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S.K Hossain Ali And Anr. v. Kala Chand Ghose (Gope) And Ors. Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Petitioners, claiming to be co-sharer tenants of an occupancy holding, applied for pre-emption under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act in respect of certain portions or shares of the holding said to have been transferred by Opposite Parties Nos. 2 and 3 to Opposite Party No. 1.
Opposite Party No. 1 resisted the application on two main grounds: (1) the Petitioners had no interest in the holding because the holding originally belonged to Misrabali and his brother Jumarali, and after an amicable partition it belonged exclusively to Misrabali; the Petitioners were not Misrabali's heirs (in particular Petitioner No. 1 was not his son); and (2) Opposite Party No. 1 had already acquired the entire holding from Misrabali and the heirs of Jumarali by earlier conveyances (Exts. A2 and A3) executed in 1921 and 1939 respectively.
The learned Munsif initially allowed the Petitioners' application, overruling the objection that the Petitioners were not heirs. On the question of prior conveyances, the learned Munsif initially held it could not be gone into. An appeal followed. The lower Appellate Court found the Petitioners to be heirs of Misrabali but remanded for determination of the question left undecided. The learned Munsif at first declined to decide that question citing earlier High Court decisions, but on a subsequent remand he found the earlier conveyances had not been acted upon and that the transfers relied upon by the Petitioners were valid; he held the Petitioners entitled to pre-empt.
On appeal the learned Additional District Judge reversed the Munsif's finding, concluding that Exts. A2 and A3 were bona fide transactions vesting title in Opposite Party No. 1, leaving no interest in Misrabali to devolve on others. The Munsif's order was set aside and the application for pre-emption was dismissed with costs. The present Rule challenges that judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in a proceeding under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Court may go into questions of title (specifically whether prior conveyances extinguishing the interest of alleged co-sharers can be inquired into).
- Whether the Petitioners satisfied the status requirement of being co-sharer tenants such that a right of pre-emption under section 26F arises.
- Whether a defect of parties (alleged omission of certain heirs or failure to substitute a deceased petitioner) affected the maintainability of the pre-emption proceeding.
- Whether the Petitioners are precluded from challenging the remand order or the procedures adopted earlier because of principles of finality and the remedy not having been pursued (i.e., objections as to the propriety of remand under procedural law such as section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Bhagirath Chandra Das)
- In proceedings under section 26F the Court should not go into questions of title; if the fact of the transfers in respect of which pre-emption is claimed is not disputed and the applicant complies with deposits and formalities, the Court must allow the application.
- Reliance on earlier decisions (including those reported in the Calcutta Law Journal and specific judgments of Henderson, J.) to support the proposition that allowing pre-emption vests in the applicant only such title as the transferring co-sharers purported to transfer; if the transferring co-sharers had no title, nothing passes to the pre-emptor.
- Even if, under sub-section (8) of section 26F the transferee is deemed to be a raiyat ejected from his holding, the transferee could still resist eviction and the pre-emptor would have to sue for possession, where title questions could then be raised.
Opposite Parties' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Nirmal Chandra Nundy and Opposite Party No. 1)
- Opposite Party No. 1 contended (as a factual and legal defence) that the Petitioners had no interest because the entire holding had already passed to him by prior conveyances Exts. A2 and A3; the later conveyance from Opposite Parties Nos. 2 and 3 was, according to him, made by mistake because the holding had been included in the earlier kobalas.
- Mr. Nundy argued it was too late for the Petitioners to raise certain procedural objections at this stage because the Petitioners' counsel had previously acquiesced in an order of remand directing the Munsif to determine whether Exts. A2 and A3 were genuine. If the remand order was appealable and no appeal was taken, or if revision was available and none was taken, the principle of finality (with reference to section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure) should prevent reopening the matter on appeal from the final decree.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nibaran Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Hem Nalini Debi (Henderson, J.) | Cited by Petitioners to support that in pre-emption proceedings the applicant acquires only such title as the transferor purported to transfer and that the transferor's own rights remain unaffected; used to argue the Court need not investigate title fully in a section 26F proceeding. | The Court acknowledged that this decision lent some support to Petitioners' argument but held that it did not establish a hard and fast rule excluding consideration of title questions in all section 26F proceedings. The Court considered the decision but concluded jurisdiction to examine some title questions remained necessary in certain cases. |
| Jogendra Nath Chowdhury v. Sheikh Golam Samdani (M.C. Ghose, J.) | Cited (along with other Calcutta Law Journal decisions) in support of the proposition that courts should not go into title in pre-emption proceedings where the transfers are undisputed and formalities complied with. | The Court referenced it as part of the authorities relied upon by Petitioners but held that these cases did not preclude inquiry into title questions in all circumstances under section 26F. |
| Sindhuram Panja v. Ambica Charan Santra (Henderson, J.) | Cited by Petitioners as further authority for the proposition that allowing pre-emption vests only the transferee's acquired title and that title questions can be left for subsequent proceedings. | The Court noted the citation but determined that notwithstanding such precedents, the statutory text and necessary implications in section 26F required that certain title questions (for example, whether a person was already a co-sharer) could be inquired into in a pre-emption proceeding. |
| Basanta Kumar Churnakar v. Durganuth Pal (Edgley, J.) | Used as an illustration where a question of whether a deed of sale was intended to be a mortgage was entertained in a pre-emption proceeding. | The Court relied on this judgment by way of illustration to support the proposition that not all title-like questions are excluded from pre-emption proceedings; it was cited to justify overruling the Petitioners' categorical objection to going into questions touching on title/maintainability. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined whether section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act categorically excluded all title questions from the ambit of a pre-emption proceeding. It rejected any absolute rule that the Court must never inquire into title in such proceedings, reasoning from the text and structure of the section.
