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Shyam Sundar Halwasiya v. Jodhraj Halwasiya .

Calcutta High Court
Nov 19, 1947
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant, Shyam Sunder Halwasiya, brought civil Suit No. 1227 of 1947 against Seth Jodhraj Halwaisya. During the hearing before Edgley, J., on 24 June 1947, after the plaintiff had examined himself and was undergoing cross-examination, an incident occurred on the veranda immediately outside the courtroom. It was alleged that the plaintiff seized one Gajanand Chamaria by the throat, abused him and threatened to kill him to prevent him from deposing for the defendant. A petition alleging contempt was filed on 25 June 1947 and a rule issued calling upon the plaintiff to show cause. The plaintiff appeared, offered an unqualified apology and proffered to the Court through counsel. Edgley, J., after affidavits and oral examination of deponents, found that the plaintiff had abused and assaulted Gajanand to intimidate him and interfere with the administration of justice. The learned Judge committed the plaintiff to two weeks' imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 400. The plaintiff appealed this order.

A preliminary objection was raised by the respondent challenging the competency of the appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent on the ground that the order was made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and therefore not appealable under that clause. The High Court heard the matter and ultimately dismissed the appeal as incompetent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of Edgley, J., committing the plaintiff for contempt and imposing a fine was an order "made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction" within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent, thereby rendering an appeal under clause 15 incompetent.
  2. Whether the expression "criminal jurisdiction" in clause 15 should be read as limited to the jurisdiction conferred by clauses 22 to 29 of the Letters Patent (i.e., ordinary criminal trial jurisdiction), as contended by the appellant.
  3. Whether the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, as developed in English law, should be adopted and applied by this Court in determining the nature of the contempt and the consequent appellate remedy.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Mr. Atul Chandra Gupta (for the appellant) argued that the phrase "criminal jurisdiction" in clause 15 of the Letters Patent refers to the jurisdiction comprised in clauses 22 to 29 of the Letters Patent and therefore does not include orders for contempt made in civil proceedings; on that basis the appeal under clause 15 would be competent.
  • Mr. Gupta also urged that the English distinction between civil and criminal contempt is an artificial technicality producing anomalies (for example, the difference in treatment of outsiders vs. parties) and that Indian Courts should not accept that distinction unless it is grounded in equity, justice and good conscience.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent's counsel raised a preliminary objection that the order was passed in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and therefore the appeal is incompetent under clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Section 31 of the Judicature Act of 1925 (corresponding to Section 47 of the Judicature Act of 1873) Statutory rule that no appeal lies from any judgment of the High Court in any criminal cause or matter. Used to illustrate that if a contempt proceeding is criminal in nature, the resulting sentence is treated as a criminal judgment from which no appeal lies to the High Court in criminal causes or matters.
(1890) 15 P.D. 593 and related passages (including Cotton, L.J., cited at 15 P.D. 59) Explanation of the civil/criminal contempt distinction: some contempts (e.g., disobedience to civil orders) are civil in nature, while others (e.g., obstructing administration of justice) are criminal. The Court relied on these English authorities to explain and adopt the jurisprudential distinction between civil and criminal contempt and to show that not all contempts involving imprisonment are necessarily criminal, but that certain forms of intimidation or obstruction are criminal.
(1913) A.C. 417 (House of Lords) Authority that acts such as intimidation of witnesses, scandalizing a judge, or prejudicing a litigant's case are criminal contempts because they amount to public injury and obstruct the course of justice. The Court cited Lord Atkinson's observations in this decision to support the view that intimidation of a witness (as alleged here) amounts to criminal contempt and therefore the judge was exercising criminal jurisdiction.
57 Bom. 286 (Bombay High Court decision, as cited in the opinion) Support for treating certain contempts as constituting the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, relevant to appeal competency under Letters Patent. The Court stated that the view it adopted receives "entire support" from this Bombay High Court decision and relied on it as persuasive precedent for treating the present contempt order as exercise of criminal jurisdiction.
7 Bom. 5 1 (Sargent, C.J. — earlier Bombay decision referred to in discussion) Held, under the earlier wording of clause 15, that an appeal would lie against an order for attachment for contempt (because clause 15 then used wording tied to "criminal trial"). The Court noted this earlier holding in the context of how clause 15 was worded before the 1919 amendment, explaining why that decision no longer controls the present interpretation of "criminal jurisdiction."
25 Cal. 236 (earlier Calcutta decision referred to by Mr. Gupta) Earlier decision which, according to the Court, did not consider the present point and which can be supported on the former wording of the Letters Patent at the date when that decision was made. The Court observed that 25 Cal. 236 did not consider the present point and thus did not resolve the issue under the amended wording of the Letters Patent; it therefore was not treated as binding on the present question.
45 Cal. 1696 (Calcutta decision) Defines and accepts the distinction between criminal contempt (conduct against the dignity and authority of the Court) and civil contempt (failure to do something ordered for the benefit of another party). The Court relied on this prior decision of the same Court (quoting Mookerjee, J.) to show that this Division of the Calcutta High Court had already recognized and applied the civil/criminal contempt distinction in Indian jurisprudence; that precedent reinforced the Court's acceptance of the distinction in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in the following logical steps, tied to the wording of the Letters Patent and the nature of contempt:

