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Balaram Mandal v. Sahebjan Gazi
Opinion Summary — Das, J. (Reference under s.5 of the Court-fees Act)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Reference arises under s. 5 of the Court-fees Act and presents three specific questions concerning valuation and court-fees. The factual matrix as reported by the Stamp Reporter is as follows:
- The plaintiff alleged that the disputed property originally belonged to Akazaddin and others, and that the plaintiff purchased it by a registered deed for Rs. 1,000 from Akazaddin and others in the benâmi of his brother-in-law, defendant No. 1.
- The plaintiff entered into possession. Subsequently defendant No. 1 sold the property to defendant No. 2; the plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 2, in collusion with defendants Nos. 3 and 4, was attempting to dispossess him.
- The plaintiff sued for a declaration that defendant No. 1 was the benâmdâr of the plaintiff in respect of the disputed property and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking possession.
- In the plaint the plaintiff valued the declaration at Rs. 1,000 and the permanent injunction at Rs. 10. Court-fees of Rs. 20 were paid on the declaration and annas 12 on the injunction.
- The suit was decreed on contest. Contesting defendants appealed to the lower appellate court; that appeal was dismissed. The present appeal was taken by defendant No. 2, with court-fees paid on the same basis as in the courts below.
- The Stamp Reporter opined that valuation contrary to s.7iv(c) and that a single valuation should have been used; the matter was referred by the Stamp Reporter to the Registrar (Appellate Side) as Taxing Officer, who in turn referred the substantial questions to Das, J. as Taxing Judge under the Chief Justice's order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether one valuation should be put under s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act, subject to correction by the court under s. 8(c) of the Court-fees Act.
- Where the defendant and not the plaintiff is before the court, what is the procedure to be followed for valuing the relief?
- Whether s. 17(2) of the Court-fees Act, as amended, applies to cases arising under s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Mr. Roy, appearing for the appellant (defendant No. 2), contested the Stamp Reporter's view that a single valuation should be used.
- Mr. Roy contended that unless the plaintiff properly values his relief, the correct fee payable on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal cannot be ascertained; where there is no objective standard of valuation, the court is not in a position to value the relief.
Plaintiff
- The plaintiff did not appear in the Court despite being served with notice specially drawing attention to valuation under s. 7iv(c). No substantive arguments from the plaintiff are contained in the opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal; Zeb-Ul-Nisa v. Din Mohammad | Definition of "consequential relief" — a relief which follows directly from the declaration, whose valuation is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantial relief. | The Court applied the definition to hold that the prayer for a permanent injunction in the plaint is a consequential relief and therefore s. 7iv(c) is attracted. |
| In re Kalipada Mukherji | Authority for the proposition that the correct mode in cases under s. 7iv(c) is to put a single valuation, the option of valuing the relief resting with the plaintiff; Rankin, J. expressed that in such cases there is only one relief. | The Court relied on this case to conclude the plaintiff should have put a single valuation and that, where the plaintiff fails to act, the Court may have to determine valuation as best it can. |
| Narayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Society, Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Mafijuddin Ahmad | Recognised the power of the Court to correct an improperly made valuation by the plaintiff. | The Court noted that this recognition is embodied in the amendment to s. 7iv(c) (by Bengal Act VII of 1935) and relied on it to justify court correction of valuation when necessary. |
| Star Trading and Investment, Ltd. v. Ashutosh Mukherjee | Warning that, absent rules under s. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, the court may be powerless in cases where there is no objective standard of valuation. | The Court referred to this limitation but distinguished the present facts (plaintiff absent despite notice) and proceeded to value the relief as best it could. |
| Sailendra Nath Mitras v. Ram Chandra Pal | Illustration that a plaintiff's valuation (Rs. 1,010 in that case) was accepted for jurisdictional purposes and the court proceeded and decreed on that footing, including costs. | The Court used this example to justify fixing a minimum valuation (not less than Rs. 1,010) in the present case when the plaintiff failed to value properly or appear. |
| Mahitosh Mukherji v. Satya Ranjan Chatterji | Held that a relief for possession ancillary to declaration came within s. 7iv(c) and treated the reliefs as two reliefs based on the same cause of action, applying s. 17(2) so fee is payable according to relief with the largest fee. | The Court discussed this decision when considering whether s. 17(2) applies to s. 7iv(c) cases, and ultimately rejected the view that s. 17(2) applies to consequential-relief situations under s. 7iv(c). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured sequence addressing each of the three referred questions:
-
Whether s. 7iv(c) applies and whether a single valuation is required.