Key analytical points the Court relied upon:
- The Court observed that section 26F contains express exceptions and qualifications (for instance sub-section (1), clause (a), and sub-section (11)) which by their nature require inquiry into matters that are effectively title questions — e.g., clause (a) contemplates pre-emption not applying when the transferee already holds an interest other than by the transfer in question (which requires proof of that prior interest).
- Sub-section (11) may require the Court to decide whether a transfer is within the ambit of the section or is, in reality, a mortgage (simple or usufructuary) or a mortgage by conditional sale, where no foreclosure decree exists; that also involves factual and legal examination.
- The right of pre-emption is expressly conferred on "one or more co-sharer tenants," so if an objection is raised that the applicants do not have that status, the Court must be competent to decide that issue within the proceeding.
- Where a defence asserts that the entire holding had already passed by earlier conveyances (as Opposite Party No. 1 contended regarding Exts. A2 and A3), such a defence goes to the root of the maintainability of the pre-emption application and may be properly inquired into rather than deferred automatically to a subsequent title suit.
- The Court acknowledged that if complicated title questions arose, it might be prudent to remit the parties to a regular title suit, but this did not justify a categorical refusal to consider title issues in all section 26F proceedings.
- The Court used the decision of Edgley, J. in Basanta Kumar Churnakar v. Durganuth Pal as an example where the nature of a transaction was examined in a pre-emption proceeding.
Applying those principles to the facts, the Court held that the Opposite Party's defence that prior conveyances vested the entire holding in him could properly be gone into in the section 26F proceeding because it directly affected whether any co-sharer interest remained and thus whether a right of pre-emption arose.
On the procedural objection of defect of parties (heirs not made parties or failure to substitute a deceased petitioner), the Court reasoned that a transferee is not a necessary party to a pre-emption proceeding under section 26F and that the heirs in question were effectively already on record; thus the objection lacked substance and was overruled.
The Court also noted the Opposite Parties' contention that Petitioners had acquiesced in the remand and had not pursued available remedies (appeal or revision) against the remand order; while the Court found this argument to have considerable force, it did not decide the procedural-finality question finally in these proceedings.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Rule is discharged.
The Court ordered that the Rule be discharged and awarded costs: hearing-fee and two gold mohurs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Petitioners' challenge was rejected; the order discharging the Rule means that the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge (which set aside the Munsif's finding and dismissed the pre-emption application) stands as against this Rule. Costs were awarded against the Petitioners (hearing-fee and two gold mohurs).
- The Court clarified that section 26F does not ipso facto oust the judicial power to examine certain title-like questions where those questions bear directly on the maintainability of a pre-emption application (for example, whether a person is already a co-sharer or whether an earlier conveyance has vested the entire holding in the transferee), though it acknowledged that complex title disputes may be better resolved in a regular title suit.
- The opinion did not articulate the creation of a new wide-ranging precedent beyond this reasoning; it emphasized a case-by-case approach rather than a rigid rule. No broader or novel legal doctrine beyond the application and interpretation described above was expressly announced in the text of the opinion.
This summary is confined strictly to the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.
1. The Petitioners in this case claiming to be co-sharer tenants of an occupancy holding applied for pre-emption under sec. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act in respect of certain portions or shares of the holding alleged to have been transferred by Opposite Parties Nos. 2 and 3 to Opposite Party No. 1. The application was resisted by Opposite Party No. 1 mainly on two grounds. It was contended, in the first place, that the Petitioners had no interest in the holding, which originally belonged to one Misrabali and his brother Jumarali, and subsequently on an amicable partition between the brothers, came to belong exclusively to Misrabali, inasmuch as the Petitioners were not the heirs of Misrabali at all, in particular, Petitioner No. 1 was not a son of Misrabali. Secondly it was alleged that the Opposite Party No. 1 had already acquired the entire holding from Misrabali and the heirs of Jumarali by two conveyances, Exts. A2 and A3, the first of which was executed by Misrabali in 1921 and the other by the heirs of Jumarali in 1939.
