme of the Indian Acts.
  8. Conclusion of law: Applying the definition in s. 2(5), its proviso, and the interpretations of the Income-tax Act provisions, the Court concluded that the syndicate (a partnership) whose sole functions were holding the leasehold property and collecting rent/royalty was not carrying on a "business" within s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act and therefore its receipts were not subject to excess profits tax under s. 4.

Holding and Implications

Question answered, in the negative.

Holding (direct effect):

  • The Court answered the referred question in the negative: the East India Prospecting Syndicate (a partnership whose activities consisted wholly or mainly in holding a leasehold interest and collecting rents/royalties) was not carrying on a "business" within the meaning of s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 and therefore the income in question could not be charged to excess profits tax under s. 4.
  • The assessees (the syndicate) were awarded their costs of the Reference. The hearing-fee was assessed at five gold mohurs and the assessees were entitled to a refund of the Rs. 100 deposited.
  • Chatterjee, J. concurred with the judgment.

Broader implications (as discussed in the opinion):

  • The opinion clarifies that, under the Indian statutory scheme, mere holding of property and deriving income by way of rent or royalties by a partnership or individuals does not constitute "business" for the purposes of the Excess Profits Tax Act; only companies or incorporated societies may be deemed to carry on a business by reason of the proviso to s. 2(5).
  • The decision emphasizes the need to harmonize subordinate rules (e.g., Schedule I rules) with the substantive statutory definitions and indicates that English authorities developed under broader English statutory language cannot be mechanically applied where the Indian Acts differ in scope and drafting.
  • The Court treated royalties under lease/sub-lease as falling under income from property or "other sources" (s. 6(iii) or s. 6(v) of the Income-tax Act), relying on Privy Council authority that royalties are not profits or gains of a business for Indian law purposes.

Note: This summary reflects only the reasoning and conclusions contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Harries, C.J:— This is a Reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, in respect of the assessment of the East India Prospecting Syndicate, Calcutta, to excess profits tax.

The syndicate claimed that it was not liable to pay excess profits tax, because it was not carrying on a business within the meaning of s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. The Tribunal found that it was carrying on a business; but it was requested by the syndicate to state a case for the opinion of this Court. The Tribunal stated a case and formulated the following question for the opinion of this Court:—

Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee can be said to be carrying on a “business” within the meaning of s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, so as to bring the income in question within the charge to excess profits tax?

The facts of the case giving rise to this dispute can be shortly, stated follows:—

Some time in the year 1919, the Villiers Colliery Company, Limited, obtained a prospecting, licence from the Raja of Talchar in respect of about 8 square miles (less 1,000 bighâs) of land, under which there were seams of coal. On August 5, 1920, a partnership was formed, which was named the East India Prospecting Syndicate, Calcutta, and this partnership originally consisted of two limited companies and three individuals as partners. Subsequently, one of the individuals died and the partners of the syndicate at all material times consisted of these two limited companies and two individuals.

The objects for which this partnership was created are set out in the Instrument of Partnership. The partnership was formed:—

(1) to purchase from the Villiers Colliery Company, Limited, their coal-prospecting rights held under that company's prospecting license with regard to the area in question;

(2) to take all necessary steps to give effect to the several terms and conditions contained in such license; and

(3) to promote a company or companies with limited liability for the purposes of acquiring at a profit to this syndicate all or any of the properties including the benefit of the prospecting license.

It was provided that the consideration for the sale or disposal of any of the rights or interests of the syndicate should be utilised and employed, first, in paying all debts and liabilities of the syndicate; secondly, in repaying any capital contributed by the members in respect of their shares; and, thirdly, the surplus should be divided among the members in proportion to their respective shares.

In pursuance of this deed the syndicate acquired the prospecting license from the Villiers Company, Limited, for a consideration of Rs. 10,00,000. The sum of Rs. 4,00,000 was paid in cash and the Villiers Company, Limited, were given a share in the syndicate to the value of Rs. 8,00,000 in discharge of the balance of the purchase price.

