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Central Glass Industries Ltd. v. Abdul Hossain .

Calcutta High Court
Apr 2, 1947
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Opinion Summary — R.C. Mitter, A.C.J. (with Amiruddin Ahmad, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Abdul Hossein, was employed as a gauge boy in the appellant company's factory. His duty was to carry glassware within the factory premises. On 11-7-1945 at about 5 P.M., while on the factory premises, he fell and broke his left arm. On that date the respondent was due to work the second shift; the first shift normally began at 8 A.M. and ended at 2 P.M., after which the second shift would begin. Both parties admitted these basic facts.

The respondent's account was that he slipped on his wooden slippers while carrying a gauge from a room to pick up glassware, fell inside the factory under a mango tree and injured his arm. He gave evidence himself and called a corroborating witness, Sheikh Yakub.

The appellant admitted the respondent's employment but in its written statement denied that the respondent received any personal injury arising out of or in the course of his employment. It further alleged that, if injured, it occurred outside working hours and outside the usual place of work.

At trial the appellant produced two witnesses, Abdul Moula and the timekeeper, Akhoy Kumar De. Akhoy Kumar De stated that on the day in question the first shift had begun late (about 1 P.M.) and continued until 6 P.M.; second-shift employees such as the respondent had to attend the factory at about 1 P.M. and wait in the compound until the first shift ended. According to him, the respondent was playing in front of the office with other boys and stumbled over a hole in the ground, causing the injury.

The Commissioner awarded Rs. 720 as compensation, reasoning that even accepting the appellant's witness's version, the accident occurred in the course of the respondent's employment and arose out of it. The appellant appealed to this Court raising a substantial question of law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the accident occurred "in the course of" the respondent's employment.
  2. Whether the injury "arose out of" the respondent's employment — i.e., whether the employment was the distinctive and proximate cause of the injury.
  3. Whether, once a substantial question of law is involved on appeal, this Court should remit the matter to the Commissioner or may review the evidence and decide questions of fact itself under the relevant statutory provision (Section 30 of the Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Account

  • The respondent testified that while bringing a gauge he slipped on his wooden slippers inside the factory, under a mango tree, and broke his left arm.
  • He called a corroborating witness, Sheikh Yakub, who supported his version of events.

Appellant's Account

  • The appellant admitted the respondent's employment but denied that any compensable injury occurred in the course of or arising out of employment.
  • Its written statement alleged the injury, if any, occurred outside working hours and at a place other than the usual place of work.
  • The appellant's timekeeper, Akhoy Kumar De, stated that the first shift on that day extended late (from about 1 P.M. to 6 P.M.), that second-shift workers had to attend early (about 1 P.M.) and wait in the compound, and that the respondent was playing with other boys in the compound when he stumbled over a hole and was injured. This account implies the respondent was not actively engaged in his duties at the time of the accident.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1903) 2 K.B. 7181 That to fasten liability on an employer a workman must prove two things: (1) the accident occurred in the course of his employment, and (2) it arose out of his employment. The Court invoked this two-part test as the basic legal standard to determine compensation liability and applied it to assess whether both elements were satisfied in the respondent's case.
1917 A.C. 127 (House of Lords) Interpretation of "arising out of the employment": applies to the employment as such — its nature, conditions, obligations and incidents — and includes cases where the workman is placed "within the zone of special danger" by reason of these features. The Court relied on Lord Shaw's formulation to explain that "arising out of" is broader than merely the duties performed and includes risks created by the conditions and incidents of employment; used this to test whether the respondent's injury had the necessary relation to his employment.
60 Cal. 421 Followed the construction in 1917 A.C. 127 regarding the interpretation of "arising out of the employment". The Court noted that the House of Lords decision has been followed in this Court (60 Cal. 421) to support the broader interpretation of "arising out of" employment.
(1916) 114 L.T. 241 Authority that risks peculiar to the employment, i.e., arising from its character and surrounding circumstances, bring a case within the statute. Used to support the proposition that the employment's peculiar risks (its character, conditions, incidents) can make an injury compensable; contrasted against perils created by the workman himself.
37 C.W.N. 81 Authority for the appellate court's power to review evidence and decide questions of fact when a substantial question of law is involved on appeal. The Court followed this Division Bench view to justify reviewing the record and deciding factual issues itself rather than remitting the matter to the Commissioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a two-part analysis based on established legal standards: first whether the accident occurred in the course of employment; and second whether it arose out of the employment.

