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Sm. Suhashini Das & Anr. v. Mahendra Kumar Bose Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Chakravartti, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner and her husband were tenants of premises No. 1, Girish Vidyaratna Lane, Calcutta. The landlord required those premises for his own occupation. On learning this, the petitioner purchased premises No. 9, Jugipara Bye-Lane in September 1944, but that purchased house was in occupation by a tenant. On 13 January 1945 the petitioner applied to the Rent Controller for leave to bring a suit for ejectment against the tenant; permission was granted on 12 July 1945.
The tenant appealed against the Rent Controller's order to the District Judge of Alipore under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order. That appeal was initially dismissed on 20 September 1945, upholding the Rent Controller's permission. Pursuant to that permission, the petitioner filed an ejectment suit in the Court of the Munsif at Sealdah on 25 September 1945 (which, the opinion states, was pending).
On 12 January 1946 the tenant filed an application for review before the learned District Judge; that application was allowed on 30 February following, the learned Judge set aside the Rent Controller's order and withdrew the permission to sue. The present Rule (petition) was directed against that setting-aside/order of the District Judge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the District Judge, in hearing the tenant's appeal and subsequent review application under the relevant House Rent Control provisions, was acting as a "Court" (i.e., in his ordinary judicial capacity) such that his order is subject to revision by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946 (in particular section 26 and related provisions) altered the legal character of the District Judge's role so as to convert him, with retrospective effect, into the presiding officer of the District Court (i.e., a judicial officer whose orders would be revisable by the High Court), notwithstanding earlier authority treating equivalent appointments as persona designata.
Arguments of the Parties
Counsel supporting the Rule (Mr. Mukherjee / Mr. Mookerjee)
- Accepted the correctness of the earlier decision in Kiran Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji (which treated the District Judge as a persona designata under the Bengal Order) but submitted that the subsequent Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946 changed the position.
- Relied on section 26 of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, which provides that proceedings commenced under prior House Rent Control Orders shall be deemed to have been commenced under the corresponding provisions of the Ordinance and that appointments made under those Orders shall be deemed to have been made under the Ordinance.
- Argued that, because of section 26, the proceedings before the District Judge must be deemed to have commenced under the Ordinance and the District Judge's appointment as appellate authority must be deemed to be an appointment under the Ordinance, thereby converting his status into that of a presiding judicial officer (with retrospective effect) and making his orders revisable by the High Court.
The opinion does not set out any detailed counter-arguments advanced on behalf of the tenant or the Provincial Government in the text provided.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kiran Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji | Held that an order passed by the District Judge in exercise of powers conferred by paragraph 12 of the Bengal House Rent Control Order could not be revised by the High Court because the District Judge acted as a persona designata (not as a Court) and the House Rent Control Order was an executive order, not a legislative provision conferring ordinary judicial jurisdiction. | The court accepted the correctness of that decision and applied its core reasoning—specifically the characterization of the District Judge as a persona designata—to the present matter. The court compared the language of the earlier Bengal provision and the corresponding Calcutta provisions and concluded that the District Judge was not acting in his ordinary judicial capacity and, therefore, his order was not revisable under section 115 CPC. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying the preliminary question whether the District Judge, when hearing the tenant's appeal and review application under the House Rent Control provisions, was acting as a Court in his ordinary judicial capacity such that the High Court could exercise revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The court relied on the prior decision in Kiran Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji which had held that, under the Bengal House Rent Control Order (paragraph 12), the District Judge acted as a persona designata and his orders were not revisable by the High Court. That earlier decision rested on two reasons: (i) the relevant Order named only the "District Judge" (not the presiding officer of the District Court) and the language did not indicate he was intended to act in his judicial capacity; and (ii) the House Rent Control Order was an executive order rather than a legislative provision, and therefore did not enlarge the jurisdiction of Civil Courts.
Counsel for the petitioner argued that the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946 (a statutory enactment) removed the second reason relied on previously, and that section 26 of the Ordinance made proceedings and appointments under the earlier Orders deemed to be under the Ordinance with retrospective effect. The court examined that contention carefully.
The court compared the relevant textual provisions. The Calcutta House Rent Control Order contained section 14(1)(b), which provided for appeals to the "District Judge of the 24-Parganas" or "such other person or persons as may be appointed by the Provincial Government to hear such appeals, either concurrently with, or to the exclusion of, the said District Judge." The corresponding provision in the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, was section 25(1)(b) and used substantially the same language.
The court reasoned that the explicit power to appoint "such other person or persons"—potentially any person in private life or from other services—shows that the office of "District Judge" in these provisions was not intended to be the District Judge acting in his normal judicial capacity; the District Judge's status under the clause is therefore aligned with that of any persona the Provincial Government might appoint. Consequently, the District Judge, as contemplated by the Calcutta House Rent Control Order and the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, is a persona designata rather than the presiding judicial officer of the principal District Court.