- The Court examined the plaint and the nature of the reliefs: declaration of title and a permanent injunction. Applying the precedents defining "consequential relief" (Kalu Ram; Zeb-Ul-Nisa), the Court concluded that a permanent injunction that follows directly from a declaration is a consequential relief.
- Given that consequence, the case falls within s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act: the relief must be valued ad valorem on the amount at which the relief is sought in the plaint, subject to s. 8(c).
- The plaint, however, showed two separate valuations (Rs. 1,000 for declaration; Rs. 10 for injunction) with separate payments. The Court held that this was erroneous and not in accordance with the statute.
- Relying on In re Kalipada Mukherji, the Court reiterated that the correct mode is to put a single valuation, the option of valuation resting with the plaintiff.
- Mr. Roy’s contention — that without an objective standard the Court cannot sensibly value the relief — was acknowledged. The Court noted the limitation identified in Star Trading (absence of rules under s. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act), which may leave the court powerless in some contexts.
- Because the plaintiff had been served with notice and did not appear to exercise his option to value, and because the power to correct valuation is recognised (Narayanganj case and the statutory amendment), the Court concluded it must fix a valuation "as best as it can" in the circumstances.
- The Court observed that valuation for court-fees governs jurisdictional valuation under s. 7iv(c), and relying on the practice in Sailendra Nath Mitras (where Rs. 1,010 was treated as the valuation), the Court held that in the special facts of this case the relief cannot be put at less than Rs. 1,010 and therefore deemed the value to be Rs. 1,010 under s. 7iv(c).
-
Procedure when the defendant, not the plaintiff, is before the court.
- The Court held that the proper procedure is to serve notice on the plaintiff to appear for the limited purpose of assessment of court-fees.
- If the plaintiff, having been so served, fails to appear, the court is authorised to put a valuation as best as it can in the circumstances of each particular case.
-
Whether s. 17(2) applies to cases under s. 7iv(c).
- The Court quoted s. 17(2): where more reliefs than one based on the same cause of action are sought either jointly or in the alternative, the fee shall be paid according to the value of the relief in respect of which the largest fee is payable.
- The Court reviewed conflicting judicial views: Rankin, J. (in In re Kalipada Mukherji) that in s. 7iv(c) cases there is only one relief requiring a single valuation; Sen, J. (in Mahitosh Mukherji) who treated ancillary reliefs as separate for s. 17(2) purposes and applied the "largest fee" rule.
- The Court analyzed the meaning of "relief" in s. 17(2) and concluded the clause contemplates a relief which is independently chargeable with court-fees under the Act. Consequential relief (as defined and applied under s. 7iv(c)) is not per se independently chargeable.
- On that basis the Court concluded that s. 17(2) does not apply to cases arising under s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act, where a single valuation is required and ad valorem fees are payable on that single valuation.
Holding and Implications
Holdings:
- The Court held that s. 7iv(c) applies to the present case and a single valuation must be put for the reliefs claimed; the plaintiff had not properly done so.
- Because the plaintiff failed to appear after notice, the Court was empowered to assess the valuation as best it could and deemed the value of the relief to be Rs. 1,010 under s. 7iv(c).
- The proper procedure where the defendant and not the plaintiff is before the court is to serve notice on the plaintiff for the limited purpose of assessment of court-fees; if the plaintiff fails to appear, the court may determine valuation as best it can.
- The Court held that s. 17(2) of the Court-fees Act does not apply to cases arising under s. 7iv(c), because s. 17(2) contemplates reliefs independently chargeable with fees, whereas consequential relief under s. 7iv(c) is not independently chargeable.