On the appellant's evidence (Akhoy Kumar De), the Court noted that the respondent was not engaged in work at the precise moment of the accident — his shift had not begun — and that he was playing in the compound. The Court accepted that the timekeeper's statement contained a potentially damaging admission that second-shift workers had to attend early and remain within the factory compound until their shift began. The Court construed this admission to mean that such workers could not lawfully leave the compound between reporting time and the start of their shift.

The Court explained that the fact of being required to remain within the factory compound while waiting could be relevant to whether the accident occurred in the course of employment (since it placed the employee on the employer's premises and under conditions imposed by the employment). However, the Court distinguished that relevance from the separate requirement that the injury must "arise out of" the employment — that is, the employment must be the distinctive and proximate cause of the injury.

The Court examined the authoritative interpretation of "arising out of the employment" (notably the House of Lords decision in 1917 A.C. 127 and authorities following it) explaining that the phrase encompasses risks tied to the nature, conditions, obligations and incidents of employment, and covers being placed in a "zone of special danger" by reason of employment. Conversely, risks that are merely the product of a workman's own unrelated conduct (added perils) generally do not qualify.

Applying these principles, the Court considered whether an injury sustained while playing in the factory compound during an enforced period of idleness (waiting for the second shift to start) could be said to have arisen out of the employment. The Court concluded that an injury sustained while "playing in the ground of the factory" during such idleness did not necessarily arise out of employment merely because the employee was obliged to remain in the compound.

The Court also addressed the procedural question whether to remit the matter to the Commissioner or to determine factual issues itself. Relying on Section 30 of the Act and the view in 37 C.W.N. 81, the Court held that once a substantial question of law exists on appeal, it may examine the whole case and determine questions of fact from the record. The Court therefore reviewed the evidence itself rather than remitting.

After reviewing the evidence, the Court stated that it believed the respondent's version of events regarding how, when and in what circumstances he was injured. On that factual finding the Court held both that the accident occurred in the course of the respondent's employment and that it arose out of his employment.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED. The Court found that the respondent sustained the personal injury both in the course of his employment and arising out of his employment. Costs were awarded in the form of a hearing fee of two gold mohurs.

Implications:

  • The Court reversed the Commissioner only in the legal reasoning it had applied (finding a misdirection on a substantial question of law) but, having reviewed the evidence, reached the substantive factual conclusion that the respondent's injury satisfied both legal requirements for compensation.
  • The Court exercised its power under Section 30 of the Act to review evidential questions and decide facts on appeal once a substantial question of law was raised, following the authority in 37 C.W.N. 81.
  • No broader or novel rule of law beyond the application of existing authorities (as cited) was announced by the Court; the decision applies existing interpretations of "in the course of" and "arising out of" employment to the facts of this case.

Note: The summary above is limited strictly to the material and citations appearing in the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

R.C Mitter, A.C.J:— The respondent Abdul Hossein was a guage boy in the appellant's factory whose duty was to carry glassware from one place to another. On 11-7-1945, at about 5 P.M he fell down within the premises of the factory as a result of which he broke his left arm. On that day he was to have worked in the second shift. The first shift usually begins at 8-O'clock in the morning and ends at 2 O'clock in the afternoon and then the second shift begins. These facts are admitted by both parties.

2. The case of the respondent is that he was bringing the gauge from a room with which he was to pick up the glassware, when on the way the wooden slippers which he was wearing slipped, and he fell down on the ground inside the factory and under a mango tree and injured his arm. In support of that case he examined himself and another witness, Sheikh Yakub, who corroborated him.

3. The appellant company in its written statement admitted that the respondent was a guage boy in the factory but did not state how and when the accident occurred. It simply stated “that either on that date or at any other date the respondent did not receive any personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment”, and that he “received the injury at a time other than the hours of his work and at a place other than the usual place of his work.”