Addressing section 26 of the Ordinance, which deems proceedings and appointments under prior Orders to be proceedings and appointments under the Ordinance, the court expressed doubts at two points: first, whether the mere naming of the District Judge constituted an "appointment" within the meaning of section 26; and second, even if it were an appointment "under" the earlier Order, substituting the Calcutta Rent Ordinance's provisions for the earlier Order's provisions does not alter the dispositive language that treats the District Judge consistent with being a persona designata. The court therefore concluded that section 26 did not retrospectively convert the District Judge into the presiding judicial officer of the District Court or into a Court whose orders are revisable by the High Court.
On that basis the court held that the order passed by the learned District Judge was not an order of a Court within the meaning required for revision under section 115 CPC, and therefore the Rule challenging that order failed on the preliminary ground of non-reviewability.
The opinion also notes the practical orders: the Rule is discharged, no order as to costs is made, and the counter-affidavits filed should be kept on the record. Justice Ellis concurred with the reasoning and result.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court concluded that the order passed by the learned District Judge was not an order passed by a Court in his ordinary judicial capacity and therefore was NOT revisable by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Rule (challenge to that order) is DISCHARGED.
Direct implications for the parties:
- The petition challenging the District Judge's review order fails and is discharged.
- No order as to costs was made by the High Court in the circumstances.
- The counter-affidavits filed in the High Court are to be kept on the record.
Broader implications: The court applied and followed prior authority (Kiran Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji) and held that equivalent provisions in the Calcutta House Rent Control Order and the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946—by reason of their language permitting appointment of "such other person or persons"—treat the District Judge as a persona designata rather than as the presiding judicial officer of the District Court. The opinion does not announce a new precedent beyond applying this principle to the facts before it.
Agreement: Ellis, J. concurred with the judgment of Chakravartti, J.
Chakravartti, J.:— This Rule fails on a preliminary ground and it is, therefore, unnecessary to refer to the merits of the order against which it is directed.
2. The facts, briefly stated, are the following: The Petitioner, along with her husband, was the tenant of premises No. 1, Girish Vidyaratna Lane, Calcutta, which, however, came to be required by the landlord for his own occupation. When the Petitioner came to know of that circumstance, she purchased a house for herself, namely, premises No. 9, Jugipara Bye-Lane, in September, 1944. A tenant, however, was in occupation of the house purchased by the Petitioner. On the 13th January, 1945, the Petitioner made an application to the Rent Controller for leave to bring a suit for ejectment against the tenant in occupation of the house. Permission was granted on the 12th July, 1945, but against the order of the Rent Controller, the tenant preferred an appeal to the learned District Judge of Alipore under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, That appeal was, in the first instance, dismissed on the 20th September, 1945, and the order of the Rent Controller, according permission to the Petitioner to bring a suit in ejectment, was upheld. In pursuance of the permission thus secured, the Petitioner actually filed a suit in ejectment in the Court of the Munsif at Sealdah on the 25th September, 1945, which, we understand, is pending. On the 12th January, 1946, however, the tenant filed an application for review before the learned District Judge and that application was allowed on the 30th February following. The learned Judge set aside the order of the Rent Controller and withdrew the permission granted. It is against that order that the present Rule is directed. The first question which arises is whether the learned District Judge, in hearing the appeal filed by the Petitioner's tenant and the subsequent application for review, was acting as a Court at all and whether the order passed by him is liable to interference by this Court in the exercise of its revisional powers. In a case dealing with the Bengal House Rent Control Order, namely, Kiran Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji(1), it was held by Mukherjea and Blank, JJ., that an order passed by the District Judge in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by paragraph 12 of the Bengal House Rent Control Order could not be revised by the High Court, inasmuch as the District Judge, in exercising those powers, did not act as a Court, but only as a persona designata and a superior executive authority. Broadly stated, that decision was grounded in two reasons. The first was that the relevant paragraph of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, namely, paragraph 12, named only the “District Judge” and the language used in the order gave no indication that the District Judge was contemplated as the presiding officer of the principal Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction in the District. The second reason given was that the House Rent Control Order itself was not a legislative provision of the ordinary kind but an executive order by which the existing jurisdiction of the Civil Courts could not be enlarged. It was accordingly held that the District Judge in exercising the powers conferred by paragraph 12 of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, could not be held to be a Court at all, far less a Court subordinate to this High Court.
3. Mr. Mukherjee, who appears in support of the present rule, accepts the decision we have referred to as correct, but he argues that by reason of the enactment of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, the second reason relied upon by the learned Judges has disappeared. There is now, he says, an enactment which has the force of a statute. He then refers in particular to the provisions of sec. 26 of the Ordinance which reads as follows:
“Any proceedings commenced under any provision of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, or of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, 1942, or of the Bengal Hotels and Lodging Houses Control Order, 1942, shall, on the said Orders ceasing to be in operation, be continued and be, as far as may be, deemed to have been commenced under the corresponding provision of this Ordinance and any appointment made under any of the said Orders shall, for the purposes of the said proceedings, be deemed to have been made under this Ordinance as if this Ordinance was in operation when the said proceedings were commenced or such appointment was made.”