On April 22, 1921, the syndicate entered into an agreement with the Raja of Talchar for a mining lease in respect of about 5,000 acres of this coal-bearing land for a term of thirty years with an option to renew.

This mining lease gave the syndicate the usual powers given by a mining lease and subjected them to the usual liabilities. They were given power and liberty to enter upon the lands and to search for, win, work and raise and carry away the minerals thereunder. The syndicate were under a liability to pay certain dead rents and royalties—the royalty being at the rate of two annas per ton. The syndicate were also to pay rent in respect of surface lands occupied by them for the purposes of mining.

The syndicate then promoted a company known as the Talchar Coalfield, Limited, and agreed with that company to sublet to it this mining property. A sub-lease was executed on September 26, 1924, which was to have effect from December 1, 1921, in consideration of Rs. 20,00,000, which was to be paid and satisfied as to Rs. 15,00,000 by allotment to the syndicate or their nominees of 1,50,000 fully paid up shares of Rs. 10 each in the Talchar Coalfields, Limited, and, as to the balance of Rs. 5,00,000, by payment in cash. The provisions in this sub-lease with regard to the rights and liabilities of the sub-lessees were similar to those contained in the indenture of lease, dated April 22, 1921, made by the Raja of Talchar in favour of the syndicate. However, the Talchar Coalfield, Limited, were bound to pay, not only the half yearly dead rent, but had to pay, during the subsistence of this lease, a certain amount based on the output of steam coal, rubble and dust coal. The amount so payable periodically was considerably in excess of the amount payable by the syndicate to the Raja. The sub-lease was, therefore, a profitable undertaking, because the syndicate received from the sub-lessees, the Talchar Coalfield, Limited, a half-yearly sum which was considerably in excess of the half-yearly sum payable by the syndicate to the lessor, the Raja of Talchar.

For the financial year ending March 31, 1942, the syndicate's net income on account of rent and royalty under this sub-lease was computed at Rs. 1,20,877. The standard profit after necessary adjustments, for the purposes of ascertaining the excess profits, was taken to be Rs. 1,04,856. The excess profits were, therefore, Rs. 16,021, from which sum was deducted a sum of Rs. 5,152 representing the deficiency which had been brought forward. In the result the applicant was assessed to excess profits tax on the sum of Rs. 10,889 for the period ending March 31, 1942. It appears that, for the chargeable accounting period ending March 31, 1943, there were no excess profits which could be subjected to tax.

The Excess Profits Tax Officer treated this income arising from the sub-lease as the profits of a business and assessed the assessees to excess profits tax. The assessees contended before the Tax Officer that they were not carrying on any business and that their income was merely income from property. The Tax Officer, however, rejected that view and assessed them to excess profits tax. The syndicate appealed and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner reversed the finding of the Tax Officer and set aside the assessment. The department then appealed to the Tribunal which in turn set aside the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and affirmed the finding of the Excess Profits Tax Officer.

Mr. Atul Gupta, who has appeared on behalf of the appellant, has contended that the Appellate Tribunal were clearly wrong, because, upon the plain terms of the Excess Profits Tax Act, the income of the syndicate could not be taxed.

The charging section of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 (XV of 1940), is s. 4, which is in these terms:—

Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall, in respect of any business to which this Act applies, be charged, levied and paid on the amount by which the profits during any chargeable accounting period exceed the standard profits a tax (in this Act referred to as “excess profits tax”) which shall in respect of any chargeable accounting period ending on or before March 31, 1941, be equal to fifty per cent, of that excess.

It is quite clear, from the terms of this section, that this tax can only be levied on profits of any business to, which the Act applies and Cannot be levied on any profits except from such business.

The term “business” is defined in s. 2(5) of the Act in these terms:—

“Business” includes any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture or any profession or vocation, but does not include a profession carried on by an individual or by individuals in partnership if the profits of the profession depend wholly or mainly on his or their personal qualifications, unless such profession consists wholly or mainly in the making of contracts on behalf of other persons or the giving to other persons of advice of a commercial nature in connection with the making of contracts:

Provided that, where the functions of a company or of a society incorporated by or under any enactment consist wholly or mainly in the holding of investments or other property, the holding of the investments or property shall be deemed for the purpose of this definition to be a business carried on by such company or society.