  1. Interpretation of clause 15: The Court examined clause 15 of the Letters Patent, which disallows appeals "from the Judgment (... not being a sentence or order ... made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court." The precise phrase "in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction" (adopted after the 1919 amendment) was contrasted with the earlier wording ("sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial") to show a broader connotation for "criminal jurisdiction" than merely "criminal trial."
  2. Appellant's narrowing argument rejected: The Court rejected the appellant's contention that "criminal jurisdiction" should be equated to jurisdiction conferred only by clauses 22 to 29 of the Letters Patent (i.e., ordinary criminal trial jurisdiction). The Court reasoned that even if the judge's power in contempt matters derived independently of the Letters Patent or was preserved by clause 38 of the Charter, it could still be "criminal jurisdiction" for purposes of clause 15; the existence of imprisonment or penal characteristics in a contempt proceeding can render it criminal in character even if not a formal criminal trial under clauses 22–29.
  3. Adoption of the civil/criminal contempt distinction: The Court surveyed English authorities and doctrine distinguishing between civil contempts (primarily enforcement mechanisms to secure compliance with court orders between parties) and criminal contempts (acts that obstruct or impede the administration of justice and amount to public injury). The Court found this distinction to be grounded on "sound juridical principles" rather than mere English technicality.
  4. Application to the facts: The Court applied that distinction to the facts of this case. The assault and threats directed at a proposed witness (Gajanand) were characterized as intimidation intended to interfere with the administration of justice. Citing authorities (including (1913) A.C. 417), the Court concluded that intimidation of a witness is a criminal contempt because it is a public injury which tends to obstruct the course of justice.
  5. Conclusion on appeal competency: Because the penalty was imposed as a summary punishment for conduct that tended to impede or obstruct the course of justice (i.e., criminal contempt), the Court held that the Judge had exercised criminal jurisdiction and, consequently, an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent was incompetent.
  6. Practical observations: The Court observed that, had it possessed appellate jurisdiction, it would have regarded the imprisonment sentence as excessive in light of the plaintiff's unqualified apology and would have set aside the imprisonment. The Court noted the fine had already been paid, stayed execution of the imprisonment for two months from the date, and left open recourse to provincial clemency to remit the sentence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed as incompetent.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The Court concluded that the contempt committed by the appellant was criminal in nature (intimidation of a witness) and that the order of committal and fine was made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction; accordingly, clause 15 of the Letters Patent bars the appeal and the High Court dismissed it as incompetent.
  • The learned Judges expressed the view that the sentence of imprisonment was excessive given the appellant's unqualified apology; they would have set aside the imprisonment if they could have entertained the appeal. Nevertheless, they were without jurisdiction to do so under clause 15.
  • The Court stayed execution of the sentence for a further period of two months from the date of the opinion, and the sureties will continue. It was recorded that the fine had already been paid.
  • The Court indicated that it would be open to the appellant to apply to the Provincial Government for remission of the imprisonment under clemency powers.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

The opinion rests on existing statutory and case-law distinctions between civil and criminal contempt; it applies those principles to hold that the particular conduct (intimidation of a witness) was criminal and therefore the appeal under clause 15 was incompetent. The Court relied on prior Calcutta and Bombay authorities and English decisions in reaching its conclusion.