2. The learned Munsif before whom the application was filed allowed it, overruling the objection of the Opposite Party that the Petitioners were not the heirs of Misrabali.
3. As regards the other objection that Opposite Party No. 1 had already acquired title to the holding by prior purchase, the learned Munsif held, that this was a question which could not be gone into. An appeal was taken against the learned Munsif's order by Opposite Party No. 1. The lower Appellate Court found that the Petitioners were the heirs of Misrabali, but directed a remand to the learned Munsif in order that the question which he had left undecided should be decided. On remand the learned Munsif, however, declined to go into that question relying on certain decisions of this Court, namely, the decision of Henderson, J., in the case of Nibaran Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Hem Nalini Debi.(1) and that of M.C Ghose, J., in the case of Jogendra Nath Chowdhury v. Sheikh Golam Samdani(2) and re-affirmed his previous order. There was a further appeal against this decision to the learned District Judge. The Appellate Court found it necessary to make another remand. The matter again came back before the learned Munsif, where the same points were re-argued. This time the Court carried out the directions contained in the order of remand. Upon the evidence the learned Munsif found that the earlier conveyances on which the Opposite Party No. 1 relied in support of his title had never been acted upon, and that the two transfers on the basis of which the Petitioners claimed to pre-empt were valid and operative. In that view it was held that the Petitioners were entitled to preempt. On appeal that judgment has been now reversed. The learned Additional District Judge has set aside the finding of the learned Munsif regarding the previous kobalas, Exts. A2 and A3. Upon the evidence his conclusion is that these were bona fide transactions, as a result of which Opposite Party No. 1 had acquired title to the entire holding, so that there was no interest left in Misrabali which could devolve upon his death on Opposite Parties Nos. 2 and 3 or on the Petitioners who were joint heirs with them. In the result the order of the learned Munsif has been set aside and the application for pre-emption dismissed with costs. It is against this judgment that the present Rule has been obtained.
4. The main contentions of Mr. Bhagirath Chandra Das on behalf of the Petitioners have been two-fold. In the first place, he maintained that in a proceeding under sec. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it was not open to the Court to go into questions of title. So long as the factum of the transfers in respect of which the application for pre-emption was made was not in dispute, the Court was bound to allow the application, provided the deposits and other formalities required by the section were complied with by the applicant for pre-emption. In support of this argument reliance was placed on the two decisions reported in Calcutta Law Journal to which reference has already been made, as also on another judgment of Henderson, J., in the case of Sindhuram Panja v. Ambica Charan Santra(3). It was pointed out that all that would follow from allowing an application under sec. 26F would be to vest in the applicant such title as the transferring co-sharer tenants had purported to transfer. If the transferring co-sharer tenants had no subsisting title at the date of the transfer, nothing could possibly pass to the applicant for pre-emption. As was pointed cut by Henderson, J., in the case of Nibaran Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Hem Nalini Debi any right which the transferor might have in the property would remain entirely unaffected and it was only the right, title and interest of the transferee which would pass. From that point of view it was argued that no prejudice could possibly arise to any party from allowing the application. The question of title, if any, acquired by Opposite Party No. 1 under the previous conveyances would remain open and could be raised by him in any subsequent proceeding. If, as a matter of fact, Opposite Party No. 1 had acquired title under those conveyances and were also in possession of the holding as alleged by him since the date of his purchase, then, though under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 26F, on the granting of the application for pre-emption, he would be deemed to be a raiyat ejected from his holding by proceedings for his ejectment, he might still refuse to vacate, and if he did not vacate, the pre-emptor would necessarily have to sue him for possession, and in such a suit the question of title could well be raised.
