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Choice School v. Salim

Kerala High Court
Nov 20, 2007
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent (plaintiff in the original suit) filed O.S. No. 1348 of 2003 in the Court of the I Additional Munsiff of Ernakulam seeking a declaration that his termination by the first defendant School (letter dated 23.6.2003) was void and illegal, reinstatement as Music Teacher on the same salary and conditions, a mandatory injunction directing reinstatement, and damages of Rs. 9,000 per month from the date of suit until reinstatement.

The Trial Court partly decreed the suit by judgment and decree dated 31.1.2004: it held the suit maintainable, concluded that the defendants had complied with R.29(2) of the Affiliation Bye-laws but were adopting an unhealthy practice in terminating the plaintiff, and granted a mandatory injunction that if the defendants wanted to fill the Music Teacher post the plaintiff shall be appointed. The Trial Court rejected the prayers for declaration and damages.

The plaintiff appealed by filing A.S. No. 200 of 2004. Subsequent to the trial court judgment but before final appellate disposal, the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) — before which the plaintiff had a pending representation complaining of his termination (a fact not disclosed in the plaint or at trial) — passed an order dated 23.2.2004 in favour of the plaintiff, holding his termination bad, illegal and arbitrary, declaring the termination null and void and directing the management to follow the Affiliation Bye-laws.

After the CBSE order, the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 3566 of 2004 in A.S. No. 200 of 2004 seeking permission to withdraw the suit (expressed as "withdrawal" but effectively seeking abandonment). The defendants/respondents in the appeal objected. The Appellate Court allowed the application (the order impugned in this Civil Revision Petition). The present opinion arises from the Civil Revision Petition challenging that order. The revising court modified the order of the lower court by allowing abandonment only on the condition that the plaintiff pay Rs. 5,000 as costs to the defendants on or before 15.1.2008, failing which the Civil Revision Petition will be dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, at the appellate stage, a plaintiff/appellant may be permitted to withdraw or abandon a suit with liberty to file a fresh suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) C.P.C., particularly where the trial court has rendered findings and granted a mandatory injunction.
  2. Whether permission to withdraw/abandon should be refused where such withdrawal would nullify rights already vested in the defendant(s) as a consequence of the trial court's decree or where defendants would be prejudiced.
  3. Whether suppression by the plaintiff of the pendency of proceedings before the appropriate authority (here, the CBSE) bears upon the propriety and terms on which permission to withdraw/abandon should be granted.
  4. Whether the civil court could and did have jurisdiction to grant reinstatement as a remedy for termination of personal service, and how that interacts with the remedy before the CBSE.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Defendants') Arguments

