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Tml Financial Services Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, a non-banking finance company (defendant in Original Suit No. 233 of 2008 before the Munsiff Court, Hosdurg), provided finance to the respondent (plaintiff) for purchase of a motor vehicle under a loan-cum-hypothecation agreement (Ext. P1). The plaintiff filed Suit No. 233 of 2008 seeking damages of Rs. 50,000 and a declaration that he is not liable to repay outstanding instalments, alleging that the vehicle was illegally seized by the defendant. On appearance the defendant moved Interlocutory Application No. 3475 of 2008 (P4) under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking a stay and reference of the dispute to arbitration on the basis of Clause 23 of Ext. P1. The learned Munsiff heard both sides and dismissed P4 by order dated 17.11.2008 (P5), concluding that Section 8 did not apply. The petitioner challenged P5 by filing the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, seeking reversal of the Munsiff’s order and a reference to arbitration.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit alleging illegal acts (specifically an alleged illegal seizure of a vehicle) is ousted by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — in particular whether statutory interdiction under Section 5 of the Act prevents the civil court from deciding such a suit.
- Whether the dispute presented in the suit (claim for damages and declaration based on alleged illegal seizure) falls within the "matter" covered by the arbitration agreement (Clause 23 of Ext. P1) so as to require reference to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act.
- Whether an arbitration clause can be relied upon to bar a civil suit when one party alleges that the other has committed an act opposed to public policy and per se illegal, and whether the court must examine the factual averments in the plaint in determining its jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner / Defendant
- The petitioner is a finance company that advanced a loan for purchase of the vehicle and holds a hypothecation under the loan-cum-hypothecation agreement (Ext. P1).
- The agreement contains an arbitration clause (Clause 23) providing that "all disputes, differences and/or claims arising out of this loan agreement" shall be referred to arbitration; accordingly, disputes between the parties must be referred to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act.
- The vehicle was seized and later released to the petitioner by the police under a document referred to as P2 kachit; therefore the dispute falls within the arbitration agreement and the civil court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit.
Respondent / Plaintiff
- The plaintiff contended that the claim for damages arises from an illegal seizure of his vehicle and that such a dispute does not fall under the arbitration agreement; Section 8 of the Act therefore has no application.
- The arbitration clause cannot oust the civil court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages where the suit alleges an illegal act and matters opposed to public policy.
- The civil court is competent to examine whether the dispute falls within the arbitration agreement and to decide its own jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
- Reliance was placed on a decision of this court, Vijaya Narayanan v. Prabhakaran (2006 (1) KLT 797), which had been followed by the court below to support non-interference with P5.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vijaya Narayanan v. Prabhakaran, 2006 (1) KLT 797 | Relied upon to support the proposition that the lower court's order (P5) refusing reference to arbitration did not merit interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. | The judgment was noted as relied upon by the respondent and followed by the learned Munsiff; the High Court observed that the Munsiff's finding that Section 8 did not apply in the given facts did not call for interference and approved that finding for the time being. |
| Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya, (2003) 5 SCC 531 (2003 (2) Arb. LR 43 (SC)) | Established that where a suit is in respect of a matter partly within and partly outside an arbitration agreement, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted; the word "matter" in Section 8 contemplates the entire subject-matter of the suit being subject to arbitration. | The Court applied this principle to conclude that the plaintiff's claim for damages arising from an alleged illegal seizure is not "a matter" entirely covered by the arbitration clause; therefore Section 8 did not require reference of the suit to arbitration. |
| Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., AIR 1969 SC 78 | Referenced for parameters settled by the Constitution Bench regarding the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain suits of a civil nature, particularly where public policy or illegal acts are implicated. | The Court invoked the authority to reinforce that even where an agreement provides for arbitration, acts opposed to public policy (such as alleged illegal seizure) permit the injured party to approach the civil court for damages; the civil court's jurisdiction is not ousted automatically by an arbitration clause when illegality/public policy is alleged. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the competing contentions against the statutory scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the pleadings in the plaint. The analysis proceeded along these lines:
- The court explained the scope of Section 8 of the Act: it mandates reference to arbitration where the judicial authority is satisfied that the action before it is the subject-matter of an arbitration agreement, and the party applies for reference not later than when submitting the first statement on the substance of the dispute. The power is mandatory but conditional on the court finding that the matter before it is indeed within the arbitration agreement.