Show all summary ...

B.K Mukherjea, J.:— This appeal is directed against an order made by Edgley, J. on 3-7-1947, by which the present appellant, who was the plaintiff in a civil suit, has been committed to prison for contempt of Court and further directed to pay a fine of Rs. 400. The facts so far as are material for our present purposes may be shortly stated as follows:

[2] The appellant Shyam Sunder Halwasiya brought a civil suit against Seth Jodhraj Halwaisya in the Original Side of this Court which was registered as suit No. 1227 of 1947 and the suit came up for hearing before Edgley, J. on 23-6-1947. On the afternoon of 24-6-1947, the plaintiff, who had examined himself as a witness in this case, was under cross examination by the defendant's counsel and before the cross-examination was finished the case was adjourned till the day following. It appears that one Gajanand Chamaria was instructing the defendant's counsel while he was cross-examining the plaintiff, and it is said that the defendant requested Gajanand to depose in the suit in his favour. After the hearing of the case was adjourned, the plaintiff left the court room before Gajanand and defendant and he waited at the veranda which is immediately outside the northern wall of the room. As soon as Gajanand came out and stepped into the veranda the plaintiff, it is said, seized him by the throat and abused him threatening to kill him if he would dare depose in the suit against him. Edgley, J., was still in court room hearing another matter and Gajanand through a learned counsel brought this incident to the notice of the learned Judge, who directed him to put in a formal petition. The petition was filed on 25th June and a rule was issued calling upon the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of Court. The plaintiff appeared to show cause on 26-0-1947 and offered an unqualified apology through his counsel. Having regard to the seriousness of the charge, Edgley, J., thought that an enquiry should be held and thereupon affidavits were filed and the deponents were verbally examined in Court. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had actually abused and assaulted Gajanand on 24-6-1947, and he did so in order to intimidate him and to interfere with proper administration of justice. On these findings the learned Judge directed the appellant to be committed to prison for a period of two weeks and in addition to that pay a fine of Rs. 400. It is against this judgment that the plaintiff has filed the present appeal.

2. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has taken a preliminary objection challenging the competency of the appeal. It has been contended that the order passed by a single Judge of this Court in exercise of criminal jurisdiction cannot be challenged by way of appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. The point is an important one and as it appears not to have been considered in any other previous decision of this Court we deem it necessary to examine the matter carefully.

3. The material portion of clause 15 of the Letters Patent bearing on this point runs as follows:

“And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal from the Judgment (…… not being a sentence or order… made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court…”

4. The whole controversy centres round the point as to whether the order of Edgley, J. was passed in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and if this question is answered in the affirmative obviously this appeal will be incompetent. Mr. Gupta appearing for the appellant has argued before us that the expression “criminal jurisdiction” occurring in cl. 15 of the Letters Patent refers to and means the jurisdiction that is exercised by a Judge of this Court under clauses 22 to 29 of the Letters Patent and as these clauses apparently do not cover a case of inflicting penalty for contempt of Court an appeal is not barred under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. The contention though plausible at first sight does not appear to us to be sound. It is true that the various clauses of the Letters Patent classify the different jurisdictions of this Court under different heads and Clauses 22 to 29 come under that part which is headed as “Criminal Jurisdiction”. Mr. Gupta may be right in his contention that these clauses contemplate what is ordinarily known as criminal trial, and this is clear from the provision of cl. 25 which lays down that there shall be no appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Port William in Bengal:

“from any sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial before the Courts of Original criminal jurisdiction which may be constituted by one or more Judges of the said High Court.”

5. It would be pertinent to point out here that in the Letters Patent as it stood before the amendment of 11-3-1919, the expression used in cl. 15 was “sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial” and not “an order made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction”. As the orders in contempt cases arising out of civil proceedings cannot ordinarily be said to have been made in course of a criminal trial, it was held by Sargent, C.J in 7 Bom. 5 1 that an appeal would lie against an order for attachment for contempt under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent as it then stood. Beaumont, C.J, was apparently not properly informed when in commenting on this decision in a subsequent case reported in 57 Bom. 2862 he observed that the exact wording of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent was overlooked by Sargent, C.J, in the previous case. It is clear, however, that the amendment of the Letters Patent in the year 1919 deliberatley changed the expression, and the expression “criminal jurisdiction” apparently has a wider connotation than a “a criminal trial” as used in cl. 25 of the Letters Patent. If the jurisdiction which the Judge exercises in a contempt matter is criminal jurisdiction it is immaterial in our opinion whether the jurisdiction was derived from the Letters Patent or existed apart from it which was expressly preserved by cl. 38 of the Charter and we do not think that it would be correct to say that an appeal would lie against an order made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction simply because there was no criminal trial in accordance with the provisions of clauses 22 to 29 of the Letters Patent.