5. On the face of it the argument so formulated seems to derive some support from the cases relied on. At the same time one does not see that any useful purpose is served in every case by remitting the parties to future title suits, if the question to be investigated is not really such as the statute has expressly or by necessary implication excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court in a proceeding under sec. 26F. Looking at the section as a whole, it is impossible to maintain that all questions of title are necessarily excluded from the purview of the Court. The right of pre-emption does not exist in the case of every kind of transfer of a portion or share of an occupancy holding. There are certain exceptions which are expressly specified in several clauses of sub-sec. (1) of the section. Among those, cl. (a) obviously involves questions of title. This clause provides that pre-emption would not lie in the case of a transfer to a person who is already a co-sharer in the tenancy by virtue of an interest which has accrued to him other than by the transfer in respect of which preemption is claimed. In other words, it is open to a person to defeat an application for pre-emption by showing that he already acquired an interest in a portion or share of the holding in dispute, in other words, by proving title to a share or portion acquired otherwise than by the transfer on the basis of which the application for pre-emption is made. Then again, sub-sec. (11) also shows that the Court may have to go into the question whether the transfer on the strength of which pre-emption is claimed is such a transfer as is contemplated by the section, or is a simple or usufructuary mortgage or mortgage by conditional sale in respect of which no decree or order absolute or for foreclosure has yet been made. It is further to be observed that the right of pre-emption conferred by sec. 26F arises only if certain fundamental conditions are satisfied, apart from the formalities or deposits prescribed by the section. The right is a right given to “one or more co-sharer tenants of the holding,” and it arises only if a portion or share of the holding is transferred to a person other than a co-sharer. If, therefore, upon an application for pre-emption, an objection is raised that the Petitioners do not fulfil the status of co-sharer tenants, the Court cannot very well decline to go into the question. The objection in the present case amounted to an objection of that kind. It was, in effect, tantamount to saying that the title to the entire holding having previously passed to Opposite Party No. 1 under Exts. A2 and A3, the Petitioners who claimed to be co-sharer tenants were not co-sharer tenants at all, because if the entire holding had already passed to Opposite Party No. 1 there could not be any question of any co-sharer being left who would be competent to apply for pre-emption. Then, again, the Court on an application under sec. 26F should certainly be competent to go into the question as to whether the person in whose favour the transfer had been made was a co-sharer tenant already otherwise than by such transfer.
6. Let us turn a little more closely to the facts of the present case. What was in substance the Opposite Party's defence to the Petitioners' application? It was to the effect that the application for pre-emption was misconceived, because upon the facts there could be no question of any transfer of any share or portion of the holding after the entire holding had been already conveyed to him by the previous kobalas by the former owners. It was no doubt true that in spite of that the Opposite Party No. 1 again purported to take a conveyance from Opposite Parties Nos. 2 and 3, but according to Opposite Party No. 1's case that was done through mistake, it having been overlooked that this particular holding which is Dag No. 884 had been already included in the previous conveyances in their favour, Exts. A2 and A3. If then those conveyances were genuine transactions, the defence of the Opposite Party would be a complete answer to the application for preemption. I see no reason why that defence could not be gone into, as, in fact, it went to the root of the matter if one might put it that way. As regards the cases relied on by Mr. Bhagirath Chandra Das, it is sufficient to say that no hard and fast rule can be laid down. It will all depend on the nature of the question which is raised between the parties. It may be that if it involved complicated questions of title, the Court would be well advised in relegating the parties to a regular title suit for the adjudication of such questions, but if it was only a question of the maintainability of the application which could be easily disposed of in the proceeding under sec. 26A, there is no reason why the Court should decline jurisdiction. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the judgment of Edgley, J., in the case of Basanta Kumar Churnakar v. Durganuth Pal(4), where the question whether a transaction which, on the face of it, purported to be a deed of sale had really been intended to be a mortgage and not a deed of sale, was gone into in a proceeding for pre-emption. On those grounds I must overrule the first point raised on behalf of the Petitioners.
7. The second point raised was one of defect of parties, but there is very little substance in this. The alleged defect of parties is said to arise from the fact that the heirs of one of the transferees were not made parties to the Rule, and no substitution has been made in place of one of the Petitioners who died. So far as the transferee is concerned a transferee is not a necessary party in a pre-emption proceeding under sec. 26F, and so far as the heirs of one of the deceased Petitioners are concerned, those heirs are already on the record, though no note was made of the fact. The second objection must consequently be also overruled.
8. On behalf of the Opposite Parties Mr. Nirmal Chandra Nundy has further pointed out that it was too late for Mr. Das at this stage to raise the question which he had raised in this proceeding. Mr. Das's client had acquiesced in and accepted the order of remand made by the lower Appellate Court, by which that Court directed the learned Munsif to come to a finding as to whether the previous conveyances, Exts. A2 and A3, were genuine and bonâ fide transactions. If that order of remand was an appealable order, no appeal had been preferred, and under sec. 105 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure the propriety of the remand order could not be challenged at a later stage on an appeal against the final decree. If, on the other hand, it was maintained that the order of remand was open to revision, the fact that no proceeding was taken in revision would similarly shut out the Petitioners from challenging the order of remand at this stage. The terms of sec. 105 (2) might not apply in terms, but the same principle should be held to be applicable. That principle was that of finality. A party cannot be allowed to stand by without taking recourse to the remedy which the law provides, and then at a later stage, when the matter may be supposed to have become final, try to reopen it in the view I have taken on the first point raised by Mr. Das, it is not necessary for me to decide this question finally in these proceedings. I am merely content to observe that there seems to be a good deal of force in what has been said by the Opposite Party.
9. The result is that the Rule is discharged with costs, hearing-fee, two gold mohurs.
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