- The court emphasized that Section 8 does not relieve the court of its duty to satisfy itself regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the action is the subject-matter of that agreement; otherwise a reference may cause grave prejudice and offend fundamental justice and the rule of law.
- The court examined Ext. P1 (the loan-cum-hypothecation-cum-guarantee agreement) and, in particular, Clause 23 (the arbitration clause) and Clauses 17 and 18 (which deal with consequences of default and empower the lender, inter alia, to take possession and seize the asset and sell it without court intervention). The court noted that even if the agreement purported to permit seizure without court intervention, an act done illegally or by force is opposed to public policy and cannot be validated by contract.
- Applying Sukanya Holdings, the court observed that the word "matter" in Section 8 contemplates the entire subject-matter of the suit being subject to arbitration. Where the suit includes causes of action outside the arbitration clause (for example, allegations of illegal seizure opposed to public policy), Section 8 does not apply to oust the civil court's jurisdiction for those aspects.
- The court reiterated that the proper inquiry is into the averments made in the plaint: the cause of action and the reliefs sought must be considered in their entirety. A contractual forum-selection or arbitration clause can bind parties only to the extent that the contract's terms are not contrary to public policy.
- The court concluded that allegations of illegal seizure (an act opposed to public policy) give rise to a civil right to seek compensation/damages in the civil court, in addition to any criminal remedies; such a right cannot be denied merely because the parties had agreed to arbitrate disputes arising under their contract.
- Finally, the court clarified that the observations did not express any view on the merits of the plaintiff's case or the defendant's defence; rather, they establish that, on the material before the court at the interlocutory stage, the learned Munsiff was justified in holding that Section 8 did not require reference to arbitration.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
DISMISSED — The writ petition for interference with the Munsiff's order (P5) was dismissed. The High Court approved, for the time being, the Munsiff's conclusion that Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not attracted in the facts of this case.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The direct effect of the decision is that the interlocutory order of the learned Munsiff refusing to refer the dispute to arbitration (P5) stands; the civil suit claiming damages and a declaration will proceed in the civil court for trial to determine the merits, including whether the seizure was lawful or illegal.
- The Court made clear that its observations are provisional and not an adjudication on the merits; if at trial the seizure is found to have been lawful and the dispute is shown to fall entirely within the arbitration clause, the remedies may then be referable to arbitration.
- Because the opinion does not purport to resolve the substantive issues of liability or the lawfulness of the seizure, no broader legal rule or new precedent beyond the application of existing authorities was laid down by the Court in this interlocutory decision.
Note: This summary is confined to the matters and reasoning expressly set out in the provided opinion and does not add factual or legal material beyond the text.
The judgment of the court was delivered by
S.S Satheesachandran, J.:— The writ petition is filed seeking mainly the following relief:
To set aside/reverse the order dated 17.11.2008, passed by the learned court of the Munsiff of Hosdurg in the Interlocutory Application No. 3475 of 2008 in Original Suit No. 233 of 2008, titled as Vinod Kumar v. TML Financial Services Ltd. and may consequently be pleased to allow the application filed by the petitioner under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, thereby referring the matter to arbitration, to be conducted by the arbitrator.
2. Petitioner is the defendant in OS No. 233 of 2008 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Hosdurg, and the respondent, the plaintiff. Suit is one for damages for a sum of Rs. 50,000 and also for a declaration that the plaintiff is not liable to repay the outstanding instalments defaulted on the loan availed from the defendant for the purchase of a vehicle in view of its illegal seizure by the defendant. P3 is copy of the plaintin the above suit. Petitioner/defendant, on appearance, moved an application for stay of the suit contending that the parties are governed by an arbitration agreement, and, therefore, all disputes and differences are to be resolved only by a reference to arbitration. P4 is the copy of that application. Arbitration agreement entered between the parties was also produced with that petition. PI is the copy of that agreement.