4. The Ordinance came into force on the 1st October, 1946. Mr. Mookerjee contends that under the first part of the section above quoted, the proceedings in the present case must be deemed to have commenced under the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, although in fact they were initiated under the Calcutta House; Rent Control Order. In the second place it is contended that the appointment of the District Judge as the Appellate authority under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order m??? now be deemed to be an appointment ??? the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, so that it an appointment under a statutory provision and not an executive order. Accordingly, he argues that the District Judge in the present case must be deemed to have been converted into the presiding officer of the Court of the District Judge with retrospective effect, as would appear from the second part of the section.
5. In our opinion, this contention cannot be accepted. Paragraph 12 of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, on which this Court had occasion to pronounce in the case already referred to, mentioned only the “District Judge of the District” as the Appellate authority in respect of houses outside the Presidency Town of Calcutta. The corresponding provision in the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, namely, sec. 14 (1) (b), however, mentioned not only the “District Judge of the 24-Parganas,” but also
“Such other person or persons as may be appointed by the Provincial Government to hear such appeals, either concurrently with, or to the exclusion of, the said District Judge.”
6. It is perfectly clear that if this Court thought that the reference to the District Judge in paragraph 12 of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, as distinguished from the Presiding Officer of the Court of the District Judge, indicated that the District Judge was not acting in his normal judicial capacity, there is far greater reason to think that the Calcutta Rent Control Order, which makes room for persons other than the District Judge, does not contemplate the District Judge as a judicial officer or the Presiding Officer of the principal Court of Original Jurisdiction in the District. The appeal, as appears from the provision we have quoted, may be presented either to the District Judge or such other person or persons as may be appointed by the Provincial Government. Such other person or persons may be any person or persons, and it could not possibly be contended, that a man in private life or an officer of some other department, say the Forest Service or the Irrigation Department, if empowered by the Provincial Government to hear such appeals, would be a Court. It is perfectly clear that the status of the District Judge under this clause must be the same as, and cannot be different from, that of the other person or persons whom the Provincial Government may choose to appoint. In our opinion, it follows that the District Judge, as contemplated in sec. 14 (1) (b) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, is not the District Judge in his ordinary judicial capacity or the Presiding Officer of the principal Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction in the District, but a persona designata. It is noticeable that under the section, the District Judge might be excluded altogether by an order of the Provincial Government which is inconsistent with his being contemplated as the Court of the District Judge to whose existing Appellate Jurisdiction a new subject-matter is being added.
7. The corresponding provision in the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, is sec. 25 (1) (b) and there the language is
“District Judge of the District in which the premises in respect of which such order is made are situated or to such other person or persons as may be appointed by the Provincial Government to hear such appeals, either concurrently with, or to the exclusion of the said District Judge.”
8. It will be noted that in all essential respects, the language used in the Ordinance is the same as the language used in the Calcutta House Rent Control Order and the considerations to which we have referred as indicating that the District Judge in his ordinary judicial capacity is not contemplated by the Calcutta Rent Control Order, apply equally to the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946.
9. Reverting now to Mr. Mookerjee's argument based on sec. 26, it may be conceded that since the present Rule was pending on the 1st October, 1946, the proceedings before the District Judge must be deemed to have commenced under the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, though, strictly speaking, the section would seem to apply only to this rule.
10. But the applicability of the section or rather the latter part of it to the status of the District Judge is still not clear. The section speaks of “appointment” and it speaks of “any appointment made under any of the said Orders.” We doubt whether the naming of the District Judge as the Appellate authority was an “appointment” at all within the meaning of sec. 26; but assuming it was an appointment, we doubt further whether it was an appointment “under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order.” If the nomination of the District Judge as the Appellate authority be an appointment at all, we think it is an appointment by the Calcutta House Rent Control Order and not an appointment made under it. An appointment “under” a provision is an appointment made in exercise of powers thereby conferred, a further act by the authority empowered to appoint. But conceding in Mr. Mookerjee's favour that the case is one of appointment and also of an appointment under the Order, his argument is in no way assisted, if, for the provisions occurring in sec. 14 of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, these contained in sec. 25 of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance are substituted. The same language which excludes the District Judge as the principal judicial officer of, the District from the purview of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, is used in the Ordinance and equally excludes the District Judge in his normal judicial capacity from the purview of the latter. Accordingly, in our opinion, even if the District Judge who dealt with this matter when the Calcutta House Rent Control Order was in force, be now to be taken as the Appellate authority appointed under the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, he remains a persona designata and is not converted into a Court with retrospective effect.
11. For the reasons given above, we are of opinion that the order passed by the learned Judge is not an order passed by a Court and accordingly is not revisable by us under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Rule is accordingly discharged, but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Let the counter-affidavits filed be kept on the record.
Ellis, J.:— I agree.
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