4. At the trial the company examined two witnesses, Abdul Moula and Akhoy Kumar De. The last mentioned witness was the time keeper of the appellant's factory. He stated that the respondent met with the accident at 4-30 or 5. P.M When the first shift was still working, as on that day the first shift began to work as late as 1 P.M instead of 8 A.M in the morning which was the usual hour for the work to begin, and the first shift went on till 6 P.M, that the respondent was an employee for the second shift, that he had to come and actually came at 1 P.M and had to wait in the factory com-pound, that he was playing in front of the office with other boys, who also had to wait till the first shift ended and in the course of the play he stumbled at a hole in the ground and injured his arm. The learned Commissioner did not decide which version was true, but stated that even assuming the version given by Akhoy Kumar De to be true the accident, according to him, would have to be regarded as one which had occurred in the course of his employment and had arisen out of it. He accordingly awarded Rs. 720 as compensation to the respondent. We do not think that this case can be disposed of in that way. The statement of Akhoy Kumar De is that the respondent was not at the time of the accident engaged at his work his work was to begin later. His statement is that the accident occurred in the compound of the factory but when he was at play. The statement which could be regarded as a damaging admission, if at all, is that the workmen who were to work in the second shift had to attend at about 1 P.M and had to remain in waiting till they began work. We take that statement to mean that they could not leave the factory from the time they entered the compound and till they actually began to work in the second shift. The statement so understood can at most be relevant on the question as to whether the accident occurred in the course of his employment, but in our judgment would have no bearing upon the question as to whether it arose out of his employment. In order to succeed the workman must prove two things for fastening the liability on his employer, namely (1) that the accident occurred in the course of his employment and (2) that it arose out of his employment: (1903) 2 K.B 7181.

5. The phrase “arising out of his employment” has been interpreted in a number of decisions in England, of which the decision of the House of Lords in 1917 A.C 1272 is the most important. That decision has been followed in this Court in 60 Cal. 421.3

6. One thing is established by the reported decisions, namely that the personal injury must have some relation to the employment. If it has no relation to the employment the workman can not claim compensation. It is also established by the reported decisions that the phrase “arising out of the employment” occurring in S. 3 of the Act indicates that the workman's employment must be the distinctive and proximate cause of his personal injury and that the phrase does not mean only that the personal injury must have resulted from the “mere nature of his employment and is not limited to cases where the personal injury is referable to the nature of his employment, that is to say the duties he has to discharge. If the personal injury can be attributed to the duties which he has to discharge, the workman would certainly be entitled to compensation but he may also be entitled to Compensation in cases where this personal injury is not directly connected with the duties of his office. In 1917 A.C 127 Lord Shaw after discussing this matter in some detail observed as follows:

“In short my view of the statute is that the expression ‘arising out of the employment’ is not confined to the mere nature of the employment.’ The expression, in my opinion applies to the employment as such— to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of these the workman is brought within the zone of special danger and so injured or killed it appears to me that the broad words of the statute, ‘arising out of thee employment’ apply.”

7. The words “conditions” and “incidents” in this observation would cover the cases of risks peculiar to the employment—not added perils produced by the workman himself for peculiar risks would generally arise from the character of the employment and the surrounding circumstances. If the personal injury resulted from the peculiar risks of the employment the workman would also bring his case within the statute: (1916) 114 L.T 241.4 In our opinion the workman who is injured in the course of his employment would be entitled to compensation only if his employment had given rise to the circumstance of injury by accident, and in testing the case from that point of view the word “employment” is not to be defined in a narrow manner by reference only to the duties or the workman but the character, conditions, incidents and special risk involved would have to be taken into consideration. Judged from these principles we cannot hold that the personal injury would be taken to have arisen out of his employment which a workman received while playing in the ground of the factory where he was obliged to remain in idleness while another shift was working and before his turn of beginning work had arrived. We therefore hold that the Commissioner has misdirected himself on a substantial question of law. In these circumstances the further question is whether we should remit the case to the Commissioner or we ourselves should decide the question of fact relating to the accident. Section 30 of the Act gives an appeal to this Court if a substantial question of law is involved, but once that condition is satisfied we are entitled to consider the whole case, and for that purpose to review the evidence on the record and to decide questions of fact. This is the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court which we respectfully follow. 37 C.W.N 81. In this case we propose to decide the question of fact ourselves.

8. [His Lordship then discussed the evidence in the case and observed.] We believe the respondent's version of how, when and in what circumstances he sustained the personal injury. On this finding we hold that he sustained the personal injury in the course of his employment and that it arose out of his employment.

9. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs hearing fee two gold mohurs.

Amiruddin Ahmad, J.:— I agree.

N.S.D

10. Appeal dismissed.