Mr. Atul Gupta's argument was that the assessee syndicate were not carrying on any business to which the Act applied and, therefore, they were not subject to excess profits tax. Mr. Gupta relied upon the proviso to s. 2(5) of the Act. He has contended, and I think rightly, that the proviso makes it clear that the functions of any body which consist wholly or mainly in the holding of investments or other property cannot amount to a business, because it is said in the proviso that in certain cases the holding of investments or property shall be deemed for the purpose of this definition to be a business. Where an Act states that certain activities are deemed to amount to a business, it is clear that such activities would not normally amount to carrying on business. But where an Act provides that such activities shall be deemed to be carrying on a business, then, for the purposes of that particular Act, the activities which do not usually amount to carrying on business will be regarded for that Act and that Act only as amounting to carrying on business. It seems to me that the proviso makes it clear that any company or incorporated society or individuals would not be carrying on business merely because they were holding securities or property. But for the purposes of the Excess Profits Tax Act an exception is made in the case of companies or societies incorporated under any enactment. The proviso states that a company or an incorporated society will, for the purposes of the Act, be regarded as carrying on business, where its functions wholly or mainly are the holding of investments or other property. It will be seen that the proviso only makes the holding of investments or property by limited companies and incorporated societies tantamount or carrying on business. On the principle expressio unius exclusio alterius it follows that, if only companies and incorporated societies are to be deemed to carry on business by holding securities or property, then all other bodies or individuals do not carry on business where their functions are wholly or mainly holding such securities or property. The syndicate is neither a limited company nor an incorporated society. It is a partnership and, as such, is not covered by the proviso. Therefore, it seems to me clear upon the plain words of sub-s. (5) and the proviso thereto that the syndicate cannot be said to carry on business, if its function is wholly or mainly holding property.

There can be no doubt that this syndicate came into existence to acquire what was thought to be valuable mineral rights and to develop to the profit of the syndicate such rights when they had been acquired. In due course, the syndicate acquired a lease of a large area of land with a right to work the minerals thereunder. The syndicate, however, never worked the minerals themselves, but granted a sub-lease to a coal-mining company, which worked the minerals thereafter. It is common ground that, after this sub-lease, the syndicate merely collected the rent and royalties payable under such sub-lease and retained as their profit the excess of the payments received over the payments made to the Raja of Talchar under their lease.

Dr. Gupta, who has appeared on behalf of the department, has had to concede that in the years 1941, 1942 and 1943 the syndicate did not carry on any mining operations and that all they were entitled to, at that time, was to receive the rents and royalties under the sub-lease.

It seems to me clear, therefore, that the functions of this partnership consisted wholly in the holding of property and they had no other functions whatsoever. If this sub-lease had been granted by a limited company or by an incorporated society, the net profit could be regarded as profits for the purposes of Excess Profits Tax Act by reason of the proviso to s. 2(5) of the Act. But, being neither a company nor an incorporated society, the net profit cannot be regarded as the profits of business and, therefore, they cannot be taxed under s. 4 of the Act. It appears to me that the terms of s. 2(5) make it clear that the profits of this syndicate cannot be regarded as profits of the business so as to make them taxable under the Excess Profits Tax Act.

Dr. Gupta, on behalf of the department, further argued that the profits of this syndicate were rightly assessed to excess profits tax by reason of sub-r. (4) of r. 4 of Sch. I of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. That sub-rule is in these terms:—

In the case of a business which consists wholly or partly in the letting out of property on hire, the income from the property shall be included in the profits of the business whether or not it has been charged to income-tax under s. 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or under any other section of that Act.

It is urged that this rule makes it clear that, in the case of every business, which consists wholly or partly in the letting out of property, the income thereof must be regarded as profits and gains of a business for the purposes of the Act.