3. Respondent/plaintiff filed a counter that the dispute presented before the court for adjudication does not fall under the arbitration agreement and, therefore, Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) has no application to the case. The learned Munsiff, after hearing both sides, upheld the contention raised by the respondent/plaintiff and dismissed P4 petition. P5 is the copy of that order. Propriety and correctness of that order is challenged in the writ petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction vested with this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
4. I heard the learned counsel on both sides. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a non-banking financial company engaged in the business of finance. Since the respondent had defaulted in payment of the instalments due for the financial assistance provided by the petitioner/company to purchase a vehicle in terms of the hire purchase agreement under which the vehicle stood hypothecated to the petitioner/company, with the assistance of the police, the vehicle was seized and later, it was released by the police to the petitioner/company under P2 kachit. The agreement executed by the parties for providing financial assistance to the defendant to purchase the vehicle, copy of which is produced as P1, it is submitted, clearly spells out that the disputes and differences, if any, between them in respect of the loan arrangement have to be resolved by way of arbitration. P3 suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff claiming damages and also for declaration that he is not liable to pay the defaulted instalments of the loan, according to the learned counsel, is not maintainable, and the civil court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute canvassed, as such disputes have to be resolved only by the process of arbitration as provided under the agreement between the parties. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff contended damages are claimed in view of the illegal seizure of the vehicle and that is not a matter falling under dispute or difference as covered by the arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement entered between the parties in respect of the loan arrangement cannot oust the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit for damages and adjudicate the issues involved thereunder when the suit claim is based on seizure of the plaintiffs vehicle illegally, submits the learned counsel. Civil court has competency to go into the question whether the dispute is covered by the agreement containing the arbitration clause and then decide its jurisdiction to entertain the suit, according to the counsel. Reliance is also placed on Vijaya Narayanan v. Prabhakaran, 2006 (1) KLT 797, rendered by this court, which has been followed by the court below as well to contend P5 order passed by the learned Munsiff, in the given facts of the case, does not call for any interference in exercise of the visitorial jurisdiction vested with this court.
5. The question posed for consideration is as between the parties to an agreement containing an arbitration clause whether the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit or proceeding over a dispute, the cause of action of which is stated as based on acts of the other imputed as illegal and opposed to public policy, stands ousted by the statutory interdiction under Section 5 of the Act. In examining that question, the scope and ambit of Sections 5 and 8 of the Act vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a dispute of a civil nature with special emphasis to Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the dispute canvassed for adjudication in the suit in relation to the agreement containing an arbitration clause entered by the parties in the backdrop of the case presented for the reliefs claimed cannot be lost sight of. Specific case imputed by the respondent/plaintiff for the reliefs claimed in the suit is that the vehicle covered by the hire purchase agreement was illegally seized by the petitioner/defendant, and so much so, the defendant company is liable for damages and also that the plaintiff is entitled to get a declaration that he is not liable to repay the defaulted instalments outstanding under the loan. Whatever be the merit of the case canvassed by the plaintiff, which, of course, can be decided only after trial, the question is whether the dispute presented for adjudication before the court falls within a dispute or difference between the parties as amenable to arbitration. Even if the agreement containing the arbitration clause empowers the finance company to seize the vehicle in the event of default in payment of the instalments, it cannot do so illegally as the seizure of the vehicle can be done only under due process of law. If the vehicle had been illegally seized, as alleged, even if the agreement between the parties provides for seizure by whatever means, such seizure cannot be countenanced as it is against public policy. Was there an illegal seizure of the vehicle or not is a matter that requires to be adjudicated upon. The defendant company, of course, has got a case that it got release of the vehicle under P2 kachit from the police. The defence so canvassed can be appreciated only in trial of the case. The arbitration clause in the agreement cannot be put forward as a shield when one of the parties to the agreement commits an act opposed to public policy and per se illegal and causes injury to the other party. In such circumstances, the civil right of the injured party to seek compensation or damages from the wrongdoer over and above initiating appropriate criminal proceedings has to be recognised and given effect to. He cannot be denied that right for the sole reason that he has entered into an agreement with the other party containing an arbitration clause, and so much so, he has to work out his remedies only by way of arbitration. The nature of the act imputed and the cause which requires to be adjudicated cannot be eschewed from consideration in deciding whether Section 8 of the Act has application to the suit or proceeding presented before the court even if the parties had entered into an agreement containing an arbitration clause, and it has some nexus with the dispute presented and the reliefs claimed.
6. Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act reads thus:
“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement—
(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.”
Section 8 referred to above empowers a judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration when an action brought before it is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement. Whereas in the old Act, under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the stay of proceedings was discretionary, the reference of disputes to arbitration in a matter which is subject to an arbitration agreement is mandatory under this section. The old Act for stay of the proceedings by the court mandated the party applying for such stay to satisfy the court not only that he is but also that he was ready and willing to do everything necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration even at the time of commencement of the proceedings. No such burden is now cast upon the party seeking the reference to arbitration in matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement under Section 8 of the Act. However, the section postulates that what can be referred to an arbitrator is only the dispute or matter which the arbitrator is competent or empowered to decide. It must be shown that the matter covered by the action before the court is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement and further, apart from satisfying the condition stated in the provision for a reference of the parties to the arbitration, before making an order of reference the court has to come to a finding that action brought before it is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement and the court cannot on the mere asking of a party refer the parties to arbitration. If the court does not satisfy itself regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement and also that the matter in action brought in the suit or proceedings is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement, a reference under Section 8 of the Act may cause grave prejudice to the party who has approached the court and arbitral proceedings commenced in such cases will result in anathema to fundamental justice and rule of law.
7. Ext. P1 is the agreement entered by the parties in respect of the financial assistance provided by the petitioner/company to the respondent for purchase of the motor vehicle. Clause 23 of the agreement is relied upon as the arbitration clause for reference of the disputes, differences or claims in respect of the transaction to arbitration. Clause 23 of Ext. P1 agreement reads thus:
“All disputes, differences and/or claims arising out of this loan agreement or as to the construction, meaning or effect hereof or as to the rights and liabilities of the parties hereunder shall be settled by arbitration to be held in Mumbai in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be referred to a person to be appointed by the lender. In the event of death, refusal, neglect, inability, or incapacity of the person so appointed to act as an arbitrator, the lender may appoint a new arbitrator. The award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on all parties concerned.”
Ext. P1 is styled as ‘Loan-cum-Hypothecation-cum-Guarantee Agreement’. Clause 17 of Ext. P1 agreement stipulates that in the event of defaults named thereunder the amount due under the loan shall immediately become due and payable irrespective of any other conditions agreed upon. Clause 18 dealing with the consequences of event of default further specifies the entitlement of the lender in such situation “to take possession, seize, recover, appoint a receiver/manager, remove the asset from the place of standing and also be entitled, on such terms as may be deemed fit by the lender without the intervention of the court or authority, to sell the asset by public auction or by private contract“. Even assuming that Ext. P1 agreement containing the arbitration clause executed over the motor vehicle enables the petitioner/company (lender) to seize the vehicle otherwise than in due process of law, if force is resorted to for such seizure, which is the imputation made in the plaint to contend that there was an illegal seizure of the vehicle, it cannot be stated that the dispute between the parties arising thereof is a matter falling within the subject matter of an arbitration agreement. An agreement opposed to public policy cannot give rise to any valid legal action or defence. In this context, it is appropriate and profitable to take note of the observations of the Apex Court in Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya, (2003) 5 SCC 531 : 2003 (2) Arb. LR 43 (SC), wherein it has been held that even in a case where a suit is commenced in respect of a matter which falls partly within the arbitration agreement and partly outside, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted, and the word ‘matter’ in Section 8 of the Act, it is held, contemplates that the entire subject matter of the suit should be subject to arbitration agreement. In the above decision it has been stated thus (para 15, p. 47 of Arb. LR):
“The relevant language used in Section 8 is—”in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement” the court is required to refer the parties to arbitration. Therefore, the suit should be in respect of “a matter” which the parties have agreed to refer and which comes within the ambit of arbitration agreement. Where, however, a suit is commenced—”as to a matter” which lies outside the arbitration agreement and is also between some of the parties who are not parties to the arbitration agreement, there is no question of application of Section 8. The words “a matter” indicate that the entire subject matter of the suit should be subject to arbitration agreement.”