  • The court below (Appellate Court) was not justified in permitting the suit to be withdrawn because rights have already accrued in favour of the defendants by reason of the trial court's findings and orders.
  • The plaintiff did not approach the court with clean hands and suppressed material facts (specifically, the pendency of the representation before the CBSE); therefore he cannot be permitted to withdraw the suit and thereby negate adverse findings of the trial court.
  • The petitioner relied on authority including K.S. Bhoopathy v. Kokila and Neelakanta Pillai v. Madhava Kurup to support these contentions.
  • The petitioner also pointed out that a petition for review against the CBSE order had been filed by the petitioner on 23.3.2004 and that review petition was pending.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The proper authority to decide reinstatement and validity of termination is the Central Board of Secondary Education, and the respondent had approached that authority and obtained relief.
  • The civil court had limited jurisdiction to order specific enforcement of a contract for personal service; therefore some reliefs claimed by the plaintiff (such as reinstatement) were outside the remit of the civil court.
  • There were formal defects in the suit and/or sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to withdraw or abandon the civil proceedings and pursue the remedy before the CBSE.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.S. Bhoopathy v. Kokila ((2000) 5 SCC 458 : AIR 2000 SC 2132) The Supreme Court laid down principles regarding withdrawal from suit with permission to institute a fresh suit under O. XXIII R.1(3), emphasizing that the grant of leave is discretionary and must be exercised with caution and circumspection; appellate-stage withdrawal requires careful consideration of all relevant aspects. The opinion relied on K.S. Bhoopathy to underscore that the appellate/second appellate court must apply its mind strictly to conditions in O. XXIII R.1(3) and consider the desirability of permitting a party to start afresh, given the potential to nullify adjudications below.
Neelakanta Pillai v. Madhava Kurup (2007 (2) KLT 340) The case was cited by petitioner counsel; the opinion records reliance but does not elaborate a specific principle from this case in the text. The opinion notes that the petitioner relied on this decision; no further elaboration of how its principle was applied appears in the opinion.
Amminikutty v. George Abraham (1987 (1) KLT 574) Used to support the proposition that Order XXIII Rule 1 applies to appeals as well (i.e., withdrawal/abandonment at the appellate stage requires consideration and permission). Cited to show courts have taken the view that R.1 applies to appeals, reinforcing that permission to withdraw at appellate stage is required when the appellant seeks to efface the judgment and decree below.
Hulas Rani Baij Nath v. Firm K.B. Bass and Co. (AIR 1968 SC 111) Explains that sub-rule (1) of O.XXIII R.1 gives an unqualified right to withdraw under certain circumstances; if no permission to file fresh suit is sought under sub-r(3), the plaintiff is liable for costs and precluded from instituting fresh suit. Cited to show that the Code does not require the Court to refuse permission to withdraw in certain circumstances and to explain consequences (costs and preclusion) where withdrawal is effected without permission to institute a fresh suit.
Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1987) 1 SCC 5 : AIR 1987 SC 88 Considers distinction between 'abandonment' and 'withdrawal' under sub-rr.(1) and (3) of O.XXIII R.1 and articulates the principle that once a suit is instituted a fresh suit on same subject-matter is not normally permitted after abandonment without satisfying sub-r(3). Used to explain the foundational distinction between abandonment and withdrawal with leave, and to support the principle that permission to institute a fresh suit is required to prevent abuse of process and repeated litigation.
R. Ramamurthi Aiyar (dead) by LRs. v. Raja V. Rajeswararao ((1972) 2 SCC 721 : AIR 1973 SC 643) Holds that if a vested right comes into existence before the prayer for withdrawal, the Court is not bound to allow withdrawal; example given under Partition Act where rights accrue on application to buy share at valuation. Cited to demonstrate that withdrawal may be refused where defendants have acquired a legally cognizable advantage or vested right prior to the application for withdrawal.
The Executive Officer, Arthanareswarar Temple v. R. Sathyamoorthy ((1999) 3 SCC 115 : AIR 1999 SC 958) Surveys High Court decisions and holds that withdrawal at appellate stage may be permitted where withdrawal will not nullify adjudications in favour of defendant; if such adjudications would be nullified, permission should not be granted. Cited to summarize High Court views and to support the proposition that withdrawal at appellate stage must not nullify final adjudications in favour of defendants unless no prejudice results.
R. Rathinavel Chettiar v. V. Sivaraman ((1999) 4 SCC 89) Holds that where a decree passed by the trial court is challenged in appeal, the plaintiff cannot withdraw so as to destroy that decree and the vested rights under it unless very strong reasons are shown that withdrawal would not affect vested rights. Cited to affirm that withdrawal which would destroy vested rights under a decree is not permissible except on strong grounds; applied in assessing whether defendants had vested rights here.
Thakur Balaram Singh v. K. Achuta Rao (High Court citation referenced in text) Referenced among High Court decisions dealing with O.XXIII R.1 applications at appellate stage; used as an example of jurisprudence on withdrawal where trial findings might be nullified. Listed with other High Court authorities in the opinion's discussion; the opinion does not detail a distinct rule drawn solely from this case.
Kedar Nath v. Chandra Karan (AIR 1962 All 263) Referenced among High Court decisions cited in the Executive Officer decision's survey relating to withdrawal at appellate stage. Included in the set of illustrative High Court authorities; the opinion does not separately analyze its specific principle beyond that grouping.
V. Dube v. Harcharan (AIR 1971 All. 41) Referenced as one of the High Court decisions considered in Executive Officer; part of the jurisprudential context on withdrawal/abandonment at appellate stage. Referenced among other High Court cases; no unique application beyond being part of the jurisprudential background cited by the court.
Charles Samuel v. Board of Trustees (1978) 2 Mad LJ 243 Referenced among High Court authorities dealing with O.XXIII R.1 and withdrawal/abandonment at appellate stage. Included as an illustrative authority in the court's survey of High Court decisions; the opinion does not separately extract a unique rule from it.
Lala Chetram v. Krishnamoni ((1984) 1 Mad. LJ 28) Referenced among High Court authorities in the Executive Officer survey on applications under O.XXIII R.1. Listed as part of the High Court jurisprudence considered; no distinct application in the opinion beyond that group citation.
Jubedan Begum v. Sekhawat Ali Khan (AIR 1984 Punj. & Har. 221) Referenced among High Court decisions cited in the Executive Officer analysis on withdrawal/abandonment. Identified as part of illustrative High Court authorities; no separate analysis in the opinion beyond noting the case as cited in Executive Officer.
Ram Dhan v. Jagat Prasad (AIR 1982 Raj. 235) Referenced among High Court decisions dealing with O.XXIII R.1 in the Executive Officer decision's survey. Included in the group of High Court authorities cited; not separately discussed in detail in this opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by setting out the statutory framework: Order XXIII Rule 1 C.P.C. which permits a plaintiff to withdraw or abandon a suit and provides conditions under sub-rule (3) for withdrawal with permission to institute a fresh suit where either (a) a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) there are sufficient grounds for allowing a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter.