6. This leads us to enquire as to whether the order appealed from in the present case is or is not made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.

7. Subject to statutory provisions, if any, all superior Courts of record possess the inherent power of inflicting punishment for acts which amount to contempt of Court. In English law a distinction is made between a contempt which is criminal and one which is not so, and under Section 31 of the Judicature Act of 1925, (which corresponds to Section 47 of the Judicature Act of 1873,) no appeal lies from any judgment of the High Court in any criminal cause or matter. The question has come up for consideration in various cases before the English Courts as to whether the order made in a particular contempt case is an order made in a criminal cause or matter. The mere fact that the proceeding in respect of which the order is made is a civil proceeding certainly does not make it a civil contempt; nor the fact that an order for imprisonment has been made necessarily makes it criminal. The distinction in English law is based on the ground as to whether the words or acts complained of constitute an obstruction of or interference with the administration of justice and hence amount to a public injury, or it merely involves disobedience to judgments, orders or other processes of the Court and hence rank merely as private injuries.

8. An elaborate discussion of these questions will be found in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in England in (1890) 15 P.D 593 and that of the House of Lords in (1913) A.C 417.4 The principles adopted by the English Courts are that a mere disobedience to an order of the Court by a party to a suit or proceeding even if wilful would not make it a crime. It implies-primarily as between the parties to the proceeding a right to exercise or a liability to submit to a form of a civil execution or certain civil processes; though as between the party in default and the State a penal or disciplinary method is to be employed by the Court to enforce compliance with its order. As Cotton, L.J, observed in (1890) 15 P.D 59:

“There are many contempts of Court that are not of a criminal nature; for instance, when a man does not obey an order of the Court made in some civil proceeding, to do or to abstain from doing something—as where an injunction is granted in an action against a defendant, and he does not perform what he is ordered to perform, and then a motion is made to commit him for contempt—that is really only a procedure to get something done in the action, and has nothing of a criminal nature in it.”

9. On the other hand, when the acts complained of involve scandalizing of a Judge or intimidation or corruption of jurors or witnesses in a suit or the prejudicing of the case of any litigant in any pending proceeding such acts must certainly amount to criminal acts. (Vide per Lord Atkinson in 1913 A.C 417 at 455). These are public injuries and the offender aims at tainting the source of justice and obtain a result of a legal proceeding different from that which would follow in the ordinary course.

10. Mr. Gupta has drawn our attention to certain observations of Lord Atkinson in (1913) A.C 417 at p. 456 and he has argued that the distinction between civil and criminal contempt as made in English Courts is an artificial distinction which leads to various anomalies and these artificial rules should not be introduced into our law. The only anomaly pointed out by Lord Atkinson in the case referred to above is that disobedience of an injunction or order of the Court by a party upon whom the order is imposed is held to be a civil contempt in English law, whereas it is regarded as a criminal contempt if the same act is committed by an outsider who was no party to the suit. It may be, as Lord Atkinson points out, that the results are somewhat anomalous. But the distinction is sought to be made expressly on the ground that a person who is not a party to a suit or proceeding and is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court in the suit itself has no right to thwart or obstruct any order which the Court passes in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, and in this sense his acts would amount to obstruction or impeding the course of justice. Be that as it may, we are not certainly bound to follow any decision of the English Courts unless it is in consonance with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience, and we can import the English precedents only in cases where there is a total absence of Indian law on the particular subject. We need not and should not adopt any rule of English law which is based upon any technicality of the English system or seems to us to be artificial in its character. But the broad distinction made in English law between civil and criminal contempt is, in our opinion, not grounded on any technical rule of English law, but on sound juridical principles, and in the absence of any legislative enactment on the point, we do not think that we should hesitate to adopt that. The question whether the order for committal or attachment made in a contempt case has been or has not been made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction would, in our opinion, have to be determined on the ground as to whether the penalty was imposed as a method of enforcing the order or processes of a civil Court or it was a summary punishment for a criminal act which tended to impede or obstruct the course of justice. On this view we have taken, it is clear that the order complained of must be deemed to have been made by the learned Judge in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and consequently an appeal would not lie under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. The view which we are taking receives entire support from the decision of the Bombay High Court in 57 Bom. 286. As I have said above, there is no express decision of our Court on this point. The decision in 25 Cal. 236,5 to which our attention has been drawn by Mr. Gupta, does not at all consider this point and this decision can certainly be supported on the wording of the Letters Patent as it existed at the date when the decision was made.