It is to be observed that the rule only applies to cases where a business consists wholly or partly in letting out property. In short, the letting out of property must amount to a business, and, if it does not, then the sub-rule can have no application. The proviso to s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act makes it clear that the holding of property which of course must include its management and letting it out for profit is not a business, but it is deemed to be a business in the case of companies or societies incorporated under any enactment, if the functions of such bodies consist wholly or mainly in holding property. Individuals or partnerships do not fall within this provision and, therefore, the holding of a property by a partnership, even if it is its sole activity, is not a business and is not to be deemed to be a business. Therefore, the holding of property by the syndicate does not constitute a business and it cannot be said that its business consists in letting out the minerals which it held. That being so, it appears to me that sub-r. (4) of r. 4 of Sch. I of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, cannot assist the department. Unless this construction is put on the sub-rule, the sub-rule will be in conflict with the definition of “business” given in the Act and clearly the rules made under the Act must be construed to avoid such a conflict and to harmonise with the substantive provisions of the Act.

The Tribunal has dealt with this case at very great length and considered a large number of English and Indian authorities, but strange to say, it never gave the proviso to s. 2(5) of the Act any consideration whatsoever. It appears to me that the definition contained in that sub-section and proviso makes it clear that any partnership which merely derives its income from some property by way of rent, royalty or such like cannot be said to carry on business for the purposes of the Indian Excess Profits Tax Act.

The Tribunal, however, as I have said, considered a large number of cases, particularly English cases and, on a consideration of these authorities, it came to the conclusion that the syndicate was in fact carrying on business and, therefore, was liable to pay the tax under s. 4 of the Act. The Tribunal considered the purpose for which this syndicate, came into existence. It points out that it came into existence for the purposes of acquiring and exploiting certain mineral rights and making a profit therefrom. It is true that the syndicate did not proceed to carry on the business of coal-mining, but they effected their purpose of making a profit by granting this sub-lease on most advantageous terms. The Tribunal thought that the granting of this sub-lease was merely carrying out one of the purposes for which the syndicate was formed and, therefore, a part of the exploitation of these mineral rights. The Tribunal was of opinion that the syndicate was engaged in the business of exploiting these mineral rights and that, in receiving the rent and royalties due under the sub-lease, it was receiving the profits of the business of exploiting these rights. The Tribunal laid great stress on an English case: Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Korean Syndicate, Limited. In that case a company was incorporated as a limited company, having for its principal object the acquisition and working of concessions and turning the same into account. In 1908, the company entered into an agreement to lease a concession in Korea, which it had acquired in consideration of the lessees paying what was therein described as a royalty, but which was in fact a percentage based on the profits made by the lessees. The company also received the interest on a certain sum of money on deposit at a bank. The company's operations were confined to the collection and distribution of these two sources of income and to the payment of the premiums on a sinking fund policy.

Rowlatt, J. held that the receipts of this company were not the profits of a business. But on appeal the Court of Appeal held that, upon the construction of the memorandum and articles and the agreement of 1908 with the lessees, the company was carrying on the business for which it was incorporated, namely, the acquisition of concessions and the turning of the same to account and was, therefore, carrying on a business within the meaning of s. 39 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915, and was, accordingly, liable to be assessed to excess profits duty under that Act.

It is to be observed that the definition of “business” in the Finance (No. 2) Act of 1915 was very different from the definition contained in the Indian Act of 1940. Section 39 of the English Act was as follows:—

The trades and businesses to which this Part of this Act applies are all trades or businesses (whether continuously carried on or not) of any description carried on in the United Kingdom, or owned or carried on in any other place, by persons ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, excepting—

(a) husbandry in the United Kingdom; and

(b) offices or employments; and

(c) any profession the profits of which are dependent mainly on the personal qualifications of the person by whom the profession is carried on and in which no capital expenditure is required, or only capital expenditure, of a comparatively small amount.

but including the business of any person taking commissions in respect of any transactions or services rendered, and of any agent of any description (not being a commercial traveller or an agent whose remuneration consists wholly of a fixed and definite sum not depending on the amount of business done or any other contingency).