The opinion explains the distinction between abandonment (complete relinquishment of the right to prosecute the suit) and withdrawal with permission to institute a fresh suit. For abandonment at the trial stage, express permission of the court is not always necessary; but withdrawal with liberty to institute a fresh suit requires the court's satisfaction of the sub-rule (3) conditions and is discretionary. The court also noted judicial authorities treating the rule as applicable to appeals and appellate-stage applications for leave to withdraw (citing Amminikutty and K.S. Bhoopathy).

The revising court applied the authorities to the facts. It found that the trial court had not rendered a final and conclusive adjudication vesting rights in the defendants: although the Trial Court held the defendants complied with R.29 of the Affiliation Bye-laws, it also found an "unhealthy practice" by the defendants in effecting termination and granted a mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiff (i.e., not a dismissal that conclusively vindicated the defendants). Moreover, the plaintiff had obtained substantive relief from the CBSE (order dated 23.2.2004 holding the termination null and void and directing compliance with Bye-laws).

The court therefore concluded that abandonment/withdrawal at the appellate stage would not prejudice vested rights of the defendants in the circumstances because the CBSE had already granted relief to the plaintiff; the defendants' contentions before the CBSE had not prevailed. The court observed, however, that although the plaintiff's application used the term "withdrawal," the actual relief sought by the plaintiff was abandonment (he did not seek leave to institute a fresh suit).

Nonetheless, the court was concerned that the plaintiff had suppressed the pendency of the representation before the CBSE throughout trial and appeal. That suppression meant the plaintiff had not approached the civil court with full candor and had an alternative effective remedy (the CBSE) which he had pursued. Because of the suppression and the fact that the defendants were put to contest the matter in civil courts, the revising court concluded it would be proper to allow abandonment only upon the imposition of terms.

Consequently, the court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to modify the lower court's order by imposing a condition: payment of Rs. 5,000 as costs by the plaintiff to the defendants on or before 15.1.2008; failure to pay would result in dismissal of the Civil Revision Petition (i.e., the modification effectively conditions the abandonment on payment of costs).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision Petition was PARTLY ALLOWED. The revising court upheld the Appellate Court's grant of permission to abandon/withdraw the suit but modified that grant by imposing a condition that the plaintiff pay Rs. 5,000 as costs to the defendants on or before 15.1.2008; failure to pay would result in dismissal of the Civil Revision Petition.

Implications:

  • The plaintiff is permitted to abandon the civil proceedings (the I.A. seeking withdrawal/abandonment is effectively allowed) but only on the condition of payment of costs of Rs. 5,000 by 15.1.2008.
  • If the plaintiff does not satisfy the conditional requirement (payment by the specified date), the Civil Revision Petition will be dismissed (i.e., the modification will not be effective and the challenge to the Appellate Court's order will fail).
  • The court found no conclusive vesting of rights in the defendants arising from the trial court judgment that would prevent abandonment in these facts; the CBSE's independent order in favour of the plaintiff meant that abandonment would not prejudice defendants' vested rights. The requirement of an adequate term (costs) was imposed because of the plaintiff's non-disclosure of the CBSE proceedings.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new, novel precedent; rather it applies established principles from Order XXIII Rule 1 and relevant Supreme Court and High Court authorities, balancing the discretionary power to permit withdrawal against the equities arising from suppression of material facts and the interests of the defendants.

Note: This summary is confined to the content and reasoning expressly contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond the text of the opinion has been included.