- The defendant appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the Reference; the hearing-fee was assessed at one gold mohur.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the Court corrected the valuation (deeming it Rs. 1,010) and awarded costs against the plaintiff in respect of this Reference (payable by the defendant appellant as indicated in the orders). The Court provided a procedural directive on notice and valuation when the plaintiff is absent.
- The opinion expressly concludes that s. 17(2) does not apply to s. 7iv(c) cases; the Court relied on statutory interpretation and earlier authorities in reaching that conclusion. The opinion does not purport to lay down any wider novel precedent beyond the statutory construction and the application to the facts presented.
All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion text. No facts, holdings, or inferences beyond the text have been added.
Das, J.:— This is a Reference under s. 5 of the Court-fees Act and raises three questions for decision, viz., (i) whether one valuation should be put under s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act, subject to correction by the court under s. 8(c) of the Court-fees Act; (ii) where the defendant and not the plaintiff is before the court, what is the procedure to be followed for valuing the relief; and (iii) whether s. 17(2) of the Court-fees Act, as amended, would apply to cases arising under s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act.
The substance of the plaint, as it appears from the report of the Stamp Reporter, is that the plaintiff brought the suit, out of which the appeal arises, on the allegation that the disputed property belonged to one Akazaddin and others. The plaintiff purchased the same by a registered deed of sale for a consideration of Rs. 1,000 from the said Akazaddin and others in the benâmi of his brother-in-law, defendant No. 1. The plaintiff went into possession of the property purchased by him. Later on, defendant No. 1 sold the disputed property to defendant No. 2, who, in collusion with defendants Nos. 3 and 4, is trying to disposes the plaintiff from the disputed property. The plaintiff, accordingly, brought the suit for declaration that defendant No. 1 is the benâmdâr of the plaintiff in respect of the disputed property and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking possession.
The suit was valued at Rs. 1,000 for declaration and Rs. 10 for permanent injunction. A sum of Rs. 20 was paid on the prayer for declaration and a sum of annas 12 only was paid on the prayer for permanent injunction.
The suit was decreed on contest.
An appeal was taken by the contesting defendants to the lower appellate court on the valuation as made in the plaint and court-fees were paid on the same footing. The appeal was dismissed by the lower appellate court.
The present appeal has been taken by the defendant No. 2 and in the memorandum of appeal court-fees have been paid on the same basis as it was paid in the courts below.
The Stamp Reporter was of opinion that the mode of valuing the relief claimed in the plaint was contrary to s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act and that court-fees should be paid on a single valuation of the reliefs claimed in the plaint. The learned advocate for the appellant having contested the view taken by the Stamp Reporter, the aforesaid points of difference were placed by the Stamp Reporter before the learned Registrar, Appellate Side, as a Taxing Officer of this Court.
The learned Registrar was of opinion that the questions involved are substantial questions and require a decision by the Court. The matter was referred to me as a Taxing Judge under the orders of the learned Chief Justice for giving my decision on the points already mentioned. I shall first take up the first question submitted to me for decision.
I have already stated the substance of the plaint which is to be found in the report of the Stamp Reporter and this is not disputed on behalf of the defendant appellant. The present case, therefore, is one where the plaintiff has prayed for a declaration of his title and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession. The question is whether s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act is attracted to the facts of this case. Section 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act would apply if the suit is one for a declaration where a consequential relief is prayed for. The expression “consequential relief” has been defined to mean some relief which follows directly from the declaration; the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantial relief: Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal; Zeb-Ul-Nisa v. Din Mohammad. Tested in this light, the prayer for a permanent injunction in the present case is a consequential relief. The present case, therefore, directly comes within s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act. Court-fees are, therefore, payable ad valorem on the amount at which the relief is sought to be valued in the plaint, subject to the provisions of s. 8(c) of the Court-fees Act.