It will be seen, therefore, that practically all activities connected with any trade or business could be regarded as trades or businesses within that Act with very few exceptions. The definition is in the very widest terms and is very different from the definition in the Indian Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940.

Further, Lord Sterndale M.R and Younger L.J were clearly of pinion that the so-called lease by the Korean Syndicate, Ltd., to the partnership in Korea was not in the true sense a mining lease at all. At p. 271-2 Lord Sterndale M.R observed:—

That is the agreement which the Commissioners call a lease. I do not think they meant in any way to beg any question by calling it so; they thought it was a convenient term by which to describe it. As I have said, in my opinion it is not a lease, nor are the sums payable under it in any way like the royalties that are paid under an ordinary mining lease. The Commissioners offer no opinion at all as to what is the effect of that agreement.

In my opinion, the effect of that agreement is that it is a carrying out of the object which the Syndicate undertook to attain, and which is mentioned in sub-cl. 1 of cl. 3 of memorandum which I have already read, of acquiring a concession and working, exploiting and turning the same to account, the same words as are used in the agreement of February 7, 1905. That is not in any way like the case of a person who holds certain investments and merely draws the interest from them, or of an owner of mines who simply leases them in consideration of the payment to him of royalties. It is nothing in the least like either of those cases, but it is a carrying out of that object mentioned in the memorandum, and which the Syndicate hopes to attain.

At p. 277 Younger L.J observed:—

I think that in the last analysis the real question here is whether this agreement of March 25, 1908, is what apparently it was regarded by the Commissioners as being—merely a lease of this Syndicate's interest in this concession, at a royalty, or whether it is not the embodiment of an arrangement by virtue of which the Syndicate turned to account its interest in this concession, an interest which it, had acquired for the purpose of turning it to account and thereby earning profit for itself. It seems to me that the latter is the true view of the arrangment embodied in the agreement.

Atkin L.J took a somewhat different view, but it is clear that the view of the majority in this case was that the so-called lease granted by the assessee was not in the true sense a lease at all. It is to be observed, for example, that the so-called lessors were entitled to a share of the profits made by the so-called lessees, and, in the view of the majority, this sub-lease was only a means of giving effect to the objects of the company, namely, exploiting the property for their profit. The terms of the so-called lease showed that the relationship between the assessees and their so-call lessees were very different from the relationship normally existing between landlord and tenant. The so-called landlords were vitally interested in the development and actually received a proportion of the profits earned. That being so, the Court of appeal was of opinion that the receipt of payments due under this lease was profit of a business and therefore liable to excess profits tax.

This Korean case is only an authority for the meaning of the term “business” in the English Act and it seems to me that the Tribunal in this case has Overlooked the words of Sir George Lowndes in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Shaw, Wallace and Company.

Sir George Lowndes in delivering the judgment of the Board observed:—

Again their Lordships would discard altogether the case law which has been so painfully evolved in the construction of the English income-tax Statutes both the cases upon which the High Court relied and the flood of other decisions which has been let loose in this Board. The Indian Act is not in pari materia; it is less elaborate in many ways, subject to fewer refinements, and in arrangement and language it differs greatly from the provisions with which the Courts in this country have had to deal. Under these conditions their Lordships think that little can be gained by attempting to reason from one to the other, at all events in the present case in which they think that the solution of the problem lies very near the surface of the Act, and depends mainly on general considerations.

I have already pointed out that, in my view, the solution of this case depends upon a consideration of s. 2(5) of the Indian Act of 1940. But, unfortunately, the proviso to that section was never considered at all by the Appellate Tribunal.

It appears to me that this English case can have no application to the case before us. It is to be noticed that the term “business” was defined in the Act under consideration by the English Courts in the widest possible terms, whereas the definition in the Indian Act of 1940 is very much narrower.