Show all summary ...

1. The respondent in this Civil Revision Petition filed O.S No. 1348 of 2003, on the file of the Court of the I Additional Munsiff of Ernakulam, for a declaration that the termination of the plaintiff from service in the first defendant School, as per letter dated 23.6.2003, is void and illegal and that the plaintiff is entitled to continue in the first defendant School as a Music Teacher on the same salary and service conditions which he was enjoying at the time of his termination, till the plaintiff's service is lawfully terminated in accordance with the Bye-laws made by the Central Board of Secondary Education. There was also a prayer for mandatory injunction, directing the defendants to reinstate the plaintiff in service as Music Teacher and to recover a sum of Rs. 9,000/- per month as damages from the defendants from thedate of suit-till the plaintiff is reinstated in service.

2. The Trial Court decreed the suit in part as per the judgment and decree, dated 31.1.2004 The defendants had raised a contention that the suit was not maintainable. The trial court held under issue No. 1 that the suit is maintainable. On the merits of the case, the trial court held that as per R. 29(2) of the Affiliation Bye-laws, the defendants are entitled to terminate the service of the plaintiff as per Ext.A 2 termination order. All the requirements under R. 29 were complied with. After analysing the evidence, the trial Court held that the defendants were adopting an unhealthy practice to cause termination of the services of the plaintiff. However, the trial court held that the defendants had not appointed any new teaching staff in the music department. A mandatory injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff, directing the defendants that if the defendants wanted to fill up the post of Music Teacher, the plaintiff shall be appointed in the first defendant School. The prayer for declaration and damages were rejected by the trial court. Challenging the judgment and decree of the trial court, the plaintiff filed A.S No. 200 of 2004, on the file of the Court of the V Additional District Judge, Ernakulam.

3. When the suit was filed, a representation submitted by the plaintiff before the Central Board of Secondary-Education complaining about his illegal termination from service was pending. But the plaintiff did not mention the same in the plaint. Even at the time of evidence, the pendency of the matter before the Central Board of Secondary Education was not brought to the notice of the civil court. After disposal of the suit on 31.1.2004, the Central Board of Secondary Education passed an order, dated 23.2.2004, in favour of the plaintiff Teacher, after finding that, his termination from service was bad, illegal and arbitrary. The Central Board of Secondary Education also held that the order of termination is null and void. The management of the School was directed to follow the provisions of the Affiliation Bye-laws in letter and spirit.

4. After the order was passed by the Central Board of Secondary Education, the plaintiff filed I.A No. 3566 of 2004 in A.S No. 200 of 2004, seeking permission to withdraw the suit. The prayer was objected to by the defendants, who were respondents in the appeal. The court below allowed the application by the order impugned in this Revision.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the court below was not justified in permitting the suit to be withdrawn as rights have already accrued in favour of the defendants in the suit. The counsel submits that the plaintiff having not approached the court with clean hands and having suppressed material facts, he cannot be permitted to withdraw the suit and get rid off the findings rendered by the trial court against him.- The counsel relied on the decisions in K.S Bhoopathy v. Kokila ((2000) 5 SCC 458 : AIR 2000 SC 2132) and in Neelakanta Pillai v. Madhava Kurup (2007 (2) KLT 340). The counsel for the petitioner also submits that against the order passed by the Central Board of Secondary Education, the revision petitioner has filed a petition for review on 23.3.2004 and the review petition is pending.

6. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the proper authority to decide the question of reinstatement and the validity or otherwise of the order of termination from service is the Central Board of Secondary Education and the respondent had approached that authority. He also submitted that the respondent approached the civil court with several prayers including a prayer for declaration that the termination of his service was iljegal and also for realisation of damages. He submitted that the civil court had no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement of the plaintiff in service, as a contract for personal service could not be specifically enforced by the civil court. The submission is that there was a formal defect in the suit and that the suit must fail by reason of such formal defect. It is also submitted that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit.

7. O. XXIII R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim. R. 1 reads as follows:

“1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim:— (1) At any time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim:

Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other person to whom the provisions contained in Rr. 1 to 14 of O. XXXII extend, neither the suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the Court.

(2) An application for leave under the proviso to sub-r.(1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend and also, if the minor or such other person is represented by a pleader, by a certificate of the pleader to the effect that the abandonment proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor or such other person.

(3) Where the Court is satisfied,—

(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or

(b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim.