11. If we could entertain the appeal we would have certainly considered the sentence that has been passed in this case to be very much excessive. On the first day that the plaintiff appeared before Edgley, J., he threw himself unreservedly on the mercy of the Court and tendered unqualified apology through his counsel. There is no clear finding as to what was the nature of the abusive language that was used by the plaintiff. The fine which was imposed upon him, we are told, has already been paid, and as stated above if the appeal was competent we would have no hesitation in setting aside the sentence of imprisonment. As we are powerless to interfere, we can only say that it would be open to the appellant to approach the Provincial Government who in the exercise of their clemency might remit the sentence of imprisonment that has been made in this case. We stay the execution of the sentence for a further period of two months from this date, and the sureties will continue.

12. The appeal is dismissed as incompetent. There will be no order as to costs.

Harries, C.J:— I entirely agree.

13. In English law a distinction has been drawn between contempts of a criminal nature and contempts of a civil nature. Generally, the distinction seems to be that contempts which tend to bring the administration of justice into scorn or which tend to interfere with the due course of justice are criminal in their nature, but that contempts in disregarding orders or judgments of a civil Court or in not doing something ordered to be done in a case are not criminal in their nature.

14. If a contempt is criminal in its nature it is difficult to resist the conclusion that a Judge dealing with such a contempt is exercising criminal jurisdiction. English Courts have now held that a sentence passed in respect of a criminal contempt is a sentence passed in the exercise of a Judge's criminal jurisdiction.

15. Mr. Atul Chandra Gupta argued strenuously that Courts in India should not accept this distinction which has been made in English law. He urged that the distinction was a purely technical one and based on no good reason whatsoever. My learned brother Mukherjea, J., however, has pointed out that the distinction rests on a very firm juridical basis. Mr. Gupta urged that this Court should not make this distinction unless it was satisfied that it was based on equity, justice and good conscience. I agree with my learned brother that the rule of equity, justice and good conscience requires us to make the same distinction in this Court. However, the matter is not open for discussion because I find that in 45 Cal. 1696 this Court drew this very same distinction. At page 240 Mookerjee, J. observed:

“A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the Court. A civil contempt, on the other hand, is failure to do something ordered to be done by a Court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein. Consequently, in the case of a criminal contempt, the proceeding is for punishment of an act committed against the Majesty of the Law, and, as the primary purpose of the punishment is the vindication of the public authority, the proceeding conforms, as nearly as possible, to proceedings in criminal cases. In the case of civil contempt, on the other hand, the proceeding in its initial stages at least, when the purpose is merely to secure compliance with a judicial order made for the benefit of a litigant, may be deemed instituted at the instance of the party interested and thus to possess a civil character.”

16. It will be seen that this Court has approved of the distinction and therefore we must accept and apply the distinction made in English law.

17. It is quite clear that the contempt alleged in this case was of a criminal nature, and I think it is impossible to argue that in dealing with this matter Edgley, J. was exercising no criminal but civil jurisdiction. He was dealing with a matter criminal in its nature, and the judgment he delivered was in my view a judgment delivered in the exercise of his criminal jurisdiction. That being so no appeal can lie by reason of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court.

18. I further agree with my learned brother in the view that he takes of the punishment imposed in this case. The appellant threw himself unreservedly upon the mercy of the Court and proffered an ample and unqualified apology. A fine in my view would have been sufficient; and I agree that this is a case in which the Provincial Government might well exercise their powers of clemency and remit the period of imprisonment.

S.C

19. Appeal dismissed.