In the English Income-tax Acts “business” is not defined, but in the Indian Income-tax Act it is defined as including “any trade, commerce, or manufacture or any adventure or “concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture”. It was essential that business should be defined in the Indian Income-tax Act, because of the mode of taxation adopted in s. 6 of the Act. Section 6 of the Indian Income-tax Act provides:—

Save as otherwise provided by this Act, the following heads of income, profits and gains, shall be chargeable to income-tax in the manner hereinafter appearing, namely:—

(i) Salaries,

(ii) Interest on securities,

(iii) Income from property,

(iv) Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation,

(v) Income from other sources.

It will be seen, therefore, that the Indian Income-tax Act draws a distinction between income derived from property or other sources and income being profits and gains of business. It was, therefore, necessary strictly to define business, otherwise it might well be held that certain income was income derived from property or other sources as well as being the profits and gains of business. It seems to me quite clear that the Indian Income-tax Act regarded interest on securities, income from property or other sources and profits and gains of business as entirely different sources of income and it seems to follow that what must be regarded as income from property or other sources or interest on securities cannot be regarded as profits and gains of business. Further, I think it clear from the terms of the proviso to s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, that holding securities of property cannot amount to a business and that must be so by reason of s. 6 of the Income-tax Act. Section 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act makes the holding of securities or of property business merely for the purposes of the Act in the case of companies or incorporated societies. The there holding of property or securities cannot, in my view, however, amount to a business within the meaning of that term as used in the Income-tax Act and can only amount to a business as the term is used in the Excess Profits Tax Act by reason of the proviso to s. 2(5) of that Act. It appears to me that the Korean Syndicate case (supra) is clearly distinguishable from the present case and in no way compels us to hold that the assessee in this case was carrying on a business.

The Tribunal also relied upon the English cases of South Behar Railway Company, Limited v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue and Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Budderpore Oil Co., Ltd.. Again, these are cases on the English Acts and it appears to me that South Behar Railway Co., Limited v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue would have to be differently decided in this country but for the proviso to s. 2(5) of the Indian Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. The South Behar Railway Company was at the time of assessment a company which functioned wholly as a company holding securities. The sole function of the company was holding certain securities, collecting dividends and distributing the same. Such would not be a business under the 1940 Indian Act but for the proviso to s. 2(5), which says that, for the purposes of this Act, it shall be deemed to be a business. Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Budderpore Oil Co., Ltd. (supra) would also have to be decided differently in India but for the proviso to s. 2(5) of the Indian Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. In that case, the company was formed for the purposes of developing certain oil-bearing properties in Assam. The properties were duly acquired and the company proceeded to develop the properties. Later they transferred their rights under a lease to another company and, at the time of assessment, they were merely lessors receiving rent and royalty. It appears to me that in this country they would have to be regarded as the holders of property and, therefore, they would not be liable to pay excess profits duty but for the fact that the holding of property by a limited company is deemed to be a business for the purposes of the Indian Excess Profits Tax Act. It seems to me that little assistance can be obtained from these English cases, which are decided upon different Acts in which the term “business” has a very different meaning.

The Tribunal also relied upon two Madras cases, namely, Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras v. Messrs. Bosotto Brothers, Ltd., Madras, Madras. In the former case a limited company incorporated for the purposes of milling rice leased out buildings, plants, machinery, etc., to another company for a fixed annual rent. Under the lease the lessees were to do the necessary repairs and to hand back the mills in good working order, while the lessors were to bear the loss by depreciation and wear and tear caused by the working of the mill. On an assessment to income-tax of the rent received under the lease, the company claimed an allowance for depreciation under s. 10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act. On the facts it was held, that the company was carrying on a business of letting rice mills and as such was entitled to a deduction for depreciation in the lettable value of its property by reason of wear and tear of the machinery which the company had to bear under the lease.

In the latter case, a company, which carried on a hotel business at Madras and Ootacamund and was empowered under its articles of association to lease its premises, leased a hotel situated in Ootacamund along with furniture and fittings to a firm which carried on the business of hotel there. The company claimed depreciation of the building and furniture leased to the firm. It was held that the letting of the premises was part of the business of the company and so it was entitled to an allowance for depreciation.