(4) Where the plaintiff

(a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-r.(1), or

(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-r-O).

he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim.

(5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorise the Court to permit one of several plaintiffs to abandon a suit or part of a claim under sub-r.(1), or to withdraw, under sub-r.(3), any suit or part of a claim, without the consent of the other plaintiffs.”

8. As per sub-r.(1) of R. 1, the plaintiff may abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim. Sub-r.(3) of R. 1 provides for granting permission to the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of such suit or part of the claim: In order to attract sub-r.(3), either of the following two ingredients must be satisfied, (i) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect; or (ii) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject matter of the suit or part of the claim. If any of these conditions are satisfied, the court may grant permission to the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit. R. 2 to 0. XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in any fresh suit instituted on permission granted under R. 1, the plaintiff shall be bound by the law of limitation in the same manner as if the first suit had not been instituted.

9. R. 1 of O. XXIII postulates abandonment of suit as well as withdrawal of the suit with permission of the Court to institute a fresh suit. For abandoning a suit, the Rule does not contemplate that permission of the Court is necessary. If a suit is to be abandoned as provided in sub-r.(1) of R. 1 of O. XXIII, there is no question of granting permission to institute a fresh suit. Abandonment is the complete relinquishment of the right of the plaintiff to continue to prosecute the suit. When the plaintiff does not wish to prosecute the suit, he is free to abandon the suit. In such cases, the Court cannot grant permission to institute a fresh suit. On the other hand, if the court is satisfied that any of the two ingredients of the sub-r.(3) of R. 1 is attracted and the plaintiff wants to withdraw from the suit, the court may grant permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of the suit. For abandoning the suit, the plaintiff need not establish the ingredients as provided in sub-r.(3).

10. For abandoning a suit at the trial stage, permission of the court may not be necessary, since sub-r.(1) of 0. XXIII R. 1 does not insist on any such permission to be granted. But when it comes to the question of withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit, permission of the court is absolutely necessary. An appeal being a continuation of the suit, Courts have taken the view that R. 1 of 0. XXIII applies to appeals as well. (See Amminikutty v. George Abraham (1987 (1) KLT 574)). The question is when a defeated plaintiff, who has filed an appeal, wants to abandon the suit, should he get the permission of the Appellate Court to do so. The appellant/plaintiff in such case could very well abandon his appeal by not prosecuting the appeal, for which permission of the Court is not necessary. The result would be dismissal of the appeal and the consequence thereof would be confirmation of the decree passed by the trial court. But if the appellant/plaintiff wants to efface the judgment and decree rendered by the trial court by abandoning the suit at the appellate stage, I do not think that any such right is vested in the plaintiff/appellant. Necessarily, he has to apply for leave of the Court to abandon the suit at the appellate stage. Though sub-r.(1) of R. 1 O. XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure does not speak of any permission being granted for abandoning the suit, it is to be noted that that is with reference to abandonment of the suit at the trial stage.

11. In K.S Bhoopathy's case ((2000) 5 SCC 458 : AIR 2000 SC 2132), the Supreme Court laid down the principles with regard to the withdrawal from suit with permission to institute a fresh suit and held that the grant of leave envisaged in sub-r.(3) of 0. XXIII R. 1 is at the discretion of the Court and that the discretion is to be exercised by the Court with caution and circumspection. Seeking permission to withdraw from the suit at the appellate stage was considered by the Supreme Court in K.S Bhoopathy'stase and it was held thus:

“… The court is to discharge the duty mandated under the provision of the Code on taking into consideration all relevant aspects of the matter including the desirability of permitting the party to start a fresh round of litigation on the same cause of action. This becomes all the more important in a case where the application under O. XXIII R. 1 is filed by the plaintiff at the stage of appeal. Grant of leave in such a case would result in the unsuccessful plaintiff to avoid the decree or decrees against him and seek a fresh adjudication of the controversy on a clean slate. It may also result in the contesting defendant losing the advantage of adjudication of the dispute by the court or courts below. Grant of permission for withdrawal of a suit with leave to file a fresh suit may also result in annulment of a right vested in the defendant or even a third party. The appellate/second appellate court should apply its mind to the case with a view to ensure strict compliancy with the conditions prescribed in O. XXIII R. 1 (3) C.P.C for exercise of the discretionary power in permitting the withdrawal of the suit with leave to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Yet another reason in support of this view is that withdrawal of a suit at the appellate/second appellate stage results in wastage of public time of courts which is of considerable importance in the present time, in view of large accumulation of cases in lower courts and inordinate delay in disposal of the cases.”