Illegal seizure of the vehicle being the dispute canvassed by the respondent/plaintiff in the suit for adjudication to claim damages it is not “a matter” covered by the arbitration clause under the hypothecation agreement and as such reference to Section 8 of the Act is not called for as it is not a matter required to be referred to arbitration.
8. Any question regarding the ouster of jurisdiction of a civil court must be examined with respect to the scheme of the Act which is pressed into service as ousting the jurisdiction, having due regard and emphasis as to the object and purport which that Act seeks to achieve. It is also well settled that a plea of bar to jurisdiction of a civil court must be considered having regard to the allegations raised in the plaint. The averments in the plaint disclosing the cause of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in their entirety. It is not proper for the court in examining the question of ouster of jurisdiction one way or the other only on the basis of the reliefs claimed de hors the factual basis of the claim raised by the averments made in the plaint. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 unequivocally states that the civil court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits cognizance of which is either expressly or impliedly barred. So much so the averments made in the plaint disclosing the cause of action have to be taken into consideration to determine whether the suit is cognizable by the civil court or not. It is also to be noted that there is a vast difference between inherent lack of jurisdiction on account of the bar under any statute or in view of the agreement by the parties binding themselves to have their disputes decided by arbitration. It is open to the parties to agree beforehand as to how the disputes or differences arising between them have to be resolved, either by court or through arbitration or conciliation. However, it has to be noted that the terms of any contract between them as to the forum for determination or adjudication of their disputes, whether it be the regular court or the arbitral tribunal as under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act can bind them only where the terms of the contract are not against the public policy. The hypothecation agreement over the vehicle for which finance was advanced by the petitioner/finance company to the respondent/plaintiff provides for arbitration in the event of disputes or differences between them and seizure of the hypothecated vehicle in the event of default in payment of the instalments by the finance company cannot oust the jurisdiction of the civil court where a claim for damages is canvassed for seizure of the vehicle illegally. Even if seizure is permitted under the terms of the agreement, it can be done only lawfully and not otherwise. Illegal seizure of the vehicle, which is opposed to public policy, over and above giving rise to criminal proceedings against the offender will also enable the injured party to approach the civil court for damages and the civil court can entertain a civil suit subject to the well defined parameters settled by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P, AIR 1969 SC 78.
9. Observations made in the judgment, I make it clear, are not to be construed as any expression on the merit of the case of the plaintiff or of the defence set up by the defendant company, but, only that in a case of this nature where the suit claim is based on an act by the opposite party which is stated to be against public policy and thus illegal, existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties which has some nexus with the dispute presented before the court will not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court inviting an order for referring the parties to the suit under Section 8 of the Act. The finding entered by the learned Munsiff that Section 8 of the Act is not attracted in the suit, in the given facts of the case, has only to be approved, for the time being, subject to the final decision in the suit after trial. The question of seizure of the vehicle, if it was done legally by the finance company, and if it is so proved in trial of the suit, needless to point out, may give rise to the conclusion that any dispute relating thereto could be canvassed only by reference to arbitration. However, if it was an illegal seizure irrespective of the arbitration agreement between the parties, the dispute thereof requires to be adjudicated in the suit by the court. That being so, at this stage, learned Munsiff was fully justified in concluding that Section 8 of the Act, in the given facts of the case, cannot be canvassed by the defendant company to resist the suit claim and an adjudication of the disputes thereunder by the civil court.
10. Writ petition lacks merit, and it is dismissed.
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