In both these cases, the Madras High Court had held that leasing or letting of the property was within the memorandum and articles of association and, therefore, within the objects for which the companies were formed. The leasing formed the business of the company and, therefore, the rent which they received could be regarded as the profits of the business and, therefore, allowances could be made for depreciation.

These cases are not binding on this Court and, with very great respect to the learned Judges of the Madras High Court, I am unable to follow them. What happened in the Madras cases was that companies which could carry on business either ceased to do so or would not do so and leased or let their properties to lessees who carried on business. It appears to me that the rent payable to the companies, therefore, was rent payable to them as the owners of property and, that being so, the rent was liable to tax, not as profits and gains of a business, but as income from property under ss. 6(iii) and 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act. The learned Judges of the Madras High Court seemed to have laid great stress on the fact that letting or leasing these properties was within the objects of the company and permitted by their memoranda and articles of association. But for that fact, of course, the companies could not hold property or lease it or do anything with it. But it does not follow that, because what they did was within the objects of the company, they were carrying on business by doing it. It appears to me that when they let or leased these properties they merely became owners deriving income therefrom and, therefore, liable to tax on the income from property and, that being so, it cannot be said that they were carrying on business and that the rents were profits or gains from such business.

The view expressed in these Madras cases was dissented from by a Special Bench of this Court in the case of In re Commercial Properties Ltd.. In that case it was held that a company owning house property and carrying on the activities of letting such houses is liable to income-tax under s. 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in the same way as a private individual awning such property.

In that case the facts were that the assessee was a registered company and its sole object was to acquire land, build houses, and let premises to tenants in Calcutta or elsewhere in India. The sole assets of the assessee consisted of three properties and the sole business of the assessee was the management and collection of rents from the said properties. At p. 1061, Sir George Rankin, C.J, who delivered the judgment of the Bench, observed:—

In the present case we have a company which owns three estates. It does not appear that any part of that property is outside the definition given in s. 9. It is found to let the houses from time to time, to see to the payment of rents and (doubtless) the doing of repairs. If that is carrying on a business, then this company carried on a business in the sense in which every landlord or owner of this type of property must necessarily carry on business. We know from section 9 itself that it is applicable to property which is let out to tenants, and it has been argued before us that when one looks at the case law one finds that, at all events, where the owner is a company and the objects of the company include the object of owning and managing house property, then the income that is derived from the tenants is an income that is derived from business. It is in that way that it is contended that these assessees should be charged under s. 10. It is said that if the question were to arise under s. 10 these assessees would not be liable to pay income tax at all so that no income tax would be recovered in respect of any of these estates, the reason being that, in point of fact, they have traded so unsuccessfully during the year in question that they have actually made a loss…………..It is obvious too, that if we are to depart in such a case as this from the careful provisions contained in s. 9 for the purposes of computing the correct figure in the case of house property on which tax is to be levied, we will get under s. 10 all sorts of complicated questions special to house property, upon which the law will be absolutely at large. In my judgment, the words of s. 6 and s. 9 and s. 10 must be read so as to give some effect to the contract that is there made between income, profits and gains from “Property” and from “Business” and I entirely refuse my assent to the proposition that because it happens that the owner of a property is a company which has been incorporated for the purpose of owning such property, therefore, the income derived from “property” must be regarded as income derived from “business”. In my judgment, income derived from “property” is a more specific category applicable to the present case.

It is to be observed that the English case of Commissioners of Inlands Revenue v. Korean Syndicate, Ltd. (supra) cited previously in this judgment was expressly considered by the learned Chief Justice and was not followed, as not being applicable to the conditions here. Further, it is clear that the view of the learned Chief Justice is diametrically opposed to the view of the learned Judges of the Madras High Court. This case decided by this High Court is binding on us, and, if I may say respectfully, I entirely agree with the reasoning of the learned Chief Justice. It appears to me that, where a company lets property and its sole activities consist in maintaining that property and collecting the rents, the rents must be regarded as income derived from property and not as the profits or gains of a business.