12. In Hulas Rani Baij Nath v. Firm K.B Bass and Co. (AIR 1968 SC 111), the Supreme Court considered the question whether the plaintiff could withdraw from the suit when issues had been framed and some evidence had been recorded, but no preliminary decree for rendition of accounts had yet been passed. It was held as follows:

“…The language of 0.23, R. 1, sub-r.(1), C.P.C gives an unqualified right to a plaintiff to withdraw from a suit and if no permission to file a fresh suit is sought under sub-r.(2) of that Rule, the plaintiff becomes liable for such costs as the Court may award and becomes precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of that subject-matter under sub-R.(3) of that Rule. There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure which requires the Court to refuse permission to withdraw the suit in such circumstances and to compel the plaintiff to proceed, with. it. It is, of course, possible that different considerations may arise where a set-off may have been claimed under 0.8, C.P.C or a counter-claim may have been filed, if permissible by the procedural law applicable to the proceedings governing the suit….”

13. In Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior (1987 (1) KLT SN 6 (C. No. 11) SC : (1987) 1 SCC 5 : AIR 1987 SC 88), the Supreme Court considered the distinction between abandonment and withdrawal under sub-rr. (1) and (3) of 0. XXIII R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To quote:

“7. The Code as it now stands thus makes a distinction between ‘abandonment’ of a suit and ‘withdrawal’ from a suit with permission to file a fresh suit. It provides that where the plaintiff abandons a suit or withdraws from a suit without the permission referred to in sub-r.(3) of R. 1 of O. XXIII of the Code, he shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. The principle underlying R. 1 of O. XXIII of the Code is that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a Court and thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing it without the permission of the Court to file fresh suit. Invito beneficium non datur. The law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will lose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason, the Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-r.(3) of R. 1 of O. XXIII”

14. In R. Ramamurthi Aiyar (dead) by LRs. v. Raja V. Rajeswararao ((1972) 2 SCC 721 : AIR 1973 SC 643), the plaintiff sought withdrawal of the suit after the defendant filed an application under S. 3 of the Partition Act. It was held that if any vested right comes into existence before the prayer for withdrawal is made, the court is not bound to allow withdrawal. It was noticed that this could happen only in very limited circumstances. As soon as a shareholder applies for leave to buy at a valuation the share of the party asking for a sale under the provisions of the Partition Act, it was held that he obtains an advantage and the Court is bound thereafter to order a valuation and offer to sell the same to such shareholder at the valuation so made. If the plaintiff is allowed to withdraw the suit after the defendant has gained or acquired the advantage or the privilege of buying the share of the plaintiff in accordance with the provisions of S. 3(1) of the Partition Act, it would enable the plaintiff to defeat the purpose of S. 3(1) of the Partition Act and also to deprive the defendant of the option or privilege available to him.

15. In The Executive Officer, Arthanareswarar Temple v. R. Sathyamoorthy ((1999) 3 SCC 115 : AIR 1999 SC 958), the Supreme Court noticed various decisions of the High Courts and held that:

“14. It is true that in a large number of cases decided by the High Courts, it was held while dealing with applications under 0.23, R. 1, C.P.C, that if an appeal was preferred by an unsuccessful plaintiff against the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing the suit and if the plaintiff appellant wanted to withdraw not only the appeal but also the suit unconditionally, then such a permission so far as the withdrawal of the suit was concerned, can be granted if there was no question of any adjudication on merits in favour of the defendants by the trial being nullified by such withdrawal. On the other hand, if any such findings by the Trial Court in favour of the defendant would get nullified, such permission for withdrawal of the suit should not be granted. (See Thakur Balaram Singh v. K. Achuta Rao, (1977) 2 APU (HC) 111); Kedar Nath v. Chandra Karan (AIR 1962 All 263); V. Dube v. Harcharan (AIR 1971 All. 41); Charles Samuel v. Board of Trustees ((1978) 2 Mad LJ 243), Lala Chetram v. Krishnamoni, ((1984) 1 Mad. LJ 28); Jubedan Begum v. Sekhawat Ali Khan (AIR 1984 Punj. & Har. 221); Ram Dhan v. Jagat Prasad (AIR 1982 Raj. 235)…”