In the plaint, the plaintiff has valued the relief for declaration at Rs. 1,000 and the consequential relief by way of a permanent injunction at Rs. 10. A fixed court-fee of Rs. 20 has been paid on the former relief under Sch. II, Art. 17(iii), and on the latter relief under s. 7iv(d) of the Court-fees Act. Such a mode of valuation is entirely erroneous and the court-fees paid are not in terms of the statute. The correct mode of valuation of the relief in such a case is to put a single valuation, the option of valuing the relief resting with the plaintiff. This was held by this Court in the case of In re Kalipada Mukherji(3). This is conceded by the learned; advocates appearing on both sides. Mr. Roy, appearing for the appellant, however, contends that, unless it lie plaintiff values his relief properly, the proper fee payable on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal cannot be ascertained, and, as there is no objective standard of valuation in the present case the court is not in a position to value the same. In the present case, the plaintiff was served with a copy of the order of this Court specially drawing his attention to the fact that the plaint may have to be valued in this Court under s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act. The plaintiff has chosen not to appear in pursuance of the notice.
The power of this Court to correct a valuation improperly made by the plaintiff was recognised in the case of Narayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Society, Limited (in liquidation) v. Mafijuddin Ahmad, and is now embodied in s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act, as amended by s. 7(2) of Bengal Act VII of 1935. As pointed out, however, in the case of Star Trading and Investment, Ltd. v. Ashutosh Mukherjee, as no rules under s. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act have been framed, the court is powerless in cases where there is no objective standard of valuation. If the question had arisen in the trial court, the court might have acted under O. VII, r. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, however, the plaintiff is a respondent and has not appeared before the court in spite of service of notice. The question, therefore, is whether the court is powerless in these circumstances. As the plaintiff has not availed himself of the option given to him by law of valuing the relief, in my opinion, the court has to value the same as best as it can. In cases arising under s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act, the value, for the purpose of jurisdiction, follows the valuation for the purpose of court-fees. In the case of Sailendra Nath Mitras v. Ram Chandra Pal the plaintiff valued his suit at Rs. 1,010 for the purpose of jurisdiction. The Court proceeded to trial on that footing. The decree for costs on a, valuation of Rs. 1,010 was passed in favour of the plaintiff. In my opinion, in the special facts of this case, the value of the relief cannot be put at a sum less than Rs. 1,010. As such the value of the relief in the present case must be deemed to be Rs. 1,010 under s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act. This disposes of the first question which was referred to me for my decision.
As regards the second question, the proper procedure in cases where the defendant and not the plaintiff is before the court, the court has to serve a notice on the plaintiff to appear in court for the limited purpose of assessment of court-fees, and if the plaintiff fails to appear in spite of such service of notice, the court is authorised to put a valuation as best as it can in the circumstances of each particular case.
Coming to the third question, the material provision is s. 17(2) of the Court-fees Act which runs as follows:—
Where more reliefs than one based on the same cause of action are sought either jointly or in the alternative, the fee shall be paid according to the value of the relief in respect of which the largest fee is payable.
In the case of In re Kalipada Mukherji (supra), Rankin, J. was of opinion that in cases coming within s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act, there is only one relief, and court-fees have to be paid on a single valuation which it is the right and duty of the plaintiff to put upon the plaint. In the case of Mahitosh Mukherji v. Satya Ranjan Chatterji, which arose out of a suit for a declaration that two deeds of gift and settlement were invalid as being fraudulent and collusive and for khâsh possession, Sen, J. held that the case came within s. 7iv(c), the relief for possession being ancillary to the relief for declaration. Sen, J. then proceeded to observe that the relief for declaration, and the relief for khâsh possession are two reliefs based on the same cause of action and as such the fee shall be paid according to the value of the relief in respect of which the largest fee is payable. The view taken by Rankin, J. in the case of In re Kalipada Mukherji (Supra), was held to have become obsolete in view of the amendment of s. 17 of the Court-fees Act by s. 12 of Bengal Act VII of 1936.
The answer to the question formulated really depends on the meaning of the word “relief” occurring in that clause. In my opinion, the second part of the clause clearly shows that the relief contemplated by the clause must be one in respect of which court-fees are independently payable under the Act. It cannot mean consequential relief, which is not per se chargeable with court-fees. The view taken by Sen, J. does not seem to be correct. In my opinion, s. 17(2) does not apply to cases arising under s. 7iv(c) of the Court-fees Act, where a single valuation has to be put, and ad valorem court-fees are to be paid on that valuation.
The defendant appellant must pay the costs of this Reference, hearing-fee being assessed at one gold mohur.
K.B
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