Royalties have been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Kamakshya Narain Singh v. Income-tax Commissioner, Bihar and Orissa to be income arising from other sources under s. 6(v) of the Indian Income-tax Act. At p. 189, Lord Wright who delivered the judgment of the Board observed:—

Under the English Acts income which consisted of mining royalties was taxed under Sch. A, but according to the relevant rules of Sch. D. Under the Indian Act the provisions of s. 9 with reference to “property” (which is headed iii in s. 6) are regarded as excluding royalties from being held to come under that head. Royalties cannot be regarded as “profits or gains” of a business. The sources of the royalties may properly be deemed to be the lessees covenants to pay them, and hence royalties fall under “other sources”.

It is quite clear from this observation that royalties receivable by a landlord cannot be regarded as profits or gains of a business. But it is contended by Dr. Gupta on behalf of the Commissioner of Income-tax that it can be so regarded in circumstances such as existed in the Korean case (supra) and such as are said to exist in the present case. It appears to me, however, that the assessees in the present case, after they had subleased the minerals to the Talchar Coalfield Company, Ltd., were merely the owners of a leasehold interest in property and the rent and royalties payable to them must be regarded as income from other sources under s. 6(v) of the Indian Income-tax Act. I cannot see that it would make any difference in India for income-tax purposes, even if the lessors of the sublease were a company. In any event, the assessees are not a company, but are a partnership. Dr. Gupta contended that the Ramgarh case could only apply where the owner of property received royalties. But it is quite clear that if a lessee of house property, for example, receives rent such is income from property. Similarly, if a lessee, who has subleased certain minerals, receives dead rent and royalties, he would, in my view, be in precisely the same position in India as the owner of the minerals who had leased them to a lessee.

It seems to me that if the principles of the Calcutta case of Commercial Properties, Ltd. (supra) be applied to the facts of this case, we are bound to hold that what was received by the syndicate in this case cannot be regarded as the profits of a business. The syndicate held certain valuable property which they leased. The rent and royalties, for the reasons given by Lord Wright in the Ramgarh case, cannot be regarded as income from property, but they must be regarded, as the royalty was regarded in the Ramgarh case, as income from other sources and not as the profits and gains of a business.

A very similar question came before the Chief Court of Lower Burma in 1920, in the case of In re Kaladan Suratee Bazar Co., Ltd., in which it was held that a company, registered under the Indian Companies Act, owning house property consisting of tenements and stalls let out for rent, and distributing the rents collected as dividends to its share-holders, is not carrying on a business as defined in s. 2 of the Excess Profits Duty Act and is not assessable thereunder. “Business” in s. 2 of the Excess Profits Duty Act must be given the same meaning as is given in the Income-tax Act. This case, it appears to me, is a direct authority in favour of the assessees' contention before us.

The same question was considered by Rowlatt, J. in the English case of Commissioners of Inland. Revenue v. Sangster, the facts of which were that the assessee was an inventor who derived considerable sums of money from royalties paid to them by companies, of which he was a manager. He had sold one invention, but that was a long time previously and in those circumstances it was contended that he carried on the business of an inventor and was, therefore, liable under the provisions of the Finance Act of 1915 to excess profits duty. Rowlatt, J. held that he was not carrying on a business because he was an owner of royalties and therefore the income from the royalties was not income from business which should make it assessable to excess profits duty.

In India, this income from royalties would also, in my view, be regarded as not income from business, but rather income from other sources and, therefore, it would not be liable to assessment to excess profits tax.

In my judgment, no assistance can be obtained from the English cases and it is clear that the view of this Court is that merely holding property and deriving income therefrom by letting it cannot amount to a business. That being so, even apart from the proviso to s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, we would be bound to hold that the activities of the syndicate do not amount to a business and that their receipts cannot be regarded as the profits of business. That being so, the dead rents and royalties could not be assessed under the Excess Profits Tax Act.

That being so, the answer to the question, which I have already set out, must be in the negative. The assessees will have their costs of this Reference—the hearing-fee being assessed at five gold mohurs. The assessees will be entitled to refund of the Rs. 100 deposited.

Chatterjee, J.:— I entirely agree.

Question answered, in the negative.

Attorney for assesses: G.K Deb.