16. In R. Rathinavel Chettiar v. V. Sivaraman ((1999) 4 SCC 89), the question considered was whether permission could be granted for withdrawal of the suit at the appellate stage, which would have the effect of destroying or nullifying the decree affecting thereby the rights of parties which came to be vested under the decree. It was held that:

“22. In view of the above discussion, it comes out that where a decree passed by the trial court is challenged in ‘appeal, it would not be open to the plaintiff, at that stage, to withdraw the suit so as to destroy that decree. The rights which have come to be vested in the parties to the suit under the decree cannot be taken away by withdrawal of the suit at that stage unless very strong reasons are shown that the withdrawal would not affect or prejudice anybody's vested rights…”

17. In the present case, it cannot be said that the defendants have acquired any vested right by the dismissal of the suit. The trial court had held that R. 29(2) of the Affiliation Bye laws were complied with by the defendants. At the same time, the trial court had also held that the defendants adopted an unhealthy practice in terminating the services of the plaintiff. Thexelevant conclusions read as follows:

“… On analysing the entire evidence on record even though defendants complied with all requirements contemplated under R. 29 of Affiliation Bye-laws issued by CBSE, the defendants are adopting unhealthy practice to cause the termination of the plaintiff from defendants school. It has come out in evidence that this is an unprincipled method adopted, by the defendants…”

18. The Trial Court had also granted a mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiff. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that a vested right accrued to the defendants and that there was a final and conclusive adjudication of all the disputes arising between the parties in respect of the termination of the services of the plaintiff, As rightly noticed by the court below in the impugned order, the question of reinstatement was outside the purview of suit and the appropriate authority was the Central Board of Secondary Education. The plaintiff having approached the Central Board of Secondary Education and the Board having passed an order in his favour, it cannot be said that abandonment of the suit at the appellate stage would cause any prejudice to the defendants. The contentions raised by the defendants before the Board on the basis of the civil court's judgment did not yield positive results and in spite of the findings rendered by the civil court, the Board granted relief to the plaintiff. I am of the view that granting permission to abandon the suit at the appellate stage would not cause prejudice to the defendants and would not affect any of their vested rights.

19. In the present case, though the plaintiff used the expression “withdrawal from the suit” in the application filed by him, he has not sought for permission of the Court to institute another case. On the other hand, a reading of the application would make it clear that he is not inviting any decision from the civil court and that he is satisfied with the remedy before the Central Board of Secondary Education. Though the word “withdrawal” is used in the application, the actual relief sought for is abandonment of the suit. The lower appellate court has also adverted to this aspect and has stated in the order that the withdrawal sought for is without seeking leave of the Court to file a fresh suit.

20. The lower appellate court exercised the discretion in favour of the plaintiff and granted the relief sought for in I.A No. 3566 of 2004. The court below has considered the relevant aspects and thought it fit to grant permission to the plaintiff to abandon the suit though the court below has used the expression “withdrawal from the suit”.

21. I would not have interfered with the discretion exercised by the court below for granting permission to abandon the suit without imposing any condition, but for the fact that the plaintiff all throughout the proceedings in the trial court did not disclose the true facts before Court. Pendency of the application before the Central Board of Secondary Education was suppressed by the plaintiff. He was fully aware that his real remedy lies not before the civil court, but before the Board. Had he disclosed the pendency of the matter before the Board and sought for certain other reliefs, which could not be granted by the Board, but only by the Civil Court, the position would have been different. The trial court has not granted the main reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff but has granted only a mandatory injunction as indicated in para. 2 above. The Court could grant the mandatory injunction only when there was no effective alternative remedy. Evidently, the plaintiff had an alternative remedy and he had availed that remedy. Certainly, he should have disclosed that fact before the civil court. But, he did not do so. Therefore, I am of the view that permission to abandon the suit could be granted in this case only on heavy terms. The defendants were compelled to contest the matter before the trial court and for quite some time before the Appellate Court. They must be adequately compensated. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the plaintiff can be granted permission to abandon the suit only on payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as costs to the respondents/defendants on or before 15.1.2008 If the plaintiff fails to pay the costs before the aforesaid, date, the Civil Revision Petition will stand dismissed. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is partly allowed, the order impugned is modified by imposing a condition for allowing I.A No. 3566 of 2004 that the respondent/plaintiff shall pay to the petitioners/defendants a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as costs, on or before 15.1.2008